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Foreword



Decentralization has been taking place worldwide for more than a decade. It has been a 
particularly important phenomenon in the countries of central and eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union as they implemented dramatic shifts in economic paradigms. 
Now more than ten years of experience enables us to assess how countries have managed 
decentralization in the context of economic and political transition. 
Intergovernmental Finance in Hungary provides an in-depth examination of how 
these processes evolved, from the perspective of the national and international experts 
who helped design the key elements of Hungary’s new intergovernmental ﬁ nance system. 
Most of their policy proposals have either been successfully implemented or integrated 
into plans for a second generation of reform. Although ten years is a relatively short time 
frame in such an historic transformation, the country’s early and sustained modernization 
justiﬁ es a comprehensive analysis of reform implementation as well as an assessment of 
their outcomes and impacts. 
Th e book is made up of conceptual essays and detailed case studies on diﬀ erent aspects 
of intergovernmental ﬁ nance and municipal management prepared for the World Bank 
Institute’s learning program on decentralization. Twenty-eight studies—highlighting 
successes, shortcomings, and failures–capture experiences that are highly relevant for 
many developing countries. Th is volume will be of interest to government practitioners, 
students, trainees, and academics, serving as a kind of handbook on the process of ﬁ scal 
decentralization. 
Frannie A. Léautier
Vice President
World Bank Institute
xix
Preface



Sometimes controversial and often questioned, ﬁ scal decentralization has been a mainstream 
paradigm and movement in the last decades in developing countries. Modernization of 
the public sector, reform of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations, enhancement of capacity 
in implementing local strategies, and development of the legislative and institutional 
framework for eﬃ  cient delivery of public services are still among the biggest challenges in 
transition economies. Even relatively advanced countries are faced with serious challenges 
in creating a modern subnational system at the beginning of the 21st century.
Th is book illustrates the decade-long transformation of the Hungarian subnational 
system with a focus on subnational ﬁ nance. It shows the rocky path of transition from 
central command to decentralized local self-governments. Hungary has decentralized and 
refurbished the state administration, reestablished full autonomy of local governments, 
and tightened budget constraints. Th e public and private sectors are bound to each other 
in public utility supply, and civic organizations are also undertaking a growing role in 
providing social services. Th is book summarizes what worked well and what did not and 
why, and then shows the challenges the country faces on entering the European Union. 
Th e present local government system reﬂ ects the euphoria of reestablishing democracy 
in the transition to a market economy through a strong belief in ﬁ scal decentralization and 
openness towards the private provision of public services. Th is approach recognizes the right 
of individual communities of whatever size to retain a separate identity and a representative 
body, but it puts increasing pressure on them to share an administrative apparatus and run 
services jointly. Although the process is still incomplete and the results are not perfect, 
Hungary’s transition and its innovative and adaptive local governments have proven the 
merits of ﬁ scal decentralization.
Th e book builds upon dozens of policy analyses prepared by local and international 
specialists. Th e studies have provided a broad range of evidence of a steady learning process 
against the background of a deep economic recession and an inevitable ﬁ scal squeeze in the 
midst of the 1990s. Hungary not only was a pioneer reformer but it moved far ahead of 
other transition economies in devolving central functions to the local level; and in developing 
an adequate legal and regulatory framework for a deeply decentralized system. Local 
governments have gained their ﬁ rst experiences of asset and ﬁ nancial management, strategic 
xx
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planning, outsourcing, municipal enterprises, public–private partnership, project preparation 
and implementation. In addition, they adopted the principle of cost-recovery service fees and 
tested target subsidization of the poorest social groups.
One can conclude that the ﬁ rst “bachelor” phase of intergovernmental reform is over and 
the actors at both national and local level should continue modernization at a more demanding 
“graduate” level. Our assessments of the achievements reﬂ ects the latter perspective.
Th is book provides a comprehensive and consistent analysis of a decade-long transition. 
Several chapters have been presented and received outstanding interest in workshops, 
training sessions, and conferences (for example, in various CIS and Balkan countries). 
Th ese experiences suggest that the material is useful for government practitioners and 
specialists, and a kind of handbook for trainees and university students in the transition 
economies and beyond. 
Th e book consists of two parts. Th e ﬁ rst is a comprehensive overview of developments 
in the 1990s with a list of policy proposals in view of Hungary’s advanced stage of transition. 
Th e second part consists of 28 case studies in three sections. Th e ﬁ rst addresses issues of 
enhancement of the overall intergovernmental system. Th e second sets out experiences in 
building local government capacities in strategic management and ﬁ nance. Th e last section 
addresses requirements for building a competitive framework for ﬁ nancing subnational 
governments.
Mihály Kopányi Deborah Wetzel Samir El-Daher
Senior Municipal Sector Manager Financial Sector Advisor
Finance Specialist Poverty Reduction and Middle-East and 
Urban Development Center Economic Management North Africa Region
  Europe and Central Asia
  Region
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Hungary, a country of 10 million people, sits at the crossroads of Europe. With its rich 
history of the Austro–Hungarian empire crossed with “goulash” communism, Hungary is 
now at the forefront of the countries undertaking the change from command to market 
economies. Th is transformation has required radical changes on almost all fronts: political, 
economic, and social.
Th e objective of this book is to illustrate the transformation of the Hungarian subnational 
system with a focus on subnational ﬁ nance viewed from a variety of perspectives. Th e shift 
away from centralized government is an important issue in all transition countries, and 
debates about decentralization are taking place in both industrial and developing countries. 
Given Hungary’s advanced stage in the decentralization process, an examination of its 
successes in developing its subnational ﬁ nance system and the challenges that remain may 
be a useful guide for policymakers and others in other countries.
Th e work in this book was initiated under the World Bank’s Subnational Development 
Program at the request of the Hungarian government. Th e Subnational Development 
Program aimed to bring major donors, local institutions, and consulting ﬁ rms working in 
the areas of intergovernmental, urban, and local ﬁ nance together with ﬁ nancial specialists 
working to develop a municipal credit market. Partners in this eﬀ ort included the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, the Urban Institute, the British Know-How Fund, 
the Canadian Urban Institute, and the Metropolitan Research Institute in Budapest. Th e 
program also brought together teams within the World Bank working on intergovernmental 
ﬁ nance, municipal ﬁ nance and local capacity-building, and the ﬁ nancial sector.
Structure and Contents of This Book
Th is book consists of two parts plus this introduction, which gives a broad perspective on 
Hungary’s macroeconomic and subnational context. 
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Part 1, “Th e Subnational System,” consists of one chapter, “Modernizing the Subnational 
System,” a policy note presented to the Hungarian government in 1999. Chapter 1 gives a 
comprehensive overview of developments in the 1990s.  Many of the chapters in this book 
were prepared as background to the policy note; other chapters represent ongoing work to 
ﬁ ll in some gaps. As such, this book presents a smorgasbord of topics and chapters with an 
overarching theme of the evolving system of subnational development.
Part 2, “Issues of Subnational Development,” contains three sections that form a pro-
verbial three-legged stool: 
 Section 1: “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System” (chapters 2 through 
13)
 Section 2: “Local Management—Structural Adjustment and Future Challenges” 
(chapters 14 through 26)
 Section 3: “Developing a Competitive Subnational Finance System” (chapters 27 
through 30).  
All three legs are needed for eﬀ ective development of the system, and each must be 
evaluated and considered in the context of the others.
Th e overall system of intergovernmental ﬁ nance, the ﬁ rst leg of the stool, underpins 
subnational development by setting the framework within which all levels of government 
must operate, that is: (a) which level of government is responsible for a given function; 
(b) how local governments are ﬁ nanced, either through local taxes or transfers; and (c) 
ultimately, how much real autonomy and decision-making authority local governments 
have. Th e intergovernmental ﬁ nance system sets the incentives for subnational governments 
and greatly inﬂ uences the degree to which they act in a responsible or irresponsible fashion; 
section 1 touches on a wide range of issues in this context. In chapters 2 through 5, section 
1 considers, ﬁ rst, the allocation of functions in theory and in practice, and then the legal 
and regulatory frameworks that inﬂ uence these allocations.  Chapters 6 through 9 focus 
on transfers, and chapters 10 through 13 discuss diﬀ erent aspects of local revenues, in 
particular, the property tax.
Th e second leg, strengthening the abilities and capacity of subnational governments to 
manage their aﬀ airs, includes the ability to think strategically, to manage both revenues and 
expenditures, to make the best use of local assets, and to be aware of how to provide services 
most eﬃ  ciently. With the development of these skills, subnational governments are well 
placed to respond to the incentives that the overall framework sets. Section 2 looks at basic 
service delivery, contracting out, oﬀ -budget activities, municipal enterprises, management 
capacity, asset management, strategic planning, regulation of urban development, and 
enhancing local ﬁ nancial management. 
Th e third leg covers building a competitive framework for ﬁ nancing subnational 
governments. Currently, transfers from the central government ﬁ nance the bulk of 
subnational activities. Local governments augment these resources by building their local 
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tax bases. Given the extensive needs, however, as well as the important ﬁ scal constraints 
placed on the government by the European Union, economists realize that public sector 
ﬁ nancing will be insuﬃ  cient. Th e question of how to develop a sustainable and sound 
credit market for subnational governments then arises. Section 3 touches on the key issues 
in this area: credit market and specialized institutions, ﬁ nancing municipal infrastructure, 
municipal revenue bonds, and a framework for municipal bankruptcy. 
Several issues require further eﬀ orts for Hungary to capitalize on the progress it has 
made so far: 
 A large number of local governments are still small and fragmented.
 Th e role of a regional level of government is still under discussion.
 Financial autonomy for localities remains low.
 Strategic planning and budget management capacities still need to be strengthened.
 
Localities still look to the central government as their key source of ﬁ nancing. 
Nevertheless, Hungary has made great progress in developing a system that, for the most 
part, supports responsible ﬁ scal behavior by all levels of government. It is, therefore, a useful 
example for other countries grappling with similar issues.
Th roughout this book, authors use the Eurostat 1995 nomenclature of statistical 
territorial units, referred to as NUTS (nomenclature of territorial units for statistics). 
NUTS2 regions are basic administrative units.
Before delving into the details, the reader unfamiliar with Hungary needs to understand 
the macroeconomic context, since it greatly shaped the actions taken in relation to lower 
levels of government and the local government structure during the 1990s. Th e next two 
sections provide a brief overview. 
The Macroeconomic Context
Th e forces shaping the evolution of the subnational ﬁ nance system were greatly inﬂ uenced 
by macroeconomic development over the course of the past decade. In the early stages of 
the transition, Hungary experienced a deep recession, as indicated by a 15 percent drop in 
gross domestic product (GDP) between 1990 and 1993 (see table 1.1) stemming primarily 
from the collapse of exports under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance trade 
arrangements. Recovery from this early recession was interrupted by the emergence of 
extreme external imbalances, as indicated by current account deﬁ cits approaching 10 
percent of GDP in 1993 and 1994, and by a signiﬁ cant increase in external debt. Th ese 
severe external imbalances were primarily caused by ﬁ scal imbalances, although the real 
appreciation of the Hungarian forint and other factors also played a role. Th e country 
suﬀ ered a sharp loss in creditworthiness, caused not only by these large imbalances, but also 
by the perception that privatization and other important structural reforms had stalled.
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Faced with the prospect of a balance-of-payments crisis, the government initiated 
a comprehensive program of stabilization and structural reforms in March 1995. Th e 
program included a sharp ﬁ scal adjustment, a 9 percent devaluation of the forint, followed 
by a pre-announced crawling peg and a rigid wage policy. Th e extent of the ﬁ scal support 
to the program is revealed by the sharp decline in the general government deﬁ cit—from 
8.4 percent of GDP in 1994 to 3 percent of GDP in 1996 (excluding privatization 
revenues)—and was made possible by a reduction in ﬁ scal expenditures by 10 percent of 
GDP during the same period. Th ese reductions in ﬁ scal expenditures aﬀ ected both the 
central and local governments and implied signiﬁ cant reductions in the transfers allocated 
to local governments.
Table 1.1 Selected Economic Indicators, 1991–2000
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real sector (percentage change)
Real GDP –11.9 –3.1 –0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 5.0 4.5 5.3
Exports of goods and services (real) n.a. 2.2 –10.1 13.7 13.4 7.4 26.4 16.9 13.2 20.7
Imports of goods and services (real) n.a. 0.2 20.2 8.8 –0.7 5.7 25.5 22.8 12.3 21.1
Real ﬁ xed investment –12.3 1.5 2.0 12.5 –4.3 6.7 8.8 13.3 6.6 2.2
Real private consumption 5.6 0.0 0.4 0.5 –5.5 –2.4 2.0 3.6 4.6 3.3
Average consumer price index 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8
Unemployment rate (end of period) n.a. 9.8 12.6 10.9 10.9 10.7 10.4 9.1 7.0 6.4
Real sector (percentage of GDP)
Exports of goods and services 32.8 31.5 26.4 28.9 37.3 38.9 45.5 50.3 51.7 60.3
Imports of goods and services 33.7 31.7 34.6 35.4 38.5 39.9 46.0 52.8 57.8 66.5
Fixed investment 20.7 19.7 18.9 20.1 20.0 21.4 22.1 23.5 23.1 25.7
General government (percentage of GDP)
Overall balance (excluding privatization) –3.0 –7.2 –6.6 –8.4 –6.4 –3.0 –4.9 –6.8 –4.3 –3.6
Overall balance (including privatization) –2.9 –6.1 –6.0 –7.5 –3.2 0.8 –1.8 –6.3 –3.4 –3.5
Expenditures 56.4 60.2 60.1 59.5 52.4 48.5 49.6 47.8 46.6 46.7
Public debt 74.6 79.0 90.4 88.2 86.4 72.8 64.6 62.3 60.7 59.2
External accounts (percentage of GDP)
Trade balance 0.5 –0.1 –8.4 –8.8 –5.5 –5.9 –3.8 –4.4 –4.5 3.5
Current account balance 0.8 0.8 –9.0 –9.4 –5.6 –3.7 –2.1 –4.8 –4.3 –3.3
Foreign direct investment 4.4 4.0 6.0 2.8 10.0 4.4 3.6 3.0 7.8 3.3
Gross external debt 67.8 57.6 63.7 68.4 70.9 61.0 51.9 56.0 63.8 66.8
Net external debt 43.6 35.0 38.7 45.4 36.6 31.4 24.4 25.8 24.6 24.7
Source: Ministry of Finance and National Bank of Hungary data.
Th e stabilization package was accompanied by an acceleration of structural reforms. 
During 1995–98, Hungary implemented comprehensive reforms that included the 
privatization of major utilities as well as the restructuring and privatization of major banks. 
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Th is program generated a large increase in the volume of foreign direct investment and 
heightened the prospects of major eﬃ  ciency gains. Hungary was also the ﬁ rst country in 
the region to implement systemic reforms to the public pay-as-you-go pension scheme and 
introduce a second, fully funded, private pillar. Th ese and other reforms restored Hungary’s 
image as the pioneer of structural reforms among transition countries.
Th e ﬁ scal adjustment and the restrictive wage policy caused a temporary slowdown 
in the growth rate of GDP in 1995–96. Growth accelerated in 1997, however, driven by 
strong increases in exports and ﬁ xed investment. Th e output recovery was accompanied by 
large inﬂ ows of foreign direct investment (US$ 23 billion by 2000) and an improvement in 
the external accounts, as indicated by the sharp decline in the current account deﬁ cit (from 
9.4 to 2.1 percent of GDP between 1994 and 1997) and by the decline in Hungary’s net 
external debt (from 45.4 percent of GDP in 1994 to 25.8 percent in 1998).
In the late 1990s, Hungary maintained its front-runner status among European Union 
accession candidates and posted one of the strongest economic growth rates in the region 
in 2000. Real GDP grew by 5.3 percent in 2000, up from 4.5 in 1999, driven by strong 
external demand. Domestic demand growth remained moderate, reﬂ ecting slow real wage 
growth (1.5 percent), while exports grew rapidly (more than 20 percent in volume terms), 
pulled by western European demand and underpinned by Hungary’s competitiveness. 
Inﬂ ation has fallen markedly since 1995, though the disinﬂ ation process came to halt in 
2000 when average inﬂ ation was 9.8 percent, barely down on the 10 percent recorded in 
1999 (see table 1.1). 
Nevertheless, ﬁ scal policy continued to be tight in 2000. Th e headline deﬁ cit was 
slightly lower than budgeted at 3.4 percent of GDP compared with a 3.7 percent of GDP 
outturn in 1999. As will be seen in some of the chapters  in part 2, “Issues of Subnational 
Development,” the government’s eﬀ orts at keeping ﬁ scal deﬁ cits low have led to a ﬁ scal 
squeeze at lower levels of government that has pushed them to strengthen their own 
sources of revenues, to sell assets, and to improve the management of expenditures.
The Structure and Context of Subnational Governments
Th e structure of government includes three levels of elected bodies: the central government, 
the 19 county governments, and the 3,200 local governments (ﬁ gure 1.1). Th ese three 
bodies appoint subordinate organizations to carry out the business of government.
Local Government
Th e Constitution and the 1990 Act on Local Government established that the basic rights 
of all local governments, regardless of size, are equal, and that only laws (as opposed to 
decrees and regulations) can modify their conditions. Th e legislation set conditions of 
strong local autonomy. Th is step was a major one in reestablishing democracy. Some 3,200 
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communities emerged from the previous 1,500 local units with a strengthened role in the 
new system. Th e average population of municipalities, including Budapest, is 3,249, but 
more than half have fewer than 1,000. In other European countries average municipal 
populations range from 1,580 inhabitants in France to 30,000 in Sweden.
Figure 1.1 Hungary—Intergovernmental Relations
Note:  NUTS—Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics.
Source: Authors.
Counties 
Hungary has 19 counties. Although the Act on Local Government downplayed the role 
of county governments, it provided some room to expand their role as regional service 
providers. Th e act states that the county government can be made, by law, to:
 Provide regional public services covering the whole of the county or the larger part 
thereof
 Organize regional public services when the majority of the users are not citizens of the 
municipality where the service provider is located.
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Other provisions of the act are not consistent with this, such as the authority for 
municipalities, unilaterally, to take on obligatory county services, either alone or in 
association. In such a case, the Act on Local Government guarantees state support to the 
municipality in proportion to the degree of service taken over. If municipalities are unable 
to perform basic mandatory functions, county governments are obliged to take them over. 
In 1994, the act was modiﬁ ed to clarify the functions of the county governments. Th e tasks 
assigned to the county are not so much service provision but “professional promotion and 
harmonization,” with little deﬁ nition of what is meant by this.
Cities with County Rank
Hungary has 23 “cities with county rank,” which in eﬀ ect are required to act as both counties 
and municipalities. Legally, these cities are considered to be separate entities, not part of the 
county. Th e legislation is not clear about what functions should be carried out by cities with 
county rank versus the county government, and each of them has tended to develop its own 
allocation of functions. Th us no systematic approach exists: such cities often have to provide 
services for broader areas (so-called spillover eﬀ ects), and many county residents are drawn 
to the city to beneﬁ t from services (agglomeration eﬀ ects).
Regions
In 1996, the government adopted the Act on Regional Development. While keeping 
existing county administrative borders, the legislation aims to create a new central–local 
government balance by creating new subnational decision-making units to elaborate 
regional development plans and priorities. Th e National Regional Development Council 
and 19 county regional development councils were created in 1996, and seven development 
councils for larger (NUTS2) regions were formed on a voluntary basis. In addition, 
about 135 small or “micro” regions have developed to improve coordination among local 
governments in a given area. 
Th is new framework puts emphasis on the county regional development councils, 
which are entitled to make proposals and decisions on county regional development issues. 
Th ey are also the constituent members of the regional development councils and have a 
role in developing regional programs and allocating the development funds provided by 
the state. Neither the old county assemblies nor the regional development councils have 
a mandate in other resource allocation. Th e Act on Regional Development authorizes the 
county development councils to decide on the decentralized component of targeted grants. 
Recent decrees (no. 9/1998, no. 31/1998, and no. 32/1998) outline the objectives for these 
decentralized targeted grants, in particular, those related to the European Union.
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Conclusion
Th e eﬀ ects of the changing macroeconomic environment and the evolving structure of 
government are reﬂ ected in the basic ﬁ scal situation of local governments (table 1.2). Total 
revenue and grants of local governments have declined from a high of 17.4 percent of GDP 
in 1992 to 11.9 percent in 2000. Local tax revenues have increased slightly over time, but 
transfers (current grants from central government) have fallen by 4 percentage points of 
GDP. Until 1998, capital revenues also provided a steady source of revenues, but these have 
fallen oﬀ  in recent years.
Table 1.2 Revenues and Expenditures of Local Governments, 
1991–2000 (percentage of GDP)
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
REVENUE 15.7 17.4 16.6 16.4 14.6 14.0 14.1 13.3 13.0 11.9
Tax revenues 2.6 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.6
Income taxes 1.9 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.9
Real estate taxes 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Taxes on product and 
services
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.3
Nontax Revenues 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.6
Current grants 9.8 9.9 9.6 9.1 7.7 7.0 6.2 6.4 6.2 5.8
Of which from central 
government
9.7 9.6 9.4 8.9 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.7
Current revenues 14.3 15.5 14.3 13.7 12.3 11.9 11.5 12.0 11.9 11.0
Capital revenues 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
Capital grants 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
Of which from general 
government
0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
Capital revenues 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.0 0.9 0.8
Privatization revenues 
(lending minus repayments) 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1
EXPENDITURE 14.8 16.9 16.8 17.2 14.3 13.3 13.3 13.4 12.8 11.9
Current expenditures 12.4 13.6 13.6 13.3 11.8 11.1 10.7 10.7 10.5 9.7
Capital expenditures 2.4 3.2 3.2 3.9 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.1
Other expenditures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
BALANCE 0.9 0.5 –0.2 –0.8 0.3 0.7 0.8 –0.1 0.2 0.0
Source: Ministry of Finance—Government Finance Statistics data.
Th e fall in revenues was also accompanied by a fall in local government expenditures. 
Th ese expenditures peaked in 1994. Th e ﬁ scal retrenching at the central level spilled over 
to local governments, with 1995 current and capital expenditures dropping by 3 percent 
of GDP. By 2000, total expenditures had fallen to 11.9 percent of GDP. Overall, local 
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government balances reﬂ ect a similar story, with deﬁ cits in 1993 and 1994, followed by 
retrenchment in the following years except 1998, when a small deﬁ cit occurred.
Th e 28 chapters in part 2 explore the details underlying these broad trends in Hungary’s 
evolving local governments. Th e changing macro-environment and the evolving structure 
of government raise important issues for eﬀ ective intergovernmental ﬁ nance and service 
delivery. Major changes to the government structure are unlikely in the foreseeable future. 
Th e key question, therefore, is how to improve the functioning of this system beyond the 
substantial progress that has been made.
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Hungary has been a pioneer in local government reform among transition economies. 
Th rough a series of legal reforms introduced since 1990, Hungary has decentralized the 
state administration, reestablished the autonomy of local governments and delegated to 
them broad responsibilities for public service delivery, implemented a legal and regulatory 
framework to enable private participation in local infrastructure and services, and 
tightened budget constraints. Th e public and private sectors have joint responsibility for 
public utilities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are playing a growing role in 
providing social services. Hungary has reinforced the intermediate levels of government by 
establishing regional development councils and has tried to promote municipal associations. 
Th e issue of the fragmented system of some 3,200 municipalities is still unresolved.
Decentralization has highlighted the need for improving the capacity of local 
governments to carry out their new responsibilities of delivering local services, maintaining 
assets, and promoting economic development. Th e successful completion of ﬁ scal 
decentralization, a joint responsibility of the central and local governments, will require 
concerted eﬀ orts in national regulatory reforms and local institution building. Only by 
removing regulatory impediments to local eﬀ orts to improve cost eﬃ  ciency of service 
delivery and to make it more responsive to local needs—by increasing local revenue 
generation capacity and addressing deﬁ ciencies in capacity building—can the desired 
eﬀ ects of ﬁ scal decentralization be fully realized.
Hungary faces a medium-term challenge to increase private and public investment to 
support economic growth and modernize infrastructure while maintaining internal and 
external macroeconomic equilibrium. Local infrastructure investment needs have been 
growing against a background of tight ﬁ scal policies that have constrained budgetary 
* Th is chapter is based on Kopányi, and others 2000. 
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transfers from central to subnational governments, especially since 1995. Th e funding 
sources for municipal investments have included local operating surpluses, central 
government transfers, and proceeds from asset sales (these are coming to an end). Municipal 
borrowing for investment has been negligible. Nevertheless, a signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancing gap is 
envisaged in the coming years, even when European Union (EU) structural funds are taken 
into account. Th is ﬁ nancing gap could be ﬁ lled only through private sources, including 
foreign direct investment.
Th is chapter raises policy issues that need to be addressed to develop and implement a 
comprehensive program of local government modernization in Hungary and is a summary 
of Fiscal, Local Management, and Municipal Credit Market Policy Notes, a report 
prepared under the Hungary Subnational Development Program. Th e chapter contains 
the following sections: facing main challenges of subnational modernization, modernizing 
the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system, strengthening local management capacity, and 
developing a competitive subnational ﬁ nance market. Foreign and local experts tested 
the primary results of the subnational reform in Budapest and several secondary cities; 
inter alia, Kaposvár, Nagykanizsa, Németkér, Nyíregyháza, Orosháza, Ózd, Püspökladány, 
Szeged, Szentes, Szolnok, and Tatabánya. 
Facing Subnational Modernization Challenges
In 1990, in the euphoria of the transition from a command to a market economy, a highly 
decentralized government system was created. Th e resulting 3,200 municipalities are 
responsible for providing local public services in a time when ﬁ scal constraints are tight, 
citizens are demanding quality services, and the country is stepping through the door of 
the EU. Th e experience of Hungary’s decentralized government system in the last decade 
of the twentieth century proved the merit of democratically elected and cautious auto-
nomous local governments, as well as the eﬀ ectiveness of local initiatives. Th e historic 
events of the 1990s—correction measures, ﬁ scal squeeze, and growing local management 
expertise—are good reasons for an assessment of Hungary’s subnational system to identify 
major challenges and the best way to implement modernization over the next 10 years. 
Reformers should continue the restructuring of the public sector and local govern-
ments; further support the autonomy of local governments; assure balanced and equitable 
development, and meet the requirements of the EU. Further steps need be taken for 
providing services eﬃ  ciently and eﬀ ectively; for strengthening the capacity and base for 
local revenue generation; and securing adequate ﬁ nancial resources. Finally it is vital to 
enhance the legal and institutional framework for subnational ﬁ nance; reduce demand-side 
impediments for municipal access to private ﬁ nance; and enhance ﬁ nancial intermediation 
and instruments to subnational entities.  
Th e above issues will be discussed in the following three sections, ﬁ rst looking at how 
to further modernize the intergovernmental ﬁ nances; then how to strengthen local 
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management capacity; and last but not least, how to develop a competitive subnational 
ﬁ nance market. 
Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System
Th e overall framework for intergovernmental ﬁ nance creates the context in which 
localities operate and to a great extent determines the incentives for local government 
behavior. A stable and predictable intergovernmental ﬁ nance system greatly facilitates 
eﬀ ective strengthening of local government capacity and the development of a competitive 
subnational ﬁ nancial market.  Although Hungary has made good progress, the system needs 
to adapt to changing circumstances and improve service delivery. Th e components of the 
system are highly interrelated and are particularly inﬂ uenced by political and institutional 
factors. Making changes to one part of the system invariably has an impact, intended or 
unintended, on other areas.
Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Framework
Th e institutional, legal, and regulatory framework for ﬁ scal federalism deﬁ nes the structure 
of government and shapes the context and incentives for interaction between levels of 
government. An eﬀ ective intergovernmental ﬁ nance system requires that levels of govern-
ment be clearly deﬁ ned and that institutions encourage transparent, predictable, and 
responsive decision-making at each level. Accountability at each level is essential; without 
it, the gains from decentralization are unlikely to materialize. Th e fragmented system of 
municipalities and public services has coincided with unclear roles and the vague legal and 
ﬁ nancial status of intermediate governments. Th ree areas need further work to improve 
accountability and incentives: (a) resolving the lack of clarity over the intermediate levels of 
government, (b) making central and sectoral legislation more consistent, and (c) strengthening 
the legal and regulatory framework for contracting out the provision of public services. 
Reducing Fragmentation and Steps toward a Multilayer Subnational System
Clarifying the role of intermediate levels of government and choosing a path are important 
aspects of improving the system. Evolving legislation has tried to address fragmentation 
and eﬃ  cient service delivery by strengthening the role of intermediate governments (for 
example, by establishing county and regional development councils) and by fostering 
municipal associations and other forms of corporations. Existing legislation, however, is 
unclear about the functions of these levels of government and how they relate to each 
other. In addition, with undetermined legal status, the intermediate levels cannot develop 
own sources of revenues, and most do not have the authority to recover costs, to receive 
grants independently, or to borrow. Th ese constraints limit their accountability and ability 
to provide services.
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Many analysts believe that merging micro-municipalities to reduce their number (from 
3,200 to, say, 150) is politically impossible. Th us one option is for the central government 
to mandate a speciﬁ c intermediate level, by amalgamating the old structures, formalizing 
regional councils, or creating new administrative units. Such a route may also be politically 
diﬃ  cult and would take several years to develop, consolidate, and implement. A second 
option is for the government to support the ongoing evolution of associations, either to 
deliver speciﬁ c services (for example, education, like school districts in the United States) 
or to provide a range of activities.
Generally, integration is pursued on the basis of the appropriate economic scale (Davey 
and Péteri 1998a) for a given function and can be referred to as functional integration or 
functional regionalism. Th e grant structure provides incentives for cities to request funds as 
part of an association. More could be done to help such associations by providing a proper 
legal deﬁ nition and giving them the capacity to act as entities to receive grants from the 
government, raise their own resources through user fees, or borrow. Although the evolution 
of such associations is well under way (Kusztosné-Nyitrai 1998), implementation of this 
option requires improving incentives and clarifying their legal status. 
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Formal mandating of an inter-
mediate level is stronger than functional integration in meeting equity, fairness, and macro 
stabilization objectives, but weaker in addressing political accountability issues. In terms 
of administrative eﬃ  ciency, the ﬁ rst option lends itself to clearer accountability and assign-
ments of responsibilities and to more comprehensive and integrated policies. Functional 
integration, by contrast, has greater ﬂ exibility, may help promote greater competition and 
responses that are more tailored to speciﬁ c needs, and lends itself better to the tradition of 
citizen participation, which has become increasingly important during the transition.
Overwhelming Sectoral Regulation and Decentralization Challenges
An important aspect of improving intergovernmental ﬁ nance is to consider how the 
objectives ﬁ t with the central and sectoral laws. Th e Act on Local Government provides 
substantial autonomy to municipalities in service delivery and standards. In practice, 
however, many sectoral laws constrain that autonomy by deﬁ ning a host of speciﬁ c terms 
and conditions under which localities must operate. Clearly, central government sectoral 
laws have a role in setting nationwide standards, normatives, and a general regulatory 
framework (Pálné-Kovács 1998).
Sectoral laws often go far beyond their core mission to enforce national standards 
and support priorities. Th ey may (a) allow too much micromanagement of localities, (b) 
undermine eﬀ ective intergovernmental ﬁ nance by separating decision-making authority 
from available local resources and pushing the system toward reliance on normative grants, 
and (c) make local governments less responsible for their decisions and their performance. 
If decentralization is to be meaningful, then such laws must leave decision-making 
authority in the hands of the appropriate level of government.
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Alternative Methods in Service Delivery and Regulatory Challenges
An issue of equal importance to appropriate government structure and a consistent 
legislative framework is an environment that eﬀ ectively supports alternative methods of 
service delivery, including outsourcing and development of public–private partnerships. 
Local governments are open to public–private partnerships. Typically, local governments 
outsource solid waste disposal, park and street maintenance services, (in some cases) water, 
and (more recently) district heating supply. Such activities will likely increase given that 
private participation is often needed to ﬁ nance capital improvements. Public–private 
partnerships, however, often overvalue the beneﬁ ts and underestimate the risks and 
regulatory challenges (Baar 1999a). Th e government should consider three measures to 
strengthen the environment for outsourcing and public–private partnerships:
 Review and revise exemptions to the Act on Public Procurement. Th e concept that an 
exemption or less stringent rule is needed, because the payment for a public service 
comes directly from the private users rather than from public funds, or that the service 
goes directly from a private company to the user, is misguided. Th e interests of the 
citizen in securing the beneﬁ ts of the Act on Public Procurement are the same whether 
the service, or payment for the service or both are directly between the government 
agency and the citizen or via the contracting party.
 Make information on public procurement contracts and the basis for pricing accessible. 
Th is disclosure is necessary to establish transparency, stronger competition, and the 
basic information required for accountability. It also helps communities to develop 
independent expertise in contracting and pricing and to make informed price decisions.
 Help localities develop the expertise to enter into and implement service delivery contracts. In 
light of the small size of many communities, as well as budget limitations, the govern-
ment may want to develop, at either the national or regional level, a unit to assist local 
governments with expertise on public procurement, contracting, pricing, and so forth.
Service Delivery Provisions and Expenditure Assignments
Clear and consistent expenditure assignments that lay out the responsibilities of the levels 
of government are fundamental for eﬀ ective intergovernmental ﬁ nance. Conceptually, 
expenditure assignments are based on the following ﬁ ve factors:
 Th e distinction between private and public goods. Some important services, such as 
defense and street lighting, cannot be limited to a single individual, and the beneﬁ ts 
of the service accrue to the whole community. Th e private sector alone would typically 
under-provide such services, so the public sector must play a role at some level.
 Th e scope of the beneﬁ ts or costs of providing a given service. Some public goods may be 
national in scope, some may be regional, and some may be local. Ideally, the aim in 
expenditure assignment is to match responsibility to the level of government that 
corresponds most closely to the scope of service delivery.
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Figure 2.1 Distributions of Municipalities by Size, Expenditure, and Population (in Percent)
Source: Ministry of Interior data. 
Table 2.1 Local Expenditure Assignments
Expenditure Nordic countries Southern Europea Hungary
Kindergartens X Xb
Primary education X Xb
Secondary education X X
Daily child care X Xb
Health X Xb
Social welfare X Xb
Public safety X X
Public lighting X X Xb
Roads X X Xb
Water X X Xb
Sewerage X X X
Garbage collection X X X
Fire protection X X
Parks and recreation X X
Cemeteries X X Xb
Housing X X X
Minority rights Xb
Notes: a. For municipalities that have a population 5,000 or fewer.
b. Mandatory.
Sources: Gibson and Battery 1993; Hermann and others 1998.
 Th e economy of scale that may be inherent in the delivery of a service (Hegedüs 1998; 
Hermann and others 1998). Some services can be provided much more cost-eﬀ ectively 
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for 10,000 people than for 200, and this economy of scale should be a factor in deter-
mining which level of government is responsible.
 Th e government’s redistribution objectives for improving equity within a country. Typically, 
redistribution expenditures should be managed by the central government to assure 
consistency with other policies (tax policies, for example) and coherence across the 
regions and municipalities.
 Th e political accountability and administrative eﬃ  ciency. Th ese factors also play an impor-
tant role in determining the most appropriate service provision level.
Th e Act on Local Government deﬁ nes a wide range of potential local government 
functions. Hungary combines the system of the Nordic countries with the dispersed muni-
cipalities typical in southern Europe (Kopányi 1998). In Hungary, 74 percent of the muni-
cipalities represent 17 percent of the population and 8 percent of municipal expenditures 
(ﬁ gure 2.1). Th ese contradictions result in further eﬃ  ciency losses. In addition, some 
services are mandatory, including potable water, kindergartens, primary education and 
daily child care, health care, welfare, public lighting, local roads, cemeteries, and protecting 
the rights of national and ethnic minorities (table 2.1). In practice, most municipalities 
provide voluntary services, but they omit or transfer to the county some mandatory services. 
Even mandatory services are ﬁ nanced only partially by the center, making it easy to cite 
insuﬃ  cient transfers and local resources, or, simply, insuﬃ  cient demand (box 2.1). 
Service Delivery and Expenditure Assignments to be Enhanced
Th e following two measures can contribute to improved expenditure assignment.
 Reduce the discretionary nature of the intergovernmental system that allows municipalities 
to decide whether they will undertake certain activities. As we previously stated, several 
services are not mandatory for localities, so some discretion exists between levels of 
government. In addition, municipalities have the option to take over some activities 
from county governments or to transfer to county governments activities they cannot 
manage. Although this discretion is intended to provide a degree of ﬂ exibility, the 
eﬀ ect is to reduce the clarity and predictability of the system. Determining which level 
of government is accountable for the delivery of a given service and whether a service 
is being delivered economically is much more diﬃ  cult (box 2.2).
 Assign expenditure functions to the level of government that can provide the service most 
eﬃ  ciently and eﬀ ectively. Municipal tasks are of four major types: public administration; 
provision of human infrastructure (education, health, social assistance); provision of 
physical infrastructure (water and sewerage, solid waste management); and economic 
and regional development. Th e government needs to consider the characteristics of 
each service when determining the appropriate level for delivery. For example, solid 
waste management is assigned to local government, even though economies of scale in 
the industry suggest that it might be more eﬀ ectively provided at the county level.
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Box 2.1 Inconsistent Decentralization in Health Care?
In 1990 local governments became not only the owners of municipal hospitals, outpatient clinics, and 
general practitioners’ oﬃ  ces, but also the employers of the health care staﬀ s. By law, local governments 
are responsible for providing virtually all kinds of public health care services. A new health insurance 
framework replaced the old tax-ﬁ nanced health system. Subsequently, the central government established 
an “autonomous” health insurance fund to cover the recurrent expenditures of health service providers based 
on output and case mix Diagnostics Related Groups (DRG) normatives. Since 1990 local governments 
have been responsible for ﬁ nancing capital expenditures from their own budget, including earmarked 
capital grants and general purpose transfers. Local health service providers are usually legally independent 
municipal institutions that have considerable managerial autonomy. 
Expenditures entail three clusters of costs: current expenditures, for example, wages, medicines, 
supplementary materials, heating, and electricity; capital expenditures on equipment, for example, 
purchasing electrical, computer, and medical equipment; and capital expenditures on real estate, building, 
and renewal. Th e local government owners of the respective service units (such as hospitals) ﬁ nance all 
kinds of expenditures, so the local government must ultimately bear the costs in case of default. Service 
unit management is delegated to the appointed unit managers, for example, senior doctors, who act with 
full authority on behalf of the local government. In practice, however, managing the above mentioned three 
ﬁ nancing tracks is beyond the control of the local governments and leaves them facing a number of sober 
governance and game theory challenges. 
Current expenditures are ﬁ nanced, mainly though not exclusively, by the health insurance fund 
through monthly reimbursement of DRG transfers. Five factors distort this expenditure. First, hospitals 
tend to report the most complicated version of a given illness to maximize revenues. In response, the Health 
Insurance Fund devalues the DRG unit transfers to maintain its monthly budget cap. Second, key cost 
factors (for example, wages) change beyond the control of hospital management and local government. 
Health care staﬀ s are public servants employed by the local government and hence are diﬃ  cult to lay oﬀ , 
and their compensation is negotiated at the national level, even though the resulting cost is covered locally. 
Th ird, although service providers reduce services that have a low grant-to-cost ratio, high grant-to-cost ratios 
encourage overuse of expensive services (such as CT scans), sometimes in outsource form (called functional 
privatization), to maximize the received transfers to the detriment of other hospitals. Fourth, manufacturers’ 
agents encourage doctors to use new, and sometimes disproportionately expensive, treatments and medicines. 
Finally, cost overruns are temporarily rolled over through regular or forced credit, or in the case of default, 
the owner’s local government must assume the added expense.  By the end of 1999 a dozen hospitals had 
defaulted. Localities managed to resolve most of the cases, but municipalities handed over three troubled 
hospitals to the counties to minimize rather than resolve the problem. 
Capital expenditures on machinery and equipment are ﬁ nanced mainly through addressed and targeted 
grants, but private foundations and local governments play a growing role. Municipalities have constitutional 
rights to apply for targeted grants, though they often do not receive them. In 1999 the Ministry of Health 
allocated about Ft 6 billion in grants targeted directly at the health institutions, and local resources ﬁ nanced 
about Ft 24 billion, at least half of which came as earmarked or general purpose grants also from the state. 
Th is system of distributing investment funds is the most powerful control the Ministry of Health has over 
the health sector. Below the surface of earmarked ﬁ nancing is a quasi-feudal system of discretional support 
where directors are dependent on the Ministry of Health. If a local oﬃ  cial is on bad terms with the ministry, 
his or her hospital might not receive even the necessary replenishments. If relations are good, however, he or 
she might receive a brand new CT scanner even if a hospital across the street already has two.  So one can 
say that the Ministry of Health either approves investments on the basis of real needs or its decisions reﬂ ect 
political relations. 
Capital expenditures on real estate renewal and development for health care facilities are ﬁ nanced 
either by the state through addressed subsidies or by the localities from local revenues, but often these 
expenditures are omitted or postponed. 
In sum, local governments have only limited control over ﬁ nancing one of their most important 
mandatory services. Financing health services is particularly problematic in institutions that have excessive 
regional service responsibility because current expenditures are mostly, but not fully, covered by central 
transfers. Hence the owner municipality bears a signiﬁ cant cost while its neighbors get a free ride. Enhancing 
decentralization by vertical service reallocation and a combination of local and regional service system with 
respective ﬁ nances would be a better way to meet these challenges.
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Box 2.2 Decentralized Social Assistance for the Poorest?
Hungary has four major clusters of social assistance. First, people who are eligible and easy to identify 
receive universal beneﬁ ts. Th e central government by law ﬁ nances cash beneﬁ ts (for example, unemployment 
insurance, maternity and child-care beneﬁ t, and family allowance) from the central budget through 
deconcentrated state agencies. Second, local governments by law provide mandatory local social assistance 
(with earmarked and normative grants) when accurate information for means testing is locally accessible. 
Earmarked matching funds support a few important social services when localities act on behalf of the 
state (for example, cash beneﬁ ts for 160,000 long-term unemployed, child-care support, and allowances for 
seniors). Th ird, normative grants are transferred to the local governments to support  dozens of mandatory 
social services, which are ﬁ nanced from the local budget. For example, regular social assistance is paid to 
thousands of people whose eligibility for long-term unemployment beneﬁ ts has expired, and regular child 
protection beneﬁ ts are paid for about 900,000 children because their families’ per capita income is less 
than the minimal pension insurance beneﬁ t. Fourth, voluntary local social services often supplement the 
mandatory services.
Universal beneﬁ ts and earmarked-fund-supported local assistance are services of the highest national 
priority. Earmarking aims to ensure maximum accessibility, whereas shared ﬁ nancing, with, say, a 25 
percent local contribution, is an appropriate tool to reduce moral hazard, that is, to ensure that localities 
properly identify eligibility (which is otherwise not easy to measure) and hence do not incur unnecessary 
costs. Th ese social services are performing well in Hungary.
Normative transfers support services when measuring the eligibility, the magnitude, and the nature 
of social assistance is complicated. Hence local information, priorities, and considerations are crucial. 
Normative grants assume a higher (for example, 50 percent or more) local ﬁ nancial contribution but do not 
imply, however, tight spending obligations, and thus they are similar to general purpose grants. Th erefore, 
if a local government values some sectors (for example, education) more than social assistance, it is free to 
reallocate funds accordingly. A recent survey shows that some localities spend 40 percent more on social 
assistance than the received normative grant, whereas others redistribute as much as 90 percent of the 
received social normative grants to other services (Kőnig 1998).
Non-mandatory local social assistance has been growing. Some localities oﬀ er additional assistance, 
but others oﬀ er nothing or only a few beneﬁ ts. For example, Ózd, a small town in northeast Hungary, 
oﬀ ers nine major types of social protection beneﬁ ts, whereas the Ferencváros district of Budapest oﬀ ers 
20 diﬀ erent kinds of assistance for the poorest people (for example, for housing maintenance, public 
burial, and public health insurance). On the one hand, the voluntary social services administered and 
ﬁ nanced locally further increase diﬀ erences in social assistance across municipalities. On the other hand, 
they represent local interests and priorities in ﬁ ghting poverty and, hence, are important supplementary 
elements of every social assistance system.  
Several dilemmas arise. Because of their small size and budget, a large group of local governments 
seems to be ﬁ nancially and professionally unprepared to provide social services to take care of the poorest 
people. Financing social programs from general purpose grants leads to inconsistent poverty alleviation 
across the country, because of high variations in payment levels both from one case to another and from one 
local authority to another. Taking good care of the poorest social groups is a key moral obligation of local 
governments. A few steps could be taken to: (a) enhance the incentives when social normative transfers 
are used for social purposes, and (b) ensure some minimal social services for the poorest, even when the 
local budget is tight. Local governments may need to transfer some assistance from the normative to the 
earmarked group (WDR 1999), even though doing so may add a signiﬁ cant burden to the central budget. 
Local civic organizations could also play an important role in articulating and representing the interest of 
the poorest, who  have little lobbying power.
Data on expenditures by size of locality indicate that a majority of small governments 
allocates a relatively small share of resources (ﬁ gure 2.1). Th e data suggest that administ-
rative expenditures are disproportionately higher in small governments than in larger 
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ones. Th e evidence on economies of scale also indicates that local expenditure for public 
infrastructure is carried out at a level that is not economically eﬃ  cient. All these point 
to the need to promote a further degree of integration for delivery of key services. 
Such integration is linked to the approach that the central government pursues toward 
intermediate levels of government (box 2.2).
Intergovernmental Resource Allocation
Because the central and local governments are equal parts of the public ﬁ nance system, 
equity and eﬃ  ciency might be the key factors in deciding where to collect, how to reallocate, 
and in what channel to collect public revenues. In this respect, local taxes are alternatives 
to intergovernmental transfers; they are also alternatives (not supplements) to central taxes. 
In a decentralized world, local revenues (taxes, fees, and general transfers) represent a large 
share of public resources. As opposed to earmarked subsidies and discretionary transfers, 
taxes and general transfers represent one means of ﬁ scal decentralization. Th e level of 
decentralization, however, is better signaled by the share of fees and taxes administered 
locally, although they may still be collected centrally. Hungary’s decentralized municipal 
system contradicts this, with low local revenues and high intergovernmental transfers.
Increase Local Revenues
A key building block of intergovernmental ﬁ nance is a system of revenue raising that helps 
localities ﬁ nance services that are assigned to them. Many Hungarians believe that the local 
tax situation is unsatisfactory—yields are low in comparison with other countries and local 
autonomy over taxation is limited. Some analysts are also concerned about high overall 
levels of taxation and the need to reduce them to be competitive globally and within the 
EU. Th e situation has two dimensions:
 Th e ﬁ scal argument. Given the tight ﬁ scal squeeze of recent years and eﬀ orts to reduce 
the deﬁ cit, some people believe that higher local tax revenue might reduce the burden 
of local expenditures on the state budget and, therefore, help support the contraction.
 Th e accountability argument. Others argue that local governments do not take enough 
responsibility in raising the resources they spend and, therefore, do not spend wisely. 
Th e quality and eﬃ  ciency of ﬁ nancial management would be improved if mayors and 
councils had to make the more diﬃ  cult decisions over revenue generation and had to 
answer directly to taxpayers for the use of a higher proportion of the budget (Bahl 1999). 
Th e ﬁ scal argument implies that reforms should not increase the overall level of local 
taxation (although any increase in the local tax burden would be oﬀ set by a reduction in 
central government taxes). Tax increases could be avoided in a number of ways. One is 
to encourage local authorities to exploit existing local sources by levying taxes that they 
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currently ignore, by increasing designated tax rates, and by improving assessment and 
collection. Because overall tax levels are high, particularly direct taxes on individuals and 
businesses (the latter exacerbated by social security taxes), any additional taxation should 
preferably be on consumption rather than on income and proﬁ ts, and direct taxation should 
be selective and progressive in its implementation.
Meeting the accountability objective requires a shift in responsibility for determining 
tax rates from the central to the local government. Transferring taxes or reducing the rates 
of some national taxes and allowing a local surcharge would facilitate this shift. To improve 
accountability, the amount of revenue subject to local discretion cannot be insigniﬁ cant. 
Taxes selected for transfer to localities or for a surcharge must: (a) raise substantial revenues, 
preferably 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) or more, and (b) be subject to local 
rate variations; that is, tax administrators must be able locate the payer and apply a variable 
rate whose consequences do not distort the tax base. People within the jurisdiction should 
bear the impact of the local decisions; that impact should not be exported to consumers or 
shareholders elsewhere.
Shift from Central to Local Taxation
Hungary’s introduction of the kind of tax system that is common in developed countries 
has been progressive, but major technical and political impediments have prevented 
enforcement of the tax rules. Th e challenges of EU accession and the lessons learned from 
the systemic ineﬃ  ciencies in the intergovernmental transfer system suggest that greater 
emphasis be placed on measuring local tax revenues. Th ree measures are likely to have the 
greatest impact on local government revenue: the value-based property tax, motor vehicle 
tax, and the personal income tax (PIT) surcharge.
 Implementation of a value-based local property tax has the potential to be a much 
stronger source of local revenue (Balás and Kovács 1999; Lados 1994). Th e property 
tax yield is very low in comparison with other countries, which suggest that a target of 
about 0.8 percent of GDP might be attainable. At that level, the tax could raise up to 
7 percent of local government budgets. Implementation of a value-based property tax, 
however, would necessitate a major change in assessments and administrative support 
(Garzon 1998). Th e current system of ﬂ at rates per square meter, varying only by land 
use and neighborhood, does not adequately reﬂ ect diﬀ erences in the market or rental 
value of real estate to bear higher rates of taxation. Th e potential exists for improving 
information organization and implementing mass assessment that could make a value-
based property tax feasible. Reformers must also consider the notion of deducting local 
property taxes from national income taxation.
 Increasing revenues from the motor vehicle tax has possibilities. Based on comparisons 
with western European countries, some analysts make a case for a gradual upward 
revision of minimum rates on large international freight vehicles, which will face the 
pressure of EU directives, and on larger cars in the interest of progressive augmentation 
26
PA RT  1    T H E  S U B N AT I O N A L  S Y S T E M
of local revenues. Th e government may also want to consider allocating a greater share, 
and perhaps all, of this tax to local governments.
 To improve local government accountability, the government may want to implement 
a PIT surcharge (Davey and Péteri 1998b). A change from PIT sharing to a local 
surcharge would not require a major modiﬁ cation of procedure, and the existing tax 
administration seems capable of managing any changes. Th e main administrative 
burden would be on employers, who would have to apply various withholding tax 
rates. Introducing a surcharge would be easier if the impact on both taxpayers and 
municipalities is neutral at a given standard rate. Setting this standard would mean 
reducing the national level of PIT taxation and imposing a ﬂ at percentage municipal 
surcharge on all PIT obligations. Municipalities would be free to impose rates above 
or below the standard, with consequent gains or losses to their budgets. Th is discretion 
might be total or within a prescribed range either side of the standard rate. A shift to 
the PIT surcharge would: (a) increase local accountability, raising the percentage of 
revenues subject to local discretion from 28 percent to near 36 percent; (b) stabilize 
local governments’ share of PIT yields; and (c) avoid the uncertainty and contention 
that surround the system of annual negotiation and decision.
Shift from Transfers to Own-source Revenues
Transfers between levels of government help to address: (a) vertical imbalance from a 
mismatch between local expenditure responsibilities and revenue raising capacity, and 
(b) inequalities across municipalities or regions (that is, horizontal inequalities) that may 
result from diﬀ ering economic conditions and capacities. Th e key aspects of transfers that 
inﬂ uence overall intergovernmental ﬁ nance are, ﬁ rst, their predictability and, second, the 
equity and eﬃ  ciency incentives they create for lower levels of government.
Th e transfer system can be summarized as follows: very large by international standards, 
ad hoc in both aggregate size and distribution, and administratively complex (Fox 1995, 
1998). Th e transfer structure has signiﬁ cant eﬀ ects on local government accountability, 
incentives to raise local revenues, and motivations to select the best investment projects. 
Generally, governments are held more accountable for revenues they raise through their 
own sources, and thus the large role of transfers implies less accountability. Unpredictability 
in the amount and allocation of transfers makes planning diﬃ  cult for local governments, 
and although transfers are calculated using a formula, that formula is complex and changes 
signiﬁ cantly from year to year.
Local governments have disincentives to raise own-source revenues:
 Small own-source revenues mean that big relative increases in local taxes have only 
a modest eﬀ ect on total revenues. Local oﬃ  cials see little value in confronting the 
political consequences of higher taxes when the eﬀ ect on local service delivery will be 
limited.
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 Local oﬃ  cials may believe that transfers will fall as a result of raising revenues. Th is 
negative trade-oﬀ  can occur in two ways.
 – If all local governments raise more revenues, the central government could lower 
the amount of transfers, leaving the local sector with no additional resources. Local 
governments generally are apprehensive that the central government will respond 
this way and use it as an excuse not to raise own-source funds.
 – Some situations result in a direct trade-oﬀ  between the revenues generated by a 
local government and the transfers. For example, deﬁ cit grants are a disincentive 
for local governments to impose their own taxes. Th e aggregate size of deﬁ cit 
grants is small, but many (and perhaps most) local governments receiving them are 
not using their maximum capacity to levy local taxes.
Enhance Predictability of Current Transfers
With greater ﬁ scal stability in sight, the Hungarian government might consider linking 
the overall size of transfers to ﬁ xed proportions of state revenues or public expenditures, 
preferably for several years at a time. Th e pool of resources available to local governments 
is determined annually by Parliament. Th ese state budget decisions have no ground rules. 
Setting the share of local government grants as a percentage of major taxes, as is done 
in other countries (for example, France, Japan, and the Netherlands) would improve the 
stability and predictability of the system. As an illustration, the 1998 normative grants 
equate with 21 percent of the combined estimated yields of value-added tax, PIT, and 
corporate income tax (a decline from 38.6 percent in 1992). Meanwhile the proportion of 
central transfers in municipal revenues has hardly changed (from 74 to 68 percent).
Th e possibilities for improving the transfer system range from introducing block grants 
to improving the formula. Th e most extensive alteration would replace the present system 
of transfers with a single equalization grant designed to compensate for both vertical and 
horizontal imbalances, including diﬀ erences in expenditure need, service costs, and revenue 
potential (Davey and Péteri 1998d; Horváth 1998). Under such a model, PIT shares 
distributed by origin would continue to be paid to municipalities (unless replaced by the 
income tax surcharge discussed in the previous paragraph). Th e rest of the current transfers 
(including the PIT equalization component) would be included in a block grant. Th e total 
grant would be divided by national population to yield a standard per capita allocation, 
which would be attributed to each municipal area after adjustment to reﬂ ect local variance 
in the major factors aﬀ ecting local revenue capacity and expenditure needs and costs.
One advantage of such an approach is that it would simplify the system (table 2.2) by 
folding into the same mechanism the PIT equalization component, earmarked operating 
grants, and deﬁ cit grants. Additionally, this approach, which would simplify the basic grant 
allocation formula, could be varied either nationwide or by area to cover the introduction 
of districts or regional associations. For example, if ﬁ ve municipalities form an association, 
their respective adjusted per capita allocations could be divided between them and the 
association according to their shares of combined expenditure.
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Table 2.2 Categorization of Grants
Financing 
Source
Local Control over Funds
Earmarked Flexible
Ad hoc Th eater
Fire brigade
Ethnic education normatives
Centralized appropriations
Most extrabudgetary funds
Accumulation revenues inside the state budget
Funds from budgetary institutions 
Deﬁ cit grants
Most normatives
Shared tax Road fund Derivation-based personal income tax 
Land tax
Motor vehicle tax
Selected normatives
Source: Hegedüs 1998.
If more extensive change is not feasible, then the government should implement 
alterations to improve the current transfer system. One aspect of this is simpliﬁ cation of 
the formula, which could make revenues more predictable and reduce administrative costs. 
Revenues would also be more predictable if the grant formula was left in place for several 
years and if the factors were not changed yearly. Th e formula could have the basic structure 
of G = r (E-R), where G is the grant amount, E is a limited number of expenditure needs, 
R is revenue capacity, and r is the amount by which the grant rises and falls with capacity. 
Th e normative system currently operates like part of the equation, where the E reﬂ ects 
the diﬀ erent normatives and r is the values assigned to each normative (Davey and Péteri 
1998c). Th e government has introduced a measure of revenue capacity into the formula. 
A key diﬀ erence from the existing system is that a much smaller number of expenditure-
need indicators would be included in the formula.
A second moderate change involves deﬁ cit grants. Any incremental changes to the 
system should aim to minimize if not eliminate this type of grant, given the adverse 
incentives that it creates for local governments. In 1999 more than 30 percent of 
municipalities applied for a deﬁ cit grant, and the total amount requested quadrupled in 
one year. Th e combined system of local revenues, grants, and revenue shares should be 
arranged so that deﬁ cit grants are used only in the most exceptional cases and not as a 
regular ﬁ nancial transfer.
Strengthening the System of Investment Grants
Th e system for ﬁ nancing investment grants is highly fragmented, has substantial 
administrative costs, and creates incentives for localities to focus on obtaining grants from 
the center rather than increasing own-source revenues and improving budget management 
(Hegedüs 1996). Th e most extensive improvement option would be for the government 
to pool all the resources allocated to investment grants into a single investment grant 
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mechanism to which all localities would apply. Such a consolidated approach would allow 
more consistent selection criteria across sectors and would help assure that resources are 
allocated eﬀ ectively. Th e national government should develop tighter selection criteria and 
more detailed review processes to ensure that selected projects are economically viable and 
the highest priority.
Th e number of applications must be reduced if the review is to be more than cursory, 
and tighter application criteria can be an important step in this direction. First, limitations 
on which local governments or projects will be considered for targeted grants could be 
made more stringent. Second, local ﬁ nancial contributions, a frequent expectation of grants, 
must be large enough to ensure that local governments consider the economic costs of each 
project. In practice the local government’s matching share is often very small, so that access 
to national ﬁ nancing dominates local decisions about which projects to consider.
A more moderate, but similar, route is to continue to strengthen the implementation 
of the resolution on harmonizing the investment grant allocation across ministries. More 
is needed to improve information coordination and project evaluation. Ministries have 
diﬀ erent degrees of willingness to cooperate in the disbursement of grants. Some want 
an improved process and others want to maintain their independent inﬂ uence. Under any 
reform scenario, the government will need to strengthen the capital grants monitoring 
system.
Enhancing Ability to Absorb EU Structural Funds
A mechanism for receiving and using EU structural grants must be put in place. Formulating 
an eﬀ ective system for investment grant allocation and developing regional strategies are 
major expectations for EU entrants. To meet these requirements, Hungary has taken the 
initial step of forming a regional development structure (Kopányi, Inel, and Papp 1998). 
Th e structure is still in its infancy, so the responsibilities and working methods of these 
organizations are not fully delineated. As with domestic investment grants, good use of 
EU structural funds requires a method for identifying optimal projects to be funded. Th e 
existing complex, disjointed system is unlikely to lead to optimal choices. Greater reliance 
on local revenue sources, including user fees, stringent evaluation of projects in terms of 
economic viability (for example, cost-beneﬁ t analyses), and tighter application criteria (to 
reduce the number of applications), would enhance the prospects for receiving EU funds 
and increase the chance that they would be targeted to the highest priority areas and would 
be used for the best projects.
Paths to Further Modernization of the Intergovernmental System
Th e components of the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system are interrelated and are 
inﬂ uenced particularly by political and institutional factors. Making changes to one part of 
the system invariably has an intended or unintended impact on others. Although changing 
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each of these areas is possible, a more eﬀ ective approach is likely to be the development of 
a coherent program of changes that can be implemented over four to ﬁ ve years. 
Th e options for reform make up a spectrum, ranging from minimal change to extensive 
or more radical change. Given the number of areas and the range of possible actions in each 
area, the system can move ahead in a variety of ways. Th e government must respond 
to a series of choices, which in turn aﬀ ect the system as a whole. Th ree possible alternatives 
are extensive change, moderate change, and minimal change (Davey and Péteri 1998d).
Extensive Change
On the extensive change path, the key starting point is determining the appropriate 
approach to strengthen the intermediate level of government. Th e government amalgamates 
the functions of many small cities into larger units that can deliver services more eﬃ  ciently. 
Th ese mergers result in precise deﬁ nitions of the levels of government and speciﬁ c 
assignment of expenditure to each level. In Hungary’s case, the choice might be made to 
strengthen further the new regional governments developed under the Act on Regional 
Development (continuing the 1999 November amendment) or to reinvigorate the role 
of the counties. Such a change would clearly require revisiting the legislation to revise 
structures and responsibilities and to assure consistency between general and sectoral laws. 
Assignments would also need to clarify the appropriate roles of the levels of government in 
service delivery (for example, standards and regulation, service provision, and performance 
monitoring).
If new expenditure assignments are set to correspond to amalgamated localities, then 
adjusting revenue assignments becomes necessary. As a start, the government would need 
to replace the derivation-based component of the PIT tax sharing with an income tax 
surcharge provided to localities and, potentially, to a regional or county level. Alternatively, 
each level of government could have a surcharge on a diﬀ erent tax, for example, municipalities 
might have a surcharge on the PIT, counties a surcharge on the motor vehicles tax, and so 
forth. Th e important thing is that each level of government has a source of own revenue. 
Developing a value-based property tax may be desirable, although establishing some degree 
of oversight to assure that the overall tax burden does not increase is important.
Although such a system would create a better balance between the revenues and 
expenditures of local governments, an equalization grant would still be needed. To assure 
that transfers to localities remained stable, either a ﬁ xed share of overall revenue or speciﬁ c 
taxes would be used to determine the amount of allocations through grants. Th e current 
range of grants would be consolidated into one simple equalization grant based on adjusted 
per capita allocations. A detailed analysis of the most appropriate indicators of expenditure 
need and revenue capacity could form the basis of such a system. Th e extensive change 
case would also move the system of investment grants toward a consolidated pool of funds 
in which grant decisions are coordinated across sectors and based on closer scrutiny and 
allocation to those activities with the highest rate of return.
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Pursuing such a path would address the fragmentation in the system and would 
rebalance the revenue side of the intergovernmental system to give more weight and 
accountability to lower levels of government. Th at being said, the system would be more 
rigid in terms of assignments and service delivery, and amalgamating localities is likely to 
prove politically diﬃ  cult. Nevertheless, such measures would improve both the predictability 
and stability of the system—important objectives for moving the system forward.
Moderate Change
In the moderate change case, a substantial number of very small localities try to increase 
the eﬃ  ciency of service delivery by creating special districts or municipal associations, 
development regions, and the like. Many such associations are developing, and this process 
reﬂ ects what might be called a “bottom up” strategy, although the center may maintain 
relatively tight control over activities through regulation, monitoring, and ﬁ nancial support.
Such an approach requires Hungary to develop the legal and ﬁ scal mechanisms to 
support cooperation among units of diﬀ erent sizes. Associations need to be given legal 
status to create and sign contracts, put up collateral for borrowing, receive grants, and 
under some circumstances perhaps, collect tax revenues. Th e legal framework must fully 
support the transparency of public procurement and pricing decisions so that diﬀ erent 
service providers have the information to operate eﬀ ectively. Th is approach also requires 
much more ﬂ exibility in terms of expenditure assignments because diﬀ erent units of 
diﬀ erent sizes will deliver diﬀ erent services. Although this dissemination of services makes 
the system administratively more complex, it has the advantage of supporting greater 
competition and better overall resource use.
In this moderate change scenario the most important factor on the revenue side is 
to assure that municipal associations, special districts, and the like are in a position to 
have some source of own revenues. In many cases, this assurance may be accomplished 
through direct cost recovery. As in the extensive change alternative, however, other 
important considerations are implementation of an income tax surcharge, potential other 
surcharges, increases in the motor vehicles tax, and development of property. For municipal 
associations and districts to be accountable, a speciﬁ c source of revenue over which they 
have some control is essential.
Replacing the current system of transfers with a single block grant would be possible, 
and transfers could then be provided to associations and the like, based on their share in 
provision of a given service. Alternatively, streamlining and revising the transfer system; 
using a simpler formula that relies more on need-based measures (rather than user-based 
measures); strengthening the use of revenue capacity and enabling municipal associations, 
special districts, and the like to receive grants directly rather than indirectly through the 
constituent municipalities would be necessary.
In addition associations’ direct access to investment grants must be improved. 
Consolidation and uniﬁ cation of the investment grant system are unlikely in the moderate 
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change case, so governments would have to make eﬀ orts to strengthen the current 
mechanisms, including tightening selection criteria and conducting a more detailed 
review of projects on the basis of economic and social criteria. To encourage associations, 
the government may also want to change the allocation criteria to put more emphasis on 
achieving economies of scale than it does now. 
Pursuing this moderate path would not do much to help address the administrative 
complexity of the system. Units of diﬀ erent size and organization would provide diﬀ erent 
services, and such a system is more diﬃ  cult to manage and does not improve the clarity 
of expenditure assignments. Th e ﬂ exibility of such a system, however, is likely to make it 
more responsive to users and, in theory, should improve overall resource allocation. Such 
an approach also has the important advantage that it is much more participatory and, to a 
certain degree, less politically diﬃ  cult to implement. Th e key aspect of pursuing this route 
is to make sure that associations and districts have the legal means and ﬁ scal resources to 
carry out their required functions.
Minimal Change
Th is route more or less preserves the status quo, with no institutional or structural changes 
to the system envisaged. Th e establishment of legal mechanisms to support the evolution 
of associations and voluntary regions as they now exist would be passive or reactive. Some 
attempt would be made to address the most egregious inconsistencies between general laws 
and sectoral laws. At a minimum, public procurement contracts should be made accessible 
to encourage transparency and further development of contracting out as a means of 
service delivery. In terms of expenditure assignments some attempt should be made to 
reconcile existing legislation and to clarify the relation between mandatory and voluntary 
assignments.
On the revenue side the minimal change case still envisages greater emphasis on in-
creasing own revenues through further development of the property tax, although planners 
expect that the implementation of a value-based system would not be as rapid as under 
other scenarios. Motor vehicle taxation would also be increased to improve own revenues.
With respect to transfers, even without institutional change, the system must be 
simpliﬁ ed and the number of normatives in the formulas must be reduced. More generally, 
the normatives need to be reduced and better focused to lessen the administrative burden 
on localities. In addition, providing counties, as service units, with access to own-source 
revenue and supporting associations by allowing them to receive grants would be desirable. 
Furthermore, planners need to strengthen the allocation of investment grants into a more 
coherent and eﬀ ective system.
Although minimal change may have some marginal impact on the system, it is unlikely 
to address some of the larger underlying intergovernmental ﬁ nance issues, such as fragmen-
tation, imbalance between expenditure and revenue assignments, and an ad hoc system for 
allocating investment grants. To address these underlying issues, bolder steps are required.
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Strengthening Local Management Capacity
Since the early 1990s the breadth of new local government responsibilities and reduced 
central government funding has put heavy pressure on municipal budgets. Most local 
governments have managed to keep balanced budgets because they have reduced their 
expenditures, increased their own revenues (mainly from asset sales), privatized and con-
tracted out services, and increased the eﬃ  ciency of their operations. Some local governments 
have virtually eliminated budgetary surpluses, reduced capital investments, underﬁ nanced 
maintenance of municipal assets, and have only partially used local taxes. Th e increasing 
role of locally administered revenues has deepened the disparities between large and small, 
between urban and rural municipalities, and across geographic regions. Diﬀ erences are huge 
between innovative, progressive municipalities, on the one hand, and those that lack expert-
ise and “enterprising” spirit among local decision-makers, on the other. Th ese two groups of 
municipalities might help each other if properly organized institutions and procedures for 
information exchange, professional cooperation, and joint policy design were in place.
Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Framework for Service Delivery
According to the 1990 Act on Local Government, the 3,200 municipalities are similarly 
mandated to provide all kinds of local services in compliance with the main democratic 
objective of ﬁ scal decentralization. In practice local public services are provided by:
 Th e state 
 Counties 
 Cities with regional competency 
 Regional associations of municipalities 
 Municipalities—by divisions of the mayor’s oﬃ  ce, local budgetary organizations (for 
example, schools and hospitals), public–private companies, private entities, and NGOs 
(for example, churches). 
Local governments are also mandated to be the basic regulators of local services 
in compliance with the national legal and regulatory framework. National regulations, 
however, go far beyond protection of national standards and support of national priorities. 
Th ey often determine the ﬁ nancing of input factors, while providing on average 70 percent 
cost coverage even for the mandatory services (known as quasi–task-ﬁ nancing). From 
the perspective of the municipalities, the legal and regulatory framework creates serious 
impediments to improved cost eﬃ  ciency.
Inconsistency of Regulations
Eﬃ  cient use of resources is limited by contradictory and overwhelming regulations 
concerning service delivery. Almost 67 percent of local government expenditures are 
dedicated to social services, such as education, health, and social care (Péteri 1999). Th ese 
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services, which are provided through local budgetary organizations, are subject to national 
rules and regulations over which local governments have little or no control. As a result, the 
process of local ﬁ scal adjustment in these sectors is contingent on numerous, sometimes 
conﬂ icting, unachievable, and frequently changing sectoral rules, regulations, and policies of 
diﬀ erent ministries. For instance, the regulation on salaries dictates that local governments 
increase minimum public employee salaries, but does not provide incremental ﬁ nancial 
resources.
Local governments often fail to comply with the ever-increasing number of complicated 
government regulations on local services. Th is noncompliance indicates that: (a) their insti-
tutional capacity is no longer suﬃ  cient to keep up with the system, and (b) the legal process 
does not suﬃ  ciently take into account local needs and incentives. Housing, for instance, 
remains subsidized by municipal budgets because of restrictive central government regula-
tions that prevent municipal authorities from raising rents and tariﬀ s to recover costs. Muni-
cipalities frequently disregard some regulations under the pretext of insuﬃ  cient resources. 
Although sectoral transfers are generally earmarked for certain services, the pressure on 
local governments to provide services diﬀ ers because of the rigidity and enforcement of 
sectoral regulations. As a result, local governments frequently draw resources from less 
rigidly regulated sectors, such as social services or housing, to cross-subsidize the provision 
of politically more sensitive and more tightly regulated services, such as education.
Grant-to-Cost Ratio versus Local Needs
Local governments are assumed to follow local service priorities strictly and, if required, 
supplement central grants from own-source revenues. Despite some increased emphasis on 
local priorities, the grant system still drives local resource management and service delivery. 
Local authorities’ economic response to changes over time in transfer allocation rules 
and to reduced government transfers has been mixed. On the one hand, many localities 
discontinued or minimized provision of services with low grant-to-cost ratios. Local 
capital investment is also largely driven by access to targeted grants. On the other hand, 
some evidence shows that, despite ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties and reduced central government 
funding, local government spending has been on the rise in sectors of high local priority 
(for example, primary schools; box 2.3).
Box 2.3 Conﬂ icting Rules in Education
In the education sector, the normative grant allocation rules prescribe the maximum number of students 
per class, which rises from 21 in grades 1 through 6 to 30 in grades 11 through 13 and 25 for the rest. Th is 
formula causes problems for schools, because in practice, the number of students per class drops in higher 
grades. Th e regulation particularly hurts schools in smaller settlements, which have limited possibilities 
to reorganize their operations or to raise extra funds. Th e essence of the problem is that the allocation of 
normative grants also follows the formula deﬁ ned by the law, which in turn translates into the number of 
classes organized or the number of teachers hired. As a result, lower grades are consistently underfunded 
while higher grades are overfunded. Yet neither the schools nor the localities have the ﬂ exibility to make 
the needed internal adjustments.
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Local governments’ response to the grant allocation system can be described as optimal 
when they discontinue or minimize provision of services if both the grant-to-cost ratio 
and the local priority are low. Grant-to-cost ratios, however, can be low not only because 
of insuﬃ  cient grant ﬁ nancing, but also because of over-capacity or bad management. In 
cases where municipalities discontinued provision of services that were badly needed 
by the community, but received insuﬃ  cient grant ﬁ nancing, their economic behavior 
can be considered distorted. An extension of this type of distorted behavior occurs 
when municipalities reduce the scale or quality of important local services, typically by 
neglecting adequate maintenance or renovation. For example, in the early 1990s, instead of 
downscaling, they closed nursery schools, partly because of the lack of grant ﬁ nancing and 
partly because of a decrease in the number of eligible children.
Another form of municipal response to a low grant-to-cost ratio for certain local 
services has been to transfer the responsibility for delivery to the county. In principle 
vertical rationalization of local service delivery is a good step. In practice this measure does 
not comply with a regional strategy and may result in lower quality of services. First, it is 
a one-sided decision by a municipality aiming to get rid of an underﬁ nanced institution. 
Second, a county usually has fewer disposable funds to supplement insuﬃ  cient transfers 
received from the central government (box 2.4).
Box 2.4 Inconsistent Decisions of Local Priorities?
Th e city of Tatabánya transferred the operation of the hospital, two high schools, and a youth hostel to the 
county. Meanwhile it decided to continue operating a sports facility and the local archives and opened a 
new higher education college. In the city of Szentes, however, where the education services overburdened 
the local budget, the municipality still preferred to continue ﬁ nancing high schools rather than transferring 
them to the county. 
Variation in local government response to central government transfers can be explained, 
at least partially, by the rigidity of grant allocation rules. From the local governments’ point 
of view, grants can be characterized by degree of spending ﬂ exibility. Th e two extremes are 
general purpose and earmarked grants. Th e larger the percentage of grant distribution that 
falls in a formula-driven, earmarked category, the more rigid the grant allocation system 
and the more distorting its eﬀ ect on the local resource allocation process. Th e period 1993 
to 1998 saw a signiﬁ cant shift from general purpose grant allocations toward a more rigid 
task-ﬁ nancing system. Although unconditional general purpose grants accounted for 
37.3 percent of all grants in 1993, their share dropped to 23 percent by 1998. As a result 
municipalities now have very few disposable revenues. Although the normative grants are 
not earmarked by law, in practice local service organizations claim their share, which is 
provided by the national budget.
Th e design of the special deﬁ cit grant program provides another example of an 
impediment to local ﬁ scal adjustment. A municipality is eligible for a deﬁ cit grant if its 
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revenues prove insuﬃ  cient to cover mandatory services. Many analysts see this program as 
distorted for encouraging many local governments to seek a solution to their ﬁ scal problems 
by claiming “deﬁ cit grants” rather than working through local ﬁ scal and structural reforms. 
Although the amount of deﬁ cit grants remains relatively small (around 0.1 percent of GDP 
in 1997), the number of local governments applying for these additional grants increased to 
almost 30 percent of all municipalities in 1999, indicating serious ﬂ aws in the design of the 
transfer system (see “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System” and Fox 1998). 
Large Disparities in Service Coverage
Although they are not statistically representative, the city case studies carried out under the 
Subnational Development Program (for instance, Sebők and Kovács 1999, Mészáros and 
Pataki 1999) indicate signiﬁ cant variation with respect to the coverage of services and the 
range of special services (table 2.3). For example, three of the six cities considered (table 2.4) 
cover only about one-third of the settlement with sewer services, whereas three of the cities 
cover three-quarters of sewer services. Coverage of gas supply and garbage collection varies, 
whereas all cities take care of about two-thirds or more of roads (table 2.4). Behind these 
ﬁ gures lie three major factors: (a) inherited service networks from socialist industrialization 
(Szolnok, Nagykanizsa); (b) successful navigation of the web of investment grants; and 
(c) local priorities, including signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial contributions from citizens to network 
investments ( Jókay, Kálmán, and Kopányi 1998). 
Table 2.3 Special Services in Sample Cities, 1998
Service Nagykanizsa Orosháza Püspökladány Szentes Szolnok Tatabánya
Higher education s s s s +
Swimming pool + + + +
Public transport +
Hospital c + c c c
Elderly home + + +
Elderly care + + + +
Housing allowance + +
Recreation + + + + +
Archives +
Th eater + +
Community art center + + + + +
Fire-ﬁ ghting + + + + + +
Library + + + +
Museum + +
Note:  Blank cells indicate no service or service provided beyond the city border; “s” indicates service provided 
by the state; “c” indicates service provided by the county; “+” indicates service provided by the city.  
Source: Ministry of Interior data.
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Provision of special services varies from a wide range in Nagykanizsa and Szolnok to a 
more limited range in other cities (table 2.4). In part these diﬀ erences stem from changes 
in the organizational forms of local service provision that started taking place in the mid-
1990s, inﬂ uenced by: (a) sectoral laws that introduced new local service responsibilities, 
(b) tax incentives for private service providers, and (c) local lobbies advocating alternative 
forms of service delivery.
Table 2.4 Urban Infrastructure Service Coverage, 1996 (percent)
Service Nagykanizsa Orosháza Püspökladány Szentes Szolnok Tatabánya National 
average 
of cities
Sewer in house 76.2 32.4 25.9 33.0 76.3 81.8 47.4
Gas supply 100.0 76.7 52.0 67.7 80.1 11.5 60.4
Covered roads 87.0 60.4 66.7 81.1 75.9 94.7 63.7
Garbage collection 99.2 74.0 20.3 75.5 96.0 100.0 76.7
Note:  Although the six cities selected for an SNDP study are not representative of all Hungarian cities, they 
provide a good spectrum of sizes, economic and social characteristics, and geographic locations. Th ey 
also diﬀ er in terms of their economic policies and manage ment capabilities. Two of them, Tatabánya 
and Szolnok, are county capitals with more than 70,000 inhabitants. Tatabánya, Szolnok, and Nagy-
kanizsa also have county rights, which put them among the 23 most important cities of Hungary. Th e 
other three cities of the sample are small or medium-sized. Orosháza and Szentes have close to 35,000 
inhabitants, and Püspökladány has 16,000. 
Sources: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce County Yearbook 1997 data; National Average of Cities data; Sebők and Kovács 
1999; Mészáros and Pataki 1999.
Alternative Organizational Forms in Service Delivery
Local governments have been innovative in introducing alternative forms of service 
delivery. Th is innovation has played a key role in reducing the size of the public sector while 
maintaining or even enlarging the scale of local service delivery. Improved cost eﬃ  ciency 
and better quality of services are the main rationale for experimentation, but in some cases 
other objectives are no less important. Th e latter are usually driven by attempts to avoid 
certain government regulations (for example, public procurement rules).Th ese regulations 
can be sidestepped by changing the institutional structure of the service provider. For 
instance, municipally-owned service providers that are budgetary organizations are subject 
to government cash-accounting rules and cannot obtain refunds from the value added tax. 
A service provider structured as an independent company can obtain a value added tax 
refund (20 percent cost saving) and, in general, receives a more favorable tax treatment. 
Such companies also enjoy greater ﬂ exibility, which enables them to avoid proﬁ t taxation 
through cross-subsidization of services.
New forms of service delivery include limited liability companies, foundations, and 
public corporations owned and controlled by the local government. Th ese units operate 
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outside the local government administration and are subject to laws and regulations 
applicable to private companies. Th eir business plans are subject to approval by the local 
assembly, which also appoints the manager, but has no power to control the management 
of municipal enterprises. Typically, a limited liability company with municipal ownership 
serves as an umbrella organization, providing a wide range of services, including preparing 
proposals for fees, tariﬀ s, and user charges (subject to approval by the municipal assembly). 
Th e main concerns with this form of local service provision are that it: (a) is frequently 
used for cross-subsidizing certain activities in a nontransparent way, (b) allows avoidance of 
proﬁ t tax, and (c) may expose the municipality to commercial risks. For example, typically 
the rents from nonresidential property subsidize residential rents, an arrangement that may 
divert the attention of the local administration from achieving cost recovery in the housing 
sector (box 2.5).
Box 2.5 NGOs in Service
Traditions are powerful in municipal service provision. Th e local governments prefer to provide services 
themselves, partially because this way the image of the “caring” local government lives on in the minds 
of citizens. In addition, their involvement directly inﬂ uences the service provision itself.  Th erefore, local 
governments and their institutions tend to establish their own quasi-nonproﬁ t forms (such as public 
foundations), that then are in competition for clients and donors with the other service provider NGOs.  
Th is competition presents a serious challenge for “real” NGOs locally (Ágh 1999). 
Local government budgetary service organizations (for example, schools) have their 
own personnel policies, the right to subcontract, and the right to use municipal assets under 
their management in the way that they see ﬁ t. Th ey can also seek external funding and 
start some entrepreneurial activities. Although the local government assembly appoints 
the director of such an institution, it has only vague operational control. In general, 
local government budgetary service organizations account for 60 to 70 percent of total 
local government spending, so the eﬃ  ciency of local governments depends on the right 
incentives being given to these entities.
In their eﬀ orts to reduce the costs of local service provision, local governments also 
have taken advantage of competitive contracting-out opportunities. Th ey are required to 
comply with the new procurement standards modeled after the EU procurement directives 
(Baar 1999a). In 1997, municipalities awarded Ft 135 billion in contracts through tenders, 
which amounts to almost 15 percent of their gross expenditures. Public service providers 
also awarded tenders in the amount of Ft 81 billion. In addition, an unknown amount 
of contracting out was done without tenders or through procedures not governed by the 
national procurement act. Th e general experience is that contracting out results in more 
cost-eﬃ  cient delivery of local services, although usually does not allow suﬃ  cient local 
government control over the providers.
Privatization, build-operate-transfer or management contract arrangements are not 
commonly used yet, but they will increase for services that require signiﬁ cant capital 
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investments, such as refuse collection or water services. By 1997 Budapest, Szeged, and 
Szolnok contracted out water services, and those contracts account for about 10 percent of 
all water services in the country. Th ese undertakings are being closely scrutinized by other 
local governments because of their somewhat mixed results. In Szeged, for instance, the 
problems stemmed from weak local government capacity to evaluate long-term service 
contracts and relatively undeveloped legislation on build-operate-transfer arrangements. 
Good examples of contracting out water services (for example, Kaposvár) do exist, however.
Financing the Delivery of Local Services: Local Revenues
From 1993 to 1998, local government revenues nationwide decreased in real terms by more 
than 20 percent. Th e ability of local governments to raise more resources is in many respects 
determined by: (a) the authority to introduce local taxes and user fees, (b) the political 
will to levy local taxes and increase user fees, and (c) the local government’s capability to 
administer taxes and fees. Furthermore, at least in the short term, local revenue generation 
is a function of municipal asset disposition policies.
Local Taxes
Local governments can make greater use of their taxing and rate-setting authority. 
Although the central government establishes local taxes and major procedural regulations 
with regard to user fees and charges, local governments have the discretion to use them and 
set the rates within the range established by the law. In this sense local governments have 
some degree of autonomy with regard to local taxation and rate setting. Local governments’ 
taxation and revenue-raising policies can vary a great deal, however: some use all of their 
legal authority to levy taxes and set rates; others levy no local taxes or choose tax rates well 
below the maximum allowed (table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Relationship between Average Tax Rates to Maximum Rates Set by the 
Central Government, Selected Municipalities, 1991–1997 (percent)
Local taxes 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Tax on buildingsa n.a. 16.6 16.6 16.6 30.5 17.0 17.0
Tax on plotsa n.a. 10.0 15.5 15.5 15.5 7.5 7.5
Communal taxb n.a. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Business taxc 100.0 66.6 71.9 84.4 95.8 77.7 86.1
Notes: a. Tax on buildings and tax on plots are per square meter.
b. Communal tax is per employee.
c. Business tax is a percentage of revenues.
Source: Garzon 1999.
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Despite ample room for additional local taxation, many analysts recognize that overall 
tax levels, particularly business taxes, are high and are becoming an impediment to business 
development and the creation of new jobs. Indicative of this situation is that in the last few 
years, the share of municipal revenues from the local business tax, levied on the net turnover, 
was higher than that from the PIT. Many believe that any additional taxes, including local 
taxation, should focus on wealth rather than on income or proﬁ ts and should be selective and 
progressive in its incidence, falling on those best able to pay (Davey and Péteri 1998b). 
Fees and Charges
Fees and charges for services that are not contracted out have been declining, and local 
governments will need to make a greater eﬀ ort at cost recovery. From 1993 to 1998 the 
budgetary signiﬁ cance of municipal user fees and charges declined rapidly, from 61 percent 
of locally generated revenue to 46 percent. In the case of the six cities selected for the 
study, only Szolnok managed to raise the share of tariﬀ  income in local revenues from 32.4 
percent to 50.3 percent (table 2.6).
Table 2.6 Tariﬀ s, User Fees, and Charges for Six Cities 
as a Percentage of Total Locally Generated Revenue, 1993–1997 (percent)
Year Nagykanizsa Orosháza Püspökladány Szentes Szolnok Tatabánya National 
Average
1993 72.05 47.59 54.53 35.94 32.39 44.68 61.08
1994 70.71 57.87 41.42 43.56 49.10 30.19 58.72
1995 62.83 42.93 71.53 30.16 43.53 36.47 54.75
1996 51.95 36.88 67.66 24.62 48.75 30.54 46.13
1997 50.75 38.62 44.79 16.75 50.31 13.06 46.15
Note:  Th e table is computed by dividing operating revenues from municipal service providers by total 
municipal operating revenues.
Source: Ministry of Interior data.
In contrast to their limited taxing authority, local governments in principle have 
full discretion to set tariﬀ s. Th e process varies a good deal around the country, from no 
local control to limited decision-making authority. For some services, such as rentals for 
nonresidential space, practically no state control exists. In the case of a typical municipal 
company, user charges are generally agreed on by the board of directors of utilities or other 
public service providers in which the local government is the main owner or shareholder.
Tariﬀ s on major municipal services have remained virtually ﬂ at in real terms, thus 
ﬂ agging potential problems with ﬁ nancing the replacement of dilapidated infrastructure and 
the mounting pressure on municipal budgets. Typically, municipal user charges do not cover 
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replacement costs, in the expectation that those costs will eventually be ﬁ nanced by central 
government grants. In Nagykanizsa, for instance, the charge for garbage collection covers 
operation and administrative costs, but excludes depreciation. Th e cost of new investment 
is the responsibility of the municipality. Th is case is not unique. Generally, utilities cover 
maintenance and operation costs, whereas reconstruction and capital ﬁ nancing remain the 
responsibility of the municipality ( Jókay, Kálmán, and Kopányi 1998).
Although tariﬀ s remain below the cost recovery level when capital costs are taken into 
account, local governments and private providers of public services enjoy an exceptional 
level of collection, as high as 94 percent over the last few years. Another indicator of good 
payment discipline is a low level of household payment arrears to service providers, which 
over the last ﬁ ve years remained relatively ﬂ at or decreased in real terms. Nevertheless, 
arrears continue to be an issue in low-income urban areas, where improvement in collection 
cannot be achieved without special programs.
Sustainability of Local Revenues
Analysis of the revenue structure of  municipalities over the last ﬁ ve years reveals that the 
almost 10 percent drop in recurrent revenues between 1993 and 1998 was mostly oﬀ set 
by a substantial rise in capital revenues from asset sales, which started to subside in 1997. 
Capital revenues have become fairly important for the cities analyzed in the case studies. 
In 1998 Szentes and Tatabánya derived almost 26 percent to 30 percent of their total 
revenues from capital sources—asset management, sale of assets, targeted subsidies from 
the central government for capital outlays, and, in a few cases, bond issues. Reliance on sales 
of municipal assets is becoming less sustainable. A precipitous decline in local revenues 
in Püspökladány was the outcome of reduced capital revenues from asset sales. If local 
recurrent revenues from taxation, tariﬀ s, and user fees remain ﬂ at, as they have been over 
the medium term, the continuing decline in capital revenues will soon translate into a rapid 
deterioration of local governments’ ﬁ nancial performance.
Several policy implications emerge from the analysis of the local revenue structure. Th e 
situation suggests that local governments need to look for alternatives to capital ﬁ nancing, 
diﬀ erent from the sale of municipal assets, which is no longer sustainable. One obvious 
strategy is to strengthen recurrent revenue sources. Th is strengthening requires modernizing 
and making much greater use of local taxes. For instance, the property tax is based on the 
physical size of the properties rather than on market value. In addition, the property tax is 
levied on nonresidential properties only. Furthermore, the vehicle tax, which is a national 
tax shared with local governments, is based on weight rather than on market value. More 
importance should be given to user charges, fees, and beneﬁ t levies for locally provided 
services. To the extent that local governments are free to set such charges, they should be 
strongly encouraged to do so. Introduction of an income tax surcharge can also provide an 
important stimulus to local ﬁ scal eﬀ ort (see “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance 
System,” Davey and Péteri 1998a, 1998b, and Balás and Kovács 1999).
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Tax Administration Capacity
Tax administration capabilities of local governments need to be strengthened. Th e ability 
of municipal governments to raise more revenues locally is in many respects determined by 
their skill in identifying taxpayers, assessing taxes, collecting taxes, and enforcing the tax 
laws. In principle taxpayers must register and report their tax obligations to the local tax 
administration oﬃ  ce. Th is requirement is the case for taxes on buildings, idle urban land, 
tourism, and business, as well as communal taxes (on private individuals and entrepreneurs). 
Likewise, vehicle owners are responsible for the vehicle tax. In practice self-registration is 
not fully eﬀ ective because not all owners comply. Th e number of potential local taxpayers or 
taxable assets is generally unknown (see Szalai and Tassonyi 1999).
Tax administrators are supposed to determine the tax liabilities for every taxpayer for 
each local tax. Determining tax liability usually requires veriﬁ cation of the taxpayer’s self-
assessment. Th e tax on buildings requires veriﬁ cation of the size of the properties rather 
than their market value and must be done at least once in the ﬁ eld. Th e same applies to 
the tax on idle urban land, which is also based on size rather than on market value. Out 
of 3,200 local governments, only two municipalities—Nyíregyháza and Németkér—use 
market valuation data in determining local taxes on business properties.
Tax arrears, an important indicator of tax collection, ﬂ uctuate broadly from one muni-
cipality to another. In the cities surveyed, they ranged from 11 percent of current local tax 
revenues to 2 percent (Garzon 1999). We should note that “arrears” refers only to taxpayers 
who have made partial payments of their obligations, not to those who are registered 
but have made no payments or those who have not registered. Th erefore, the potential 
magnitude of unpaid tax obligations is greater than the arrears reported by the cities.
In general, the sanctions for nonpayment are strict. Th e ﬁ rst is a delay ﬁ ne. In principle, 
failure to pay after a certain period may result in immediate collection of the total tax due, 
and if this measure does not work, the procedure for withdrawing a business license may 
be initiated. For the vehicle tax, the sanction is cancellation of the registration plates. For 
communal and building taxes, the possible sanctions are garnishment of beneﬁ ts, wages, 
and pensions, or conﬁ scation of mobile assets. In cases involving large amounts of arrears, 
the taxpayer’s property can be mortgaged or the local government can ﬁ le a foreclosure 
request. In practice these sanctions have rarely been used in any of the studied cities.
Th e major constraints on local tax administrations are a shortage of qualiﬁ ed staﬀ , 
weak computer capabilities, and a lack of tax collection expertise. In a sense, tax payments 
to local governments become practically voluntary. Frequently, the mayor’s oﬃ  ce seems 
to lack commitment to strengthen the local tax administration. Support agreements 
between municipalities to learn from one another’s experiences do not exist. Each local tax 
administration develops its own collection and veriﬁ cation techniques. Finally, political will 
does not seem to be strong enough to improve collections by enforcing payment discipline. 
Clearly, more revenues may be mobilized through more eﬀ ective tax collection and better 
enforcement. Local governments need greater support of their tax administrations through 
training staﬀ  and modernizing computer equipment.
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Strengthening Management at the Local Level
Signiﬁ cant achievements and a steady learning curve occurred in municipal management 
over the last two decades. Locally managed investment programs have been carried out 
since the early 1980s (for example, water, telecommunications, and gas supply development 
associations joined the ﬁ nancial eﬀ orts of local governments and citizens to improve living 
conditions). In 1990 municipal governments became elected self-governing bodies and 
received full mandate and responsibility for:
 Developing and implementing local strategies (including urban development and 
physical planning)
 Managing local ﬁ scal and ﬁ nancial issues 
 Exercising ownership rights over local public assets 
 Providing virtually all local public services 
 Regulating and supervising local public services. 
Municipal governments also serve as deconcentrated units of the public administration 
system. Success in improving the eﬀ ectiveness of service delivery, increasing local revenues, 
and responding to local challenges is contingent on having the necessary local capacity to 
manage these activities.
Need for Local and Regional Development Strategies
Th e capacity to create and implement local development strategies needs to be augmented. 
Ideally, municipal strategies and development programs should be linked to those of 
the respective regions; however, these strategies have not been used in Hungary so far. 
Municipal strategic plans should determine key priorities and serve as a conceptual 
framework for medium- and short-term economic plans from which the annual budget 
plan can be derived. Local governments are required to produce a long-term urban 
development strategy and zoning regulation (Locsmándi and Baar 1999), in compliance 
with physical planning regulations (1997 Act on Formation and Protection of the Built 
Environment), as the basis for developing a four-year economic plan to be approved ideally 
after the municipal elections. Th e Act on Public Finances also requires that a “rolling” plan 
be prepared and approved along with the annual budget for an additional two-year period. 
Local governments do not use medium- and long-term plans widely or consistently.
Th e Act on Regional Development was adopted in 1996 as a response to the dispersed 
municipal system, missing intermediate layers of governments, and EU accession challenges. 
A system of sub-county, county, regional (NUTS2), and national regional development 
councils was put in place. Th e councils include delegates of local governments, the 
national government, the Chambers of Commerce, employers and employee associations, 
and NGOs. Th e regional councils were thought of as the main channel for coordinated 
management of local economic development. Progress toward regional planning, however, 
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has been insuﬃ  cient. Instead the development councils limited their activities to local 
allocation of central funds earmarked for regional development, a very small amount of 
resources so far. In November 1999 amendments to the Act on Regional Development:
(a) redeﬁ ned the NUTS2 big regions from their statistical role to strategic development 
units, (b) moved the composition of the regional development councils toward a profound 
centralization, (c) increased the share of state representatives signiﬁ cantly, and (d) changed 
to consultative status of the council members formerly delegated by the sectoral chambers, 
civic organizations, and employer and employee organizations.
Local governments, particularly in the large and medium settlements, are keen to 
prepare and implement local initiatives, though development strategies are often sketchy, 
casual, and sometimes mix elements of local, regional, and national targets. For instance, 
although it is not a municipal task to build national freeways bypassing settlements, local 
governments frequently compete for such projects and are willing to make certain ﬁ nancial 
sacriﬁ ces. Th e most common local economic development strategies involve public 
investment in local infrastructure and direct marketing of locations to foreign investors. 
For instance, Tatabánya created an industrial park from an unused industrial area and has 
attracted 15 foreign investors and about US$ 75 million capital between 1996 and 1999 
(Kovács and Sebők 1999). An important element of local government strategies to attract 
public investments is their stand on certain “unattractive” activities, such as incinerators 
and landﬁ lls. Subsidies, tax holidays, municipal guarantees, or any other form of ﬁ nancial 
assistance to entrepreneurs are less common techniques.
Local goals and strategies are often distorted by the investment grant allocation system 
(see “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System” and Jókay, Kálmán, and 
Kopányi 1999, and Davey 1998a). Local governments attempt to use all the means they can 
to inﬂ uence the allocation of central grants. Such eﬀ orts frequently result in intense 
competition (anywhere from hundreds to a few thousand grant applications are prepared
in each of the  cities annually) and not always in a sensible and sound approach to economic 
development.  In a decentralized state, local investment priorities do not always coincide 
with direct service provision responsibilities. Th e goals of local economic development 
diﬀ er by type of settlement, for example, direct investment in cities, with a more favorable 
environment for domestic  or foreign investors, and job creation in rural areas hit by 
unemployment. Local strategies are hard to deﬁ ne in the 2,500 smaller municipalities; 
combining them into about 150–200 small regions for development and eﬃ  cient service 
delivery purposes is inevitable.
Development programs should be ﬁ nancially sound and should comply with inter-
national standards. Available Poland-Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of the 
Economy (PHARE) grants have been underused because of the lack of strong project 
proposals. Eﬀ orts to strengthen local government capacity for creating and implementing 
municipal and regional economic development strategies should focus on planning 
skills such as assessment of potential growth areas, prioritization of activities, ﬁ nancial 
management, and performance-oriented results management.
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Municipal Budgeting and Financial Reporting
Closely linked to eﬀ ective economic development and eﬃ  cient use of public resources is 
the improvement of municipal budgeting and ﬁ nancial reporting practices. Preparation 
of local budgets and ﬁ nancial reporting are important and intricately connected parts of 
local ﬁ scal management. Both processes are subject to strict national regulations and are 
determined by the information needs of the national budget preparation process. Line-item 
budgeting is used for planning expenditures by organizational units to calculate service 
inputs. Local government ﬁ scal information is based on the chart of accounts for budgetary 
(public) organizations. Local governments determine the level of detail for local ﬁ nancial 
reporting within the general framework established by the law (box 2.6).
Box 2.6 Budgeting Rules
Th e annual local government budgeting procedures, their contents, and the forms of presentation and 
reporting are strictly regulated by the law and government decrees. Local governments must meet ﬁ xed 
deadlines for preparing local budget concepts (November 30), presenting budget proposals (February 15), 
approving budgets (within 30 days after presentation), and presenting semiannual reports (September 15) 
and annual reports (within 4 months). 
Th e form of budget classiﬁ cation is also standardized. Budgets should be structured by organizational 
units and by special groups of expenditures (for example, salaries, operating expenses, welfare payments, 
capital expenditures) within each unit. By law, local governments must prepare a balanced budget. 
However, because municipal budgets are still heavily dependent on central grants and transfers—which 
are unstable and unpredictable (see “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System”)—the opening 
and the closing of local budgets are usually far apart. Local government budgetary organizations follow 
double-entry bookkeeping and cash-based accounting. Accrual accounting is used to account for municipal 
budget-related activities. Special rates of depreciation for the public sector are used for tangible assets. 
Municipal ﬁ nancials consist of a balance sheet, a cash-based budget report, a report on cash reserves 
or savings, a proﬁ t-and-loss statement, and supplementary annexes. Th e latter contain several output 
indicators of municipal functions and services.
Overall, formal rules for budgeting and reporting procedures are properly set. Few 
people recognize, however, that budgeting and ﬁ nancial reporting are not simply a set of  pro-
cedural rules for spending public money, but are also a potential building factor of modern 
public expenditure management. Budgeting may be used as a tool to implement policies 
according to local needs, and reporting might serve as an instrument to provide feedback on 
policy outcomes. A sectoral- or program-type approach to budgeting promotes allocation 
eﬃ  ciency (that is, allocation of resources from lower to higher priority sectors or programs). 
Application of performance indicators or output measures supports operational eﬃ  ciency 
by providing information about the cost-eﬃ  ciency of the service provider units.
Although local governments have full authority to allocate recourses within their 
budget totals, only a few of them set sectoral plans. In the absence of a strategic view, local 
governments use budgeting to allocate funds among existing service organizations. Th is 
traditional line-item budgeting method prevents local governments from having a broader 
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view of service delivery. Furthermore, input budgeting is poorly connected to the level of 
services or ﬁ nancial performance of service providers. As a result, local budgets frequently 
serve primarily the purpose of recording rather than directing expenditures.
In sum, local budgeting and reporting systems face the following problems: (a) lack of 
strategic vision in the budget preparation process, (b) lack of regional and sectoral scope, 
(c) inconsistent reporting and budgeting of activities of local budgetary institutions and 
municipal companies, (d) limited access to comparative information on municipal ﬁ nances 
and service delivery, and (e) shortage of staﬀ  trained in modern budgeting techniques. 
Th ese problems are interconnected. In the absence of a clear strategy for service delivery, 
the output (performance) criteria cannot be identiﬁ ed, and without performance indicators, 
no measurable service goals and standards can be quantiﬁ ed.
Most of these problems cannot be solved by simply introducing new regulations. 
Reformers should disseminate innovative approaches and methods; professionals and local 
practitioners should learn them. One possible option is to move away from organization- 
and input-based budgeting methods toward output-based budgets. An important step in 
this direction would be to develop and introduce key service delivery indicators and to 
ensure that they are presented in budget plans and annual reports and that information on 
outputs is fed back to the budget of the subsequent year.
A promising move is to supplement traditional budgets with functional (sectoral) or 
program budgets within a strategic framework. Experiments are underway to develop 
program- and zero-based budgeting methods. Experience from Szentes and Szolnok 
showed that transparent information on sectoral spending alone modiﬁ ed policy priorities 
tremendously. Program budgeting, however, would require technical assistance to train 
local ﬁ nancial oﬃ  cers in new budgeting methods.
A further necessary step to improve local policymaking and asset management is the 
presentation of current and capital expenditures and revenues as two separate statements. 
Th is separation serves only demonstration purposes, because cross-ﬁ nancing between 
current and capital budgets is allowed, but it provides useful information on the general 
trends in local government ﬁ nances and the use of municipal assets.
Finally, a problem is publicity and accessibility of municipal ﬁ scal data for the general 
public. Information on local municipal budgets and the budgets of municipally owned 
service providers, including balance sheets and property registration data, is collected by 
the local oﬃ  ces of the County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce, which used to 
be a part of the Ministry of Interior, but which has belonged to the Ministry of Finance 
since 2000. Although comprehensive expenditure and revenue data are collected annually 
by the government for ﬁ scal monitoring purposes, this information is kept conﬁ dential at 
the national level. Only the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance have access 
to detailed actual ﬁ scal data on municipalities. Although some comparative averages are 
produced from these data for public use, they are not suﬃ  cient for any comprehensive 
policy evaluation purposes.
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Capital Budgeting and Capital Investments
A key issue confronting local governments today is the lack of skills and knowledge 
with regard to capital budgeting and capital investments. Local staﬀ  and elected oﬃ  cials 
must learn new techniques in planning, appraising, negotiating, and implementing 
capital investments. Most municipalities have little experience in selecting and preparing 
investment projects, undertaking feasibility studies, and monitoring and evaluating project 
outputs. As a result, as suggested by the six city case studies, many local governments 
failed to make the best use of the privatization revenues and invested in unduly risky and 
ill-conceived commercial real estate development projects. During recent years, ﬁ nancing 
recurrent spending became the highest priority of local governments, and the bulk of 
capital expenditures fell mostly on urban areas. Hundreds of the smallest municipalities 
are facing major economic and managerial disadvantages in preparing and implementing 
investment projects.
Th e transformation of ﬁ nancing local capital investments has modiﬁ ed capital 
investment management methods and techniques. Municipal investment departments’ 
roles changed from acting as project implementation agencies to identifying and marketing 
local capital investments and coordinating each stage of the investment process from 
tendering to monitoring a contractor’s performance. Th ey often have to work in cooperation 
with neighboring municipalities.
Th e expected development of project ﬁ nancing (see “Modernizing the Intergovern-
mental Finance System”) will further modify the current relationships among local 
governments, operating companies, and project lenders. Although national budget grants 
still have a strong inﬂ uence on the local choice of capital investments, municipal investment 
behavior will change, too, as private sources of ﬁ nancing gain in importance. Concession 
agreements and build-operate-transfer schemes will require comprehensive contractual 
arrangements between local governments and operating companies. On the ﬁ nancing side, 
the diminishing share of central government ﬁ nancing in capital investment projects will 
subject local governments to increasing ﬁ nancial scrutiny by commercial project lenders (see 
Kopányi and Hertelendy 1999). Th is scrutiny, in turn, generates a need for information on 
local governments’ borrowing capacity, knowledge about developing investment strategies, 
project appraisal techniques, and comprehensive comparative ﬁ scal data for evaluating 
the risk-and-return proﬁ le of municipal project sponsors (see “Developing a Competitive 
Subnational Finance Market”).
A critical challenge ahead is the introduction of adequate investment planning and 
capital budgeting. Such a process will necessitate stricter and more thorough investment 
selection criteria and may also improve the targeting of investments, through careful 
project appraisal and evaluation, making municipal investment decisions subject to closer 
public scrutiny. An example of such an investment process, although a simpliﬁ ed one, can 
be found in Tatabánya. Th e municipality ranks capital investment projects according to 
their potential to generate external coﬁ nancing. Projects with a sizable number of central 
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government grants or private equity investments are preferred. A preliminary calculation of 
investment returns is made before a project is approved. 
Another important aspect of the current municipal capital budgeting process is the 
strong inﬂ uence of central government objectives on local investment priorities. Based on 
the case studies, several distorting eﬀ ects of central government investment subsidies can 
be outlined ( Jókay, Kálmán, and Kopányi 1998). Perhaps among the most pronounced ones 
are overinvestment and ﬁ nancing capital investment projects of low local priority. Lacking 
own resources, many communities are forced to implement centrally funded projects only, 
instead of pursuing their own investment objectives. In Szentes, for instance, decisions 
about whether the investment project will be implemented are determined almost entirely 
by the availability of central government ﬁ nancing. Only in exceptional cases are municipal 
capital investment decisions inﬂ uenced by the local demand for the service (see Nayar-
Stone and Tönkö 1999).
Central subsidies often encourage local governments to over-invest (that is, to build 
capacities that they cannot aﬀ ord to operate in the long run). Also, central transfers 
frequently subsidize ﬁ nancially unhealthy investments, and that subsidization leads to 
operational diﬃ  culties and unjustiﬁ ed indebtedness. Th e grant application does not require 
precise cost calculations, and local governments do not take into account the ﬁ nancial 
costs associated with future projects. Since consumer fees in many instances do not cover 
increased operating costs, ﬁ nancing has to be provided by the municipality. Reducing over-
investment should be sought not only at the municipal level, but also at the central level, 
because unnecessary capacity increases central costs (Hegedüs 1996). Beyond the recently 
tightened selection criteria and a more detailed review process, local ﬁ nancial contributions 
must be large enough to ensure that selected projects are economically viable and are the 
highest local priorities and that local governments consider the real costs of each project.
Managing Municipal Assets
Municipalities own a signiﬁ cant part of public assets. Th ey received land, residential and 
commercial housing units, and assets of physical and human public services, mostly in 1990. 
Real estate, securities, and other shareholdings were transferred to them as compensation 
proceeds from privatization after 1991 (ﬁ gure 2.2). Most of their present material assets are 
by law non-tradable because municipalities divested most of their salable land, ﬁ xed assets, 
and housing units, and invested in core physical and human infrastructure properties. Th e 
national aggregates of municipal assets show a rather outdated “book value” and, in fact, 
are assumed to be overall much bigger than accounted. A huge part of the material assets 
are accounted for as zero book value either because of improper accounting of depreciation 
and rehabilitation or because some assets (for example, land) were accounted for in the 
previous regime as zero value. Nonetheless, a part of invested assets is overvalued when 
shareholdings or securities accounted for at face values belong to enterprises that are 
stripped, in liquidation, or nonexistent.
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Since 1994 local governments have been required to prepare annual asset ledgers 
and ﬁ nancial statements. Th ese two sets of records are not linked. Municipal accounting 
regulation must be amended to provide a framework for consistent asset management 
(Kassó 1999). Th e regulation requires registration of assets’ market value as well as a 
description of function and the physical characteristics. In practice, the required market 
value data are not readily available, because the valuation of certain types of property is 
complicated by the lack of market comparables and undeveloped valuation techniques.
Figure 2.2 Municipal Assets (Ft billion)
Source: Ministry of Interior and National Tax Oﬃ  ce data.
Various clusters of local assets—such as cash and other liquid assets; securities and 
ownership stakes in non-service enterprises; land, housing, and other real estate; and 
assets of public services with limited marketability—require very diﬀ erent strategies 
and management. Decisions about sale or contracting out should be based on clear 
considerations about present and future value, options of short- and long-term costs, and 
beneﬁ ts related to the assets in question. Fiscal managers have often ignored these kinds of 
considerations, overruled by political goals and short-term gains, with the aim of getting rid 
of management diﬃ  culties (for example, sale of housing stocks).
Th e usual institutional setup of local asset management follows local public administ-
ration or service supervision units. Th e administration oﬃ  ces have limited management and 
monitoring competency, leaving eﬀ ective decisions to politicians in various committees or 
to the mayor and his or her deputies. Usually no institutionalized or informal relations exist 
between the managements of asset categories. Th erefore, key asset decisions often seem to 
be result of ad hoc, politically driven, or even fraudulent decisions without accountability or 
personal responsibility (box 2.7).
In many cases local asset management lacks a coherent conceptual underpinning, is 
highly fragmented, and may be one of the most undeveloped areas of ﬁ nancial management. 
Decisions are often made by local politicians and frequently are professionally questionable. 
Th e maintenance of the assets is nobody’s responsibility. Even if municipal institutions are 
assigned to maintain the assets, they do not have the necessary resources. At the same time, 
local capital expenditure for maintaining existing assets is among the lowest of budget 
priorities. In general, local governments have an acute shortage of asset valuation experts 
and professionally trained property managers.
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Box 2.7 Municipal Treasuries Improve Eﬃ  ciency
Th e overall ﬁ nancial outcome from improved treasury operations at the local level has been remarkably 
positive. Following the ﬁ rst quarter of operations, the municipalities that introduced independent treasuries 
reported that their budget deﬁ cits were reduced by 10 to 15 percent. Instances of budget overruns, frequent 
in the past, were reduced to a minimum, and through what some observers deemed was a better managed 
procurement process, the actual costs were cut by 20 percent while liquidity became more predictable. 
Nevertheless, despite their obvious advantages, the lack of professional staﬀ , inadequate technical support 
systems, and the low level of awareness of their potential beneﬁ ts currently impede the widespread 
introduction of independent treasuries by municipal authorities (Barati and Péteri 1998). 
Local governments are passive owners of securities and other holdings even if they own 
majority stakes in joint ventures. Even the fully or majority-owned municipal companies are, 
in most respects, treated as fully independent private entities. Although the management of 
these entities is appointed by the local government’s assembly, the latter does not exercise 
eﬀ ective ownership control. Enterprise plans and annual reports are mostly submitted to 
the local government, but they are neither consolidated with nor attached to the annual 
report of the municipality.
Managing the core assets of human services (schools, hospitals, and homes for the 
elderly) is one of the biggest local management problems. Because these services are not 
fee-based, their assets are almost entirely non-marketable, and the services are managed 
as local budgetary organizations. Most of them have very high level of institutional inde-
pendence. As a result teachers and medical doctors deal with the investment management 
to prepare grant applications, procurement, and contracts with developers. Troubles rooted 
in the central transfer system (see chapter 4, “Th e Legal and Regulatory Framework of 
Fiscal Decentralization”) often coincide with poor ﬁ nancial management of local budgetary 
organizations.
A few municipalities have separated the professional and ﬁ nancial management of 
their budgetary organizations, whereby a ﬁ nancial and technical service ﬁ rm provides 
asset management services for all operational, maintenance, and development activities 
of the local budgetary organizations (Kassó 1999). As a response to ﬁ scal pressures, many 
municipalities have set up so-called municipal treasury organizations, whose mandates 
vary from cash manage-ment of budgetary organizations (simple bookkeeping, account 
management, and related ﬁ nancial analysis) to budget preparation and cost management 
(Barati and Péteri 1998). Since municipal treasury organizations obtain detailed ﬁ nancial 
information on municipal service providers, they have a strong incentive to improve the 
ﬁ nancial eﬃ  ciency of their operations and the quality of community services.
Monitoring and Supervision of Municipal Activities
A  decentralized municipal system cannot be eﬀ ective if it lacks eﬃ  cient monitoring that 
provides for economic and ﬁ nancial control before the commitment is made, accounting 
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control before payment is made, and audit after the conclusion of the action. National, 
local, and market institutions provide monitoring over municipalities. Only the State 
Audit Oﬃ  ce, which reports directly to Parliament, can exercise direct and unlimited 
supervision over municipal activities. Since 1990 more and more national watchdogs have 
started to oversee municipalities. Line ministries monitor sectoral standards and national 
priorities, and regional treasury oﬃ  ces control and execute intergovernmental transfers in 
the framework of net ﬁ nancing. Finally, the regional public administration oﬃ  ces exercise 
legislative control.
All the major elements of local control are in place, though not performing equally 
well. Local government, municipal organizations, and companies are supervised by the 
local assembly, local committees, and internal and external audit (for cities having an annual 
budget over Ft 100 million). In addition NGOs’ feedback is welcome, and rules provide for 
making documents of key public service decisions accessible to local citizens. In principle, 
the local assembly is the best tool for monitoring and supervising local government 
organizations and municipal companies. Finally, the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy serves 
as a key framework for exercising market control over municipal activities by private 
enterprises and ﬁ nancial entities.
Th e present local government monitoring and supervision system has ﬁ ve major 
problems: (a) the inability of the State Audit Oﬃ  ce to conduct external audits eﬃ  ciently; 
(b) the inability of the local assembly and its committees to exercise operational control 
and to enforce accountability and responsibility; (c) the undeveloped practice of using 
audits; (d) the shortage of trained local staﬀ s; and (e) vague transparency, undeﬁ ned citizen 
control, and biased feedback by NGOs. 
Municipal plans, ﬁ nancial reports, and contracts for public services are, by law, in 
the public domain. Th e transparency rules, however, are often ignored, misinterpreted, or 
overruled for example, in the concession contract by making it conﬁ dential in a special 
clause (Baar 1999). 
Th e communication between NGOs and local governments is very poor. In a few cases, 
NGOs successfully inﬂ uence and monitor local policy through their representatives in local 
councils and committees (Ágh 1999). 
Some analysts have suggested enlarging the State Audit Oﬃ  ce’s capacity and using 
the County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce to tighten control over municipalities’ 
ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows. Although national institutions are easy to use, a centralized control system 
limits decentralization, focuses on ﬁ nancial input rather than performance measurement, 
and ignores eﬃ  ciency in service provision. In parallel, improving the quality of local 
government audits by developing the capabilities of internal and external auditors and 
establishing transparent processes for their selection is crucial (for example, through 
chambers of auditors and local government organizations). For small local governments, 
regional audit services shared by several municipalities should be established.
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Developing a Competitive Subnational Finance Market
Local infrastructure investment needs have been growing against a background of tight 
ﬁ scal policies that constrained budgetary transfers from central to subnational levels of 
government. Competing claims for scarce budgetary resources led to large funding gaps 
for local infrastructure investments. Private capital would be required if local infra-
structure services were to be brought to standards that support growing household and 
business demand and meet EU requirements. At the same time responsibility for the 
provision and ﬁ nancing of services is being increasingly decentralized, and local govern-
ments are assuming expanded service-provision roles. Yet, the ability of local governments 
to ﬁ nance and deliver services is often constrained by limited institutional capacity and 
ﬁ nancial resources, which may aﬀ ect the level and quality of municipal investments.
Legal and Institutional Framework for the Subnational Capital Market
Th e development of an orderly and eﬃ  cient subnational ﬁ nance market depends 
critically on the overall legal, regulatory, and institutional framework in which the market 
participants operate. Th e role of this enabling environment is to provide the foundation for 
the emergence of a market in which private investors and ﬁ nancial intermediaries compete 
to mobilize ﬁ nancial resources from savers, while pricing subnational credit correctly 
and allocating capital eﬃ  ciently among subnational investments through a wide range 
of tailored ﬁ nancial products. Th e legal, regulatory, and supervisory environment for the 
subnational ﬁ nance market should seek to strengthen market governance and transparency, 
establish and maintain a level playing ﬁ eld on the market, and limit moral hazard.
In a system of subnational borrowing regulated by market discipline, excessive borrowing 
would be prevented by rising premiums or outright exclusion of subnational borrowers by 
the market. Strict reliance on market discipline requires, among other things: 
 Absence of explicit or implicit government guarantee for subnational borrowing. Growing 
numbers of governments are stressing that they will not issue sovereign guarantees for 
subsovereign transactions as a matter of sound ﬁ scal policy and to reduce moral hazard. 
Although the adoption of such legislation constitutes major progress toward separating 
sovereign and non-sovereign risks, ensuring the credibility of the stance prohibiting 
government bailouts of subnational entities requires adopting additional regulations 
governing the treatment of creditors in case of municipal default ( Jókay, Szepesi, and 
Szmetana 2000).
 Openness of capital markets. Many governments have made signiﬁ cant progress in 
liberalizing capital markets—in particular, in eliminating regulations on ﬁ nancial inter-
mediaries holding government or subnational securities or both—although restrictions 
continue to hamper the free movement of capital, such as minimum holding require-
ments or regulations preventing the issuance of speciﬁ c types of ﬁ nancing, guarantee, 
or hedging instruments by subnational entities.
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 Full disclosure and access to information on the ﬁ nancial position of subnational borrowers. 
Despite progress in some countries, the mechanisms for reporting and monitoring 
ﬁ nancial information, including subnational debt, are generally absent or, when in 
place, remain deﬁ cient. 
In a system of direct, ex ante administrative controls on subnational borrowing, 
governments could be tempted to rely on models ranging from case-by-case approval 
to an outright ban on borrowing. Under this system, the central government may exert 
control over subnational borrowing either by using a detailed approval process or restricting 
the sources of borrowing (for example, borrow only from the central government for 
special purposes) or both. Such direct controls have two drawbacks. First, they can lead 
to politically motivated and economically ineﬃ  cient credit allocation decisions by the 
central government. Second, case-by-case approvals may strengthen creditors’ and debtors’ 
assumption of an implicit sovereign guarantee and make it more, rather than less, likely that 
the central government will have to intervene in case of default by a subnational entity.
In the middle of the spectrum lies a third, rules-based model in which the subnational 
capital market is allowed to play its resource mobilization and allocation role in the 
economy and is underpinned by a legal and institutional framework designed to maintain 
macroeconomic and ﬁ scal stability and ensure market eﬃ  ciency and transparency. In the 
following sections we summarize the key elements of a rule-based, market-conforming 
subnational ﬁ nancing system.
Prudential Framework for Subnational Borrowing
Th e main components of the prudential framework for subnational borrowing pertain to 
the deﬁ nition of public debt, borrowing limits, sovereign and intermediate government 
guarantees, and local government bankruptcy regulations.
Deﬁ nition of Public Debt
Th e deﬁ nition of public debt includes all recourse-based direct obligations that a public 
entity may enter into. Consistent with EU legislation, public debt includes the liabilities of 
the general government (central government, social security funds, and local governments) 
in currency and deposits; bills; short-, medium-, and long-term bonds; and loans. Not 
included are guarantees and other contingent liabilities (such as promissory notes) of 
the central government, social security funds, and local governments. Budget regulations 
stipulate that guarantees and other contingent liabilities are counted as current budget 
expenditure by the time they are called. Th e yearly central government budget contains a 
provision against guarantees that might be called. An alternative system would consist of 
counting guarantees and other contingent liabilities as a speciﬁ c category within public 
debt, subject to rating. Th is system would require that local rating agencies have suﬃ  cient 
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capacity to rate all guarantees and contingent liabilities issued by the central government, 
social security funds, and local governments.
Borrowing Limits
Th e 1995 Act on the Supplementary Budget limited the value of new medium- and 
long-term debt to be issued by local governments that year to 70 percent of the own 
adjusted current income of the local government. Adjusted own current income is the 
sum of current own revenues, such as local taxes and fees, minus the annual amortization 
payment of short- and long-term liabilities. For the purpose of calculating the borrowing 
limit, medium- and long-term debt includes guarantees and other contingent liabilities 
incurred by local governments. Th is borrowing limit was integrated in the legislation as an 
amendment to the Act on Local Government and is currently in force.
Sovereign and Intermediate Government Guarantees
Th e current legislation does not contain a speciﬁ c limitation on sovereign guarantees to 
subsovereign transactions. As a matter of policy, however, the central government does 
not issue sovereign guarantees to subnational transactions. Exceptions to this policy can 
be made by the government on a case-by-case basis for loans by international ﬁ nancial 
institutions (such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the 
European Investment Bank). Th ese cases are rare, generally involving projects of national 
importance undertaken in the capital city, and the guarantees are counted against the yearly 
ceiling imposed on guarantees in the annual budget law. Th e credibility of this policy is 
further reinforced by the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy. Th e current legislation does not 
contain a speciﬁ c limitation to the issuance of subsovereign guarantees by local governments, 
frequently issued on behalf of municipal (and sometimes private) companies.
Local Government Insolvency and Bankruptcy Regulations
Hungary is the only country in the region that has introduced a regulation governing local 
government insolvency and bankruptcy. Th e 1996 Act on Municipal Bankruptcy regulates 
the debt clearance procedure of local governments, which may be generated by the local 
government and by its creditor if the local government or the budgetary organization 
ﬁ nanced by it falls behind its debt obligations by more than 60 days. Since the law entered 
into force in 1997, there have been 11 municipal bankruptcy cases. Th e causes for the 
bankruptcies range from investment in failed business activities to guarantees issued 
without the knowledge of the council to local public investment programs (linked with gas 
supplies) beyond the ﬁ nancial capacity of the municipality. No cases have occurred because 
of current operations, reﬂ ecting the role of deﬁ cit grants in preventing such cases. All cases 
have led to debt restructuring. All municipalities that have emerged from the procedure are 
in stable ﬁ nancial condition.
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Policy Recommendations
Key recommended policy adjustments should seek to do the following:
 Integrate guarantees and other contingent liabilities, ﬁ rst by the central government 
and over the medium term by local governments, into general government debt
 Require full ﬁ nancial disclosure by local government
 Introduce an amendment to the public ﬁ nance law explicitly prohibiting the use of 
sovereign guarantees for subnational transactions, with exception of requiring approval 
on a case-by-case basis by Parliament
 Over time, as market signals take hold, reassess limits on local government borrowing 
based on long-term debt servicing capacity.
Auditing and Collateral Issues for Subnational Borrowing
Th ere are three major instruments applicable for enhancing subnational borrowing capacity 
without sophisticated legal framework and sovereign guarantee: auditing, and asset and 
revenue collaterization.
Auditing
Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce performs two types of local government audits. Th eme audits focus 
on speciﬁ c operations for a sample of governments (for example, public utilities or social 
services). Audits of ﬁ nancial and economic operations focus on management of targeted 
grants and investment subsidies.
Revenue Collateralization
Th e Act on Local Government limits revenue collateralization by local governments to 
own revenues, deﬁ ned as local taxes, proﬁ ts, dividend and interest income, local duties, a 
proportion of environmental penalties, and other revenues. Budget regulations allow for the 
creation of sinking funds earmarked for servicing a particular local debt.
Asset Collateralization
Asset collateralization by local governments is conditioned mainly by the registration 
system for real estate assets, the valuation system for real estate assets, and the designation 
of local government assets that can be used as collateral.
Th e registration system for real estate assets, developed over the last 20 years, records 
property ownership, quality, use, protection, and book value in the case of land. Th e system 
was up to date nationwide, with two major gaps in 1999: (a) 600,000 rural landowners from 
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privatization are not yet registered, and (b) Budapest had a signiﬁ cant backlog in recording 
modiﬁ cations resulting from sales of property, the bulk of which was eliminated by 2000.
Th e valuation system for real estate assets diﬀ ers for buildings and building plots, on the 
one hand, and for rural land, on the other. To enhance the tax regulation for buildings and 
building plots, a draft act on value-based property tax was prepared, but failed to receive the 
government support required for submission to Parliament. Th us the issue remains open 
and underlies the proposal for elaborating a medium-term tax reform that focuses not only 
on the property tax, but also on changes consistent with EU requirements. Currently no 
system of land valuation exists, because the absence of a land tax provides no incentive to 
set up a land valuation system. In addition, land values are likely to remain depressed, even 
following privatization, given the small size of individual property areas. 
Th e Designation System
For real estate that can be used as collateral by local governments, the Act on Local 
Government distinguishes between primary and secondary assets. A local government 
may declare as primary assets those that serve directly its delivery of compulsory duties 
and its authority to enforce public rights and powers. Th e act also distinguishes between 
two types of primary assets: (a) non-saleable assets, including local public roads and their 
structures, squares, parks, and other assets to be designated by an act or by a decree of 
the local government, and (b) assets salable in a limited way, including public utilities, 
institutions, and public buildings, as well as real property and movables designated by the 
local government. Disposition of salable primary assets may be made in accordance with an 
act or in a decree of the local government. Th e Act on Local Government prohibits local 
governments from using primary assets as collateral.
Policy Recommendations
Key policy reforms to improve the framework for subnational borrowing would need to do 
the following: 
 Strengthen the capacity of the State Audit Oﬃ  ce to audit local government credit-
worthiness and asset and liability management
 Allow the collateralization of salable primary assets or introduce three categories of 
assets—primary assets (not salable, not collateralizeable), secondary assets (salable 
under certain regulations, collateralizeable), and tertiary assets (freely salable and 
collateralizeable) 
 Establish a system for the valuation of buildings and building plots
 Design and implement a system of land valuation (once land registry is completed).
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Financial Sector Regulatory and Supervisory Framework 
for Subnational Borrowing
Th e main components of the regulatory and supervisory framework for subnational 
borrowing pertain to debt issuance, registration, disclosure, and supervision rules.
Issuance
Bond issuance by local governments is authorized by the 1996 Act on Securities, which 
became eﬀ ective on January 1, 1997. Th e Act on Securities conforms with EU directives, 
in particular the March 1979 council directive about listing securities on exchanges, 
as well as subsequent council directives regarding information disclosure and mutual 
recognition (March 1980). To make a public oﬀ ering on the securities market, an issuer 
must publish a prospectus and announce the public oﬀ ering; both the prospectus and the 
announcement are subject to approval by the Supervisory Commission. Th e act does not 
contain regulations regarding the public oﬀ ering of securities by local governments, either 
in Hungary or abroad. Th e act also does not regulate private oﬀ ering of securities by the 
central or local governments, although speciﬁ c regulations have been introduced by the 
State Financial and Capital Market Supervision (now State Financial Supervision, SFS) to 
regulate private issues by local governments. Th ese regulations provide that private issues 
must be a minimum Ft 5 million, investors must be speciﬁ ed in advance (since June 1998, 
they are required to produce a letter of intent), and local governments must use the services 
of a brokerage ﬁ rm and produce “relevant information” to the investors.
Registration
Local government borrowing (loans, bonds) as well as guarantees and other contingent 
liabilities are recorded ex post by the local government’s department of the Ministry of 
Finance as part of the yearly submission of the budget execution by local governments to 
central Ministry of Finance. Bond issues by local governments are registered with the SFS. 
For public issues, the notiﬁ cation is part of the bond issue prior authorization process by 
SFS. For private issues, which do not require prior authorization by SFS, the obligation 
of notiﬁ cation has been in place since January 1, 1997. Th e Ministry of Interior maintains 
a systematic, real-time notiﬁ cation system for local government loans, local government 
guarantees, and other contingent liabilities. No system is in place for real-time notiﬁ cation 
of borrowing, guarantees, and other contingent liabilities by municipal companies.
Disclosure
For public oﬀ erings, issuers must disclose regular information on their ﬁ nancial and 
income position and operations and must provide the information in the form of annual 
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minute sheets and annual reports. Local governments are not required to prepare annual 
minute sheets. Issuers must ensure the inspection of their annual reports by investors and 
announce the time and place of such inspection in a national daily newspaper and the 
exchange journal. Th e annual report must be sent simultaneously to the SFS. Except for 
government securities, issuers must send to the SFS and publish in a daily newspaper and 
in the exchange journal all information directly or indirectly aﬀ ecting the value or return of 
the securities. Save for the exemption from the obligation to prepare annual minute sheets, 
the Act on Securities contains no additional disclosure rules in the case of public oﬀ erings 
by local governments. For private oﬀ erings, the Act on Securities contains no speciﬁ c 
disclosure rules, not even the type of information to be supplied by local governments to 
investors, because this information is considered to be part of the due diligence process of 
the investors.
Supervision
Th e issuance, trading, and settlement of securities are under the purview of the SFS. With 
few bond issues by municipalities to date, experience with supervision is limited. Th e 
SFS has so far taken a passive approach toward the supervision of public issues by local 
governments, limiting its overview to ensuring that issuance procedures and supporting 
documentation are in accordance with the law.
Policy Recommendations
Priority actions for strengthening the ﬁ nancial sector’s legal, regulatory, and supervisory 
framework for subnational borrowing should provide for the following: 
 Th e SFS should establish detailed disclosure rules for public issues by local governments, 
beyond the publication of the annual minute sheets.
 Th e SFS should strengthen its capacity to carry out both oﬀ site and onsite supervision 
of local government as borrowers.
 Th e Ministry of Interior should establish a system of real-time notiﬁ cation of borrow-
ing, guarantees, and other contingent liabilities by municipal companies.
Meeting Demand for Subnational Investment Finance
in the Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework
Following its membership in the EU, Hungary faces a considerable challenge to increase 
both private and public investment to support economic growth and modernize its 
infrastructure while maintaining internal and external macroeconomic equilibrium. Local 
governments and municipal companies play a critical role in this context, because they are 
responsible for undertaking a substantial portion of the infrastructure investments required. 
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Th e implied increase in the investment rate of local governments and municipal companies 
has implications for the composition of the central government’s ﬁ scal program and the 
structure of its ﬁ nancing, including the current account over the medium term.
Subnational Investment Back to its Track
In the 1990s local government investments have decreased from an average of 3 percent to 
less than 2 percent of GDP. Th e decline has been particularly noticeable since 1995. Over 
the 1991–1997 period, local governments ﬁ nanced these investments from the following 
sources: 
 Current balances including net interest revenues (45 percent of the total) 
 Investment grants from central government and capital transfers (47 percent, of which 
23 percent passed on to local service companies)
 Asset sales and privatization revenues (31 percent). 
Additional asset revenues allowed municipalities to retire debt incurred in the late 
1980s, as shown by their negative net average borrowing (–17 percent) during the period 
(see table 1.1 and Kopányi and Hertelendy 1999).
As a consequence of the decrease in transfers and adverse investment incentives, local 
governments’ investments lagged behind replacement rates in the 1990s. Strong evidence 
indicates that local investment decisions have been distorted by the investment grant 
system. Th e availability of capital grants has largely driven local investment decisions, while 
privatization revenues, borrowing, and private equity have not been adequately used (see 
“Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System” and Jókay, Kálmán, and Kopányi 
1998). For example, proceeds from asset sales and privatization were often invested in 
government securities or bank deposits, whereas key renewals were postponed (Pálné-
Kovács 1998). Privatization has often aimed at cash generation rather than rationalizing 
or developing public services through public–private partnership. In 1997 municipalities 
still owned a non-service portfolio of about 1.0 percent of GDP, including shares of 
manufacturing and other companies (for example, hotels and shops). Th is ownership was 
divested and used for ﬁ nancing service development.
During the preaccession period local government investments were well below what 
would be required to meet EU infrastructure standards. Because local infrastructure will be 
modernized, local investments in basic human and physical services are expected to increase 
progressively from 2.2 to 3.0 percent of GDP over the medium term. Th is signiﬁ cant 
increase may be attributed to two factors: core assets and market penetration. First, present 
regulations classify the basic elements of the human and physical infrastructure as non-
marketable core assets. Th erefore, development, replacement, and renewal of these assets 
should be ﬁ nanced out of municipal budgets. Second, telephone, electricity, and gas supply, 
which are characterized by low unit costs and are not associated with negative externalities, 
are well developed and have been taken over by the private sector. By contrast, sewage 
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and solid waste systems involve large unit costs and negative externalities. Increasing the 
level of service provision from around its present 20 percent level would, therefore, require 
considerable investments.
Shift toward Municipal Companies and Private Providers
Profound changes are anticipated in the structure of local investment ﬁ nance in terms of 
sources of funding. Indeed private funds are expected to play a growing role, which would 
ease the ﬁ scal burden, but would have an impact on the current account (see table 2.7 
and ﬁ gure 2.3). Th e current balance of municipalities is expected to remain constant over 
time (at 0.8 percent of GDP). Th e composition of the balances would change, however. 
First, current transfers from the central government will decline in line with the necessary 
changes in tax rates (see “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System” and 
Kopányi and Hertelendy 1999). Second, local ﬁ nancial revenues, mainly interest income, 
will dry up because municipalities will no longer hold large deposits as privatization 
revenues decline. Th ird, local own revenues (taxes and fees) are expected to grow,  making 
up for the declining current transfers and local ﬁ nancial revenues.
Two kinds of grants (government and EU) are now accessible for local investment 
purposes. Th e bulk of EU transfers should ﬂ ow to local governments, about 1.5 out of 
2.0 percent of GDP (World Bank 1999a). Furthermore, these funds will partially ﬁ nance 
public utility investments carried out through local public–private partnerships. From the 
EU funds, about 0.7 percent of GDP is to be channeled to these local investments, whereas 
about 0.8 percent would be available to ﬁ nance other service developments.
Table 2.7 Local Investment Finance 1997 and 2005 (percentage as share of GDP)
Funds Local governments Public utilities
1997 2005 1997 2005
Total investment 2.2 3.0 1.6 3.2
Investment ﬁ nancing
Savings (current revenue–current expenditure) 0.8 0.8 –0.3 0.2
Financing requirement external to the sector of 1.4 2.2 1.9 3.0
 European Union grants 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.7
 General government capital grants 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.0
 Asset sales 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
 Foreign direct investment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Borrowing –0.7 0.5 1.3 2.0
Note:  2005 data projected.
Source: Kopányi and Hertelendy 1999.
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Figure 2.3 Local Investment Finance
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
In line with a decrease in central government grants, capital transfers to local 
governments (including contribution to local companies) are expected to decrease from 1.1 
percent of GDP in 1997 to 0.7 percent over the medium term. On the one hand, transfers 
from local governments to municipal companies are expected to decline. On the other 
hand, a signiﬁ cant share of local government funds will be used as the necessary matching 
part to EU funds (for example, an 0.8 percent of GDP EU transfer requires an 0.3 percent 
of GDP matching share under the present 25 percent matching rule; the matching share 
subsequently might be increased to 40 or 50 percent). Furthermore, proceeds from asset 
sales and privatization will dramatically decline (from 1.6 percent in 1997 to roughly 
0.2 percent of GDP over the medium term), because the bulk of marketable assets were 
privatized during the 1990s. As a result, local governments would need to borrow the 
equivalent of about 0.5 percent of GDP over the medium term, after having been mostly 
net lenders in the 1990s.
Companies providing local public utility services invested on average about 1.1 
percent of GDP over the 1991–1997 period. Unlike local governments, public service 
companies generated operating deﬁ cits (0.3 percent of GDP in 1997) because of low 
user fees. Hence, their investments had to be ﬁ nanced out of capital grants from central 
and local governments as well as from borrowing (see table 2.7). EU funds will primarily 
support infrastructure (utility) investments. Th us, close to half of the projected increase in 
the investment rate in the economy would be accounted for by municipal companies (1.6 
percent out of the total increase of 3.5 percent of GDP) over the medium term. As a result, 
investments by municipal companies are projected to double (from their 1.6 percent 1997 
level to about 3.2 percent) over the medium term.
Th ese investments will be partially ﬁ nanced from the net operating surplus of 
municipal companies, which is expected to increase as a result of improved cost recovery 
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policies. Capital grants to municipal companies are projected to increase slightly, ﬁ nanced 
primarily by EU funds (0.7 percent of GDP by accession). As the concept of functional 
regionalism materializes (see “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System”), a 
signiﬁ cant amount of foreign direct investment (and supplemental borrowing) should 
contribute to the development of the public utility sector (roughly estimated at about 0.3 
percent of GDP). As a result, the net borrowing requirement of municipal companies, 
which amounted to 1.3 percent of GDP in 1997, is projected to increase to about 2.0 
percent of GDP over the medium term.
Supply of Subnational Investment Finance
Hungary’s municipal ﬁ nance markets began to emerge in the 1980s, though they remain 
small and lag behind the development of the ﬁ nancial sector as a whole. Municipal demand 
for medium- and long-term ﬁ nance has been limited, and borrowing is concentrated 
mainly in a few large cities. Apart from Eurobond issues by the city of Budapest (German 
Mark 150 million 1998–2003), neither municipalities nor municipal companies have issued 
an international bond. Debt service as a share of municipal revenues has been well below 
the authorized limit of 70 percent of own-source revenues.
Determinants of Growth of Subnational Credit Market
Th rough the mid-1990s, the municipal ﬁ nance market was dominated by the National 
Savings Bank, which had been oﬀ ering short- and medium-term lending instruments 
for municipal clients. Municipalities held their accounts with the National Savings Bank, 
which also acted as underwriter for municipal bond issues. Since 1994, the National 
Savings Bank’s exclusive market dominance declined slightly (from 100 to 80 percent) as 
new private banks, such as Raiﬀ eisen and Citibank, began to compete for market share. A 
small market for municipal company ﬁ nance started to develop following the incorporation 
of municipal companies in 1991. Despite increased market competition, the range of debt 
instruments available to municipalities remains limited, oﬀ ering no debt reﬁ nancing, bond 
pooling or insurance or partial risk and credit guarantee instruments. Currency hedging 
instruments do not extend beyond six months and have yet to be used by municipalities or 
municipal companies (Makay 1998).
Based on the policy changes introduced in the ﬁ nancial sector, the municipal credit 
market has the potential and scope for growth and diversiﬁ cation. Yet, when examining 
the prospects for the supply of funds to subnational entities, analysts need: (a) to assess the 
determinants and sources of supply, including the types of instruments oﬀ ered by banks 
and non-banking capital market intermediaries, and (b) to address the constraints that 
may hamper the supply of subnational funds and to highlight mechanisms (for example, 
nonrecourse project ﬁ nance options) and products (for example, securitization) that 
enhance local government ability to mobilize private resources. In this context, reformers 
must review the following:
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 Th e options for local governments to access private credit in a way consistent with 
macroeconomic stability 
 Th e role of local operational entities distinct from political subdivisions 
 Th e links between local government ﬁ nance and  broader capital market issues 
 Th e impediments to local government access to credit markets 
 Th e role of specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries for local government investments. 
In the context of the EU integration strategy, Hungary could look at the broader 
European ﬁ nancial market as a funding source for Hungary’s investments including 
municipal infrastructure.
Sources of Funds for Local Government Investments and Potential Need for Credit
Th e funding sources for municipal and municipal company investments have included 
local government current account savings, central government grants, and proceeds from 
local asset sales. Th e contribution of current account savings to local infrastructure ﬁ nance 
varied signiﬁ cantly over time and also across municipalities by size. Th e ability of munici-
palities to increase operating savings is contingent on local capacity to generate own revenues 
(including tariﬀ s adequate for cost recovery) and optimize expenditures. Investment grants, 
when available, represent a main source of funding for local government investments, 
especially for smaller municipal entities with limited asset base and marginal creditworthi-
ness. Th e size and composition of investment demand has been correlated to the availability 
of investment grants. Proceeds from the sale of municipal assets have also provided a 
funding source for local government investments. Th is funding source is temporary, 
however, and has virtually come to an end as municipalities are left with nontradable core 
assets and participation in municipal companies that might not be easily reduced.
Should their present funding sources, in aggregate, fall short of investment require-
ments, local governments would need to ﬁ ll the gap through market borrowing. Local 
government borrowing has been a central subject of the intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations 
debate. A contentious issue has been the potential impact of subnational borrowing on 
macroeconomic stability and the conditions under which such borrowing may be consistent 
with macroeconomic policy objectives.
Subnational Borrowing and Macroeconomic Risks: 
Tax-Supported or Revenue-Based Debt
Local governments can have access to credit from a number of sources. One source has 
been borrowing from the central government. Local governments can also incur liabilities 
in running arrears to suppliers and delaying salary payments. Another, transparent, way 
is to borrow on private credit markets. Long-term borrowing to fund long-term assets 
may be appropriate to promote intergenerational equity and allow for long-dated costs 
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to be spread throughout the period over which long-term beneﬁ ts are expected to accrue. 
Local government borrowing should be based on good economic and ﬁ nancial principles, 
however, which should be the focus of policy measures.
Foremost among these principles is that borrowing by local governments should be 
a substitute for borrowing by the central government, not an added burden to the national 
public debt. Borrowing should be dedicated to funding capital rather than current expendi-
tures (a clear distinction must be made between the two expenditure categories). Borrowing 
may be justiﬁ ed to ﬁ nance investments that generate rates of return above the cost of capital. 
Borrowing aimed at ﬁ nancing operational deﬁ cit should be precluded. At the time of 
borrowing, the parties involved should establish that debt service would be aﬀ ordable when 
measured against local government income. Borrowing must be based on strict investment 
criteria, optimal ﬁ nancing schemes, and reliable project risk and return benchmarks.
Th e potential eﬀ ect of local indebtedness on macroeconomic stability (moral hazard 
issues) should be duly assessed. In this regard, Hungary has, over the past few years, 
introduced laws and regulations that provide some deterrent for implicit sovereign 
guarantee of municipal debt. Among these is the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy, which 
deﬁ nes debt workout procedures in case of municipal default. In assessing the potential for 
creating contingent liabilities at the sovereign level, a distinction must be made between 
two local government borrowing schemes: tax-supported and revenue-based debt. When 
they need to borrow, local governments should ﬁ rst seek budget-neutral, nonrecourse 
project ﬁ nance options that would reduce claims on ﬁ scal resources.
Tax-Based Financing
In tax-based ﬁ nancing, local government debt service would be met out of local government 
general revenues (Bahl 1999).Th is borrowing, part of local government general obligations, 
would be appropriate to fund investments for “public goods,” the cost of which may not be 
charged directly to the individual consumers. In this case, however, local governments must 
demonstrate that the public goods so ﬁ nanced would have support growth and eventually 
increase local tax receipts out of which the debt would have to be serviced. (For instance, 
borrowing based on tax increment districts has been used in some countries to fund the 
development of rundown areas and to service debt out of the “incremental” tax receipts 
brought about by improved property values.) Local government tax-based borrowing 
should carry no central government guarantee. Yet even without explicit guarantee, such 
general obligation debt may conceivably create contingent liabilities at higher government 
levels if creditors perceive that local government indebtedness would always entail implicit 
central government insurance.
Revenue-Based Financing
In revenue-based ﬁ nancing, local debt service would be met out of the revenues of a speciﬁ c 
project, when such revenues are directly levied on consumers. Revenue-based ﬁ nancing 
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may be structured on a nonrecourse basis, in which private creditors’ rights and claims are 
limited to the project’s speciﬁ c revenues or, at most, the project entity’s assets. Th ese revenues 
and assets would be segregated from all other local government assets, and creditors would 
have no claims to the latter. Th is nonrecourse ﬁ nance should, all the more, extend to the 
sovereign level and shield the central government from implicit liabilities associated with 
local government debt. In addition to reducing contingent liabilities at the sovereign level, 
revenue-based ﬁ nancing can also entail credit enhancement structures that could lower the 
interest costs of borrowing (even conceivably below the reference cost of central government 
debt). A credit enhancement feature commonly used is to pledge speciﬁ c project revenues 
on a seniority basis to creditors. To do so, revenues would be channeled through a segregated 
account managed by an independent trustee whose sole role is to ensure that debt holders 
are being paid according to priority. Th e corresponding debt could be secured by the 
dedicated income streams, to the extent these are suﬃ  cient, of such projects as water and 
sanitation facilities and mass transit. Municipalities are allowed to pledge future streams of 
income as security, although the concept of such pledges remains largely unfamiliar.
Political Jurisdictions or Operational Entities
To address the issue of a multitude of small local governments, the creation of “special 
purpose entities” may be an appropriate and practical solution. Local governments are 
political, administrative entities that play a primary role in service delivery. In some cases, 
however, a service clearly could be delivered more eﬀ ectively by a group of such entities, for 
instance, to improve economies of scale and, as a result, the viability of public investments. 
Some countries occasionally resort to outright mergers of administrative entities to 
deliver services more eﬃ  ciently. Other countries refrain from tampering with the political 
subdivisions, but encourage ad hoc associations for delivering services.
In terms of policy measures, the government may want to encourage the establishment, 
through incentives if need be, of such special purpose entities, which would be legal units 
vested with powers to enter into contracts and which have clear authority to borrow, to levy 
fees against services provided, or to levy betterment taxes against improved property values. 
Such a corporate entity, owned by the association of municipalities, would be dedicated to 
the operation of a public utility and would be able, for instance, to pledge project revenues 
as security for borrowing. Borrowing by special purpose entities separate from local 
governments is less likely to create (implicit) contingent sovereign liabilities. Finally, such 
entities may also be assigned credit ratings, which might be unrelated to—sometimes better 
than—the ratings of participating municipalities.
Local Government Finance and Broader Capital Market Issues
Th e framework related to municipal debt issuance is an important determiner of access 
to credit by local governments. Local government borrowing has been limited and largely 
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conﬁ ned to commercial bank loans in addition to a small number of bond issues by large 
cities (these sometimes carry a central government guarantee). Financial institutions may 
hold local government securities without restrictions. Existing institutional savings can 
provide a potential funding pool for investments in local government projects, because debt 
securities issued by local government entities might ﬁ t well in the portfolios of institutional 
investors (insurance companies, pension funds, investment funds) seeking diversiﬁ ed long-
term uses for their resources.
Despite an overall friendly regulatory environment, local government ﬁ nancial 
transactions need to be supported by speciﬁ c regulations as well as eﬀ ective instruments 
and institutions. When focusing on the building blocks for a resilient local government 
ﬁ nance sector, ﬁ nancial policies should seek to foster the development of long-term debt 
instruments that can narrow the local government resources gap and meet the long-dated 
requirements of infrastructure investments. Th e broader capital market development issues, 
which might call for policy adjustments, relate to ﬁ ve factors.
 Underwriting, distribution, and market-making capabilities in secondary markets for 
municipal securities, which cover, among other things, prudential issues, such as capital 
adequacy ratios for underwriters and market makers for municipal securities
 Registration, settlement, and custody of local government securities
 Disclosure standards for ﬁ nancial institutions and other market players involved in 
local government securities
 Benchmarks for pricing debt obligations of municipal entities in reference to central 
government securities yield curve—the existing pricing structure in the various 
credit market segments (for example, government and corporate debt and ﬁ nancial 
institutions’ certiﬁ cates of deposit) should provide the base references for pricing 
local government debt obligations, although the absence of long-dated government 
securities would not allow straightforward results at the end of the maturity spectrum
 Credit enhancement structures (securitization, guarantees, bond insurance, bank letters 
of credit, convertible debt, derivative products), which confer preferential credit status 
on local government debt obligations, diversify and transfer risks, and increase market 
acceptance of local borrowing. (Th e nascent domestic credit rating capabilities in 
Hungary would provide prospective investors and creditors with a useful tool for the 
credit assessment of subnational borrowers.)
Impediments to Local Government Access to Credit Markets
One constraint in terms of local government infrastructure ﬁ nance pertains to the limited 
availability of long-term lending, because loan maturities to local governments rarely 
exceed ﬁ ve years—a serious predicament given that long-dated debt instruments are 
required for infrastructure ﬁ nance. Th is situation arises from concerns regarding credit and 
interest rate risks. In this regard, policy measures should foster an environment to reduce 
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both credit and interest rate risk. Credit risk could be reduced through credit enhancement 
mechanisms, such as: (a) lending secured by the income stream of revenue generating 
projects, (b) put options for bond issues, or (c) callable loans by ﬁ nancial institutions, which 
would encourage longer term commitments by potential creditors. Interest rate risks, which 
in a high interest rate environment deter borrowing, might be mitigated in pricing loans 
using an indexed, ﬂ oating rate; from the investor standpoint, interest rate risk might be 
further mitigated through portfolio diversiﬁ cation techniques (for which guidelines are 
usually established case by case by institutional investors).
Moreover, the unpredictability and ad hoc nature of ﬁ nancial transfers between various 
government tiers is an added impediment to building local government capacity to attract 
private credit. Because securing central grants is sometimes inﬂ uenced by local government 
lobbying, the ad hoc nature of the grants makes assessing local government creditworthiness, 
particularly for medium- and long-term funding commitments, diﬃ  cult for prospective 
investors (see “Modernizing the Intergovernmental Finance System”).
Local Government as a Potential Borrower
In assessing the conditions for municipal ﬁ nance market development, one focus should 
be on the factors that may impede, from the demand side, the municipal sector’s access to 
credit. One such impediment is the limited eﬀ ective demand resulting from the weakness 
of small and medium local governments to structure investment proposals that meet the 
due diligence requirements of private lenders. When planning to access private capital 
markets, areas of critical importance that call for government attention and support 
relate to project selection and preparation, ﬁ nancing strategies, and ﬁ nancial management 
(which underpins creditworthiness). Local governments need to strengthen project 
selection processes through quantitative criteria based on economic priority, relevant return 
benchmarks, or least cost solutions.
Essential to the analysis would be the assessment of the aﬀ ordability of fees (“capacity 
to pay”) that a project may have to charge to be able to service debt. Moreover, local 
governments need to develop ﬁ nancing strategies involving, in particular, project ﬁ nance 
options on a nonrecourse basis that reduce claims on ﬁ scal revenues. Th e development of 
multiyear investment plans would allow local governments to assess better the implications 
of pledging ﬁ xed assets as collateral for borrowing for a given project, because such 
assets may become necessary as a pledge for another project in the pipeline. Finally, local 
governments need to improve and optimize ﬁ nancial management, including current 
expenditure, asset and liability, and liquidity management.
As a matter of policy, all municipalities should improve ﬁ nancial disclosure to 
give investors reliable and standardized information; to this end, they must consider 
establishing, at the national or provincial levels, databases that have relevant indicators 
and ratios on local government ﬁ nance (such as ratios of debt service to revenues, current 
revenues to current expenditures, share of local to total revenues, and share of local taxes to 
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total revenues). Th is information would also constitute a useful basis for credit rating, for 
which local government entities should be prepared.
Fostering competition and privately providing local infrastructure should be integral 
parts of city development strategies. To this end, reformers must promote closer ﬁ nancial 
partnerships between local governments and providers of services and capital—commercial 
banks, securities ﬁ rms, institutional investors, infrastructure funds, rating agencies, utilities 
operators—that have complementary interests in private ﬁ nance and local infrastructure 
investments.
Specialized Financial Intermediaries for Local Government Investments
Market borrowing by local governments may entail direct bond issues, or loans or lines of 
credit from commercial banks. Another way for local governments to mobilize long-term 
resources could be through specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries that provide a vehicle for 
debt pooling for local investments. In the United States municipal bond markets have been 
a primary vehicle for local infrastructure ﬁ nance through debt funding supported by the 
taxing power of local governments, and revenue bonds secured by project earnings. Other 
industrialized countries have relied more on ﬁ nancial institutions, including specialized 
ﬁ nancial intermediaries, to provide credit for local governments. Financial intermediation 
and bond markets are not mutually exclusive funding channels for local investments because 
they could play complementary roles in serving two segments of the local government 
ﬁ nancial market.
In Hungary having direct access to long-term credit markets is not yet feasible for 
a large number of small and medium-sized local government entities. Using ﬁ nancial 
intermediaries that could tap private credit markets on behalf of subnational borrowers 
could be one way to foster market access. Lending to municipal entities would be achieved 
in leveraging the intermediary’s equity funds through bond issuance in the private credit 
markets without government guarantee.
Th e regulatory and institutional environment would allow a role for market-based 
specialized ﬁ nancial institutions operating within the country’s competitive ﬁ nancial 
sector. Lending would be mostly to viable, revenue-generating infrastructure investments. 
Lending can also done by balance sheet and directed to public goods investments if the 
lending intermediary can establish, and shoulder, the risk so that local borrowing entities 
can generate the ﬁ scal resources needed to service debt. Th e built-in diversiﬁ cation of the 
intermediary’s portfolio resulting from the variety of subsectors and borrowers would 
provide good security, strengthen the credit quality of the debt issued by the intermediary, 
and allow the use of credit enhancement mechanisms, such as bond insurance, which may 
be brought to bear only in the case of an expanded and diversiﬁ ed pool of debt.
Further analyses related to the feasibility assessment of specialized ﬁ nancial inter-
mediaries would need to address, among other things:
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 Th e structural and institutional arrangements needed to establish market-based 
ﬁ nancial intermediaries that would operate in a competitive environment and issue 
debt without government guarantee
 Th e main operational features in terms of product range (for example, loans, equity 
participation, guarantees, and underwriting) oﬀ ered by the intermediary and the 
diversiﬁ cation of its portfolio between sectors and borrowers
 Th e main ﬁ nancial parameters related to the intermediary’s funding, lending and 
product pricing policies (including credit and interest rate risk management) needed 
to ensure ﬁ nancial sustainability.
Conclusions
Th e present local government system mirrors the euphoria of reestablishing democracy in 
transition from a command to a market economy, the strong beliefs in ﬁ scal decentralization, 
and the openness towards private provision of public services. Th is approach recognizes 
the right of individual communities of whatever size to retain a separate identity and a 
representative body, but it puts increasing pressure on them to share an administrative 
apparatus and run services jointly.
Th e studies under the subnational development program have provided a broad range 
of evidences of a steady learning process against the background of a deep economic 
recession and an inevitable ﬁ scal squeeze in the 1990s. Hungary not only was a pioneer 
reformer but it has moved far ahead among transition economies in devolving central 
functions to the local level; and in developing an adequate legal and regulatory framework 
of a deeply decentralized system. Local governments have gained ﬁ rst experiences, inter 
alia, in asset and ﬁ nancial management, public–private–partnership, project preparation 
and implementation, and in rule-based public procurement, but also adopted the approach 
of cost-recovery service fees, and correspondingly tested target subsidization of the poorest 
social groups.
One can conclude that the ﬁ rst “bachelor” phase of intergovernmental reform is over 
and the actors at both the national and local level ought to continue modernization at 
a more demanding “graduate” level. Our assessment of the 1990s achievements reﬂ ects 
the latter perspective. Reformers at both the national and local level are facing with the 
following challenges and opportunities during the ﬁ rst period of the country’s membership 
in the European Union:
 Continuing the restructuring of the public sector and local governments. Localities have 
adjusted to changing circumstances, but are reaching the limit of their adaptive 
capabilities within the intergovernmental framework. Th e intergovernmental ﬁ nance 
system needs substantial changes for localities to adjust further and use their resources 
more eﬀ ectively. Service delivery should be based on a notion of functional integration 
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or functional regionalism, that is, at the level that assures the most eﬃ  cient use of 
resources.
 Supporting the autonomy of local governments. Because of local governments’ over-
whelming reliance on central transfers, economic autonomy has not matched political 
autonomy. Local governments have made eﬀ orts to improve accountability, trans-
parency, and service delivery, but their success has been oﬀ set by sectoral legislation 
that limits local decision-making authority through unnecessary micromanagement. 
Economic autonomy is also limited by a grant allocation system that constrains local 
government initiatives.
 Assuring balanced and equitable development. Since 1990, changes in public resource 
allocation aimed at managing revenue disparities across municipalities and providing 
standard public services have been only partially successful. In addition, they have 
contributed to unpredictability, high administrative costs, and reduced incentives for 
local governments to strengthen local revenue bases. Reductions in inequality between 
small and large and between urban and rural municipalities and across geographic 
regions require reconsideration of the system of grant allocation and distribution.
 Meeting the EU requirements. Meeting EU standards in infrastructure, environment, 
and other areas will require a large investment, part of which will be local. One 
challenge will be the eﬀ ective absorption of EU funds to support accession. Investment 
needs are so large, however, that public funds alone cannot meet them. Th e challenge 
will be to provide an intergovernmental framework that supports local government 
eﬀ orts to access capital markets to ﬁ nance investment needs.
 Providing services eﬃ  ciently and eﬀ ectively. Th ree necessities challenge eﬃ  ciency: (a) 
ensuring further reduction of the cost of services, (b) obtaining optimal scale in 
service delivery, and (c) exercising eﬀ ective regulation and supervision over private 
service providers. Although local governments have been able to improve cost-
eﬃ  ciency, constraints block further improvements. Th e micromanagement by sectoral 
ministries and the system of transfers hinders medium-term local planning for the 
most cost-eﬀ ective service delivery. Limited local management capacity and expertise 
in contracting out and pricing services greatly inﬂ uence the overall quality of service 
delivery. Hence not only municipalities, but also ministries and national agencies that 
have not adjusted their functions to the new decentralized environment, are to blame 
for poor management practices.
 Strengthening the capacity and base for local revenue generation. From a policy perspective, 
the ability of local governments to raise revenues locally is an important indicator 
of their ﬁ scal strength. Th ree aspects need to be considered: (a) the sustainability of 
revenues, (b) the ability to generate revenues through taxes or service fees, and (c) the 
degree to which local tax increases have been accompanied by municipal accountability 
to taxpayers. Local revenues are becoming increasingly important components of 
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Hungary’s ﬁ scal strategy even though localities still rely heavily on central grants (68.4 
percent of total local government revenues in 1998) and pursue a policy of minimum 
local taxation.
 Strengthening strategic planning and ﬁ nancial management. Local ﬁ nancial management 
capacity, particularly current budgeting and cash management, has improved signi-
ﬁ cantly, but has not kept pace with changes in the overall municipal legal framework. 
Suboptimal ﬁ nancial management, lack of trained personnel, and weak ﬁ nancial 
controls often result in misallocation of public investments. Local capacity for 
budgeting, ﬁ nancial reporting and auditing, asset and debt management, and eﬀ ective 
use and regulation of land all must be strengthened. Th is eﬀ ort will be critical to the 
eﬀ ective use of resources, including EU structural funds.
 Securing adequate ﬁ nancial resources. When essential services (those not provided 
through private operations and concessions) cannot be funded by operating surpluses 
and central transfers, private borrowing must ﬁ ll the gap. Th is gap may become 
signiﬁ cant even when EU structural funds are taken into account, because proceeds 
from asset sales, which have been an important source of ﬁ nance, are rapidly coming to 
an end.
 Enhancing the legal and institutional framework for subnational ﬁ nance. Subnational 
entities are ranked among the most risky borrowers in Hungary. Although the Act 
on Municipal Bankruptcy is a useful instrument, weaknesses remain in the ﬁ nancial 
sector regulatory and prudential framework for subnational debt and in the budgetary 
framework to support municipal access to private credit.
 Reducing demand-side impediments for municipal access to private ﬁ nance. A key factor in 
developing a competitive and sustainable subnational market for local infrastructure 
ﬁ nance would be to enhance local governments’ ability to access capital and credit 
markets consistent with macroeconomic stability. Most municipalities are too small to 
undertake investment projects on an economically viable scale, and their size presents 
a major constraint, to nonrecourse ﬁ nance schemes. Th e regional service associations of 
municipalities lack capital, and they are economically nonviable market entities.
 Enhancing ﬁ nancial intermediation and instruments to subnational entities. Unlike 
Hungary’s private ﬁ nancial markets, the municipal credit market remains under-
developed in terms of competitiveness, depth, and liquidity. Falling inﬂ ation and 
interest rates alone will not resolve the issues resulting from a lack of modern capital 
market ﬁ nancing instruments and structures and ﬁ nancial intermediaries to meet 
the projected growth in investment demand of municipalities and public service 
enterprises.
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Th e 1990 reforms of local government in the post-communist states shared three 
characteristics: (a) respect for the right of individual communities to form basic units of 
self-government; (b) suspicion of higher tiers of local administration; and (c) contention 
over their future. Th ese reforms were essentially reactions to the period of communist 
rule, governed by the principle of the unity of state property and administration and the 
concept that local autonomy did not exist. Although communist hierarchies of national 
committees had embraced some practical delegation to county, town, and village levels and 
some limited degree of local representation, the will of the Party hierarchy could always 
prevail. Moreover, historical boundaries had often been ignored in forced amalgamations 
of settlements.
Th e 1990 reorganizations recognized the principles of local autonomy and reasserted 
historical rights and communities. Th e Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak laws, for example, 
allowed virtual freedom for any settlement to declare itself self-governing. In Hungary the 
number of municipalities doubled in 1990; in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the process 
of fragmentation continued for some years. In one Czech village nine people constituted a 
local government area, a population now reduced by mortality to seven.
An innate conﬂ ict arises, however, between this fragmentation and local government 
demands for the right to administer a wide range of competencies covering the regulation 
of local society and the provision of local services. Th is chapter discusses the approaches 
within the European Union to resolving this tension. It begins by comparing the range of 
competencies conferred on local government and goes on to examine the implications of 
these for the structure and organization of local authorities.
* Th is chapter is based on Davey 1998.
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Local Government Responsibilities and 
Division of Competencies between Tiers
Let us ﬁ rst summarize the experiences in major local government competencies in 11 
European Union member states: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Th e list excludes functions exercised 
by the Länder in Austria and Germany and the Belgian regions, which also have federal 
status. It includes functions assigned to upper tiers of local government. Th e division of 
competencies between the basic and upper tiers of local government varies considerably 
between countries, depending to some extent on the size of the lower tier authorities.
In some countries, the separation of function between tiers is clear, with counties 
having the following responsibilities:
 Britain—primary and secondary education, all roads and public transport, social 
services, libraries, waste disposal (but not collection), strategic land use planning, and 
ﬁ re and consumer protection (in larger towns, these two are the responsibility of single 
tier authorities or joint boards).
 Denmark—hospitals, administration of social beneﬁ ts, regional roads, and upper 
secondary schools (gymnasia).
 Sweden—hospitals (except in three large cities), special care for the handicapped, and 
special forms of technical education.
 
All these countries have small basic authorities that have been amalgamated, so that 
they are all capable of fulﬁ lling the tasks reserved for them. In other European countries, 
the division between tiers is less clear. For example, French departements and German 
Landkreise have basic responsibility for secondary school buildings and equipment and for 
social assistance, but these responsibilities may be shared with the larger municipalities. In 
Belgium, France, and Germany, upper-tier responsibilities are either exercised in parallel 
to the municipal level (for example, recreational and cultural facilities) or are residual in 
character (for example, maintaining roads where the municipalities lack capacity).
Th e lack of a clear division of competencies between tiers in this second category is 
due partly to the varying sizes of lower-tier authorities and the survival of small municipal 
bodies. Th e upper-tier authority has to combine two roles: providing services with large 
catchment areas and supplementing municipal services in the smaller communities.
Uniform Responsibilities
In all 11 states, local government is responsible for the following:
 physical planning, including building and planning permission
 public health control, including waste collection and disposal
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 parks and open spaces
 recreational amenities, including sports facilities, libraries, museums, and other cultural 
activities (these functions are not usually exclusive of any level)
 public transport (usually planning and subsidizing rather than direct operation)
 social services, including homes and other services for the elderly and childcare.
Variable Responsibilities
Th e division of other major competencies between central and local government and the 
private sector varies among the 11 countries, with local government involvement deﬁ ned 
as follows:
 Education—In Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, local governments exercise full 
responsibility for primary and secondary education, subject to national policies for 
curriculum and standards. (British local authorities are required to delegate signiﬁ cant 
powers to school governing bodies in which parents are represented, and some schools 
are self-governing and directly funded by the government). In Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, local governments are responsible for 
construction, equipment, and upkeep of primary and secondary school buildings, but 
not for the employment or oversight of teachers. In Portugal, local governments are 
responsible for all these functions for primary schools, but not for secondary schools.
 Hospitals—Upper tiers of local government are responsible for hospital services in 
Denmark, Italy, and Sweden.
 Social beneﬁ ts—State beneﬁ ts are administered by local government in Denmark and 
Sweden. British local authorities administer housing beneﬁ ts and local tax relief. Local 
governments provide safety net supplements to state beneﬁ ts in Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
 Roads—Local governments in all countries except Portugal maintain local and regional 
roads. British local authorities also maintain national trunk roads (only as agents in the 
case of motorways).
 Public utilities—In Britain, water, sewerage, gas, and electricity have been privatized, 
but they are regulated by national legislation. In the other 10 countries, these services 
remain local government responsibilities, though usually franchised to companies that 
operate on a national or regional basis. Th e ownership of these companies varies widely 
between countries.
 Fire protection—Th is service is a local government responsibility in Austria, Belgium, 
Britain, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain.
 Policing—Municipal police forces responsible for traﬃ  c and bylaw enforcement 
operate parallel to national police forces in France, Germany, and Italy. Britain has no 
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national police force; county police forces are supervised by special boards representing 
local governments and the magistrates.
Size and Task
Decisions concerning the assignment of competencies raise basic questions about the 
optimal size of local authorities. Th e argument has several conﬂ icting dimensions.
Catchment Areas
Th e ﬁ rst dimension of the argument relates to the match between catchment areas and 
territorial jurisdiction. How do municipal boundaries correspond with the area from which 
the clients for its services are drawn? What is the minimum area and population for which 
an eﬀ ective service can be provided?
Some observers say that, in principle, municipal boundaries should embrace the 
catchment areas of their main service functions. Th is response raises a number of secondary 
questions. First, what is a minimum level of service? Is a population able to ﬁ ll a medium-
sized primary school suﬃ  cient for a municipality charged with educational responsibilities? 
Most European countries would accept that view, which results in population thresholds 
around 5,000. In Britain, however, a professionally dominant view has prevailed that 
a local education service must integrate a full range of facilities, including a choice of 
primary, secondary, and vocational schools, and support services, such as teacher training, 
specialist advisors, counseling, and inspection, an apparatus that may be economical only 
for populations of 100,000 or more.
Th e same argument can apply to any function. Does one clinic or general hospital 
constitute a local medical service? If not, what range of specialist facilities has to be 
included? Do economies of scale demand that responsibility for maintaining trunk and 
local roads should be shared by the same engineers using the same equipment? Is it eﬃ  cient 
to separate bulk water supply and treatment from reticulation? Moreover, whatever 
catchment area is eventually agreed to be reasonable for one service is unlikely to coincide 
with the boundaries of another, except in the case of large towns.
Executive Capacity
Th e second issue concerns the size of the local authority necessary for eﬀ ective management 
of services and exercise of regulatory duties and is principally a question of ability to recruit 
and employ professional staﬀ  resources, though technical equipment may be involved. Some 
analysts also argue that larger authorities can attract more intelligent elected members, 
although this assertion is diﬃ  cult to verify. Th e associated issue of cost raises the question: 
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Does the overhead cost of maintaining a central administration become disproportionately 
heavy below a particular population threshold?
Th e Council of Europe has reported on a number of surveys on these issues taken by 
member states, including Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands (CoE 1994). Th e 
results are somewhat inconclusive, partly because eﬀ ectiveness is hard to measure. Th ey 
tend to suggest that below a population of 5,000, unit costs are substantially higher and 
professional capacity equally lower. Above this level, diﬀ erences in cost and core administ-
rative abilities are not consistently evident, although more specialized technical skills may 
be marshaled only in municipalities of 12,000 people or more. Th e Dutch study suggests 
that population size is not the only determinant of the level of professional skills deployed; 
whether a municipality is a regional center or part of a major conurbation is also a major 
consideration.
 
Financial Resources
Territorial fragmentation generally increases disparity between local authorities’ resource 
bases. Two types of disparity are at issue: (a) between the general wealth and income 
levels of local authority areas, and (b) in the distribution of commercial and industrial 
undertakings contributing to local revenues.
Large jurisdictions are likely to contain a mixture of more and less aﬄ  uent areas, contri-
buting diﬀ erent levels of local taxation, such as shares of or surcharges on personal income 
tax or residential property taxation. Th e poorer areas may also demand higher levels of 
spending on social services and support (although this cost may be partially oﬀ set by higher 
standards of environmental services secured by richer neighborhoods). A large jurisdiction 
will permit some cross-subsidization between localities in the municipal budget.
Small jurisdictions may be far more uniform in degree of aﬄ  uence or poverty and level 
of revenue generation. Indeed, when procedures allow the formation of small authorities, 
aﬄ  uent neighborhoods have an incentive to secede from a larger territory to escape from 
subsidizing services elsewhere.
Large jurisdictions are likely to combine business and industrial districts with a range 
of residential areas. When jurisdictions proliferate, industrial and commercial development 
may be concentrated in one local authority, but the people they employ and serve may be 
scattered between several others. Th is diﬀ usion will lead to gross disparities in the incidence 
of taxes on business premises or transactions.
Th e impact of these disparities on the ﬁ nances of small authorities depends on the 
types of taxation assigned to local government and the method of their distribution. In the 
Czech Republic, for example, shares of personal income tax accrue to the district in which 
they are collected, but are distributed to individual municipalities according to population. 
Shares of corporate proﬁ t tax, by contrast, accrue to the municipality from which they 
derive. In Slovakia, shares of personal income tax are distributed to local authorities 
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according to population nationwide. Th ese systems mitigate diﬀ erences in local tax bases to 
a varying extent, although disparities in wealth and economic activity will still be reﬂ ected 
in nontax-revenue, such as property income.
A second ﬁ nancial issue concerns the role of intergovernmental transfers—grants and 
revenue shares—in mitigating the eﬀ ects of territorial fragmentation. Reference has been 
made to mechanisms by which the distribution of tax shares may reduce disparities in their 
geographical incidence. Th is reduction may also extend to taxes levied by municipalities. 
In Denmark and Sweden, for example, the yields of the local income tax surcharges 
are distributed to some degree between authorities that have above and below average 
income tax bases; variations in expenditure need are also taken into account. A similar 
redistribution of business tax yields takes place in the Ile de France (metropolitan Paris). 
Th e British Revenue Support Grant aims to compensate fully for diﬀ erences in the value of 
residential property on which the council tax is levied.
Grants may also compensate for mismatches between municipal boundaries and 
local service catchment areas. Th e Hungarian normative grant is based on a combination 
of factors, some of them general (for example, population size) and some speciﬁ c to indivi-
dual services (for example, the number of secondary school pupils). Speciﬁ c factors have 
tended to increase in number and weight in order to give added support to municipalities 
running regional services. Th e Netherlands revenue-sharing system, on which municipalities 
depend for half of their current income, has recently been revamped to give preponderance 
to the needs of authorities with either high levels of social deprivation or regional center 
functions.
Th ese examples show that it is possible to compensate for the disparities and 
mismatches to which territorial fragmentation gives rise. But costs arise in terms of local 
autonomy and accountability. Municipalities become less dependent on the resources 
directly levied on their local economy and more dependent on redistribution by the state 
and on transfers with a greater degree of speciﬁ city.
Moreover, encouraging fragmentation simply by compensating small municipalities 
for their size and excessive per capita overheads becomes a real danger. Some grant systems 
include a basic lump sum element which, though small overall, can be signiﬁ cant for tiny 
authorities; others, as in Hungary and Slovakia, may include an equalization fund for 
villages in deﬁ cit. Compensating nonviable authorities for their self-inﬂ icted penury also 
presents dangers. State budget support should be an incentive to share administrative and 
service costs, not to continue misguided eﬀ orts to go it alone.
Political Representation
Th e conventional wisdom is that the design of local government structures must contend 
with a universal tension between the demands of political participation and economic 
eﬃ  ciency. Services will be more eﬀ ective and eﬃ  cient if local jurisdictions are large, but 
political participation will increase if they are small.
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Both suppositions are questionable though. Th e correlation between size and eﬀ ective-
ness above populations around 5,000 is inconclusive, and so is the inverse correlation 
between size and political participation. Again, this chapter draws on analysis by the 
Council of Europe of studies in Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Sweden (CoE 1994). 
In two measurable respects, participation has been shown to vary inversely with size: 
(a) voter turnout at local elections, and (b) the extent to which individual citizens are 
acquainted with elected oﬃ  cials. Countervailing forces aﬀ ecting the quality of participation 
are also in evidence, however. Larger jurisdictions tend to house a more vigorous civil 
society—a more eﬀ ective combination of local media and pressure groups scrutinizing 
local government and articulating demands and options. Elected members of the larger 
authorities are more likely to be organized on party lines; this partisanship can distort the 
debate of local issues, but it does put some curb on faction and can (although it does not 
always) facilitate hard, strategic choice. 
Factors other than size, of course, contribute to the quality of political participation. 
Electoral systems are important. Election by ward rather than at-large decreases the fear of 
exclusion from power by peripheral or minority communities; it can also lessen resistance 
to a process of amalgamation, because individual council members may be conﬁ dent of 
keeping their places whatever the new boundaries.
Some analysts contend that the political legitimacy of a local authority depends more 
on its historical identity than its size. It can attach as much to a large city as to a small village. 
Th is eﬀ ect has been shown in Britain, where a recent reorganization has been persuaded 
by public opinion to revive historical counties—such as Herefordshire and Rutland—
abolished in 1974 because of supposed nonviability, and to dispense with new territories, 
such as Avon and Humberside, carved out in 1974 in the name of strategic capability.
Is Th ere an Optimal Size?
Th e search for optimal size has proved elusive, more the pursuit of alchemy than economics 
or political science. Attempts to relate size objectively to eﬃ  ciency, eﬀ ectiveness, and 
participation are bedeviled by problems of measurement. Evidence tends to converge around 
a population threshold of 5,000, below which unit costs rise and eﬃ  ciency declines. Above 
this level the evidence is inconclusive, because the more specialized demands for economies 
of scale can be met by more politically acceptable forms of cooperation and buying in 
(Hermann and others 1999).  Th e pursuit of optimal size (and the belief in economies 
of scale) was most active in the 1960s and 1970s, when widespread amalgamations were 
undertaken in several European states. Th e number of local authorities declined by 87 
percent in Sweden, 80 percent in Denmark, 78 percent in Belgium, 76 percent in Britain, 
and 67 percent in West Germany. Similar policies were pursued by communist regimes, 
but most were reversed in 1990. Th e policy was least eﬀ ective in the Mediterranean states, 
where alternative strategies have been pursued, encouraging intermunicipal cooperation or 
strengthening intermediate tiers.
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It could be argued that diﬀ erences in the degree of restructuring reﬂ ect diﬀ erences in 
the context and concept of local government. Territorial fragmentation remains greatest 
and amalgamation processes least eﬀ ective in the Napoleonic systems in which the state 
maintains a major local presence through prefectorial administration and ﬁ eld technical 
services. Th ese support, oversee, and supplement local government in the delivery of 
services. Local authorities have been important traditionally not so much for their capacity 
to provide services themselves but rather for their ability to represent local demands and 
interests to agencies that have the mandate and resources to do so. Conversely, attention 
to size has been greater and amalgamation policies more active in northern European 
states where the state does not maintain a major executive apparatus at local level and has 
depended to a far greater extent on local government to provide local services.
Th ese contrasting traditions have converged to some degree in recent years. Th e 
Mitterand reforms in France, for example, transferred more executive tasks and apparatus 
to local government control, particularly at the intermediate levels, whereas postwar 
governments in Britain have created several parallel networks of single-purpose, non-
elected authorities, in some cases taking over local government responsibilities.
Nevertheless, broad diﬀ erences between northern and southern European systems 
remain. Th e paradox is that post-communist reforms in countries such as Hungary have 
basically created a southern European structure of multiple local authorities that have huge 
disparities in size and resources, but a northern European role in terms of function and 
self-suﬃ  ciency. Th e post-communist backlash also makes them particularly sensitive to 
attempts at rationalization.
Remedies
Most European countries have responded in some way to these challenges. No uniﬁ ed 
solution exists to improve the eﬃ  ciency of service delivery, although a clear tendency has 
emerged to create larger service units or regions via association of municipalities through 
legal, organizational, and ﬁ nancial consolidation of service units or neighbor municipalities.
Th e Nordic countries and Britain have opted for amalgamation of municipalities; 
others preferred other alternatives that tolerate, willingly or by default, a proliferation of 
jurisdictions, giving equal status to large cities and a mass of tiny villages. In such cases, 
practical solutions  must be found to the inability of many local authorities to perform even 
elementary duties.
Even when amalgamation policies have been pursued, some tasks are beyond the 
capacity of most individual local authorities. Th ey may have exceptionally large catchment 
areas (for example, a school for the blind), they may demand highly specialized expertise 
and equipment (for example, a trading standards laboratory), or they may require 
strategic coordination over a very large area (for example, transportation planning in a 
conurbation).
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Reformers have suggested many types of alternative solutions to these situations, 
and these solutions can be grouped into four categories: (a) amalgamation; (b) structural 
solutions, vesting competencies in intermediate levels of single- or multipurpose authority; 
(c) cooperative solutions, leaving basic local authorities with functional responsibilities 
exercised through cooperation, whether compulsory or voluntary; and (d) contracting 
solutions, leaving basic local authorities with functional responsibilities exercised by buying 
service provision or management. 
Amalgamation
Some local government systems have been reorganized to achieve a target minimum size 
of basic local authority—around 5,000 people in Scandinavian countries and vastly larger 
in Britain.
In some cases, creating larger functional units of local government has left intact a 
basic village level of representation. Parish councils in Britain have no mandatory tasks, 
which are all assigned to county or district local governments, nor do they receive state 
funding. Th ey do have the right, however, to levy a small surcharge on the local tax and 
to spend it on supplementing local services, to be consulted on planning applications, 
and to be active in representing local demands and views to any local public or private 
agency. Parish councilors may sit on the governing bodies of local schools, for example, 
even though the schools belong to higher tier authorities. In some German Länder, where 
Grossgemeinden (large communities) have been created by amalgamation, the constituent 
Gemeinden have retained the right to elect a mayor to represent local views and to carry out 
minor administrative and ceremonial functions. In these ways, some sense of local identity 
is preserved, even though responsibilities requiring signiﬁ cant ﬁ nance and staﬃ  ng are 
performed by local authorities covering a larger area and population.
Structural Solutions: Intermediate Tiers
Th e most frequent structural solution to inadequacies of the basic level of local government 
is to establish an intermediate tier of multipurpose, elected bodies. Examples are the French 
departements; the British, Danish, and Swedish counties; the German Kreises; the Romanian 
judets; and the Dutch province. Hungarian counties fall into this category.
Signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in how these middle-tier authorities function are evident. Th e 
ﬁ rst diﬀ erence is their geographic scope. Th e normative model is for the whole country 
to be divided into these units and for their local government authorities to exercise their 
particular tasks everywhere within their respective boundaries.
Th e exceptions are many, however. Several countries follow what is known in 
Britain as the “doughnut” shape, within which large cities and towns are excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the surrounding middle-tier authority and exercise both basic and 
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middle-tier functions. Th is exclusion applies to British metropolitan boroughs and unitary 
authorities, German Kreisfreistädte, and Hungarian county-rights towns. Th is pattern may 
be nationwide or conﬁ ned to exceptional cases (for example, Stockholm, Prague, and three 
other Czech cities).
Th e doughnut system has long historical roots in most cases. It harks back to days, 
usually mediaeval, when burgeoning cities obtained charters from the Crown to exercise a 
degree of autonomy over tasks performed outside their boundaries by royal delegates. Th is 
exemption from county jurisdiction is a treasured mark of local identity and autonomy and 
is often ﬁ ercely defended.
Th e exclusion of cities from middle-tier jurisdiction respects tradition and allows the 
integrated delivery of services, but it also causes diﬃ  culties, particularly in managing and 
funding services with wider catchment areas and in coordinating development planning 
and transportation with a city’s hinterland.
A second major diﬀ erence relates to the assignment of functions to the intermediate 
tier. In countries such as Denmark and Sweden, the functions of the middle tier are tightly 
deﬁ ned to avoid duplication and minimize infringement on municipal competence. Th ey 
tend to be conﬁ ned to the management of very large or highly specialized institutions, 
such as hospitals or technical colleges. Th e functions of British county councils are wider, 
embracing primary and secondary education, social services, and transportation. Even in 
Britain, however, relationships with the lower tier are nonhierarchical and respective tasks 
are demarcated to avoid any suggestion of superior authority. Central government deals 
directly with the lower tier in respect to its ﬁ eld of competence.
Th is demarcation is not universal. In countries where the basic tier includes many tiny 
communities, the role of the middle tier may be more ﬂ exible. Th e division of responsibility 
between the German Kreis and Gemeinde is more varied and ﬂ exible, depending on local 
agreement, capability, and partnership. Th e Kreis has its distinct duties, but it also has a 
general role in supplementing and supporting the smaller Gemeinde.
Flexible solutions mean that the division of competencies between the basic and 
intermediate tiers does not follow a uniform pattern—the current position in Hungary. Th e 
problem is adapting the ﬂ ow of ﬁ nancial resources, particularly because the variations in 
competence often apply to the most costly regional services such as schools and hospitals, 
which earn little direct revenue.
Intermunicipal Cooperation
Th e 1990 local legislation in central European countries generally made provision for 
municipalities to form associations for the common discharge of functions. Th ese powers 
were largely voluntary, and generally, countries have been disappointed at the lack of 
implementation. Th e Hungarian legislation was an exception in that it virtually required 
very small neighboring municipalities to establish a common oﬃ  ce to employ a qualiﬁ ed 
administrative notary.
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Far greater experience of intermunicipal cooperation lies in those western European 
states that have large numbers of small municipalities. Chief among these is France, which 
has more than 2,000 multipurpose syndicats de communes maintaining roads, water supplies, 
and social and educational services on behalf of their members and more than 11,500 other 
syndicats providing a single service, such as water supply, schools, electricity, gas, or ﬂ ood 
control. Th ey are run by joint committees representing the member community councils 
and levy a compulsory contribution from them. Th e Gemeindeverbände play a similar role in 
German Länder (mainly in the south or east) where amalgamation of small municipalities 
has not been compulsory, usually providing a joint administration. Roughly 50 percent of 
Spanish municipalities are involved in joint authorities, half of them single-purpose and 
half multipurpose.
Even in countries where basic tier authorities are generally larger, joint working is 
common for specialized functions with signiﬁ cant economies of scale. In Britain the county 
level normally has joint authorities for ﬁ re protection, public transport, and waste disposal. 
In Finland smaller authorities form joint boards mainly for health care, social services, and 
vocational training.
Th e operations of these joint authorities diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly. First, their legal forms 
vary from an independent statutory authority to a joint committee or a company in which 
the partner municipalities hold equity. Most are governed by a board of representatives of 
the member authorities. Th ey may establish their own management structures or entrust 
administration to one of the constituent municipalities. Th e British joint boards normally 
employ technical staﬀ , but they use the administrative, accounting, and legal machinery of 
one of the member boroughs or districts.
Th e second diﬀ erence concerns the ﬁ nancial base. Joint authorities typically receive 
directly any charges or fees pertaining to their function, but they rely on contributions from 
member municipal budgets for the balance of their costs. Whether these contributions are 
obligatory or voluntary (that is, at the discretion of the joint boards or the municipalities) 
depends on the statutory base of the board. In some cases, joint boards in France and 
Britain may levy a tax directly, normally by “precepting” on taxes raised by their members 
(that is, putting an additional percentage rate on the local tax base).
Th e third diﬀ erence lies in the nature of the cooperation. Some joint authorities are 
voluntary creations of their member municipalities. Others are legally required, such as 
the metropolitan ﬁ re and public transport authorities in Britain, some (but not all) of the 
French communautes urbaines, or the common rural administrative oﬃ  ces in Hungary. Many 
lie in between these two categories, the result of vigorous arm twisting by the state. A high 
proportion of the French syndicats de communes fall into this category, being constituted by 
agreements brokered by prefects and backed by state grants and loans only accessible to 
joint authorities.
Th is lesson, indeed, may be the principal one of western European experience. Large 
municipalities may combine spontaneously to run a highly specialized function that is 
peripheral to their main operations and a relatively small charge on their budgets, but 
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small municipalities do not cooperate readily with neighbors to run a basic service such 
as a school or a water supply or to share administrative machinery, whatever the technical 
merits of such arrangement.
A high degree of legal compulsion or state manipulation lies behind the scale of 
intermunicipal cooperation found in countries such as France and is essential in such systems 
to secure service viability, particularly in rural areas. Of special interest is the French legal 
provision that all communes in a locality must participate in a speciﬁ c “syndicat” established 
by agreement between two-thirds of the communes concerned or communes representing 
two-thirds of the population of the area served. Making budgetary contributions binding 
on member authorities and providing model formulas for the distribution of costs may also 
be important.
Contractual Arrangements
An alternative strategy for coping with ineﬃ  ciencies of size is contracting out or buying in. 
Such practices may be intermunicipal or commercial. Intermunicipal arrangements consist 
of buying services from another local authority. Th is arrangement is not uncommon in 
central Europe, where rural and suburban authorities frequently purchase services from 
municipal companies owned by the core town (although the towns are normally reimbursed 
by direct charges on rural and suburban residents). Some newly restored unitary authorities 
in Britain are buying special services, such as trading standards laboratories, from the 
surrounding county.
 A widespread alternative is contracting out service provision to a commercial company, 
which may operate on a national or even international basis. Again, France oﬀ ers the most 
cases, with companies, led by Compagnie Generale des Eaux and Sociètè Lyonnaise-Dumez, 
managing 75 percent of municipal water supplies with a high degree of vertical integration, 
including distribution, treatment, maintenance, and pipe manufacture. Th ese companies 
have expanded their contracting to many other municipal services, Generale des Eaux being 
active in construction, street lighting, leisure management, car parking, telecommunications, 
public health, and catering. Th ey have also expanded to other countries, taking advantage of 
privatization and contracting out policies in Britain, for example, and securing water supply 
management contracts in the Czech Republic.
British legislation requires local authorities to submit provision of many services to 
public tender, and the in-house organizations are allowed to compete with the private 
sector. Th is arrangement has also brought private sector companies into the management 
of services, such as refuse collection and leisure centers, and even into white collar services 
such as engineering, payroll management, and legal representation.
Contracting out enables municipal purchasers to beneﬁ t from the economies of scale 
oﬀ ered by external suppliers, and to tap into the expertise they gain from operating on 
a wider scene. Some of the leisure management companies have undoubtedly brought 
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new ﬂ are and innovation to sporting and cultural facilities in Britain. Contracting out 
also potentially oﬀ ers greater eﬃ  ciency; compulsory competitive tendering is estimated 
to have resulted in overall cost savings of 6 percent in Britain, even though in-house 
organizations have secured around 70 percent of the contracts. But the eﬃ  ciency beneﬁ ts 
depend on the existence of genuine competition, based on alternative providers, honest and 
transparent procurement processes, and eﬀ ective supervision. Local authorities must retain 
the technical expertise to design and supervise contracts or have some shared resource for 
doing so. Th is level of control poses some problems in the post-communist states, where 
professional skills have largely been located in the municipal companies and institutions 
rather than in the town halls, which tend to be staﬀ ed largely by lawyers and generalists.
Conclusions
Belief in economies of scale, which dominated the debate over local government structure 
and function through much of postwar Europe, resulted in major reorganizations and 
reductions in the numbers of local authorities in several, largely northern European, 
states, together with the creation of intermediate tiers for strategic purposes, mainly in 
conurbation. Th e theory of economies of scale has been echoed in much of the restructuring 
and “globalization” of the commercial world.
Th e 1980s and 1990s have witnessed something of a reaction against this trend. “Small 
is beautiful,” an emphasis on community, and a reversion to historical identity mark the 
backlash. Countries have little technical consensus or political will to drive through further 
amalgamations. “Buying in” is the most typical solution to the needs for shared capability.
Empirical evidence has suggested that the eﬀ ectiveness of local authority services 
declines and unit costs rise below a municipal population threshold around 5,000. Above 
this level, no conclusive evidence indicates that increasing size results in either improved 
eﬀ ectiveness or reduced participation.
Th e local government systems recreated since 1990 in several of the post-communist 
states share the major problems of disparate size and mismatch with functional require-
ments that inspired the northern European amalgamations of previous decades. Whether 
restructuring oﬀ ers a feasible solution is questionable. Restructuring is out of fashion in 
western Europe and contrary to the post-communist mood in central and eastern Europe.
Th e Hungarian government’s approach—applied with extreme caution—may oﬀ er 
the only practical solution to the proliferation of very small municipalities. Th is approach 
recognizes the right of individual communities of whatever size to retain a separate identity 
and a representative body, but it puts increasing pressure on them to share an administrative 
apparatus and run services jointly.
Th is process cannot be purely voluntary. On the one hand, municipalities need legal 
requirements for minimum capabilities necessary for speciﬁ c competencies that induce 
the municipalities to cooperate. On the other hand, municipalities need ﬁ nancial and 
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legal incentives to encourage cooperation—model agreements, criteria for cost sharing, 
improved access to state budget support, even possibly access to taxing power. Financial 
incentives should encourage cooperation, not costly isolation. Both sticks and carrots are 
essential to the process.
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4The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Fiscal DecentralizationIlona Pálné-Kovács
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Th e new Hungarian Constitution and the 1990 Act on Local Government (ALG) formed 
the basic legislation of the decentralized subnational system. Th is initial legislation provided 
a broad, uniﬁ ed, ﬂ exible, and open framework for local competencies, responsibilities, and 
expenditure assignment. Th e legislation aimed at ensuring continuity and radical reform in 
local functions and services in conformity with the liberal paradigm of resource regulation 
and widespread local autonomy. Th e ALG deﬁ nes mandatory and voluntary tasks, but local 
governments identify local needs and priorities and thus determine the level and quality 
of services. In this system the role of central grants is to supplement local funds rather 
than ﬁ nance tasks. Th e annual Budget Act, the 1992 Act on Public Finance, and sectoral 
regulations have gradually supplemented the ALG and deﬁ ned key conditions for its 
implementation.
Th is chapter reviews the present legislative framework of local service delivery and 
highlights key contradictions in the current regulation. I argue that because a clear division 
of competencies provides a solid basis for adequate ﬁ nancing schemes and quality-assuring 
monitoring systems, the major caveats of further progress in ﬁ scal decentralization depend 
on legal and constitutional regulations and not so much on local government ﬁ nance itself. 
I have identiﬁ ed several issues that must be addressed to ensure that the legal framework 
provides for clear expenditure assignment, stability in ﬁ nancing, and accountability in 
operation and investments.
* Th is chapter is based on Pálné-Kovács 1998.
PA RT  2    S E C T I O N  1    M O D E R N I Z I N G  T H E  I N T E R G O V E R N M E N TA L  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M
94
Expenditure Assignment Regulations
Unlike the German and many other European legal systems, the regulation of the Hungarian 
system is unclear about the legal nature of centrally mandated tasks of local governments. 
Mandatory and voluntary (locally undertaken) tasks are not clearly distinguished and thus 
do not ensure clarity in ﬁ nancing.
Unclear Local Competencies
In principle the Constitution should set forth the services to which citizens have unique 
rights and specify the responsibility of the central and local governments in providing 
these services. Services due to all citizens (for example, elementary education, basic health 
care, and social services) could be considered to be unique rights and central government 
tasks. Provision of these tasks could still be delegated to local governments, but the central 
government has the full ﬁ nancial responsibility. At the same time local governments must 
comply with formal and organizational regulations and training requirements. Central 
government tasks or a part of them could also be outsourced from local governments 
to the private or nonproﬁ t sector, as several international examples show. In quite a few 
countries, education and health care either are not local government tasks or are organized 
by special local governments (for example, Italy and Finland).  Mandatory local tasks could 
refer to regional or local public goods provided by a dominant cluster of local governments 
(although not all). Th ese services can include secondary education and vocational training, 
in-patient and special medical treatment, child and youth protection, care for disabled and 
elderly citizens, basic community services, basic library services, maintenance of public 
collections, and certain social services (such as family assistance or aid for the homeless). 
In these cases, the central government has only to supplement local resources and may 
regulate technical standards and quality in providing these goods. Voluntary local services 
could mean any kind of services; nevertheless, they should be ﬁ nanced exclusively from 
own revenues or shared taxes.
Mandatory Tasks: General versus Sectoral Regulation
Th e ALG, the most comprehensive regulation of local government aﬀ airs, initially did not 
specify clearly the mandatory local services. It mentions local government responsibilities 
in general in a quite inconsistent way and provides some examples headed by the term 
“especially” (paragraph 1, section 8). Even in the case of the latter tasks, localities have 
the right to decide the extent and quality of services in light of local needs and resources 
(paragraph 2, section 8). Th erefore, these responsibilities cannot be considered to be 
obligatory in the sense of a public law. In addition, many of these tasks are not primarily 
local (for example, public safety, public transportation, and local energy supply), and the 
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current system provides no tools to ﬁ nance them. Since 1994 local governments have had 
a list of mandatory services (for example, kindergarten, elementary school, basic social and 
health services, potable water, local roads, and public lighting; paragraph 4, section 8).
Th at the law provides neither sanctions for non-fulﬁ llment of the mandatory tasks nor 
a monitoring system for local responsibilities and service delivery is a legal phenomenon. 
As a ﬁ nancing consequence, central government transfers (block grants and normative 
grants) are provided regardless of the extent or quality of services. In other countries the 
central government has the right to exercise professional control if services are mandated to 
subnational levels or to the private sector and state transfers are partially or fully withheld 
in case of poor quality or insuﬃ  cient provision.
To complicate the system further, sectoral laws since 1990 have deﬁ ned additional 
local government tasks. Strangely, there is an unclear legal relationship between local 
government tasks deﬁ ned in the ALG that require a two-thirds majority to be approved 
and other sectoral laws approved by only a simple majority by the Parliament. 
In principle the ALG provides for the ﬁ nancing of all obligatory tasks. Th is part of 
the law has been in the crossﬁ re of debates since its inception. Th e ALG states that the 
Parliament, in tandem with assigning a new mandatory task to the local level, must provide 
adequate funding and decide the extent and form of respective central transfers (paragraph 
5, section 1).
Sectoral laws that deﬁ ne additional tasks, however, usually do not deal with ﬁ nancing 
issues and do not adequately increase local resources. Even if the Parliament intends to 
provide additional resources, the most debated issue is usually whether the tasks should 
be covered fully or only partially from the state budget. Th e counterargument often is that 
local governments will rely on their own revenues when ﬁ nancing new tasks.
Although normative grants often change in tandem with the enactment of sectoral 
rules (or sometimes new earmarked grants are created), just as frequently funding of new 
tasks is integrated into an old normative, with no regard for how much the new provision 
may cost. General purpose grants are designated to ﬁ nance tasks for which normative 
grants are not speciﬁ ed in the transfer system, but quite often general grants are referred to 
when the localities require additional transfers for new mandatory tasks.
Voluntary Tasks
Th e ALG deﬁ nes the scope of voluntary tasks more clearly by saying that local govern-
ment can provide any kind of local function or service not designated by law to other 
organizations’ competency. Nevertheless, some tasks are voluntary only for certain types 
of local governments and obligatory for others. Tasks of regional scope (for example, 
secondary education) are designated to larger settlements and to counties as a mandatory 
task, but the ALG allows other settlements to provide them or even to take them over in 
accordance with local priorities. Th us the diﬀ erentiation between mandatory and voluntary 
tasks is inconsistent in the legislation.
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Th e central government’s involvement in ﬁ nancing voluntary tasks is totally unregulated. 
Evidently, own and shared incomes serve (among other things) as funding for voluntary 
tasks, as do some state transfers, which the ministries allocate in a rather uncoordinated 
way. According to the regulation, in case of a ﬁ nancial crisis, local governments must 
maintain their obligatory tasks and cut their voluntary services ﬁ rst. Th e regulation holds a 
dilemma: localities must apply the same rules in downsizing voluntary and obligatory tasks, 
so streamlining of obligatory tasks becomes rather diﬃ  cult. In addition, voluntary tasks 
represent maneuvering opportunities, because local governments make decisions according 
to local demand. Abandoning voluntary tasks from the local services would mean the loss 
of an essential aspect of subnational autonomy. 
Fragmented Service Delivery
Diﬀ erentiating expenditure assignments by size of local governments is one of the biggest 
problems in the subnational legislation, despite the basis provided by the ALG. Th e ALG 
acknowledges (in paragraph 1, section 6) that diﬀ erent tasks and competencies might occur 
in villages, towns, county governments, the capital city, and its districts. More obligatory 
tasks and competencies may be delegated to local governments of settlements that have 
a larger population and bigger capacity. Th ese provisions clearly give the legislature the 
opportunity to decide the scope and extent of services that should be provided by a certain 
rank of local government.
Th e same paragraph of the ALG also contains an auxiliary rule that overturns the 
logic of the main provision and hinders implementation. Th e local government of a small 
settlement can voluntarily provide services otherwise delegated by law to municipalities 
that have larger population or to county governments, assuming that the small settlement 
is able to supply the services in its area, either by itself or in association with other local 
governments. In such a case the small locality is automatically eligible to receive normative 
transfers to ﬁ nance the tasks taken over from bigger municipalities.
Th is rule has blocked the development of an optimal expenditure assignment and 
ﬁ nancing scheme for several reasons. First, unilateral local decisions can distort an existing 
and well-operating service by creating parallel capacities. As a result, the initial service 
provider can no longer use its own optimal capacity. Second, the central government might 
even reinforce irrational expenditure assignments by guaranteed funding of new tasks of 
smaller municipalities. Th is arrangement may bring bigger local governments originally 
mandated to perform certain tasks into a diﬃ  cult ﬁ nancial situation, because providers 
receive transfers according to the number of users rather than capacities. Th ird, the task 
taken over by the government of a small settlement is often provided only to its own 
citizens, and it cannot be obliged to supply a bigger area. As a result the local government 
initially responsible for servicing a bigger area cannot simply withdraw because that would 
leave citizens without service.
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Sectoral Regulation and Economies of Scale
Th e ALG states (in paragraph 3, section 8) that laws can diﬀ erentiate task assignments by 
the size, population, or other conditions of settlements. Such diﬀ erentiation rarely happened 
in the past; distinction was not even made between tasks of villages (say 100 citizens) and 
towns (say 50,000 citizens). Nevertheless, some sectoral acts aim at stimulating the use of 
economies of scale, such as the 1993 Act on Social Administration and Assistance, the 
1996 Act on Fire Protection, and the 1998 Act on Construction. 
Analyzing the regulation, one can conclude that the legislature did not want to get 
involved directly in forming special service districts or identifying the optimal size of 
service units. Th e sectoral laws have not regulated a clear and stable diﬀ erentiation of tasks 
by type or size of municipalities, although these laws at least state that services should 
be organized by region. Municipalities are usually eligible for central support when they 
organize the regional task locally or form a region with a very small neighbor (say, to supply 
2,000 citizens).
A set of indirect tools at hand discourages fragmented service delivery, such as applying 
tight service standards or inspecting suppliers’ licenses and accreditation. When qualitative 
and quantitative conditions of service delivery have been well deﬁ ned, small localities are 
individually unable to meet the standards. Since sectoral funds for investment grants are 
limited, they often serve only to demonstrate that central government support exists, but in 
practice, that support is not accessible for many municipalities even though they are eligible 
to apply for sectoral support. Th e interesting legal feature of this framework is that central 
government or ministerial decrees can substantially change the rules of service delivery 
without amendment of laws (that is, without Parliamentary approval).
Primary Education
Th e 1993 Act on Public Education does not diﬀ erentiate by size of settlements, apart from 
tasks assigned exclusively to county governments. Th e act precisely deﬁ nes institutional 
and professional requirements for local education and deﬁ nes only a subsidiary role for the 
central government in elementary and secondary education. Institutions that have regional 
or national functions can be managed by the state, with approval of the minister of ﬁ nance, 
only if the original operator proved incapable. On the positive side the act orders county 
governments to initiate service contracts between local governments in a given geographic 
area and encourages them to make a six-year development plan for public education and 
for the operation of their institutional network.
Th e act states that operational expenses are not fully covered by the central government, 
though the cost coverage should not be less than 80 percent. School budgets, therefore, 
contain contributions from the central and local governments, and maybe own revenues 
(for example, fees paid by the students for food or extracurricular activities). Th e diﬃ  culty 
in ﬁ nding the right techniques to ﬁ nance education is demonstrated by the fact that the 
number of normatives has increased tremendously, and now a few hundred indicators are 
PA RT  2    S E C T I O N  1    M O D E R N I Z I N G  T H E  I N T E R G O V E R N M E N TA L  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M
98
used to specify the content of education services. Th is trend, though it symbolizes the 
responsibility of the central government, does not encourage localities to rationalize their 
institutions or service delivery.
Social Assistance
Th e 1993 Act on Social Administration and Assistance deﬁ nes basic tasks for all localities 
and special task assignments by size clusters of settlements (2,000, 10,000, 20,000, and 
30,000 or more inhabitants). In villages with fewer than 500 inhabitants, the village 
manager fulﬁ lls basic social tasks.
Th e weakness of the regulation is that bigger settlements with special tasks are not 
responsible to serve beyond their own area, so citizens of a settlement that does not have a 
special social institution can use the county’s social institutions. Citizens can also use social 
services in a neighboring municipality if the two localities have a contract or joint service 
delivery association.
Health Care
Th e 1997 Act on Health Care states that citizens are eligible for basic medical services and 
for in-patient service in their place of residence or vicinity. Th ey are eligible for out-patient 
services in a place accessible by regular public transportation. Th is deﬁ nition does not have 
a real normative power. In practice, because only institutions contracted by the Health 
Insurance Fund are able to provide services, the ﬁ nancing system—the annual bargaining 
in the framework of the capacity use agreement—essentially determines how close the 
service gets to the patient.
As for local governments the act presumes that basic health care services are organized 
on a territorial basis. As opposed to its thoroughness regarding medical standards, the 
act regulates the local governments’ role superﬁ cially, stating only that municipalities are 
responsible for out-patient and in-patient care. Th e appendix to the act deﬁ nes the number 
of hospital beds in advance for ﬁ ve years based on precise statistical indices; it also lists 
the institutions with national and regional functions, regardless of whether they are in 
central or local hands. Detailed conditions for these services and the normatives of regional 
ﬁ nancing, however, are regulated in a separate law passed in 1996.
Th e essence of the health ﬁ nance model is that local governments are responsible 
for infrastructure, and operation is ensured by funding from the Health Insurance Fund. 
Within this framework, however, local governments and other managing agents can 
negotiate the capacities of their institutions. Although the owners or managers of health 
institutions can submit joint oﬀ ers for Health Insurance Fund ﬁ nancing harmonized at the 
county level, inevitably bargaining takes place within the counties and service delivery may 
still remain fragmented.
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Counties and Cities with County Rank
Th e subnational system has two particular features: (a) the subsidiary arrangement for 
county government tasks, and (b) the special status of cities with county rank. Th e latter 
not only worsened the conditions of optimal service provision at micro-regional and 
regional levels, but it also made the understanding of expenditure assignments more 
diﬃ  cult. Th e allocation of tasks between city and county governments is chaotic, both in 
the legislation and practice. As a consequence of constant changes in assignments, asset 
refurbishment and investments are often neglected, and the service providers and users 
have no stable, long-term relationship.
County governments are mandated by law to provide public services on request for 
the whole or part of the county. In addition, they can be required to provide services in 
a settlement where most users of a service unit (for example, school dormitory) are not 
citizens of the municipality (managing spillover). Th is role of buﬀ er or last resort could be 
more important, but subsequent regulations prevent municipalities and county governments 
from establishing a stable division of labor between them.
A municipality can obtain the right to take over and manage a service unit for at 
least three years if its citizens have been the primary users in the past four years. Th e act 
thus allows for the introduction of voluntary tasks, but a municipality can unilaterally take 
over service units. In addition, a municipality (alone or in association with others) has 
the right to establish a new service unit and take over a service provided by the county 
as mandatory. In such a case the ALG guarantees that the municipality receives central 
transfers in proportion with the task taken over. Th e central government, therefore, does not 
provide more money, but it reallocates the transfers between the county and the respective 
municipality. Th is regulation evidently puts county governments in an economically 
depressed position because they often must continue the service for the rest of the region, 
but operate with suboptimal use and smaller entry transfers when someone creates a new 
regional service unit.
Th e ALG does not specify (although it does not exclude) the possibility of joint 
county–municipal service delivery. Th e amendment of the ALG in 1994 intended to 
assign more, and some exclusive, tasks to the counties. Th e actual legal solution, however, 
is less than optimal. Th e act lists the mandatory services for counties, but it also states that 
municipalities may choose whether they want to provide such services. Th e ALG also states 
that municipalities can pass service units to the counties, and the counties are obliged to 
take them over.
Only a narrow range of tasks ultimately became mandates for counties, and a 
wider range of tasks remained the responsibility of municipalities. Tasks now belonging 
exclusively to counties are certain professional promotion and harmonization functions 
created by sectoral legislation in the recent years, including, for example, professional child 
and youth protection services, specialized social care services, museums, collections of 
historical documents, county library service, environmental protection supervision, tourism, 
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and the harmonization of employment policy. In sum, the 1994 amendment to the act 
brought about some positive changes, but it did not correct the major confusion in service 
delivery and disincentives in managing service units.
According to the ALG, cities with county rank are endowed with municipal and 
county tasks and competencies. Th e act thus states that county governments have no 
subsidiary role in relation to cities with county rank. Th ese cities are obliged to carry out 
county level tasks in their own territory, and cannot pass their service units or tasks to 
the county. Th is model implies that cities with county rank can or must run in parallel all 
kinds of county-type service units. Fortunately, this parallelism has not become a practice. 
Instead of duplicating service units, apart from a few exceptional cases, an ad hoc division 
of labor emerged between the county and cities with county rank. How tasks are divided 
between the county and the cities usually depends on the situation inherited from 1990. 
In general, cities have more choices than the county since the latter serves also the 
inhabitants of the city, whereas the city with county rank is not obliged to serve the rest of 
the county, though it often does.
Joint Service Delivery
Th e 1997 Act on Associations and Cooperation of Local Governments aims at improving 
the quality and eﬃ  ciency of service delivery, but it does not supply a remedy for fragmented 
service delivery. Th e act regulates several forms of associations, but it does not provide 
for advance ﬁ nancing of joint service delivery associations. Advanced ﬁ nancing requires 
the formation of a municipal association as a legal entity that operates as a budgetary 
organization. Th e act does not allow associations to collect taxes or own revenues, to 
receive direct budgetary support, or to be responsible for local services. Th e law is obscure 
regarding liabilities and property rights of associations. Th e details of ﬁ nancing associations 
for multiple services or maintaining several institutions have not been regulated.
Th e act deﬁ nes various forms of associations, but eligibility for central transfers is 
regulated case by case in the annual budget laws. Th e members of associations can decide on 
the volume of their contributions to the joint task, and their agreement is necessary for all 
issues concerning the association budget. Since the law’s enactment, analysts have realized 
that without positive incentives the mere clariﬁ cation and reﬁ nement is not suﬃ  cient 
to promote a more intensive establishment of municipal associations. Introduction of 
obligatory associations for service delivery must be addressed sooner or later.
Local government ﬁ nances contain some incentives for joint service delivery. 
Nevertheless, they change constantly and have not played a signiﬁ cant role. Th e central 
government has been promoting joint notary services since 1990, although the volume and 
conditions of transfers, and sometimes their form, have changed. Since 1998, associations 
receive extra ﬁ nancial support if the member local governments can prove they cut costs by 
providing services through the association. Eligibility for a deﬁ cit grant is also conditioned 
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on local governments’ attempts to cut expenses through service delivery in associations. 
I should note that a precise monitoring of association service delivery attempts is hardly 
possible.
Furthermore, the 1992 Act on Addressed and Targeted Grants also stimulate 
establishment of associations. Joint investments of municipalities receive a 10 percent extra 
investment grant, and the extra support is 20 percent for associations of villages smaller 
than 1,000 inhabitants. In addition, villages with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants can access 
investment grants for certain purposes (for example, a regional solid waste deposit or a 
sewage puriﬁ cation plant) only if they join associations.
Legal Shortcomings of Local Government Finance
Th e ALG introduced a new ﬁ nancial management philosophy, namely resource regulation. 
Th is approach deﬁ nes types of local government revenues and supplements them with 
central government resources in line with the mandatory tasks. Under a task-ﬁ nancing 
scheme, local budgets would be derived from expenditure needs, and the central govern-
ment would cover the gap between the local needs and resources. Th e key diﬀ erence 
between resource regulation and task ﬁ nancing is that the former gives localities freedom 
in managing their operations on the basis of locally available resources.
Local Revenues
According to the 1992 Act on Public Finance, the Parliament decides, within the framework 
of the annual Budget Act, shared taxes, the entitlement and amount of normative transfers 
as well as the targeted grants and their distribution. Th e annual budget law obviously 
plays an important role in the transfer mechanism, since the values and priorities of the 
legislators reﬂ ect the government’s concerns and determine the ﬁ nancial conditions for 
local governments—that is, state transfers and contributions, the volume of shared taxes, 
the payment obligations of local governments, and the rules of ﬁ nancial management of 
local governments.
Th ese rules enable the central government to redistribute resources annually. In 
practice the annual Budget Act modiﬁ es the local government ﬁ nance system every year. 
Th ese annual revisions make local governments dependent on the volume of state transfers 
and the shared revenues from the state budget (such as personal income taxes [PIT], 
environmental ﬁ nes, and vehicle taxes). Not only the volume, but also the entitlements 
for transfers, change year by year, and these changes make local expenditure planning and 
revenue forecasting very diﬃ  cult. Th e number of state normatives has been mushrooming 
continuously. Table 4.1 summarizes the most essential changes introduced between 1990 
and 1998.
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Th e annual Budget Act, which also determines state general rules and regulations 
related to budget implementation, contains provisions to amend other acts for the 
sake of implementation of the Budget Act. Th e rules and institutions of public ﬁ nance 
management as well as the relationship among the general government subsystems (that 
is, the division of labor and organizational setup) have not stabilized. Key properties of the 
system are reshaped within the framework of the annual budget, bearing the disadvantages 
of its temporary and often ad hoc character.
Implementation of the annual Budget Act is very diﬃ  cult, and the text is incompre-
hensible for several reasons. First, the act regulates a wider range of issues than usual; as a 
consequence, it aﬀ ects a period beyond the actual ﬁ scal year. Second, several issues are re-
regulated every year. Th ird, the structure of budgets is not consistent, and that inconsistency 
makes comparisons among various years rather diﬃ  cult. Fourth, the acts and institutions of 
public ﬁ nance management were created in vain, because their rules are subject to constant 
changes during the approval of the annual Budget Act.
As table 4.1 shows, local government ﬁ nance has been shifting gradually toward task 
ﬁ nancing. Th is shift is an issue not only because it evidently weakens the independence of 
local governments, but also because it decreases their interest and creativity in choosing 
ways of service delivery. In theory, localities must have freedom to use up current 
expenditure resources, whereas investment ﬁ nance is tied to concrete objectives. I must 
emphasize that normatives are the basis for calculating and allocating central transfers, 
but local governments are not obliged to ﬁ nance a given task strictly in accordance with 
the received current grant. Th e freedom of using recurrent grants is quite formal since in 
most cases central grants for mandatory tasks have to be supplemented from local own 
revenues.
Equalization Mechanisms
Equalization, which should be an important element in local government ﬁ nance, plays an 
overwhelming role in Hungary. It looms large because, although the disparities in income-
generating capacities across municipalities and regions are severe, the system of normative 
transfers alone is unsuitable to handle the diﬀ erences. Equalization grants originally 
were built on two instruments: (a) the deﬁ cit grant, which provided for underdeveloped 
settlements and regions, and (b) the PIT supplement. Over time, the equalization 
mechanism has spilled over. Th e objectives of equalization dominate the normative 
transfers, earmarked grants, shared taxes, and investment grants. Th is inﬂ uence makes the 
mechanism incomprehensible, and as a result equalization grants do not necessarily ﬁ nance 
the most essential needs and are not channeled where they should go.
Th e increasing need for equalization narrows the ﬁ nancing model options. Th e 
resource ﬁ nancing model might not be adequate when ﬁ nancial conditions are substantially 
diﬀ erent across municipalities and the system contains a large number of mandatory tasks 
that are not diﬀ erentiated by type of locality.
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Table 4.1 Local Government Finance in the Annual Budget Laws 
Year Shared taxes Number of normatives Centralized appropriations Priorities for addressed and 
targeted subsidies
1991 Th e share of the local 
governments from the PIT 
was 50 percent, and from 
environmental ﬁ nes 30 
percent.
Total number: 25
4 available for all local governments
1 for villages
1 for the capital city and the counties
19 for individual tasks
Total number: 8
Th e deﬁ cit grant was the most 
substantial amount.
Investment priorities were water supply 
investments in progress, urban water 
base and sewage puriﬁ cation plant, urban 
hospital, homes for the elderly, primary 
education, secondary education, and 
solid waste deposit.
1992 PIT: 50 percent, 
Vehicle tax: 30 percent,
Environmental ﬁ nes: 30 
percent
Total number: 24 
6 available on the basis of unique 
rights diﬀ erentiated by types of local 
governments
18 for individual tasks
A special equalization normative was 
adopted to assist underdeveloped 
settlements. Th is normative, however, 
has not remained in the system (see 
1993), because more and more special 
mechanisms were needed to treat 
diﬀ erences among local governments.
Total number: 17
Th is increase shows that the former 
system of normative grants was 
not capable of ﬁ nancing tasks in 
municipalities that have diﬀ erent 
expenditure needs. Th e normative for 
theaters was turned into an earmarked 
central appropriation for theaters.
Th e priorities of the system of targeted 
grants did not change essentially. 
Th e development of dormitories 
appeared in the system.
1993 PIT: 30 percent, 
Vehicle tax: 50 percent  
Environmental ﬁ nes: 30 
percent
Total number: 23, with a few minor 
changes: the normative for vocational 
training was diﬀ erentiated, a sport 
normative appeared as a new element 
in the system, and the content of the 
county normative changed again.
Total number: 17, but their content 
changed. 
Both deﬁ cit grant and support in case of 
vis major (emergency) was removed and 
put into a separate subsystem.
In 1993 priorities for targeted grants 
were not part of the annual budget law; 
they were put into a separate act. Th e 
state budget had only to decide upon the 
volume.
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Year Shared taxes Number of normatives Centralized appropriations Priorities for addressed and 
targeted subsidies
1994 PIT: 30 percent
Vehicle tax: 50 percent 
Environmental ﬁ nes: 30 
percent
Privatization revenues: 
50 percent to local 
governments; 20 percent to 
counties.
Total number: 27
Although the number of normatives 
increased only slightly, their structure 
and content changed again. A normative 
was introduced for the homeless; 
assistance for social institutions changed; 
the ethnic minority normative was 
diﬀ erentiated; and a new element was 
the normative for handicapped adults 
separated from support to handicapped 
children.
Total number: 20 Th e priorities of the system of targeted 
grants were put back into the annual 
budget law, because a reduction of 
eligibility was a declared objective. 
Investment priorities were drinking 
water, redemption of school rooms 
in poor technical condition and 
procurement of medical instruments.
1995 PIT: 35 percent, but a 
restrictive element was 
built into its use: a certain 
part had to be spent on 
long-term unemployment 
beneﬁ t. 
Vehicle tax : 50 percent 
Environmental ﬁ nes: 30 
percent
Total number: 27 again, and their 
content did not change.
Total number: 24
Eligibility conditions for the deﬁ cit 
grant become regulated in the annual 
budget law. 
In 1995 for the ﬁ rst and last time, the 
budget separately listed the public 
investments of special importance. Th is 
separation made general priorities of the 
government more transparent. Several 
of these priorities directly concerned 
local governments (for example, sewage 
treatment in selected towns and several 
investments in the capital city). Prior 
to and after that year such a subchapter 
was not present in the state budget. 
Th e targeted grant priorities expanded 
sewage plants of settlements with more 
than 2,000 inhabitants. 
Table 4.1 Local Government Finance in the Annual Budget Laws (continued)
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1996 PIT: 36 percent, however, 
only 25 percent was 
allocated on derivation 
basis, and the rest was for 
equalization.
An element stimulating 
the increase of the vehicle 
tax appeared, because 100 
percent of the revenues 
collected beyond the lowest 
tax rate could remain at the 
levying local governments.
Total number: 14
Seemingly the number of normatives 
drastically declined, but an extremely 
detailed diﬀ erentiation took place within 
the individual normatives, mostly caused 
by the Act on Public Education. Th e 
stimulation of the joint provision of 
services appeared within the normatives 
too, for example, at the normative for 
vocational schools. New tasks were 
“glued” to the county normative, for 
example, administration of public 
defense, operation of pedagogical 
institutions.
Total number: 24 
Th e deﬁ cit grant was re-regulated.
Th e number of priority areas for targeted 
grants grew again. Construction of solid 
waste deposits was supported again.
1997 PIT: 38 percent, of which 
22 percent remained at 
municipalities on derivation 
basis. Th e rest of the PIT 
revenue was allocated to 
municipalities and county 
governments for concrete 
tasks on a per capita basis. 
In other words, a part of 
the PIT was transformed 
into normative transfers.
Total number: 20
If we add the subspecies of the basic 
normatives, this number is 42. Th e 
former equalization normative for 
distressed settlements was eliminated, 
and the new decentralized mechanism 
of regional development resources was 
established after the enactment of the 
Act on Regional Development. A new 
normative for crèches was introduced. 
Th e county normative was abolished. 
Village and town governments that 
formed associations maintaining 
institutions of public education were 
eligible for extra transfers.
Total number: 20, of which several 
were connected to the Act on Public 
Education. On the other hand, 
several old earmarked provisions 
ceased to exist, such as supports for 
ferries, harbors, ﬁ re-oil supplied for 
households, support of wage policy, 
and urban public transportation. Th e 
support to minority local governments 
and the supplementary transfers for 
minority institutions were transformed 
into central appropriation. Eligibility 
conditions for deﬁ cit grant were re-
regulated. 
Targeted grant priorities did not change, 
except drinking water which was 
excluded. A special form of support was 
established for regional development, 
but this support could be used as the 
matching part required in case of 
targeted grants. As a consequence, 
regional development ﬁ nance and
local government investment ﬁ nance 
became closely intertwined. 
Table 4.1 Local Government Finance in the Annual Budget Laws (continued)
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6 Table 4.1 Local Government Finance in the Annual Budget Laws (continued)
Year Shared taxes Number of normatives Centralized appropriations Priorities for addressed and 
targeted subsidies
1998 PIT: 40 percent, of which 
20 percent was allocated 
on derivation basis and 20 
percent for equalization. 
A new shared tax—tax on 
land leasing—appeared, 
and the state budget let 
100 percent of it remain 
at the local governments.
Total number: 46 
Th e structure of normatives changed 
again. Th e amount of the administrative 
communal normative tripled. A new 
normative for regional administrative 
tasks was introduced which ﬁ nances 
new tasks created by the Act on Child 
Protection and the Act on Construction. 
Th e county normative appeared again, 
for administrative and sport tasks 
coming from the Act on Sport and the 
Act on Regional Development. Tasks 
of public collection are for the ﬁ rst time 
ﬁ nanced by a speciﬁ ed normative, as an 
eﬀ ect of the sectoral act.
Total number: 23 
Some of them were clearly targeted 
investment grants, and it is diﬃ  cult to 
understand why they were put among 
central appropriation (for example, 
South Buda–Rákospalota underground 
line). Joint notaries were supported 
through a central appropriation. 
Th e targeted grant priorities were intact.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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Th e ALG provides that local governments have a basic right to receive a supplementary 
state transfer, called a deﬁ cit grant, if they are in an economically depressed situation 
because of circumstances beyond their control (“without fault”). Th is type of grant was 
originally designed to moderate a lack of current resources in extreme situations. Because 
the law is unclear about the meaning of mandatory local tasks, however, it is also ambiguous 
about what factors indicate that a municipality is economically depressed “without fault.” 
Th ese questions remain unanswered; thus the deﬁ cit grant system amounts to nothing but 
bargaining about resources without ﬁ rm bases.
Th e role of the PIT supplement reveals that it is quite sensitive to the development 
gaps across regions and settlements. Sharing other types of taxes would be more beneﬁ cial 
for subnational ﬁ nances. In addition, because of the strong disparities in local tax revenues, 
especially the business tax, the necessity of equalization connected to local taxes has led 
to the introduction of a new indicator called “local tax capacity” to allocate equalization 
grants.
Th e equalization system is made more unstable by the central government’s authority 
to create a list of settlements that are economically depressed because of socioeconomic and 
infrastructure disadvantages. Such areas will be the beneﬁ ciaries of regional development 
grants and are eligible for most of the equalization grants. Experience shows that, although 
the Parliament has deﬁ ned principles of calculating the degree of underdevelopment on 
the basis of statistical indexes, the list of supported settlements changes constantly. Th ese 
changes are fair since the selection should reﬂ ect the current situation; some settlements 
might recover and others might need a chance to get into the system. By contrast, when 
planning medium- to long-term development strategies and project resources, the year-by-
year deﬁ nition of eligibility for support creates uncertainty.
Local Investments
Although allocation of current grants is based on normatives, the investment ﬁ nance system 
is multi-channel and has many discretionary elements. Investment grants are allocated 
through a centralized tendering process, although steps toward decentralization have been 
taken. Th e major sources of local investment are the targeted and addressed grants meant 
to support national priorities, but a signiﬁ cant part of investment is ﬁ nanced by grants from 
sectoral ministries, which have a wide range of discretion.
Th e 1992 Act on Addressed and Targeted Grants took over the regulation of these 
grants, and they are no longer subject to the annual Budget Act. Th e lack of ﬁ nancial 
resources, however, makes year-by-year ranking of national priorities necessary and, with 
it, the re-regulation—usually restriction—of eligibility conditions. As a result, the annual 
Budget Act still eﬀ ectively regulates the targeted grants and makes ministers responsible 
for regulating the allocation of investment funds they will grant. Th us each type of support 
is regulated by separate government decree year after year.
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As a consequence, investment resources become fragmented and lack comprehensive 
regulation. Coordination among channels and sectors seems problematic. Local actors 
continuously apply for investment grants despite the management and administrative 
requirements, which seem to be exaggerated, especially compared to the resources 
available.
Based on the pressure of international assessment, the government passed a decree 
on coordination of the use of sectoral and budgetary fund resources (no. 263/1997, which 
was replaced by the government decree no. 217/1998) aimed at harmonizing territorial 
eﬃ  ciency with central, regional, and sectoral objectives. Th e decree prescribed only a soft 
mechanism for coordination among the central organs responsible for disposing investment 
grants. Th ey are now obliged to share information about deadlines for tender invitations, 
evaluation of applications, and preliminary opinions. Th e decree does not stipulate rules or 
mechanisms that would force decision-makers to assemble resources nor has it yet deﬁ ned 
the organizations, mechanisms, and competencies, which could become elements of a 
single monitoring system.
In principle, localities have unique rights for targeted grants, so any local government 
could apply for an investment grant and expect central government support to implement 
its project based on speciﬁ ed national priorities. If an application is rejected one year, the 
municipality could automatically submit it the following year. Nevertheless, the regulation 
on rejected applications has also changed several times. Because the supply of funds has 
always been less than the demand, the original characteristics of the system have changed, 
despite strict eligibility conditions. Many local governments have not had access to 
investment grants for years, so their unique right is quite limited.
According to the coﬁ nancing principle, central investment grants must be supplemented 
with local funds, including borrowings. Because of the shortage of own revenues, local 
investment decisions are driven by central priorities, and investments for other purposes 
rarely take place. Th e own-resource requirement has not led to improved local ﬁ nancial 
responsibility or to precise evaluation of investment decisions and subsequent operational 
expenses, because the local contribution to a given investment is often obtained from 
another central fund (for example, the sectoral ministry’s grant), and the municipality does 
not risk its own resources when it makes an investment decision.
Because of annual changes in central government objectives and the resources available 
as targeted grants, systematic adaptation of local governments is impossible. Local 
governments cannot rely on resources from the central government and are therefore 
unable to prepare to provide their own resources and to use up the grant they may have 
obtained. Th is situation makes local public investment obscure. In 1996, for example, the 
State Audit Oﬃ  ce reported that 46 percent of targeted grants were unused.
State Audit Oﬃ  ce investigations revealed that fragmentation has become a 
characteristic not only of existing capacities, but also of new investments as well. Th is trend 
occurred partly because of lack of clarity in regulating high-cost investments until 1997. 
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Since the amendment of the act, only investments of more than Ft 200 million are eligible 
for targeted grants.
Regional Development
Th e 1996 Act on Regional Development and Spatial Planning (ARD) aimed at 
decentralizing regional policy and correcting distortions caused by the policy of the previous 
regime. Th e ARD deﬁ ned big (NUTS2) and small (NUTS3) regions as statistical districts 
which subsequently received a planning and development role. ARD also introduced 
national, regional, and county development councils with the authority to distribute the 
decentralized funds.
Th e ARD provides for resources and ﬁ nancial tools of regional development and allows 
expansion of the range of these tools. Th e act contains an earmarked provision for regional 
development and a distribution rule stating that the central government cannot dispose 
of more than 50 percent of the development fund. Furthermore, the law lists funds to be 
obtained by local governments from extrabudgetary funds and from addressed and targeted 
grants. Finally, the ARD includes the regional equalization fund, which was introduced 
several years prior to promote local infrastructure development.
I must emphasize that the act has not led to full decentralization of regional develop-
ment funds. First, central and regional organs have shared rights to dispose of regional 
development resources. Second, the decentralized funds are not integrated into municipal 
budgets partly because private entrepreneurs and nongovernmental organizations also can 
receive support from these funds. Th ird, the regional development councils are independent 
of local governments. In sum, the fact that decentralization of resource distribution has 
started is a signiﬁ cant achievement. Although amounts are small, the new system improves 
the eﬃ  ciency of decision-making by placing the decisions closer to the questions and the 
local information.
Th e biggest issue of regional development is to ﬁ nd the appropriate level of decision-
making. Th e ARD empowers county councils with allocation rights. Regional development 
resources, however, have been used almost exclusively to ﬁ nance programs in small regions 
(or microregions), special purpose associations, and municipalities. Evidently, these bodies 
strongly determine the content of the subsidized projects, their regional eﬃ  ciency, and 
range of eﬀ ects.
Th e future of the microregions is uncertain despite the fact that they seem to be 
revitalized within the institutional framework of the regional development. In a legal 
sense the microregions as statistical districts are only ﬁ ctions because municipalities can 
easily establish special service delivery districts and associations. Some microregions are 
functioning well, partly because regional development programs are relevant to these units, 
and they form the statistical basis for allocating regional equalization resources. Th e ALG 
provides a legal basis for creating joint service delivery units or regional organization of 
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services, stating that bigger settlements can be forced to accept more tasks. Th e sectoral 
regulations so far do not support creation of bigger service delivery units, however. I should 
note that the analysis in this chapter does not deal with the capital city, although its role in 
the ﬁ nancing system is clearly signiﬁ cant. Analysts must take into consideration, however, 
that the ﬁ nancing of the capital city is diﬀ erent from the general regulation in many 
respects and is worth a separate analysis.
A change in the tendency of using regional development resources for investments at 
the municipal level can be expected only if big regions have a key role in regional resource 
allocation or if the appropriation of central resources especially supports large regions. 
For either of these conditions to occur, signiﬁ cant regulatory prerequisites must be met. 
In addition to deﬁ ning the borders of big regions, regional development councils are still 
to be established with strong and clear competencies. In principle, regions could provide 
a good basis for decentralization in several sectors. In parallel with decentralization, 
functional regions are under preparation on sectoral basis with diﬀ erent regional borders 
and competencies.
Th e ARD suggests that the county regional development councils cannot only decide 
on the distribution of central resources, but they also can dispose of additional resources 
they may gather for implementation of their development programs. In practice, however, 
the councils have been limited to the disposal of central resources. No mechanisms are 
yet in place to channel resources for regional development purposes from the private 
or municipal sectors. Th e county regional development councils have not yet ﬁ nanced 
investments on their own initiative.
As a result of the amended ARD, decentralization of investment resources has become 
more and more a characteristics of local government ﬁ nance since 1998. In addition to 
the decentralized regional development resources and the regional equalization grants, 
the county regional development councils decide on the decentralized targeted grants and 
the vis-major (emergency) transfers. Municipal infrastructure development and regional 
development became interconnected, and the link between municipal development and 
regional equalization became closer. A potential disadvantage is that the blending of 
municipal and regional development objectives and priorities could mean that the use of 
resources may not be focused on priority issues.
Policy Proposals
Th e 10-year history of the subnational system has proven the merits of ﬁ scal decentraliza-
tion. Th e legislative framework changed substantially; however, a long line of functional 
and sectoral laws and decrees supplemented—and often distorted—the simple, very 
decentralized, and liberal rules deﬁ ned initially in the ALG. As a result, the framework 
today is less consistent and gradually moving from the initial resource regulation toward 
task ﬁ nancing and micromanagement by sectoral ministries, two conditions that threaten 
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local autonomy. Th e further development of the ﬁ scal decentralization framework depends 
on the following key recommendations.
 Expenditure assignment should be radically rearranged. Th e ALG must conceptually 
clarify the nature of the public services and the meaning of mandatory and voluntary 
tasks. Local government tasks should be prescribed only by law rather than by lower 
level regulation. Competencies should be diﬀ erentiated by size of local governments. 
Expenditure assignment should correspond to local demand and service delivery 
capacity (for example, size of the service area or its population). Th e preferred level of 
decentralization in the future should be large and small regions, or an urban attraction 
zone.
 Joint service delivery by municipalities should be promoted or even prescribed to abolish 
the present parallels and inconsistencies. Neighbor localities organizing parallel services 
should be the exception rather than the rule. Th e ALG and the constitution should 
allow for obligatory association of municipalities in two cases: (a) if a small service area 
and a lack of professional capacity prevent localities from meeting sectoral standards, 
and (b) if certain tasks require special skills.
 Th e annual Budget Act should regulate only the volume of funds, not the content and procedure 
for subnational ﬁ nance. Key rules, competencies, management, and distribution of 
intergovernmental transfers should be regulated in the Act on Public Finance, and they 
should be amended only in justiﬁ able cases. Th e sectoral acts should not set up separate 
procedures and rules for subnational ﬁ nance.
 Th e present system of municipal ﬁ nance must be simpliﬁ ed. Purely local tasks should be 
ﬁ nanced primarily from shared taxes and own revenues. Earmarked funds should be 
used to ﬁ nance central tasks delegated to local governments. Th e number of normatives 
should be decreased. Th e equalization element should be clearly separated, whenever 
possible, from general ﬁ nancing, and the various equalization resources should be 
integrated.
 Th e allocation mechanisms for central investment resources should be transparent and should 
be harmonized and coordinated across central government organs. Th e legislative framework 
should contain clear rules and procedural guarantees required for decentralized distri-
bution of investment resources.
Reference
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5Allocation of Local Government Functions: Criteria and ConditionsZoltán Hermann, Tamás M. Horváth, 
Gábor Péteri, and Gábor Ungvári



Allocation of public functions and services is speciﬁ ed by the assignment of expenditures 
and responsibilities for service delivery and is not just a simple legal action of allocating 
public services from one level or unit of government to another. Th e allocation of public 
functions can be redesigned in many ways, and all require several external conditions. 
If these legal, ﬁ scal, and institutional criteria are not met, then service delivery will not 
be eﬃ  cient. Consequently, by changing some crucial conditions, eﬃ  ciency gains can be 
realized, irrespective of the changes in expenditure assignment. Allocation of services 
cannot be designed properly unless all these conditions are harmonized. Formal changes 
in basic legislation on expenditure assignment are not suﬃ  cient for determining a “better” 
hierarchy of services. Th e art of expenditure assignment is to deﬁ ne the conditions that are 
needed most to improve service eﬃ  ciency.
In this chapter we summarize: (a) Hungary’s experiences in the 1990s in modernizing 
the assignment of public functions and expenditures, decentralizing responsibilities, and 
measuring the eﬀ ects of economies of scale in public services, and (b) the direction of 
further modernization and preconditions for change.
Allocation of Functions and Expenditure Assignment
Public functions can be delegated, with some limitations, to any level or unit of government, 
but responsibility is typically assigned to the organization that has direct contact with the 
consumer. Th is ultimate responsibility for a public service does not necessarily mean that 
other public entities or governments have no responsibility. Actual responsibility for public 
* Th is chapter is based on Hermann and others 1999.
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functions is usually divided among public sector actors. For expenditure assignment, the 
ﬁ rst issue is to deﬁ ne which services and responsibilities belong to the public sector and 
which belong to the private sector. When a service is regarded as public, it can be divided 
vertically and by activities. Technological and professional requirements of public services 
often necessitate joint service provision.
For example, in providing health care or water, basic services are connected strongly 
to other, more speciﬁ c activities (for example, laboratories) or have a regional character 
(for example, water production). Public functions can be divided by activities when 
responsibilities for operation (current expenditures) and capital investments may be 
separated. Often, shared local and central responsibilities serve equalization purposes. Both 
levels of government are responsible for service delivery, but their functions are diﬀ erent. 
Th e higher level government guarantees access to the service, whereas local government 
serves as the provider.
If expenditure assignment is deﬁ ned clearly, rules and regulations always control the 
provision of a particular service. For example, content, performance levels, and eligibility 
criteria can be the subject of public decisions at diﬀ erent levels or in several forms. 
Sometimes, these rules are not ﬁ xed; they might change with modiﬁ cation of political 
forces (for example, salary negotiations in the public sector).
Th e most important condition of allocation of public functions is how services are 
ﬁ nanced—who pays and how the funds reach the service provider. Inﬂ uence over the 
resources for ﬁ nancing a function is the basic condition of real autonomy in service delivery. 
Intergovernmental ﬁ nances can modify the functions and responsibilities of service delivery 
signiﬁ cantly.
In sum, allocation of public functions usually does not mean that service delivery 
responsibilities are clearly separated. Th ese responsibilities are shared, frequently among 
various public actors. Direct responsibility for service provision can be identiﬁ ed, but many 
possible types of service delivery strongly inﬂ uence the actual functions. We will analyze 
direct responsibilities for local government services. Th ey are subject to legal regulations, 
despite the fact that many other conditions of service delivery are deﬁ ned externally.
Reallocation of Service Responsibilities in Hungary
Th e transformation of the state was the primary force leading toward a new division of 
private and public services. Th e diminishing level of state-owned property, the changing 
role of government in production, and the lack of resources for ﬁ nancing the previously 
extended public services were important factors in this process. Because economic 
conditions forced government to establish new political institutions and mechanisms, the 
public sector’s role has also changed. In most of the former communist countries public 
failures forced governments to redesign the basic deﬁ nition of private and public goods 
and services.
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Distinction between Private and Public Functions
Th e privatization and restructuring of state property, as well as the transitional recession, 
signiﬁ cantly restricted the public sector and public funds available for social interventions 
in Hungary since the early 1990s. As a result some formerly public functions have almost 
disappeared and others (for example, housing) have been taken over by private institutions. 
Th e ﬁ nancing mechanisms of many public services have changed drastically. For example, 
private sources now play a major role in utility services and transportation. Th us, in a 
relatively short period, public expenditures decreased by between 25 and 30 percent and 
reached the level of many developed economies. By 1998 general government expenditures 
(consolidated primary expenditures without interest payments) had fallen to 39 percent of 
gross domestic product from 54 percent four years earlier (MoF and MoI 1998). 
Central versus Local Expenditures
Decentralization within the general government budget is the second issue that determines 
the character of expenditure assignment. Despite the sharp decrease in public expenditures, 
the ratio of local government budgets remained relatively stable (26 to 27 percent of general 
budget). Th is stability can be interpreted from both the political and the economic point 
of view. One political explanation is that local governments were able to keep their relative 
position during the years of ﬁ scal restriction. Th is stable proportion of the local budget does 
not reﬂ ect many new mandates that were subsequently transferred to local governments, 
though these unfunded local functions and services are hardly quantiﬁ able.
Economically, changes in the overall size of the public sector often lead to decent-
ralization of taxing and spending powers. Some research has found that a higher ratio 
of subnational own-source revenues to total government revenues is correlated with 
reduced public expenditures (Ehadie 1994). Regression analysis of 30 countries suggests 
that savings in public expenditures can be achieved by changing the role and functions of 
local governments. Mechanical transfer of functions to the local level without suﬃ  cient 
autonomy in revenue-raising capacity, however, typically does not lead to lower public 
expenditures.
Th e Intermediate Level
Th e role of the central government determines the role, if any, of the intermediate level. Th e 
issue of expenditure assignment is crucial in the countries of central and eastern Europe, 
because the intermediate level was the transmitting organization between the national and 
municipal levels. Th us the intermediate level has typically been the focus of ideological, 
political, and professional discussions (Horváth 1996a; Vági 1982). 
In Hungary, starting from the early 1970s, the intermediate (county) level of govern-
ment was a subnational counterpoint to national administration, organized by sectoral 
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ministries or departments (Balázs 1998). Widening county government functions was 
the ﬁ rst step toward more advanced decentralization, because strong counties were able to 
integrate local (regional) interests and policies. Over two decades they proved that service 
and public functions can be managed locally. Th is long learning process was missing in 
many central and eastern European countries, and that lack explains why several of them 
still have a dual structure of local governments and territorial administration. Th ese state 
oﬃ  ces often provide local services, but have poor public control and little inﬂ uence over 
elected bodies.
Several types of functions are transferred to the intermediate level: (a) regional services, 
that is, functions of large catchments areas or rarely used services or both (for example, 
utilities, special education, or ﬁ re service); and (b) intermunicipal services, such as roads and 
water (Horváth and Péteri 1997). Only roads present an expenditure assignment problem. 
Water service depends on the institutional, ﬁ scal, and regulatory environment of local 
cooperation and joint service delivery.
Reallocation across Municipalities
Th e primary goal of the transition at the local level was to ensure equal status for all types 
of local governments. To avoid hidden subordination among diﬀ erent local governments 
(especially between counties, cities, and village municipalities), all local governments 
received identical legal status. Th is political requirement was challenged, however, by 
diﬀ erences in administrative and ﬁ scal capacity.
During the period of decentralization, legal status was crucial for establishing strong 
and autonomous local governments. Later, more rigid allocation rules were needed, 
mainly because of issues with the administrative feasibility of ﬁ nancing services. During 
the reassessment of local government functions, an important issue was whether local 
governments that have diﬀ erent capacities can manage the same functions and competencies. 
Th is typical question, which is related to the vertical balance of local government functions 
and revenues, was not clearly answered.
Mandatory local government services were deﬁ ned as core services on a basic level. 
Th en, conditions were set for managing local government functions, and responsibility for 
public services was transferred to individual local governments. Regulation was based on the 
principle that if a municipality does not provide services beyond the basic mandatory ones, 
then county government should take over the provision of nonmandatory services. Th is 
principle resulted in a ﬂ exible allocation of local functions, because with some limitations 
municipalities can operate almost any local service. For example, a secondary school or a 
hospital can be operated and managed by a county, a large city, or a smaller town.
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Large Cities
Large cities, especially the capital city, have always been the exceptions. Th e “cities with 
county rank” are not part of the county: they are independent politically, in public 
administration, and in service provision. Th e relationship between the capital city and its 
districts is a critical problem. During the 1990s allocation of functions and competencies 
has been characterized by a gradual move from a decentralized structure toward a stronger 
role for the capital city.
Th e administrative rationale behind these changes is that the city functions as an 
urban entity, so the districts are closely interrelated. Technically, the relations between the 
two levels within the capital are regulated partly by general local government legislation 
and partly by speciﬁ c acts for the capital city. Th e problem of large cities and their 
agglomerations is always a separate issue for expenditure assignment.
Methods for Allocating Functions
Public functions and service are allocated in various ways. Responsibility for service and the 
conditions under which functions are transferred are important. Th ere are three diﬀ erent 
forms or levels of decentralization denoting the three typical ways to assign functions to a 
lower level of government such as deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Th ese terms 
mean that some functions are taken away from the center and transferred to other units of 
government. Th ose terms are deﬁ ned as follows:
 Deconcentration means simply the allocation of a function, primarily for administ-rative 
reasons. In these cases local governments serve general public functions, because they 
are close to citizens (for example, registry of inhabitants), but they do so on behalf of 
the central government and have no decision-making authority.
 Delegation of public functions is used when national priorities should be followed in 
providing a service. Uniﬁ ed national legislation should set the rules for equity of 
services or stabilization. Several local government services, such as social services and 
unemployment beneﬁ ts, are provided on behalf of the national government and should 
follow general principles, with some limited local discretion.
 Devolution means clear local authority for providing and managing services. “Functions 
of local signiﬁ cance” are those, such as primary education and certain urban services 
(street cleaning, lighting, and so forth), for which eﬃ  ciency can be realized by 
connecting service beneﬁ ts and costs.
“Expenditure assignment” refers not only to the allocation of functions by the 
constitution or any basic laws, but also depends on external conditions such as sectoral 
legislation, control, and procedures; availability of own-source revenues; property rights 
(degree and form of privatization); and institutional autonomy. “Sectoral legislation” 
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deﬁ nes professional conditions for public services. Diﬀ erent levels of legislation set 
service standards and summarize performance criteria. Often, these sectoral rules are 
generally accepted procedures and values, which are manifested in professional codes. 
Th ey frequently have important implications for local government decision-making. For 
example, sectoral legislation often may inﬂ uence the number of teachers or health workers 
that can be hired or ﬁ red, even though primary education and some health functions may 
be local government responsibilities.
Revenue-raising capacity and beneﬁ ts should be combined to realize eﬃ  ciency gains 
of a local service. Expenditures should be balanced with available discretionary ﬁ nancial 
sources (vertical balance). Without suﬃ  cient own sources, the advantages of local service 
provision and management cannot be realized.
Property rights have been restructured in various ways during the process of transition. 
Without clear regulations on municipal and public property rights, critical aspects of 
service delivery cannot be identiﬁ ed. Fundamental issues of privatization include how 
state-owned property is transferred to local governments, the scale of municipal property, 
and local autonomy in managing available assets.
Institutional autonomy does matter. Assignment of public functions should be 
harmonized with regulations on organizational forms of service delivery. Without local 
discretion in selecting service arrangements, eﬃ  ciency gains of local functions cannot 
be realized. Basic conditions (for example, concession regulations, public procurement 
procedures, and forms of joint service delivery) generally can be deﬁ ned, but the service 
provider should have the right to select the most eﬃ  cient form of production.
Decentralization of Responsibilities: Facts and Trends
After the above summary of the major criteria, aggregates, and overall tendencies in 
reallocation of local government functions, in this section we analyze the events and factors 
that determined the changes in the 1990s and summarize the major outcomes of the 
reform steps.
Basic Legislation
Local government functions and competencies are clearly legislated. Hierarchical 
legislation deﬁ nes the principles of allocation and the blocks of services provided by 
localities. Th e Constitution, the primary source of regulations, provides equal basic rights 
for local governments. Th e Act on Local Government deﬁ nes a wide range of potential local 
government functions and, within this group, the mandatory services. Local governments 
are responsible for 23 local public services of which 10 became mandatory in 1994 (see 
chapter 4).
C H A P T E R  5    A L L O C AT I O N  O F  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  F U N C T I O N S
119
Th e Constitution and the Act on Local Government set the basic conditions of local 
autonomy, and only laws approved by a qualiﬁ ed majority can modify them.
Th e Act on Local Government ensures ﬂ exibility in allocation of local government 
functions. Local duties ought to correspond to local needs; hence various types of local 
governments might have diﬀ erent functions and competencies. Larger cities often provide 
services for citizens of smaller municipalities. Governments have no right to refuse any 
demand from citizens just because they live outside the operating municipality. Under 
some conditions, smaller local governments are also allowed to take over the functions of 
larger local government with greater capacity. In this case the municipality undertaking the 
function gets the national budget grant. 
Th e uniﬁ ed regulation covers very diﬀ erent scales of functions. A town of 40,000 
inhabitants has more responsibility to provide public services than a village of 1,000 
inhabitants. Neither the quantity nor the quality of services is equal. For example, if 
most pupils live in surrounding small settlements, the city will, in almost every case, 
insist on provision of primary education as its own function. Although the Act on Local 
Government says that functions are provided by municipalities, in fact, most services are 
delivered by special districts (for example, secondary schools, hospitals, and museums). Th is 
situation is not reﬂ ected in intergovernmental relations. Th e real linkages among users for 
diﬀ erent municipalities remain hidden.
During the transformation two major waves had diﬀ erent underlying rationale. In the 
early stages the political advantages of the reform were emphasized. Local accountability, 
higher public participation, and control were the main arguments for decentralization. 
Changing the relationship between county and municipal governments was supported by 
the allocative eﬃ  ciency argument, saying that local articulation of needs and decisions on 
services should be more eﬃ  cient.
In the second wave equalization, economies of scale, and capacity to provide a 
minimum level of services were the most frequent arguments for reallocating functions. 
More detailed sectoral legislation deﬁ ning the conditions of local government functions 
and services followed the ﬁ rst set of basic constitutional regulations. Most of these sectoral 
laws aimed to set standards and control the contents of local services. Th ey were passed 
by simple majority vote in the Parliament, sometimes in conﬂ ict with the Act on Local 
Government, regardless of the fact that the latter has constitutional force.
Competing concepts of local government legislation and sectoral laws characterize 
the history of expenditure assignment. Local government functions are allocated by basic 
laws, but conditions of service delivery are formulated along a diﬀ erent logic. Th e abstract 
values of decentralization and local autonomy are counterbalanced by the rationality of 
providing services. Together, these two types of legislation deﬁ ne the eﬀ ective assignment 
of functions.
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Gradual Reallocation of Local Services
Local expenditures as a percentage of general government expenditures remained stable 
(25–27 percent), though local expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product 
sharply decreased, from 16.8 percent to 12 percent, between 1994 and 1998. Expenditure 
assignment to various types of local governments changed after the political transformation. 
Th e county governments lost many of their functions to cities and villages, and now they 
are responsible for 14.4 percent of local government services. Th e large cities with county 
rank increased their share of local budgets. Th e position of Budapest remained unchanged, 
but a signiﬁ cant decentralization between the capital city and its districts took place.
Th ese new proportions were encouraged by changes in grant allocation schemes. 
Village municipalities and cities in the countryside now receive a much higher share of 
total local government grants than in 1989. Th is transformation was paid for mostly by 
reduced grants to Budapest, which has to ﬁ nance its unchanged expenditures by increasing 
own-source revenues. Vertical balance of local budgets exists only in secondary cities, 
which have ratios of local expenditures and grants similar to 1989. County governments 
and villages lack own-source revenues; hence grants are disproportionately high for these 
local governments. Budapest and cities with county rank have better capacity to collect own 
revenues, so they receive less in grants than other local governments.
Needs and Services
Per capita expenditures vary considerably by the size of the city and favor bigger cities. 
Municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants obtain lower per-capita local expenditures 
than the bigger ones. Half of Hungary’s population—in the countryside—absorbs only 37 
percent of municipal budgets.
Budapest and the central region are in an extremely favorable position, because they 
account for 33 percent of local government expenditures and 28 percent of the population. 
Th e capital city is even better oﬀ  (26 percent of expenditures and 18 percent of population). 
Th ree major regions are more or less in a balanced position, because their share in 
population and total local government expenditure is equal. Th e poorest regions are in the 
Hungarian Plain.
Half of the municipalities have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, but taken together they 
account for 9 percent of the population and only 6 percent of total municipal expenditures 
(excluding Budapest and counties). Small local governments provide very few public 
services. Th is disparity suggests a fragmentation of local governments measured in terms 
of expenditure per capita. Key problems are the great variety of average settlement size and 
diﬀ erences in urban structure.
Expenditure assignment is inﬂ uenced also by grant allocation. National grants for 
municipalities that have populations up to 5,000 are higher than their proportion of 
expenditures. Smaller municipalities get proportionately more grants primarily because of 
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a lack of own-source revenues. In terms of regions the south Transdanubian and northern 
regions get higher grants compared to their populations, and they also have the highest 
number of small municipalities.
For larger cities, grants are proportional to expenditures, except for the largest cities 
(population of more than 50,000). Th is allotment reﬂ ects the characteristics of the grant 
allocation scheme, because normative grants mostly follow service functions. Th e more 
expensive service institutions are in larger cities, where per capita expenditures are 22–30 
percent above the average (table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Local Expenditures by Size of Settlements
Inhabitants Per capita expenditure (1996)
Expenditure 
as a percentage of total
Capital expenditure 
as a percentage of total
199 or fewer 68 112
200–499 54 62
500–999 72 61
1,000–1,999 76 81
2,000–4,999 74 87
5,000–9,999 83 95
10,000–19,999 124 126
20,000–49,999 130 119
50,000 or more 122 110
Total 100 100
Source: Hermann and others 1999.
Th e structure of local government expenditures shows the allocation of functions 
among diﬀ erent types of local governments. In the smallest municipalities (population 
less than 500), administration and various economic services are the most important 
expenditures. Th ese items include several diﬀ erent types of expenditures. Debt service 
might be accounted for under “administration”; various smaller costs (such as public 
lighting, welfare payments, and small purchases) are put on the largest functions. In 
municipalities that have populations of more than 500, education is the primary function 
of local governments (31–38 percent of local budgets). Health care and social services are 
signiﬁ cant expenditures in municipalities that have populations more than 10,000 (18–28 
percent). Hospitals and costly social service institutions account for 73 percent of county 
governments’ expenditures. Public utilities are minor items in local budgets, because they 
are provided by extrabudgetary service organizations.
Th e present rules of expenditure assignment can be summarized by:
 declining central government participation in service provision;
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 unchanged relationships among central and local governments, which do not support 
the realization of decentralization beneﬁ ts;
 allocation of expenditure functions proportional to population ratios, so that the 
potential losses are not signiﬁ cant in the fragmented local government system;
 vertically balanced budgets, mostly in midsized municipalities, but  small municipalities 
and especially county governments are characterized by lack of own-source revenues;
 concentration of locally owned companies as key factors in utility services and 
important sources of privatization revenues;
 sophisticated forms of nonproﬁ t organizations providing services in municipalities.
Factors Inﬂ uencing Further Reallocation of Local Functions
Th ree key factors are behind continuing changes in expenditure assignments: (a) ensuring 
equity and fairness, (b) economic stability, and (c) eﬃ  ciency gains.
First, ensuring equity and fairness, the governments’ primary function, can be achieved 
through income redistribution and by providing public services. Th is consideration is always 
behind the allocation of public functions, especially in countries where the minimum level 
of services ought to be provided. Lack of basic amenities makes a claim for strong public 
involvement, because government usually is the only well-organized service provider, as 
was the case with water service and public housing, which were crucial in the period of 
rapid urban growth. An even higher need for ensuring equity and fairness arises when the 
private sector has an increasing role. National ﬁ scal policy is able to support this situation 
not only by reallocation of functions, but also by changes in taxation and modifying the 
income stream.
Second, economic stabilization, a basic role of central government, also aﬀ ects the 
relationship between central and local budgets. Despite broadening responsibilities, local 
government revenues have remained unchanged for many years because of the national 
ﬁ scal policy to control local spending and public debt. Th is policy was regarded as the only 
instrument for controlling one-quarter of public spending in a period of ﬁ scal restrictions. 
Lowering government debt was the primary objective for economic stabilization.
Th e third factor that inﬂ uences the changes in expenditure assignments is realizing 
eﬃ  ciency gains. Under this consideration, allocation of public functions should be directed 
to the level of government that can provide the services at the lowest cost. Th is criterion 
is complex, because local public service delivery is inﬂ uenced by economic and political 
factors. 
Country examples have shown that assignment of public functions to levels of 
government not only follows diﬀ erent patterns, but also changes over time (see chapter 3). 
For example, the amalgamation process of the early 1970s in some countries (such as the 
United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries), the creation of joint service delivery 
arrangements as part of the decentralization reforms in France, and the search for new 
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Table 5.2 Expenditure Assignment Criteria: Pros and Cons for Diﬀ erent Approaches
Assignment Criteria Amalgamation Functional Integration
Pro Con Pro Con
Economic eﬃ  ciency
 Economies of scale Achievable in technical 
services
Volume of savings low; 
questionable for labor intensive 
services
Flexible, following boundaries 
of diﬀ erent services
Cannot be realized if units 
are too small
 Public sector competition None Smaller units required; loss in 
economic incentives 
Smaller local governments 
support competition
None
 Public pricing (user charges) Manageable mostly for 
regional utility services
None Cost allocation across 
jurisdictions feasible
None
Equity and fairness
 Economic externalities Spillovers are 
manageable
Against developed market in 
public utility sector
None Intermunicipal 
arrangements need to be 
developed
 Fiscal equalization Adequate ﬁ scal capacity, 
vertically more balanced 
budgets
None None Greater need for transfers
Stabilization–Macrobalance Macrobalances easier to 
manage 
Potentially less cost eﬀ ective, 
therefore contributing to higher 
deﬁ cits
Units tailored to speciﬁ c 
activities imply better overall 
resource use
Diﬀ erent units for 
functional integration 
make forecasting overall 
balances more diﬃ  cult
Political accountability
 Access and control None Lower responsiveness, 
increasing role of political 
parties in local arena
Smaller units with higher 
responsiveness
Lower minority interest 
representation
 Citizen participation None New forms of participation 
should be developed in larger 
units
Traditional forms of direct 
participation exist
None
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Assignment Criteria Amalgamation Functional Integration
Pro Con Pro Con
Administrative eﬃ  ciency
 Legal adequacy Clear and stable 
assignment
None None Mixed authorities less 
clear
 General purpose government Comprehensive, 
integrated policies
None Neutral to size None
 Intergovernmental ﬂ exibility Increased accountability Loss in ﬂ exibility Higher pressure for 
cooperation
None
 Geographic adequacy None Regional diﬀ erences in urban 
structure (“small” and “large” 
have diﬀ erent meanings)
Natural service delivery zones None
 Management capacity Greater professionalism None None Lower capacity
Source: Hermann and others 1999.
Table 5.2 Expenditure Assignment Criteria: Pros and Cons for Diﬀ erent Approaches (continued)
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forms of representation and more inclusive mechanisms of policy design are all based 
on various aspects of expenditure assignment. Th e public sector and local governments 
had to respond to diﬀ erent external conditions, so new criteria for allocation came to the 
forefront.
Several equally important factors inﬂ uence expenditure assignment. Th ey supplement 
or sometimes compete with each other when some of them get too much priority. 
Balancing these allocation criteria is extremely important. Th e fragile results of the new 
local government system can be destroyed easily if one allocation factor is favored in 
policy. Policymakers should consider four major types of assignment criteria: (a) economic 
eﬃ  ciency, (b) equity and fairness, (c) political accountability, and (d) administrative 
eﬃ  ciency (see table 5.2).
Challenges and Responses
Studies suggest that the mechanism of providing services matters more than where the 
functions are allocated in cases where economies of scale hold (see Hermann and others 
1999). Th eory and empirical evidence show that out of 12 criteria only public sector 
competition clearly calls for smaller local governments and four criteria (economies of 
scale, public pricing, economic externalities, management capacity) call for large area-wide 
jurisdictions (ACIR 1974). Most of the factors are not related to local government size. 
Assignment criteria can be met by developing institutions and mechanisms in the local 
government system.
Th e most important expenditure assignment issue to be addressed in the future is how 
functions should follow the diﬀ erences in local administrative capacity. Th e role of the 
intermediate level of government should be further clariﬁ ed. From a ﬁ scal point of view, 
this clariﬁ cation requires new solutions for managing economic externalities and unfunded 
regional services. In the search for solutions the literature on expenditure assignment 
and the international examples suggest two basic principles. First, competing allocation 
criteria should be balanced in the process of reassignment. Economic, equity, political, 
and administrative eﬃ  ciency considerations are all important factors in designing local 
government functions. Th e economies-of-scale argument is crucial in the fragmented 
Hungarian local government system, and the requirement can be met through various 
techniques of expenditure assignment.
European local government systems are able to provide eﬃ  cient public services when 
the average size of municipalities diﬀ ers greatly. Th e lesson drawn from the international 
examples is that the mechanisms of integration are what really matters. Depending on a 
country’s traditions and political culture, expenditure assignment criteria may be met in 
diﬀ erent ways simultaneously.
Debates on the future of Hungarian local governments point up two basic models 
of expenditure assignment. Th e ﬁ rst one is based on the “layer cake” model, which clearly 
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separates functions and resources by level of government. In Hungary, because local 
governments are small and have minimal and diverse revenue-raising capacity, this solution 
would lead toward amalgamation and reallocation of functions.
Th e other direction is based on the results of the 1990s. According to the principles 
of creating a modern local government system, small autonomous municipalities remain 
key actors. In this “marble cake” model, however, which has ﬂ exible boundaries among 
diﬀ erent types and levels of government, new institutions should support eﬃ  cient service 
delivery. Instead of amalgamation, the conditions of functional integration should be 
developed. Th ese conditions can be identiﬁ ed by checking the impact of the two models on 
expenditure assignment.
Amalgamation or Functional Integration
Th e two basic models can be compared along the four groups of assignment criteria 
(economic eﬃ  ciency, equity, accountability, and administrative eﬃ  ciency). Th e ﬁ rst 
argument for amalgamation is to realize the beneﬁ ts of larger municipalities. Research 
has proved that this realization of beneﬁ ts can be achieved mostly in technical services, 
but  also in primary education in Hungary. Because catchments areas of local services 
diﬀ er, this criterion hardly can be used for drawing the boundaries of general purpose 
local governments. A more ﬂ exible institutional framework is needed to provide these 
services eﬃ  ciently. Th e other argument against amalgamation is that the potential savings 
are marginal, because the numerous small local governments make only a relatively small 
proportion of public expenditures.
Small local governments are more favorable for services that are not aﬀ ected by 
economies of scale and where externalities do not exist (for example, basic welfare services 
and culture). Only these community-based, small units can increase incentives by matching 
needs and available local resources. Proper pricing practices are crucial for services that are 
ﬁ nanced mostly by user charges. Th is allocation criterion is not connected to any speciﬁ c 
size because costs and beneﬁ ts can be measured across municipal boundaries.
Spillovers provide the most important argument for amalgamation. Amalgamation 
should be accepted in many service areas. In the ﬁ eld of public utilities, however, with a 
developed private market and commercial service organizations, other forms of functional 
integration also work. Th ese intermunicipal and contractual arrangements must be 
developed further, which will help to support the gradual transformation of the local 
government system.
Larger local governments probably have more complex revenue bases and thus less 
need for horizontal ﬁ scal equalization. Th e available revenues for diﬀ erent types of local 
governments will be more balanced with their expenditures. Chances are greater that 
functions and municipal sources are matched. If municipal revenue-raising capacity is built 
into the allocation methods of intergovernmental transfers, then the problem of vertical 
imbalance can be managed.
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Political control and inﬂ uence over public decisions require diﬀ erent institutions and 
procedures under the two models. On the one hand, amalgamation will probably lower 
responsiveness, but organized political forces can counterbalance this loss. On the other 
hand, new forms of access and control might support minority interest representation 
in larger local governments. Traditionally, Hungary has had a relatively well-developed 
system of community-based citizen participation. Th is participation lies behind the 
higher community-based motivation in smaller units and would be lost by creating larger 
amalgamated units. New forms of participation should be developed.
Legal authority has been deﬁ ned for any type of local government during the ﬁ rst years 
of transition. Besides basic rights, the model of functional integration would produce a 
mixture of competencies and duties. Legal adequacy can be developed more easily for large 
localities. Th e assignment of functions would be more clear and stable.
If small local governments continue to exist, the need for special-purpose governments 
will increase. Th ese governments have some disadvantages over general governments from 
administrative and political points of view. Political mechanisms should support the control 
exercised by member municipalities. General governments’ advantage is that they can 
develop comprehensive policies, following the changing needs of the constituents.
By creating clear competencies and a stable assignment of functions, the need for 
cooperation among levels of government will decrease and, in turn, will lessen the ﬂ exibility 
of the service delivery system, but increase accountability at each level. If smaller local 
governments continue to exist, then the pressure for cooperation will be greater.
A local government’s administrative area should be large enough to determine 
strategies, provide suﬃ  cient revenues, and support popular control on public actions. 
Local governments have no optimal size, and, in Hungary, even the average size of villages 
and towns is very diﬀ erent in the two main regions. In the more densely populated 
Transdanubian region, villages are small and the towns have more central functions (Fürcht 
1996). In the Hungarian Plain, the large villages have more functions because the network 
of cities is more sparse. Th is disparity is another reason why uniﬁ ed expenditure assignment 
by size or administrative status cannot simply be implemented. Natural service delivery 
zones can be followed more easily in a geographical structure with a ﬂ exible and open 
network of municipalities.
Management capacity is generally less in small local governments. More technical 
services and functions should be administered by larger municipalities. Greater profession-
alism in local administration and service organizations might be achieved not only by 
amalgamation, but also through technical assistance, developed information systems, 
training, and so forth.
Because arguments for and against amalgamation and functional integration are 
balanced, a new framework of policy proposals should be developed to solve problems of 
expenditure assignment. Th e past decades of local government development has proved 
that no decision can be made on the basis of political versus functional integration. 
Consequently, a new policy framework should be designed.
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We recommend three major groups of actions: 
 Cooperation among local governments should be supported by creating a new legal, 
ﬁ scal, and organizational environment. New institutions and organizational forms as 
well as grants and revenue-sharing mechanisms should be developed.
 Functional integration of municipal services requires diﬀ erent techniques in sectoral 
regulation. Legislation on municipal functions and services should encourage and 
enforce integration for eﬃ  cient local services.
 Reallocation of functions with changing intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations is also 
needed in the future. Standard service capacity of local governments by cluster of 
municipalities should be redesigned. Th ese groups of local governments should be 
deﬁ ned by population size and administrative status. Reallocation of local functions 
should allow voluntary provision of any type of local services. Th e system of inter-
governmental ﬁ nances should reﬂ ect these two conditions: (a) the grant scheme must 
follow the standard (and not the individual) allocation of functions, and (b) greater 
own-source revenues should support the takeover of optional services.
Th e checklist for comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the two integration 
models has shown conﬂ icts between the competing economic and political–administrative 
arguments. Because these assignment criteria are equally important, neither of them 
should be prioritized. Finding the conditions under which both sets of criteria can be met 
is more important. Most of these conditions have no direct inﬂ uence on the reassignment 
of functions. Th at they provide harmonized legal and ﬁ scal environment for functional 
integration and cooperation is even more important.
New Institutions for Cooperation
Th e ﬁ rst argument for amalgamation was that the present local government ﬁ nance system 
cannot manage any economic externalities. New institutions for intermunicipal cooperation 
would help to solve this problem. Legal forms of cooperation have been introduced in the 
legislation in the 1990s (see chapter 4). Th e next task is to make them widely usable by 
providing the necessary professional, administrative, and ﬁ nancial conditions.
Subregional associations have been working since the establishment of the new local 
government system to provide diﬀ erent services and administrative functions (Horváth 
1996b). For further development, legal forms of associations should be elaborated more 
carefully, and ﬁ nancial incentives must be improved to increase the intention to cooperate. 
Associations depend heavily on member municipalities for their creation and operation. 
To develop institutional changes, several steps must be taken.
Associations should be direct recipients of grants. If subregional associations have the 
right to access transfers directly, ﬁ nancial incentives will increase. Subregional associations 
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can get grants according to the tasks they perform. Apart from individual municipalities, 
their common organizational structures are also entitled to get subsidies.
Th is change requires institutional conditions. Regional audit oﬃ  ces should control 
association spending directly, especially grant allocation, as in the case of local self-
governments. Regional public administrative oﬃ  ces have a right to control the operation. 
In the case of breaking rules administrative courts make decisions.
Th e proposed changing character of associations can be declared in the annual state 
budget, where subregional associations become recipients of grants. Th is change would be 
an important one structurally because it would establish a new self-government subject. 
Subregional associations would be able to get ﬁ nancial sources directly because they are 
legal entities. Because this change is crucial, declaration in the Act on Local Government 
would be a better solution. In principle the widening character of subregional associations 
with legal status would be a very important element of the local government system. It 
could mean a very strong form of integration and at the same time be an instrument for 
national government policies in local public service provision.
Separate budgets are needed for subregional associations. Potential revenues are 
normative grants, supplementary (incentive) grants, contributions from member govern-
ments, user charges and fees, private contributions, and loans. In the future, associations 
might get shared tax revenues from the member governments or the state budget.
Hungary has three large urban areas—the Budapest agglomeration and the Miskolc 
and Pécs urban areas that need to establish urban communities, a speciﬁ c association 
for particular cities and their surrounding areas diﬀ erent from other towns and village 
self-governments. Th ese three areas contain more than one-third of the population of 
the country. Each of them provides uniﬁ ed common services and each has an imbalance 
between the central city and surrounding localities. Collaboration is minimal and has no 
permanent institutional framework. Th e primary tasks of the urban communities are public 
transportation and coordination of public utility services, but member municipalities can 
agree to organize other common functions.
Clear and Stable Allocation
Stability in the local government system should be supported by gradual changes. With 
the exception of political changes in 1990, evolutionary reform steps have taken place. Th e 
continuity is especially important for the public sector, where the local level has a signiﬁ cant 
role. If forms of intermunicipal cooperation are developed and stabilized, then the grant 
system should also be harmonized with these developments. Th e advantages in variety of 
service management methods must not be eliminated just for the sake of uniformity. Local 
services require diverse forms of operation and management. For example, human and 
physical services have very diﬀ erent organizational and ﬁ nancial characteristics and cannot 
be forced into the same functional assignment system.
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Diﬀ erent levels of government need speciﬁ c structures. According to international 
experience, a multilevel structure substitutes for a neglected administrative amalgamation. 
Hungary should develop intermediate levels of government. Districts could be a level of 
territorial administration in the traditional meaning, that is, a state administrative unit or 
part of the self-governing system. In the latter case voters should elect a representative 
body.
Counties are responsible for providing speciﬁ c services for more than one municipality 
or part or the whole territory of the county (for example, specialized hospitals, secondary 
dormitories, or schools for handicapped pupils). Municipal governments also can undertake 
these functions, so speciﬁ c county functions should be deﬁ ned by law. Municipalities could 
take over these functions only under certain circumstances.
With Hungary’s full EU membership, a signiﬁ cant part of structural and cohesion 
funds will be channeled through regions. Here the term “region” has diﬀ erent meanings. A 
general development region, from a public administrative point of view, means a common 
framework for territorial activities between diﬀ erent county development councils. 
Creation of particular regions depends on free intentions of county organizations. Th ese 
regions consist of three or four counties. A speciﬁ c region conforms not to the county 
administrative boundaries, but also to existing social and spatial realities. In correspondence 
with the European Union NUTS classiﬁ cation (see chapter 1), a statistical region means a 
statistical and planning unit that conforms rigidly to the boundaries of present territorial 
administrative units. Th is conﬁ guration is important from the technical point of view of 
national ﬁ nancing. Statistical regions are not linked automatically with administrative 
regions.
Allocation by Size
Local government also must meet the needs of the inhabitants living in its surrounding 
municipalities. Th ese local governments are separate legal entities with political autonomy. 
Th e constitutional, legal meaning, on the one hand, diﬀ ers from the functional character of 
local government, on the other.
Municipalities that have larger capacities should be responsible for providing 
services for citizens living in other localities, possibly in the surrounding villages or in a 
homogeneous district. Urban municipalities responsible for provision of services for an area 
larger than their own territory should get additional resources through intergovernmental 
transfers.
Typical local government functions should be deﬁ ned by diﬀ erent population categories 
that are designed carefully for each type of service. Th is task requires detailed analysis of 
service costs and organizational characteristics. Th e economies-of-scale argument is only 
one component in allocating functions. It inﬂ uences expenditure assignment because it 
indicates the lowest rational level of service delivery.
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Th e following hypothetical population size clusters can be identiﬁ ed for local functions:
 Villages up to 2,000 inhabitants
 Villages and towns that have 2,001–5,000 inhabitants
 Towns and cities that have 5,001–10,000 inhabitants 
 Cities that have more than 10,001 inhabitants (excluding the capital districts, cities 
with county rank, and the capital city)
 Capital districts and cities with county rank
 Capital city
 Counties.
In these categories, typical functions should be listed and regulated by clusters. Th is 
method is diﬀ erent from the present logic, which guarantees the general minimum level in 
the Act on Local Government regardless of local capacity. Allocation of functions by size of 
local governments does not exclude the present optional character of functions. Mandatory 
tasks of a larger cluster may be taken over by a municipality in a smaller size cluster if the 
service conditions can be guaranteed.
Conclusion
Th ese two competing criteria—allocation of local government functions by size and 
optional provision of services, regardless of legal regulations—can be met only if 
intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations are adjusted to this dual condition. First of all, higher 
own-source revenues are a basic requirement for having suﬃ  cient funds to run services 
autonomously. Grant allocation schemes should be based on standard expenditures and 
service performance level, but diﬀ erences in revenue-raising capacity should be built into 
the model of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations.
Th e need for ﬁ scal equalization is a strong and valid argument for amalgamation. In 
Hungary, this problem is more one of the municipal ﬁ nance system: the lack of signiﬁ cant 
own-source revenues (vertical imbalance) and the rigidity of the grant allocation schemes. 
Without changing present expenditure assignment, techniques exist to decrease the present 
intense need for ﬁ scal equalization.
Th e increase in management capacity is the primary responsibility of the national 
government. Setting professional standards for service delivery, deﬁ ning minimum 
performance levels, and establishing supportive audit practices would all help make local 
government operation more specialized. As part of the national government’s role in 
developing these new practices of management and control, disseminating the information 
and knowledge will be crucial. Both national and local governments have joint responsibility 
in providing public services.
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Th e system of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations is dominated by three major features: (a) 
the scale of local government responsibilities, (b) the importance of transfers, and (c) the 
lack of uniformity in the institutional framework. Over the 1990s the system has tried 
to cope with these characteristics within a context of national ﬁ scal restraint. Th is eﬀ ort 
has inevitably resulted in growing volatility and complexity in the transfer structure. Th is 
chapter brieﬂ y discusses these major features and the problems to which they give rise.
Responsibilities
Th e scale of local government functions is exceptional, not only in the post-communist 
states, but in Europe as a whole. Only Scandinavia matches their scope. British local 
authorities have most of the same responsibilities, except medical services. In Hungarian 
local government budgets, education (27 percent) and health care-welfare services (27 
percent) are equally important functions (table 6.1). Public utilities (4 percent) and culture 
and sports (4 percent) are marginal expenditures, produced mostly by commercial or oﬀ -
budget entities. Administrative expenditures, debt service, and other economic services 
make up the balance of each budget.
More than 14 percent of total local expenditures are spent by counties, mostly for 
health care and social services. City level expenditure (40 percent) is proportional to urban 
population (43 percent). Village municipalities comprise one-ﬁ fth of local government 
budgets. 
Th ese expenditure allocations are not likely to change. Even if some decrease were 
desirable, it would require an amendment to the Act on Local Government, possible only 
with a two-thirds majority. One can speculate over movements of responsibilities between 
individual municipalities and associations, or between counties and municipalities (see 
* Th is chapter is based on Davey and Péteri 1998.
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chapter 5), but signiﬁ cant shifts between central and local government as a whole are 
unlikely.
Th e exceptional scale of local government expenditure results primarily from respons-
ibilities in the social sector (such as education, social welfare, health, housing, and so forth). 
Th is allocation has two major implications for intergovernmental relations. First,  national 
policy debate places considerable emphasis on equalization, because parity of access to 
medical service, education, and so forth is regarded as an important goal. Second, local 
government expenditure depends heavily on funding by intergovernmental transfers.
The Importance of Transfers
Grants and national tax shares allocated as grants were at 71 percent of local government 
revenue in 1998. Th e reason for this dependence on transfers is simple. Local governments’ 
heavy social sector responsibilities require access to the tax bases that can raise at least 7 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP)—personal income tax (PIT), corporate income 
tax (CIT), value added tax (VAT), and excise tax. Of these, only the PIT can be assigned 
to local government without major distortions and exporting. All these sources remain in 
central government hands. Th e same situation occurs in Britain, where transfers are almost 
as important as they are in Hungary. Dependence on transfers is much less in Scandinavia 
because local governments share the PIT base with central government through a 
surcharging system.
Local business tax yields have been growing in major urban centers, but only by 
increasing approximation to VAT. Th e European Union poses diﬃ  culties in the form of 
major expansion of this tax base. Developing a value-based property tax system holds 
signiﬁ cant potential, although both political and administrative hurdles must be overcome. 
Since the property tax raised only 0.1 percent of GDP in 1996, yields could clearly be 
increased substantially in the major urban centers.
Th e potential of this reform must not be exaggerated, however. Th e most eﬀ ective 
property taxation in Europe raises less than 1.5 percent of GDP; even if Hungarian yields 
could rise to this level, they would still support less than 10 percent of local government 
expenditure. Th e property tax could never become a signiﬁ cant replacement for the present 
scale of revenues from grants and PIT sharing.
Vehicle taxes (50 percent of which accrue to local government) have been rising, and 
further increases may be required by European Union accession. Th e main potential of 
local business, property, and vehicle taxes, however, lies in the cities and is directly related 
to their greater costs of providing physical infrastructure (traﬃ  c volumes, longer hauls to 
waste disposal, housing rehabilitation needs, and so forth). Similarly, revenues from charges 
might be increased in a number of cities, either by reviewing tariﬀ s or improving collection, 
but these funds would go largely to the infrastructure companies rather than to the main 
municipal budget.
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Table 6.1 Structure of Expenditures by Legal and Size Clusters of  Settlements (percent)
Settlement Manu-
facturing
Economic 
services
Administration Education Health care, 
social services
Public 
utilities
Culture, 
sports
Miscella-
neous
Total
Budapest 9.8 23.7 13.8 20.9 25.0 2.6 4.0 0.2 100
County 2.5 3.1 5.5 10.2 72.6 0.5 5.6 0.0 100
Cities 8.1 12.9 14.5 33.7 21.7 4.1 4.5 0.5 100
Villages 8.2 13.6 23.0 33.4 8.6 9.9 2.4 0.9 100
Municipalities 8.1 13.1 17.3 33.7 17.4 6.0 3.8 0.6 100
Total 7.8 14.4 14.7 26.9 27.4 4.3 4.1 0.4 100
 Size of settlement 
199 or fewer 16.1 30.0 35.4 5.0 5.1 4.7 3.1 0.6 100
200–499 10.0 22.9 33.6 16.9 7.9 5.2 2.5 1.0 100
500–999 8.6 13.6 27.1 35.3 8.2 4.9 1.7 0.6 100
1,000–1,999 8.5 13.3 23.3 35.5 7.8 8.9 2.0 0.7 100
2,000–4,999 8.2 13.1 20.9 34.2 9.4 10.7 2.7 0.8 100
5,000–9,999 8.2 14.2 19.9 32.6 11.5 8.8 3.5 1.3 100
10,000–19,999 7.9 11.4 17.8 30.9 23.2 5.1 3.1 0.6 100
20,000–49,999 7.8 13.5 13.0 29.1 28.3 4.9 2.9 0.5 100
50,000– 8.1 12.8 13.0 37.8 18.2 3.5 6.2 0.4 100
Total 8.1 13.1 17.3 33.7 17.4 6.0 3.8 0.6 100
Source: Davey and Péteri 1998.
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Improving the local revenue base of property and vehicle taxes and consumer charges 
will help maintain physical infrastructure (and service credit for its rehabilitation). Th e 
more substantial costs of the social sector, however, will continue to fall chieﬂ y on the 
combination of grants and PIT sharing (or surcharging).
One option would be to change the balance between grants and revenue sharing 
within this combination, increasing revenue shares and reducing the normative grants. 
Th e incentives would be psychological rather than ﬁ nancial. Th e change would not reduce 
dependence on transfers or increase local accountability or discretion. It might, however, 
reduce the feeling of dependence, giving local government a greater sense of sharing in the 
fruits of the local economy.
Two methods of increasing revenue sharing could be considered. Th e ﬁ rst would be 
a straight increase in the percentage of PIT shared by origin, which decreased from 56 
percent of current collections in 1995 to 10 percent in 2000. A second method would be to 
assign a share of VAT to local government.
Th e main objection to increasing revenue sharing at the expense of normative grants 
would be that revenue disparities between municipalities would increase. Th is increase could 
be partially oﬀ set by increasing the PIT equalization grants but only further reductions of 
the normative or special normative elements could increase the PIT equalization grants. 
Furthermore, reducing those elements would be diﬃ  cult so long as the current lack of 
uniformity in the assignment of competencies, particularly in the social sector, continues.
Th e only change in intergovernmental ﬁ nancial relations that would substantially 
reduce dependence on transfers would be the substitution of a local income tax surcharge 
for the present tax-sharing arrangements. Th e prime objective of this action, however, 
would be to increase local accountability rather than to generate more revenue. Its overall 
eﬀ ect on both national and local budgets would be neutral in the ﬁ rst instance.
The Institutional Framework
Th ree features of local government structure and the assignment of competencies  have a 
major impact on the transfer system:
 Th e structure is highly fragmented, and many small jurisdictions attempt to provide 
services without desirable economies of scale.
 Th e legislation has avoided a mandatory division of functions between counties and 
municipalities.
 Small municipalities are not obliged by law to cooperate in service provision (except for 
administrative and regulatory tasks).
As a result, assignment of competencies between types of local government is not 
uniform, and mismatches between municipal boundaries and the catchments areas of 
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service institutions are frequent. Joint arrangements for service delivery and regional 
development have grown, but they exhibit no consistent pattern.
Th ese conditions have had two impacts on the evolution of the grant system. First, 
speciﬁ c service-related elements in the normative grant calculation have proliferated. Th e 
goal is to target funding on the local government unit (municipality, county, or association) 
running a service institution. Th e monetary value of these elements has been declining 
as a percentage of the actual service costs. Th ese speciﬁ c normative grants now cover a 
signiﬁ cantly lower percentage of regional service costs. Between 1993 and 1996 grants for 
social institutions decreased from 51 to 40 percent as a percentage of current expenditures, 
and between 1993 and 1998 grants for general secondary education decreased from 94 to 
45 percent. Grants for vocational training fell from 73 to 44 percent. Th e second impact has 
been a growth in the pressure on the deﬁ cit and equalization elements within the transfer 
system as a whole. Th e changes in the structure of grants clearly shows the pressure for 
higher equalization. Between 1994 and 1998 grants for various equalization purposes have 
increased by 76 percent, while the average increase of total transfers was only 38 percent all 
in nominal terms. 
The Consequences of Fiscal Restraint
Th e intergovernmental ﬁ nance system has had to operate within tight ﬁ scal restraint. 
Between 1994 and 1998 local government expenditure decreased by 21 percent in real 
terms despite increases in responsibility. Th e changes in the structure of consolidated 
primary public sector expenditures also show that local governments were not able to keep 
their relative position.
Th is squeeze on local government budgets has evoked some increase in local revenue 
eﬀ ort, and local taxes increased from 0.8 percent of GDP in 1994 to 1.2 percent in 1997. 
Th e major source of this growth has been in the local business (turnover) tax, mainly in 
the larger towns. Municipalities have been ﬁ lling gaps by sale of capital assets (nearly 14 
percent of local government revenue in 1996), but 1998 budgets exhibited a sharp decline 
in this source, presumably as the disposable stock contracts.
Two changes in the transfer system reﬂ ect the pressures created by this situation. First, 
the element devoted to equalizing PIT shares increased from 1 percent of local government 
revenues in 1994 to 1.6 percent in 1998. Th is increase brings PIT incomes up to Ft 8,000 
per capita for villages and 9,800 for cities, ﬁ gures that are close to the national average 
PIT allocation to all local governments (Ft 8,600 per capita). It is, however, the only 
form of transfer that does seek, systematically, to reduce disparity in local revenue bases. 
Th e consequence of the high per capita equalizing minimum is that most of the village 
municipalities are eligible for the grant. In practice, PIT sharing works as a grant allocation 
scheme for villages based on the size of the local population, although towns still beneﬁ t 
from above average PIT revenues per capita. Second, the numbers of applications for, and 
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recipients of the deﬁ cit grant have increased (in 1993, 147; in 1997, 843 local governments). 
Recipients fall into three categories:
 village municipalities trying to run services that are uneconomic at their size (24 
percent of village municipalities qualiﬁ ed for deﬁ cit grant in 1996)
 towns that do not have a major PIT and business tax base to provide extensive services 
(for example, secondary schools and hospitals) for surrounding settlements (15 percent 
of towns and cities)
 counties (11 out of 19 in 1996) that have little direct revenue.
Most recipients are small municipalities, but in ﬁ nancial terms the problem lies equally 
with the counties and cities that have regional functions. Only half of the deﬁ cit grant is 
allocated to the villages, 22 percent to county councils, and 28 percent to cities.
Reform Objectives
Th e basic structure of the local government ﬁ nance system is rational. Moreover, the 
central government has made continual eﬀ orts over the 1990s to adjust it and to increase 
its fairness and eﬃ  ciency. Four weaknesses, however, put increasing pressures on the central 
government oﬃ  cials operating the system and on local governments trying to live with the 
eﬀ ects on their budgets.
First, no statutory provision, beyond the annual Budget Act, determines the overall 
size of the resources assigned to subnational governments. Th is lack leads two perpetual 
arguments: uncertainty and suspicion (whether justiﬁ ed or not) that local government 
bears an unfair share of the total ﬁ scal restraint.
Second, adjustments are frequent and many, increasing the complexity and uncertainty 
surrounding the distribution of resources among local authorities.
Th ird, because of the lack of uniformity in the assignment of functions, the number 
and complexity of the speciﬁ c normative elements of the grant calculation has increased 
constantly. Th ese elements are driven both by the central government’s understandable 
desire to see that particular service standards are met and the need to route the funding 
to the authorities providing the service in any given locality. At the same time, these 
normatives have been declining as a proportion of the costs of the services. Th is increase in 
the number of speciﬁ c normatives is unpopular with the municipalities, however, because of 
the added bureaucracy involved in establishing eligibility. Th ey could also have an adverse 
eﬀ ect on eﬃ  ciency by encouraging municipalities to sustain unnecessary volumes of service 
provision simply to earn unit-based grants.
Finally, local governments increasingly call on the deﬁ cit grant is to play the 
equalization role in the overall intergovernmental ﬁ nance system. It is ill equipped to do so, 
however, because its awards are based on the budget estimates of individual municipalities 
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without standard criteria for assessing either local revenue potential or spending need. It 
runs the risk, therefore, of rewarding low revenue eﬀ ort and ineﬃ  cient expenditure. In 
particular, it may run counter to central government policy by enabling small municipalities 
to “go it alone” in providing services instead of cooperating with their neighbors. Th e deﬁ cit 
grant was established to deal with exceptional cases, but now a majority of the counties 
and a quarter of the villages use it. Th e ministry oﬃ  cials allocating the grants make 
strenuous eﬀ orts to avoid these risks, but they are handicapped by the volume of cases to 
scrutinize and the lack of objective measurements to apply. Analysts generally recognize 
that intergovernmental ﬁ nancial relations need a more systematic equalization instrument, 
particularly in view of local governments’ social sector responsibilities.
Th e ﬁ rst experimental change in the concept of transfer allocation was implemented 
in 1998. Th e method of deﬁ cit grant allocation compares the planned expenditures of the 
individual municipalities with the average per capita expenditures of local governments of 
similar size and administrative status. A municipality’s estimated expenditure, which is the 
basis of deﬁ cit grant allocation, should be in the range of 80 to 140 percent of its group 
average. Th is approach helps the really poor municipalities and does not support ineﬃ  cient 
services with extremely high unit costs. Further progress is needed because the method of 
calculating the estimated expenditures is still based on line-item budgeting, the revenue 
capacity is not measured, and discretion remains in the allocation process. Th is is the ﬁ rst 
attempt to introduce a new transfer allocation system.
Fixing the Total
One cannot expect local government budgets to be immune from the ﬁ scal pressures 
on the national government. Indeed, between 1994 and 1998 the decline in general 
government expenditure (excluding social security funds) has slightly exceeded that in local 
government. Nevertheless, the national economy was improving, with 4–5 percent growth 
in GDP between 1997 and 2000, and consolidated public debt got close to the European 
Union target level of 60 percent of GDP. Th e national budget deﬁ cit (without privatization 
revenues) was 3.5 in 2000.
In light of this improvement, reformers pose two major arguments for protecting 
local government budgets from further contraction. First, the bulk of local government 
expenditure is on public goods, for which funding will remain a public sector responsibility, 
no matter how diverse service delivery is. Second, local governments remain responsible 
for much of the infrastructure that needs investment if they are to conform to European 
Union environmental standards. Even with the present ﬁ scal pressure, local governments 
spend more on capital improvement than their average share in general government 
expenditures.
Current procedures create at least three major problems. First, the overall pool of 
resources available to local governments in the state budget is determined annually 
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by Parliament, and no basic ground rules govern that determination. Second, resource 
distribution between individual local governments is subject to frequent change. Th ird, 
allowance for inﬂ ation in annual budget allocations tends to underestimate the actual rise 
in costs.
Th e second problem of intermunicipal distribution concerns later chapters. At this 
stage, two questions arise:
 Can the overall allocation of state budget resources to local government be stabilized?
 Can local government allocations be more buoyant in relation to inﬂ ation during the 
budget year?
Two examples illustrate the legal guarantees of the total volume of state budget support. 
In France a 1994 act stipulates that the total general grant for current expenditure (dotation 
globale de fonctionnement) will be increased annually by a percentage representing the sum 
of the forecast annual rate of inﬂ ation and half the real percentage growth rate of GDP, 
if positive. In Japan the total pool of national budget funds allocated to local government 
through a comprehensive needs and resources equalization formula is determined by ﬁ xed 
percentages of certain national taxes—32 percent of PIT, CIT, and liquor tax; 25 percent 
of tobacco tax; and 24 percent of consumption tax (equivalent to VAT). Th e French and 
Japanese laws are intended to provide a continuing, multiyear basis for the assignment 
of transfers. Th ese guarantees could, of course, be amended by Parliament, but such 
amendment would require a conscious decision independent of the annual budget process, 
involving considerable negotiation and debate. 
In other countries, such as the Netherlands, the total grant pool is deﬁ ned as a 
percentage of national revenues, ﬁ xed for a single year as part of the annual budget. In 
the Dutch case it is 11 percent. Th is level does not provide the same long-term stability 
as the French and Japanese laws. Nevertheless, the volume of transfers during the budget 
year reﬂ ects the actual collections of the taxes in question; if these taxes are buoyant, 
local governments are automatically compensated for continuing increases in costs. Th is 
protection has also beneﬁ ted local government in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where 
transfers are based mainly on annually ﬁ xed shares of PIT and  CIT. 
Risks as well as beneﬁ ts are attached to this type of indexation. In a deﬂ ationary 
situation, a ﬁ xed percentage of tax yields might produce less than the budget estimate. 
In 1995 Japanese local authorities received only 80 percent of the amount of transfers 
estimated in the budget due to tax shortfalls. Th is situation would be unlikely in Hungary, 
however, until inﬂ ation falls to negligible levels.
With greater ﬁ scal stability in sight, the Hungarian central government might 
consider linking the overall size of transfers (at least for current expenditure support) to 
ﬁ xed proportions of state revenues, preferably for several years. As an illustration, the 1998 
normative grants equate with 21 percent of the combined estimated yields of VAT, PIT, and 
CIT, a decline from 38.6 percent in 1992.
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Normative grants for local governments decreased from 6.0 to 3.3 percent of GDP 
between 1990 and 1998. Because GDP and the major taxes (VAT, PIT, and CIT) follow 
the same trend, the normative grants declined as a percentage of these taxes (in 1991, 36.5 
percent; in 1998, 21.1 percent).
If the proportion of local government normative grants to total amount of major taxes 
were kept ﬁ xed, then the municipal grants would be stable. For example, using the 1994 
percentage (29.7 percent) as a ﬁ xed ratio, by now the normative grants would be 40 percent 
higher—Ft 462 billion  (See table 6.2)
Table 6.2 Local Government Revenues by Sources (Ft billion)
Year VAT PIT CIT Tax total GDP Normative grants 
(actual)
Estimates, using 
1994 percentages
1991 149.5 183.9 77.3 410.7 2,498.3 150.1 —
1992 175.7 205.7 64.1 445.5 2,942.7 172.0 —
1993 265.0 238.4 54.0 557.4 3,548.3 209.8 —
1994 336.4 304.8 75.9 717.1 4,364.8 213.0 —
1995 423.9 383.7 91.0 898.6 5,562.0 220.1 266.9
1996 515.1 490.7 110.9 1116.7 6,845.0 253.7 331.7
1997 674.7 560.1 144.7 1379.5 8,370.0 297.3 409.7
1998 759.3 618.1 180.0 1557.4 9,855.0 329.0 462.5
Source: Davey and Péteri 1998.
Other Options for Reform
However the overall amount of transfers is ﬁ xed, their distribution should be optimized 
and their objectives should be clear. Th e prime aim is not to reduce the scale of national 
budget support, since the personal services are of great signiﬁ cance to ordinary citizens and 
demands and expectations are not diminishing. Th e main objectives must be to improve 
equity in the distribution of resources and eﬃ  ciency in their use.
A radical reform might attempt to replace the whole transfer system with an equalization-
based grant or revenue share of the Dutch, British, or Swedish type. Th ese systems attempt 
to balance local spending needs and costs and local revenue potential comprehensively and 
objectively.
Radical change will bring signiﬁ cant losers as well as winners unless overall state budget 
support increases substantially, an unlikely scenario. Serious questions arise, therefore, about 
whether a radical change in system would be politically acceptable. Th e practical alternative is 
to retain the present overall transfer system, but adjust individual elements to meet the most 
serious practical needs.
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Two alternative approaches to incremental change might be used. One alternative assumes 
that no institutional change will occur, that is, distribution of responsibilities between counties 
and municipalities, or between towns and their surrounding settlements will not be made 
uniform, and small settlements will not be compelled to associate in providing municipal 
services. Th e second alternative assumes that institutional change could be undertaken and 
that some form of intermunicipal cooperation becomes mandatory. Th is assumption also 
applies to changes in the assignment of competencies between local governments.
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Th e role that intergovernmental revenues play in local government ﬁ nance diﬀ ers widely 
throughout the world. Local governments raise much of their own revenue in the 
Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Sweden. A greater share is provided through 
transfers from the central government in Australia. Factors determining the relative size 
of the intergovernmental system include the extent of decentralization of expenditures and 
revenues, the capacity to raise revenues locally, ﬁ scal and economic imbalances across the 
country, desires for equalization, and the cultural heritage of the country. Ultimately, the 
contribution of intergovernmental revenue is a country-speciﬁ c decision, and no single 
share of transfers between levels is appropriate across all countries. Nonetheless, the role of 
intergovernmental revenues in local ﬁ nance and the way that transfers are structured can 
aﬀ ect economic eﬃ  ciency, delivery of government services, equity, and other goals that a 
country sets for itself. As a result, design of the system is very important.
Th is chapter, which describes and examines the intergovernmental transfer system, 
has three sections. Th e ﬁ rst is an overview of the existing system, including an analysis of 
each type of transfer. For analytical purposes, the intergovernmental revenue structure can 
be categorized as derivation-based tax sharing and normative, earmarked, investment, and 
deﬁ cit grants. Th e second section provides a review of overall system performance. Th e ﬁ nal 
section presents some options for modifying the intergovernmental revenue system.
Intergovernmental Revenue Structure
Intergovernmental transfers from the central government to counties and local govern-
ments are summarized in table 7.1 according to the standard budget structure used by 
the government of Hungary. Transfers are categorized as shared revenues, accumulation 
* Th is chapter is based on Fox 1998.
P
A
R
T
 
2
 

 
S
E
C
T
I
O
N
 
1
 

 
M
O
D
E
R
N
I
Z
I
N
G
 
T
H
E
 
I
N
T
E
R
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
A
L
 
F
I
N
A
N
C
E
 
S
Y
S
T
E
M
1
4
8 Table 7.1 Total Intergovernmental Transfers, 1993–1998 (Forint billion)
Local government revenues 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Shared revenues  
 PIT 48.9 61.3 93.6 101.3 135.7 187.0
 Vehicle tax 2.5 2.5 2.5 7.0 8.0 8.5
 Tax on land rental 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Shared revenues total 51.4 63.8 96.1 108.3 143.7 196.5
Accumulation revenues within the state budget 6.5 15.4 7.4 11.8 10.0 9.0
Accumulations revenues total 6.5 15.4 7.4 11.8 10.0 9.0
State transfers and grants  
 Normative subsidies from central budget 214.8 221.6 232.6 231.7 255.9 276.1
 Subsidies to theaters 2.3 2.4 2.6 3.4 4.3 4.8
 Addressed and targeted subsidies 18.3 24.6 24.2 23.4 46.0 43.0
 PIT supplement 6.5 6.5 0 0 0 0
 Deﬁ cit grant 1.6 4.4 7.0 5.4 6.0 7.2
 Other subsidies (centralized appropriations) 13.1 29.6 32.6 52.9 36.6 37.8
 Subsidies to local ﬁ re departments 0.0 0.0 2.5 7.3 8.8 11.6
 Supplementary grants to certain public education tasks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 6.5
 Investment grants for regional equalization 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 11.0 9.0
 Decentralized targeted investment grant 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3
 Public employees wage, minimum wage 5.3 9.1 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Other regrouped revenues 0.2 1.3 3.9 2.2 0.0 0.0
State transfers and grants total 262.1 299.5 311.7 326.9 371.8 400.3
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Local government revenues 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Transfers within general government
 Funds from Social Security 91.6 117.4 127.1 148.4 169.0 190.9
 Funds from extra-budgetary funds 2.4 3.5 3.4 12.7 15.0 19.0
 Funds from budgetary (chapters) institutions 4.8 6.6 6.0 7.2 8.0 8.0
 Budgetary supplements and refunds 5.0 5.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.0
Transfers within general government total 103.8 132.5 137.7 169.6 193.5 218.9
Total intergovernmental transfers 423.8 511.2 552.9 616.6 718.9 824.7
Government ﬁ nance statistics (GFS) revenue total 578.3 705.8 790.1 940.4 1,021.3 1,142.5
Government ﬁ nance statistics (GFS) expenditures total 0.0 0.0 781.6 892.5 1,011.3 1,142.7
Transfers as a percent of revenues 73.28 72.43 69.98 65.57 70.40 72.18
State transfers, PIT, revenues from land rental 311.0 360.8 405.4 428.1 507.5 588.3
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
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revenues, state transfers and grants, and transfers within general government. Local 
government non-transfer revenues have been omitted from the table. Transfers are 
budgeted to provide approximately Ft 825 billion in 1998 revenues, or about 72 percent 
of total local government non-debt revenues. Th ey have risen at a compound annual 14.2 
percent growth rate since 1993, a ﬁ gure well below the 17.5 percent inﬂ ation rate during 
the same period. Transfers have been falling as a percentage of gross domestic product as 
well as in real terms. Still, the share of local government revenue provided through transfers 
has risen signiﬁ cantly since 1996, even though the percentage is lower than in the early 
1990s.
Tax Sharing
Local governments receive percentages of the personal income tax (PIT) and the vehicle 
and property transactions taxes, representing a budgeted Ft 103 billion in 1998 or about 
one-sixth of local revenues. Municipalities also receive 30 percent of environmental 
ﬁ nes. Tax sharing is a form of revenue sharing in which the amount to be transferred is 
determined by a percentage of collections of a national tax (or taxes) and the distribution is 
based on where the tax originates. Analysts of derivation-based tax sharing normally treat 
the revenues as intergovernmental transfers, although they have some characteristics of an 
intergovernmental transfer and some of a tax. Th e revenues are much like intergovernmental 
transfers since the central government determines the revenues, by setting both the tax 
rate (or sharing rate) and the tax base, and collects the revenues. Th e structure has the 
characteristics of a local tax system, because the revenues remain in the jurisdiction where 
they are collected. 
Derivation-based tax sharing has two advantages:
 Administrative costs are low, because the revenues are collected at the same time as the 
national share of the tax.
 Revenue sources such as personal income are buoyant; whereas other tax sources that 
often are assigned to local governments typically grow slowly.
A number of signiﬁ cant disadvantages results from tax-base sharing, such as lack 
of accountability, if taxpayers do not understand that the shared revenues are provided 
to subnational governments. Problems with horizontal balance may also be a signiﬁ cant 
concern. Horizontal balance refers to the capacity of each city and municipality to ﬁ nance 
its service delivery responsibilities. 
With tax sharing in general, revenues from shared taxes are concentrated in the 
highest income (or other tax base) areas, because less aﬄ  uent places have less capacity 
to meet their responsibilities. In Hungary, local governments receive widely diﬀ erent per 
capita revenues as a result of derivation-based PIT sharing. For example, in 1995 Budapest 
collected Ft 18,300 per capita from PIT shared revenues, but the average local government 
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with a population under 1,000 received less than Ft 4,300 (Fox, Melhem and Péteri 1995). 
Of course, horizontal balance problems arise from more than derivation-based sharing. 
Essentially all tax bases are heavily concentrated in the same places, so no local taxes are 
likely to achieve horizontal balance.
A tax-sharing system’s normal structure prevents local governments from altering 
their revenues by changing tax rates. Tax sharing discourages eﬀ ective planning and service 
delivery when the speciﬁ c percentages to be shared are selected each year to balance local 
budgets. In the early years of transition these so-called “regulating taxes” were common in 
a number of countries (for example, Russia and Ukraine). Th e percentage shared has varied 
annually in Hungary as well.
Derivation-based tax sharing requires that rules be made concerning where revenues 
are derived. In Hungary PIT revenues are shared where the income earner lives as opposed 
to where the income is earned. Administrative problems always exist in determining the 
speciﬁ c local government that should receive the tax revenues.
 Sharing the PIT provided about 90 percent of total derivation-based revenues, or 
about Ft 89 billion, in 1998. Th ese derivation-based PIT revenues represent one-half (20 
percent) of the 40 percent of national PIT revenues earmarked for local governments in 
1998. In 2000 only 5 percent of the 40 percent earmarked PIT remained derivation based. 
In 1998 PIT revenues included both the derivation-based revenues and the PIT revenues 
earmarked for other purposes (see table 7.1). 
Th e actual amount of PIT revenues shared with local governments is based on tax 
collections from two years earlier because of the time necessary to prepare data based 
on point of derivation. Th e two-year lag causes a signiﬁ cant real revenue loss for local 
governments, given an inﬂ ation rate of greater than 17 percent. In other words, local 
governments’ share of PIT revenues would be much greater if the distribution was based on 
the current year’s collections. For example, local governments’ total earmarked share of PIT 
receipts was about Ft 180 billion in 1998, but the share would be about Ft 250 billion if 40 
percent of expected 1998 PIT collections were distributed. 
Two other taxes are distributed by derivation. Fifty percent of the nationally 
established motor vehicle tax rate is distributed across local governments based on the sites 
of collection. Municipalities receive all of any additional revenues if they choose to impose 
a motor vehicle tax surcharge. Likewise, county administrative oﬃ  ces collect a tax on land 
and property transactions. Th irty percent is remitted to the municipality of origin, 35 
percent stays with the county oﬃ  ce to ﬁ nance administrative expenses, and the remaining 
35 percent is placed in a pool and provided to counties on a per capita basis. 
Any undesired horizontal balance implications of tax sharing can be oﬀ set in a 
number of ways. For example, other transfers can be targeted to those areas receiving less 
in derivation revenues, or the PIT sharing can be distributed based on a formula. Both 
alternatives are used in Hungary. Th e PIT distribution is made more equal by guaranteeing 
local governments a minimum per capita amount. In 1998 villages were assured of at least 
Ft 8,000 per person, and towns were assured of at least Ft 9,800 per person. Th e minimum 
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amount has escalated rapidly in recent years and cost Ft 33.3 billion in 1998, up from 
Ft 9.9 billion in 1996. Th e minimum PIT distribution combined with the needs-based 
normatives described below provide a signiﬁ cant equalization component to the overall 
transfer system.
Normative Grants
Local governments and counties receive grants based on the value of a series of normatives 
(see appendix 7.1). Most of the revenue from normatives goes to towns and villages, but 
about Ft 9.5 billion goes to the counties. Th e normatives eﬀ ectively create a complicated 
formula-based grant structure, linked mostly to expenditure needs. Th e total amount of 
normative-based revenue going to a local government is calculated by adding the amount 
to be received from each of approximately 50 normatives. (Analysts have given diﬀ erent 
totals for the number of normatives, depending on how normatives are counted when 
multiple normatives are applied to a single situation.) Th e revenue from the normatives is 
generally not earmarked and may be spent for any purpose that the recipient government 
deems appropriate, even though the normatives are often linked to speciﬁ c mandatory 
services.
Five types of normative calculations are used:
 Several normatives are ﬁ xed amounts for each type of local government.
 Some normatives are per capita and have amounts multiplied by population to 
determine the revenues. Population can be regarded as a proxy for service needs.
 In many situations the normative amount is calculated by multiplying the number 
of recipients or beneﬁ ciaries of services times the per-beneﬁ ciary amount. Essentially 
all of these normatives are related to education or social welfare, and they give local 
governments an incentive to deliver some degree of service because the governments 
receive revenues only if there are beneﬁ ciaries.
 One normative is based on the number of beds in homeless shelters. Fortunately 
capacity normatives of this type are seldom used in the local government sector, 
because they create perverse incentives. Th ey encourage local governments to expand 
capacity without necessarily improving the service quality.
 Local tourist tax revenues are matched with Ft 2 for each Ft 1 raised locally.
Th e notion behind the normative structure is that revenues should be provided in 
accordance with the varying types of expenditure needs of each local government. Local 
governments have some degree of ﬂ exibility on spending decisions, however, because the 
revenues are not earmarked. Of course, local governments often do not have the expenditure 
ﬂ exibility that would appear to exist because many services are mandatory, and mandates 
and standards in other laws eﬀ ectively prescribe certain expenditures. Furthermore, 
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recipient governments can expect political pressure from advocates for each service to 
spend the revenues for the purpose on which the normatives are based.
It is tempting to think of the beneﬁ ciary normatives as cost reimbursement grants. 
In most cases, however, the values attached to the normatives are not based on actual 
expenditures and do not have consistent relationships with actual costs, as the Ministry of 
Social Welfare learned when it undertook a study of the costs of delivering social welfare 
services to use as a basis for setting normatives. Even if an eﬀ ort was made to relate the 
normatives to costs, no clear statement deﬁ nes the speciﬁ c service characteristics that 
constitute provision of mandatory services, so associating the normatives with precise costs 
is not possible. Furthermore, municipalities spend much more on average for the services 
than the grant that is linked to the beneﬁ ciary normatives, so at best the normatives are 
loosely deﬁ ned, partial cost reimbursement grants.
Education Normatives
At least 26 normatives are for education and are usually based on the number of students. 
For example, Ft 67,000 is provided for each kindergarten student and Ft 96,000 for each 
secondary student in grades 11 through 13. In some cases normatives are designed to 
provide incentives, such as when a greater amount is given for nonresident students to 
encourage local governments to cooperate in service delivery. Th e Ministry of Culture and 
Education estimates that the normatives provide about two-thirds of education costs, but 
the ministry recognizes that the values are not based on an analysis of actual costs. Th e idea 
is that the central government will ﬁ nance education wages, which make up about two-
thirds of total education costs. Cost estimates provided by local governments suggest that 
the normative values are suﬃ  cient to ﬁ nance about 50 percent of kindergarten costs and 
about 80 percent of high school costs. Th e central government also provides seven pupil-
based education grants for ethnic schools and programs. Th e ethnic normatives diﬀ er from 
others in that the money is earmarked for speciﬁ c purposes. (Th e normatives are generally 
described in annex 3 of the annual budget, but each of the earmarked grants is contained in 
a separate annex. For example, the ethnic normatives are presented in annex 8.) Of course, 
the earmarked revenues are fungible and may have no eﬀ ect at the margin on expenditure 
levels for ethnic programs, if the local governments were already going to spend more than 
the earmarked amounts for the services.
Social Welfare Normatives
Nine social welfare normatives are used. Beginning in 1998 the largest social welfare 
normative was split because of a concern that the range of programs was not being 
adequately provided. Basic social services for the general population are linked to three 
normatives, two of which are calculated using total population. Combined, these normatives 
provide about 20 percent of the revenues from the social welfare normatives.
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Th e other major normative is also a per capita transfer to local governments varying 
from Ft 2,500 to Ft 12,500 per person. Th e amount depends on the extent of unemployment, 
the percentage of the population paying PIT, and the percentage of the population that is 
under age 18 and over age 60. Th e intent is to provide greater funding to municipalities that 
have larger expenditure responsibilities, although in a recent analysis of spending patterns 
the Ministry of Social Welfare found no relationship between program expenditures 
and factors in the formula. Th e speciﬁ c deﬁ nition of the factors used to determine the 
normative’s value (for example, the meaning of unemployed), and the weights attached to 
the factors are set each year through discussions between the central government and the 
Parliament. Th ese two parties may consider many issues when setting the amount for this 
normative, but one goal is to establish an allocation that achieves some preconceived (at 
least regionally) conclusion of how the revenue should be distributed. Th e deﬁ nitions and 
weights appear to be set to meet these goals.
Beneﬁ ciary-based normatives are also used for social welfare purposes. Five types of 
beneﬁ ciaries are identiﬁ ed, including for homes for the elderly, homeless, handicapped, 
orphaned, and people who need rehabilitation.
Operation of the Normative System
Th e mechanisms for distributing normative revenues to individual municipalities as well 
as the total amount provided are determined every year through the political process. Th e 
system is complicated and detailed, giving an appearance of precision, but in fact the process 
is ad hoc and is routinely adjusted. Th e number of normatives used each year and the values 
applied to each varied radically between 1996 and 1998 (see appendix 7.1). In part this 
variation reﬂ ects the newness of the government structure and attempts by the government 
of Hungary to ﬁ ne-tune the transfer system, but it also may reﬂ ect manipulation to meet 
political objectives. Th e use of more normatives is encouraged by advocates for speciﬁ c 
programs who want to see funding linked to service characteristics. Annual changes in 
the major social welfare normative, for which the factors and their deﬁ nitions are changed 
every year, provide an excellent illustration of how the structure is altered. Th e education 
normatives also have been subject to signiﬁ cant changes as the number of normatives 
and the value linked to each have been adjusted radically during the past years. One 
outcome is that municipalities cannot accurately anticipate their revenues from one year 
to the next.
Frequent changes in the normative structure complicate a system that is already 
confusing and administratively complex. Population normatives can be calculated easily 
using estimates provided by the Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce. Th e beneﬁ ciary normatives, 
however, require careful compilation. For example, schools must follow detailed instructions 
on how to calculate the number of students. Many normatives, such as the number of 
students in class in grades 9 and 10, the number in grades 11 through 13, the number eating 
lunch at school, and so forth may apply to the same school, so many separate counts must 
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be kept. One case was observed where 23 normatives applied to a single school. Generally, 
these normatives are based on the average number of students each day, so daily counts 
(sometimes more than once per day) must be maintained. Th e academic year crosses two 
ﬁ scal years, so schools and local governments must follow two diﬀ erent sets of deﬁ nitions 
and normative values during the same academic year.
Budgeting for normative grants begins with agreement among the central government, 
the Parliament, and local governments on the total amount to be distributed. Simultaneously, 
as part of the national budget planning process, local governments provide estimates in the 
fall on the expected number of beneﬁ ciaries and the other factors that go into calculating 
the normative grants for the following year. Th e total number of beneﬁ ciaries is used to 
set an average amount (the normative’s value) that is the basis for the distribution across 
governments. Th e normative values are then used to calculate the amount that each local 
government is to receive. Th e local governments do not ﬁ nd out how much they will get 
until March. Payments based on these calculations are regarded as preliminary, and actual 
normative payments are determined after the number of beneﬁ ciaries is determined at 
year’s end. Local governments receive additional amounts if they underestimated the 
number of beneﬁ ciaries and must repay excess amounts if they overestimated beneﬁ ciaries. 
Interest is charged if the diﬀ erence between the total estimated and total actual amount 
exceeds 5 percent. Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce inspects some municipalities to determine if 
the counts given by schools and other sources are accurate. A ﬁ nal reconciliation based 
on the audits can result in additional payments to local governments or a return of money 
if overpayments were made. Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce examines normative grants in about 
500 municipalities per year and performs comprehensive audits in about 40 to 50 other 
municipalities.
Despite the administrative diﬃ  culties, the normative system oﬀ ers two advantages 
for the intergovernmental transfer system. First, it links transfers to expenditure needs, 
ensuring that revenues are positively correlated with needs. Second, it provides transfers 
to the local governments making the expenditures. Th e close linkage between transfers 
and expenditure responsibilities is important because many services are not provided by 
all municipalities. For example, only about 120 municipalities operate hospitals, and most 
municipalities operate secondary schools. Changes in the structure should be focused on 
reducing the problems while retaining some aspects of these strengths.
Earmarked Operating Grants
Funds from a number of grants are earmarked for speciﬁ c purposes, such as annual grants 
for theaters and ﬁ re protection, and the ethnic normatives mentioned above. In addition a 
series of earmarked grants called “centralized appropriations” (Ft 37.8 billion in 1998) have 
purposes that can  vary from year to year. Accumulation reviews inside the state budget and 
funds from budgetary institutions are not categorized as centralized appropriations because 
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they may also be provided to entities other than local governments. In 1998 centralized 
appropriations were made for children’s programs (Ft 9.5 billion), teachers’ education (Ft 3.5 
billion), textbooks (Ft 1.6 billion), severance pay for employees (Ft 1.5 billion), subsidies for 
public utility user fees (Ft 3.4 billion), public utility investment (Ft 2.5 billion), and elderly 
care (Ft 5.1 billion). Sectoral ministries also have revenues to ﬁ nance delivery of speciﬁ c 
operational programs, and some of these funds are granted to municipalities. In the budget 
accounts these amounts are called “funds from budgetary institutions.” Th e total value of 
such programs was Ft 8 billion in 1998, the same as in 1997. Th e Ministry of Culture and 
Education, which provides grants for information technology, staﬀ  training, subsidies for 
school books, and other purposes, is responsible for much of these funds. Th e grants from 
centralized appropriations and funds from budgetary institutions are normally provided 
directly through sectoral ministries, based on guidelines that were developed according to 
sectoral legislation. Th e ministries often have considerable ﬂ exibility for making the speciﬁ c 
allocations of these grants.
Extrabudgetary funds provide earmarked operating revenues. Th e largest of these 
revenues is the social security fund, which is used to ﬁ nance health services including 
services provided through municipalities. Much of the revenue is distributed as 
reimbursement for the costs of service delivery. Th e labor fund, the second largest, assists 
municipalities in ﬁ nancing unemployment insurance beneﬁ ts for people whose initial 
unemployment beneﬁ ts have expired.
Investment Grants
Investment grants ﬁ nance speciﬁ c projects that normally are selected through competitive 
bidding processes. In most cases the transfer of these funds occurs as payment on the 
basis of invoices for actual expenditures, rather than through direct transfers to local 
governments. Th e funds are generally earmarked, because they are intended for speciﬁ c 
projects. Th e projects often involve implementation across several years, so the grantors 
frequently make multiyear commitments. Th e funds remain unused in about 10 percent of 
the cases because local governments decide not to undertake the investment or are unable 
to provide their cost share.
Four categories of investment grants are made directly through the central government 
budget: addressed, targeted, discretionary and regional development grants. Other grants 
may be made through the centralized appropriations described above. For example, in 1998 
an appropriation was budgeted to fund sewer systems in Budapest and the 22 cities with 
county rights.
Addressed and Targeted Grants
Addressed and targeted grants are the largest categories of investment grants, ﬁ nancing an 
estimated 60 percent of all local investments (Kopányi, Inel and Papp 1998). Addressed 
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grants generally provide 100 percent funding and are made for large projects that have 
signiﬁ cant spillover beneﬁ ts. Th e projects are selected by the Parliament, normally on 
recommendations from the Ministry of Interior and the sectoral ministries.
Targeted grants are normally for smaller projects with lower spillovers and are 
matching grants that have an average of 50 to 60 percent national and 40 to 50 percent 
local ﬁ nancing. Th e grant component is increased 10 percent if the grantee is a municipal 
association. Between 1993 and 1995 the percentage paid by the central government varied 
by type of project from 90 percent for clean water projects to 30 percent for improving 
primary school classrooms (Urban Institute 1996). Th e percentages paid by the central 
government were lower in 1996 than in 1993–1995.
Priority areas for targeted grants are set in the annual Budget Act. Th e major priorities 
for 1998 include management of solid waste, rehabilitation of dilapidated primary schools, 
purchase of medical equipment, and operation of sewage and water systems that are linked 
together. Project applications are reviewed by the County Treasury and Information 
Service Oﬃ  ce, the Ministry of Interior, and the sectoral ministries. All municipalities are 
entitled to apply for targeted grants, and applications that meet all criteria are automatically 
approved, though funding may not be available.
Other Discretionary Grants
Sectoral ministries and extrabudgetary funds make grants for investments in the same 
manner as they do for operational purposes. Th ese revenues are called “accumulation 
revenues” within the state budget in the ﬁ nancial accounts and amounted to Ft 9 billion in 
1998, down from Ft 10 billion in 1997. Th e extrabudgetary funds and sectoral ministries 
each have priority areas that were established by the Parliament, but each has considerable 
ﬂ exibility in making the grants. Local governments and nongovernmental entities can apply 
for grants through these programs. Some programs require that a minimum percentage of 
the grants be made to local governments (for example, 65 percent of water fund grants).
Th ree extrabudgetary funds make grants to local governments—environmental 
protection, roads, and water management. Each fund operates under a long-term plan 
approved by the Parliament. Agendas overlap to some degree, particularly between 
environmental protection and water management. Th e extrabudgetary funds are ﬁ nanced 
through a variety of means. For example, the road fund is ﬁ nanced mostly with an excise tax 
on fuel, but the portions available for grants to municipalities (less than Ft 1 billion) come 
from a 25 percent share of the central government’s part of the motor vehicle tax. Each 
fund has a separate decision-making mechanism for selecting the projects to ﬁ nance. Th e 
environmental protection fund makes grants or loans for water and sewer (approximately 
28 percent of the total), solid waste (about 25 percent), and air pollution. Financing for 
municipalities normally is in the form of grants, and is given with the expectation of 50 
to 60 percent local cost sharing. Th e water management fund provides grants for water 
and sewer projects, using ﬁ nancing from a portion of the water consumption fees. Th e 
PA RT  2    S E C T I O N  1    M O D E R N I Z I N G  T H E  I N T E R G O V E R N M E N TA L  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M
158
road fund makes small grants to local governments to improve connector links to national 
roads. Grants provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare for hospital equipment are also 
categorized as accumulation revenues within the state budget.
Regional Development Grants
Two grant programs are administered through the county regional development councils 
that were formed in anticipation of European Union (EU) membership. Th e regional 
councils are not local government bodies, though they include local government oﬃ  cials 
in addition to private sector representatives and others. Th ese grant programs allow some 
investment funds to be allocated based on regional rather than national priorities. Grants 
from both programs must be made in accordance with the counties’ development plans.
Th e ﬁ rst program, regional equalization grants, is targeted toward distressed and less 
developed municipalities. Formally, the regional subsidies are made through the Ministry 
of Environment and Regional Development and the regional equalization grants are 
made through the Ministry of the Interior. Th e ministries use a scoring system (which is 
approved by the Parliament) to determine the distribution of revenues across counties and 
then allow the regional development councils to make speciﬁ c allocations. Th e subsidy is 
10 percent greater if the grantee is a municipal association. Th e second program, regional 
development targeted appropriations, is available for all purposes and for local governments 
and nongovernment entities. Either grants or recurrent subsidies can be given. Some private 
sector grants include interest subsidies. Th e grants are made with the requirement of at least 
20 percent local funding, though no explicit mechanism ensures that local governments 
meet their commitments. Th e regional development councils normally provide grants of 
under Ft 200 million, and these grants are given in place of smaller targeted grants. Larger 
grants still must be obtained through the addressed and targeted grant structures. Th is 
ﬁ nancing dichotomy may provide incentives to increase or decrease the size of projects, 
depending on which structure oﬀ ers the best terms and easiest access to grants.
Coordination of Investment Grants
Investment grants are poorly coordinated because the volume of applications is huge and 
the number of granting agencies is large. Municipalities often bid for every possible grant 
with the hope of being successful on an acceptable share. One municipality indicated 
that it submits as many as 1,000 applications annually, though only a small portion 
of these applications request signiﬁ cant resources. As a result, each municipality often 
applies for multiple grants for the same project and for grants for many diﬀ erent projects. 
Municipalities have many incentives to bid for numerous grants. Uncertainty about the 
overall grant system causes local governments to apply for funding now because they worry 
that it will not be available later. All schools or other institutions in a municipality may 
apply for the same grant program. Municipalities are not prohibited from simultaneously 
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applying for and receiving grants for the same project through many of the programs 
described above. For example, water and sewer projects can be funded through the 
addressed, targeted, environmental protection, water fund, and regional grant programs, 
and possibly through others.
Most grant programs receive applications for much more ﬁ nancing than is available. 
For example, the road fund annually receives about 1,000 applications, of which it can 
fund about 150. Furthermore, the volume of applications precludes granting agencies 
from undertaking comprehensive reviews of the applications. In fact, projects are seldom 
evaluated in terms of their economic viability. Factors such as the local government’s ability 
to ﬁ nance its share of the cost play a much greater role in the decision process than project 
quality, even though the fungibility of resources means little information is available on 
a local government’s apparent ﬁ nancial capacity. All of these considerations increase the 
chance that decisions are based on grantsmanship and political criteria.
Some organizations, such as the environmental protection fund, make grants based on 
recommendations from interministerial committees, which allows for some coordination 
between grantors. Unfortunately, these committees have not resulted in a well-coordinated 
system. Grantors often have diﬀ erent application processes, ﬁ ling requirements, and 
selection criteria.
Poor coordination results in four problems. First, project selection is likely to be sub-
optimal, both for allocations across sectors and for choice of projects. Second, some projects 
have received grants totaling more than 100 percent of their cost. Th e quality of projects 
proposed by local governments can be seriously diminished, because the governments 
have little incentive to select optimal projects when the entire cost is borne externally. 
Th ird, conﬂ icts between agencies can result in project work commencing, but never being 
completed, because some sources of ﬁ nance fail to materialize. Th e diﬀ erent granting 
sources may make ﬁ nancing available on inconsistent schedules, particularly for multiyear 
projects. Finally, signiﬁ cant administrative burdens are created for both local governments 
and the central government.
Government resolution 263/1997 was adopted to allow more eﬀ ective coordination 
of the resources managed by the ministries and the extrabudgetary funds. Th e resolution 
also allows the Treasury to monitor disbursements of grant funds from the diﬀ erent 
sources. Resolution 263 also permits the Treasury to ensure that debts owed the central 
government are met prior to any disbursement of funds. Th e system for implementing 
the resolution has not been fully developed, and the resolution is best characterized as 
laying out an objective. Th e expectation is for a single tender to be issued for all projects 
of the same type. Local governments will apply once to the institution where the largest 
grant is being requested. Th e evaluation process for all prospective grants for each project 
is to occur simultaneously, and the institution receiving the proposal is responsible for 
coordination with other potential grantors. Presumably, this arrangement will allow better 
overall targeting of investment funds and will reduce the possibility for excessive grants. At 
this time ministries have diﬀ erent willingness to cooperate in the disbursement of grants; 
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some want an improved process and others want to maintain their independent ability to 
inﬂ uence the grant-making process.
Deﬁ cit Grants
Deﬁ cit grants are provided to assist local governments that have deﬁ cits through no fault 
of their own or local governments that go bankrupt. Th e total value of these grants was 
Ft 7 billion in 1998, up slightly from the 1997 level. During the year the aggregate value 
of deﬁ cit grants can be increased using unspent funds from the addressed and targeted 
grant programs. In recent years the number of applications for deﬁ cit grants has increased 
dramatically from only a small number to over a third of all local governments.
A series of criteria has been established by the Parliament to determine which local 
governments qualify for the grants. Th ese criteria include the following: 
 Municipalities must levy local taxes (in practice this requirement seems to be 
interpreted as meaning the business tax). 
 Capital expenditures must be less than capital revenues (presumably to ensure that 
current revenues are not being used to ﬁ nance investments).
 No deposits with duration of three months or more may be made.
 Th e grants are made only to assist governments in covering mandatory tasks.
Local governments must make application for deﬁ cit grants to the County Treasury 
and Service Information Oﬃ  ce by April 30 and September 30 of the year in which the 
grant is to be made. Th is oﬃ  ce analyzes the applications to determine whether the local 
governments qualify and reports its ﬁ ndings to the Ministries of Finance and Interior, 
which make a joint decision on whether a grant should be made and for how much. Th e 
decision is then presented to the Parliament for review.
Deﬁ cit grants create perverse incentives because local governments can increase their 
grant revenues through behavioral changes. As a result, local governments that appear to 
be in relatively good ﬁ nancial condition can receive deﬁ cit grants. Local governments have 
an incentive to raise less of their own revenues and to increase expenditures on mandatory 
services. Certain revenues can be shifted from covering mandatory to nonmandatory 
expenditures, and deposits can be held for periods just short of three months. Th us, the 
grant received by a municipality can depend heavily on its grantsmanship skills.
Overall Characteristics of the Grant Structure
Th e transfer system can be summarized as:
 very large by international standards
 ad hoc in aggregate size and distribution 
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 administratively complex
 necessary to achieve vertical balance, given the limited revenue-raising authority of 
local governments
 enhancing the equalization of local government revenues
 partially aimed at encouraging local governments to carry out national priorities 
 distorting the eﬃ  cient behavior of local governments.
Importance of Transfers in the Intergovernmental Finance Structure
Th e share of local revenues provided through transfers is relatively high in Hungary. Wide 
variation exists across Europe and the world in the percentage of revenues raised through 
transfers (see table 7.2). Cross-country diﬀ erences in the role of transfers arise because of 
divergences in local government service delivery responsibilities, priorities on equalization, 
local own-source revenue raising capacity, political judgments, and other factors. Transfers 
tend to play a large role in transition countries because of limited access to local own-source 
taxes. Th e share of revenues from transfers is high in Hungary, even by the standard of the 
transition countries (lower than Bulgaria, but the same or higher than other transition 
countries). Data in table 7.2 are for 1996, when a lower percentage of revenues came 
from transfers than the 72 percent in 1998 (see table 7.3). Th e availability of privatization 
revenues is one explanation for lower transfers in 1996 and 1997.
Table 7.2 Percentage of Local Government Revenues from Transfers, 1996
Country Percent Country Percent
Albania 94 Italy 38
Austria 35 Netherlands 60
Belgium 78 Norway 33
Bulgaria 78 Poland 60
Czech Republic 45 Romania 38
Denmark 24 Slovakia 39
Finland 31 Slovenia 67
France 26 Sweden 19
Germany 45 Switzerland 18
Greece 58 United Kingdom 77
Hungary 66
Source: Council of Europe 1997.
One justiﬁ cation given for such a large component of Hungarian local government 
ﬁ nance coming from transfers is that local governments are responsible for health care and 
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2 Table 7.3 Intergovernmental Transfers as a Percentage of Revenues, 1993–1998 (percentage)
Local government revenues 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Shared revenues
 PIT 8.46 8.69 11.85 10.77 13.28 16.37
 Vehicle tax 0.43 0.35 0.31 0.75 0.78 0.74
 Tax on land rental 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
Shared revenues total 8.89 9.04 12.16 11.52 14.06 17.20
Accumulation revenues within the state budget 1.13 2.18 0.94 1.26 0.98 0.79
Accumulations revenues total 1.13 2.18 0.94 1.26 0.98 0.79
State transfers and grants
 Normative subsidies from central budget 37.14 31.41 29.45 24.64 25.06 24.17
 Subsidies to theaters 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.42
 Addressed and targeted subsidies 3.17 3.48 3.06 2.49 4.50 3.76
 PIT supplement 1.12 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Deﬁ cit grant 0.27 0.62 0.89 0.57 0.59 0.63
 Other subsidies (centralized appropriations) 2.26 4.19 4.13 5.62 3.58 3.31
 Subsidies to local ﬁ re departments 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.77 0.86 1.02
 Supplementary grants to certain education tasks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.57
 Investment grants for regional equalization 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.08 0.79
 Decentralized targeted investment grant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38
 Public employees wage, minimum wage 0.92 1.30 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Other regrouped revenues 0.03 0.18 0.49 0.23 0.00 0.00
State transfers and grants total 45.31 42.44 39.46 34.75 36.41 35.05
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Local government revenues 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Transfers within general government
 Funds from Social Security 15.84 16.64 16.08 15.78 16.55 16.71
 Funds from extra-budgetary funds 0.41 0.49 0.43 1.35 1.47 1.66
 Funds from budgetary (chapters) institutions 0.82 0.94 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.70
 Budgetary supplements and refunds 0.86 0.71 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.09
Transfers within general government total 17.93 18.78 17.43 18.04 18.95 19.16
Total  transfers 73.26 72.44 69.98 65.57 70.40 72.20
Revenues total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Ministry of Finance data.
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education, and many central government oﬃ  cials appear to believe that the wages should 
be ﬁ nanced nationally. Transfers would still be more than 50 percent of local revenues, even 
with these categories excluded.
Ad Hoc Grant Financing
Although a number of detailed mechanisms for determining the allocation of grants (tax 
sharing, the formula for normatives) are available, the implementation of the system has 
varied signiﬁ cantly from year to year, giving it an ad hoc nature. 
Th e percentage of PIT allocated by derivation has varied every year, from 100 percent 
in 1990 to 30 percent in 1994 to 5 percent in 2000. Th is variation leaves localities with little 
certainty about what proportion of PIT collections they will retain from year to year.
Th e amounts used to ﬁ nance other normatives and earmarked, deﬁ cit, and investment 
grants are determined each year through the annual Budget Act process. Normatives are 
regularly redeﬁ ned, leading to a degree of uncertainty. Ad hoc transfers account for more 
than two-thirds of transfers to local governments.
Th e contribution of diﬀ erent grant categories to overall local ﬁ nance has changed 
dramatically since 1993 (see table 7.3). Shared taxes, particularly the PIT, have risen 
markedly as a percentage of total transfers. Social security and other extrabudgetary funds 
have also increased their relative contribution. Th e normative grants, by contrast, have fallen 
dramatically since the early 1990s, primarily because of the way revenues are categorized in 
the budget rather than because of a change in the ﬁ nancing structure. If the normative-like 
grants had been recategorized from PIT sharing to normatives, the percentages would not 
have changed signiﬁ cantly (table 7.4).
Table 7.4 Categorization of Grants
Financing source Local control over funds
Earmarked Flexible
Ad hoc Th eater
Fire brigade
Ethnic education normatives
Centralized appropriations
Most extrabudgetary funds
Accumulation revenues inside the state budget
Funds from budgetary institutions 
Deﬁ cit grants
Most normatives
Shared tax Road fund Derivation based personal income tax 
Land tax
Motor vehicle tax
Selected normatives
Source: Hegedüs 1998.
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Each country’s central government makes political judgments on its aggregate support 
for the local government sector. Key diﬀ erences concern whether ad hoc decisions are made 
each year or whether the central government sets a broad policy that is expected to last for 
a period of years. Th e Hungarian central government and the Parliament appear to evaluate 
most transfers to local governments as a package and to raise or lower the components annually 
to achieve intended objectives. Indeed, the implicit plan may be to determine annually the 
total amount of resources in the local sector. Local government oﬃ  cials agree that a total is 
negotiated annually, and one category of grants is reduced as another is raised so that the 
total is reached. Th e annual negotiations seem to center around shared taxes and most other 
transfers. Extrabudgetary funds and ministry programs that can be delivered through local 
governments or nongovernment entities are excluded. Th e perception that transfers are 
budgeted as an aggregate is reinforced through their explicit summing in the budget.
To the extent that the overall grant structure is seen as a package, sharing taxes, such 
as the PIT, does not have any practical inﬂ uence on the total amount of revenues local 
governments ultimately receive. Th e PIT shared by derivation aﬀ ects the distribution 
between local governments, even if not the total amount. Th us, the two-year lag for receipt 
of PIT revenues does not reduce the overall amount of local government revenues, though 
it can change their distribution across local governments. Th is relationship can explain 
why local governments do not appear to place a high priority on reducing the lag. Th e 
dominance of ad hoc revenues in the ﬁ nancing package allows for easy adjustments to oﬀ set 
patterns in shared revenues. For example, normative grants can be lowered to oﬀ set higher 
shared tax revenues. Th e frequent changes in the number and value of normatives certainly 
suggest that this oﬀ set is the intent.
Administrative Complexity
Th e intergovernmental ﬁ nance system entails high administrative costs for the central and 
local governments. Th e complicated structure results in part from the wide range of goals 
that the central government is seeking to achieve. Still, the goals could be accomplished 
with a simpler system. Th e process of calculating and disbursing the normatives requires 
signiﬁ cant eﬀ ort, even though the revenues are not earmarked for the expenditure categories 
to which they are linked. Similarly, the investment grant process is very expensive because 
signiﬁ cant eﬀ ort is devoted to preparing and assessing grant applications. Administrative 
costs for the grant system are small, however, relative to the costs of collecting the same 
revenue with local government taxes.
Achieving National Objectives
No explicit statement is available on the transfer system’s goals, so it must be interpreted based 
on: (a) its apparent objectives and (b) practices in other countries. Transfers are normally 
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made for one of three reasons. First, transfers are provided to enhance overall vertical balance, 
which exists when each level of government has access to suﬃ  cient revenues to meet its 
expenditure responsibilities. Th e notion is that the central government has access to more 
productive taxes (value added, corporate income, and personal income taxes) than local 
governments, and these revenues should be shared with local governments where much 
of the expenditure responsibility lies. Second, grants are used to achieve a desired degree of 
horizontal balance because local capacity to raise own-source revenues diﬀ ers widely across 
areas. Th ird, transfers are used to encourage local governments to carry out national priorities.
Vertical Balance
Given the broad responsibility of local governments, creating vertical balance is a key role 
for the transfer system. Local government expenditure responsibilities are well in excess of 
available own-source revenues, and national revenue capacity is well above the expenditure 
responsibilities. Of course, an alternative approach would be to lower national taxes and 
transfers to local governments and to allow local governments much more authority to raise 
revenues from own sources. Th is option is considered further below.
Horizontal Balance
Wide diﬀ erences exist in per capita local government revenues from the derivation-based 
PIT sharing and business taxes. Per capita business tax revenues vary more than PIT 
revenues (Ministry of Finance 1998). Ensuring local governments a minimum level of per 
capita PIT revenues and providing normative grants are the most signiﬁ cant mechanisms 
for reducing horizontal imbalances. Th rough these programs, the structure can be thought 
of as contributing greater revenues to places that have lower capacity (less PIT revenues) and 
to places that have greater expenditure needs (larger populations and more beneﬁ ciaries). 
Grants provided to distressed municipalities and places that have deﬁ cits through no fault 
of their own are also intended to reduce horizontal imbalances. Finally, some grants made 
through the county development councils are targeted toward the least developed areas. 
Despite these various programs, diﬀ erences in actual expenditures remain. For example, 
1995 per capita expenditures varied from Ft 52,900 in local governments that have 2,000 
to 4,999 people to Ft 79,400 in places that have 20,000 to 49,999 people to Ft 123,800 
in Budapest (Fox, Melhem, and Péteri 1995). Th e spending diﬀ erences can be caused by 
variations in service demands, expenditure needs, or revenue capacity.
Most grant systems around the world seek to reduce imbalances, but not to achieve 
complete equality in spending, because a trade-oﬀ  exists between giving local governments 
incentives for eﬃ  cient behavior and equalizing local revenue capacity or spending levels. 
For example, local government incentives for raising revenues often are lessened by revenue 
equalization, though this distortion can be avoided if the capacity to raise revenues rather 
than the revenues is equalized.
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National Priorities
Th e transfer system can assist in accomplishing two types of national priorities: targeting 
expenditures to high priorities and achieving overall macroeconomic objectives. An 
important reason for high national prioritization is often that some services, such as health 
care, transportation, and education, create externalities, meaning that people living outside 
the direct delivery area beneﬁ t from the services. Local governments have a tendency to 
underprovide these services because the governments ignore beneﬁ ts for nonresidents. 
In these cases the central government can use the transfer system to encourage local 
governments to provide eﬃ  cient service levels. A national policy can also provide minimum 
service levels in areas such as health care. Th e central government should ﬁ nance these 
service mandates.
As discussed above (see table 7.3), the government of Hungary earmarks transfers 
for theaters, ﬁ re protection, and investment expenditures. Th eaters and ﬁ re protection are 
unusual services to be ﬁ nanced with earmarked grants because the beneﬁ ts are likely to be 
very localized and have limited geographic spillovers. Local rather than national priorities 
usually should set service levels in these cases. By contrast, investment expenditures are 
often targeted for areas, such as clean water and sewer, that may have signiﬁ cant spillovers 
and that have been high national priorities. Th e grants have been eﬀ ective at getting local 
governments to select these projects.
Th e normative grant system appears to have an underlying theme of encouraging local 
governments to provide services that are national priorities. Local governments retain 
considerable ﬂ exibility to spend the normative grant resources on other programs, however, 
and at least in the case of social welfare the grants have not been spent as the Ministry of 
Social Welfare had hoped. Th us the normative system has not been structured to aﬀ ect 
spending on national priorities.
Th e central government can also use the transfer system to accomplish macroeconomic 
goals. A frequent concern across the world is that the aggregate of local government ﬁ scal 
trends could dampen the eﬀ ects of national ﬁ scal policies or exacerbate cyclical trends. 
Th e dominant role of transfers in local ﬁ nance lessens the macroeconomic concerns 
because the central government can adjust local government revenues to support overall 
macroeconomic policies.
Eﬀ ects on Eﬃ  cient Local Government Behavior
Th e transfer structure can have a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on whether local governments operate 
eﬃ  ciently. Speciﬁ cally, the grant structure can inﬂ uence local governments’ accountability, 
planning, local revenue raising, and project identiﬁ cation.
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Accountability
A key expectation of governments is accountability to their citizens. Most analysts agree 
that governments are more accountable for revenues that they raise through their own 
eﬀ orts, at least in part because people are often unaware of revenues that are transferred 
from one government to another and often do not know which government to hold 
accountable for their eﬃ  cient use. Th e spending government also is not required to defend 
taxes when services are ﬁ nanced using transfers. For these reasons, local governments like 
to ﬁ nance services with transfers. Local government accountability is probably signiﬁ cantly 
hampered by the large role played by transfers.
Predictability and Planning
Governments must be able to predict their revenue ﬂ ows if they are to engage in eﬀ ective 
short-, medium-, and long-term planning. Some degree of unpredictability is inherent in 
all revenue structures because of the complicated relationship between revenue structures 
and economic growth. Developing a predictable revenue system and undertaking eﬀ ective 
planning are particularly diﬃ  cult, however, when transfers are based on annual decisions 
and budget negotiations. As noted above, about two-thirds of transfers are determined by 
annual decisions of the central government and the Parliament. Th e problem is exacerbated 
because the distribution across local governments is uncertain until well into the ﬁ scal year.
Raising Own-source Revenues
Th e transfer system must be structured to encourage (or at least not discourage) the 
generation of local own-source revenues so that local governments can be held more 
accountable, can plan more eﬀ ectively, and can meet local service demands. Citizen 
satisfaction also can be enhanced because people are better able to relate receipt of services 
to payment of local taxes than to payment of national taxes.
Local governments have disincentives to raise own-source revenues. One reason is 
that the small size of own-source revenues means that big relative increases in local taxes 
have only a modest eﬀ ect on total revenues. Local oﬃ  cials see little value in confronting 
the political consequences of higher taxes when eﬀ ects on local service delivery will be 
limited. Additionally, local governments have a disincentive to raise revenues if they believe 
that transfers will fall as a result. Th is decrease can occur in two ways. First, if all local 
governments raise more revenues, the central government can respond by lowering the 
amount of transfers and leaving the overall local sector with no additional resources. Local 
governments generally are apprehensive that the central government will respond this way 
and use this fear as an excuse not to raise own-source funds. Second, in some cases the 
trade-oﬀ  between the revenues of speciﬁ c local governments and their transfers is direct. For 
example, deﬁ cit grants are a disincentive for local governments to impose their own taxes. 
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Th e aggregate size of deﬁ cit grants is small, but many (perhaps most) local governments 
receiving these grants are not using their maximum capacity to levy local taxes.
National taxes can be lowered as local governments generate more of their own 
resources. Th e need for lower national taxes in combination with greater local revenue 
generation may be particularly signiﬁ cant in Hungary where the aggregate tax burden is 
high.
Incentives to Adopt Good Projects
A good project ﬁ nance structure is one component of a system that leads to selection of 
optimal investment projects. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local governments select 
projects based on whether grant funding is available and that local government oﬃ  cials 
view receipt of grants as an important measure of their success. In some cases grants are 
intended to encourage local governments to select projects that are in the national interest, 
such as when grants are used to entice local governments to invest in projects that have 
large beneﬁ t spillovers. In other cases, however, local governments may simply elect to 
undertake projects because most of the funding is external, and the speciﬁ c use of the funds 
may not be compelling.
Poor design of transfer programs can cause local governments to select projects that 
are too large, not the most important priority for local needs, or based on inappropriate 
technology. Grants, particularly matching grants, change the cost of projects to 
municipalities, so the same project selection decisions will not be made when ﬁ nancing 
is entirely local as when national funding is available. Furthermore, decisions on project 
characteristics can be skewed by grant requirements. For example, provisions in the 
application process can lead to such practices as building water or sewer projects that are 
too large or selecting a technology that is not the best for the particular use (see chapter 
28). Additionally, local governments can be expected to opt for projects that have high 
initial investment costs and low operating costs to ensure that national funding plays the 
maximum role in ﬁ nancing infrastructure services.
Two methods for improving the process are obvious. First, the central government 
should develop tighter selection criteria and more detailed review processes to ensure that 
selected projects are economically viable and are of the highest priority. Th e government 
must reduce number of applications if the review is to be more than cursory, and tighter 
application criteria can be an important step in this direction (for example, more stringent 
limitations on local governments or projects considered for targeted grants). Second, local 
ﬁ nancial contributions, a frequent expectation of grants, must be large enough to ensure 
that local governments are forced to consider the real costs of each project. Conceptually, the 
local ﬁ nancial share of projects should equal the share of beneﬁ ts received by local residents, 
and the national share should equal the proportion of beneﬁ ts that occur as spillovers. Th e 
local government’s matching share is often very small, however, causing access to national 
ﬁ nancing to dominate local decisions on which projects to consider.
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Local governments should make investment decisions based on lifetime project costs, 
including investment, operations, and maintenance. In many cases user fees fail to cover 
operations and maintenance and investment costs. Th e best option is to increase user 
fees. In the event that fees are not increased, local governments may not perceive the full 
implications of shortfalls, depending on the ﬁ nancing mechanism. One possibility is for 
planners to view future recurrent costs as a national rather than a local responsibility, since 
local recurrent budgets are ﬁ nanced mostly through transfers. Under this scenario new 
investments reﬂ ect a future commitment by the central government to provide suﬃ  cient 
lifecycle ﬁ nancing. Another possibility is that transfer revenues will not rise with the 
recurrent costs. Th is possibility means local governments incur greater risks as they take 
on the additional operating costs associated with new investments because a means to 
ﬁ nance the costs must be found. Local governments could reduce expenditures on other 
services, undermaintain the new infrastructure, or raise additional local revenues. A ﬁ nal 
possibility is for local governments to shift some expenditures to county governments to 
free up resources.
Options for Enhancing the Transfer System
Th e intergovernmental transfer system evolved rapidly during the 1990s and oﬀ ers a 
number of positive features. Still, opportunities for further development are apparent. 
Th is section outlines some modiﬁ cations that could be made and addresses changes in the 
context of EU membership. Changes cannot be seen in a vacuum because local government 
budget constraint requires that local government spending equal local own-source revenues 
plus intergovernmental transfers. Relationships between the three elements of the ﬁ scal 
equation mean that reformers must develop the best transfer scheme in the context 
of the entire local government sector. Th e starting point should be decisions on local 
government service responsibilities. Th en a system for ﬁ nancing these services, using both 
intergovernmental and own-source revenues, must be identiﬁ ed. Th is section examines only 
the intergovernmental ﬁ nance component of the local government sector.
Th e transfer system can be modiﬁ ed to enhance three aspects of local government 
behavior: accountability, predictability, and administrative costs. Th ese improvements can 
be achieved through two basic changes in the local ﬁ nance system: imposition of local 
income tax surcharges and use of a simpliﬁ ed formula grant structure. Analysts of the local 
government sector have previously suggested both ideas.
Local Income Tax Surcharge
Reducing the shared PIT combined with allowing local governments the authority to 
impose PIT surtaxes would be an eﬀ ective way to improve accountability. Income surtaxes 
are used in a number of countries including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, and the 
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United States. Th e central government should lower national PIT rates correspondingly 
to maintain the share of personal income paid in taxes. Local governments would be 
permitted to use surtaxes as necessary (though a maximum rate could be imposed) to 
replace lost shared tax revenues and to expand local revenues if additional responsibilities 
are devolved to local governments. Th is set of policies would make local governments more 
accountable by requiring them to enact legislation to generate more of their own revenues 
and by allowing residents to be more aware that revenues are being spent by their local 
governments. Local governments also would have a greater capacity to set diﬀ erential tax 
rates according to variations in local service demands. Of course, the resulting horizontal 
imbalances (which would not be very diﬀ erent from the current derivation-based tax 
sharing) are a disadvantage because the per person income tax base will diﬀ er widely 
between areas. Th e grant formula described below can reduce horizontal imbalances.
A minimum surtax rate could be imposed to limit tax competition between local 
governments. Th e minimum can be set by either continuing to have some tax sharing 
or enacting legislation that sets a minimum local rate, because the eﬀ ects are similar. 
Administration of the surtaxes would not be very diﬀ erent from the existing shared 
taxes—the Tax Department would still be required to report revenues based on where 
people live. A signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence is that the Tax Department would need to collect the 
tax revenues at surtax rates that diﬀ er between local governments. Also, local governments 
would place much more pressure on the Tax Department to reduce the two-year lag in 
distribution of PIT revenues.
Grant Formula
A simpliﬁ ed grant formula could make revenues more predictable and reduce administrative 
costs. Revenues would be more predictable if the grant formula was developed and left in 
place for several years. Th e system would also be more predictable if the factors used to 
determine the amount granted to each local government did not change radically from 
year to year. A signiﬁ cant reduction in the number of factors used in the grant formula 
would also lower administrative costs. Of course, a more limited set of normative grants, 
investment grants, and other grants could be retained.
Every formula has two components, one determining the total amount of grants for 
subnational governments and the other deciding how these grants will be distributed 
between them. Th e total amount to be transferred would be based ideally on a percentage 
of total central government tax revenues or of a particular tax. Grants based on a broad 
set of national taxes are normally preferred because local governments share in the overall 
capacity of the central government to raise revenues.
Th e distribution of revenues between local governments is intended to help provide 
budget balance and to give the greatest assistance to places with the least capacity to provide 
for their own needs. Intergovernmental transfers based on a formula that provides larger 
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grants as a local government’s expenditure needs rise and as its revenue capacity decreases 
are the best means for alleviating horizontal imbalances. Th e formula would have the 
structure G = r (E-R), where G is the grant amount, E is diﬀ erent measures of expenditure 
needs, R is diﬀ erent measures of revenue capacity, and r is the amount the grant rises with 
needs and falls with capacity. A diﬀ erent grant rate could be attached to expenditure needs 
and to revenue capacity. Th e normative system operates like part of the equation, where E is 
the diﬀ erent normatives and r is the value assigned to each normative. Th e main diﬀ erences 
between the existing system and one based on the simpliﬁ ed grant structure are the number 
of normatives and the role that revenue capacity plays.
Th e grant formula must be based on objective measures of expenditure needs, such 
as the number of children of school age, to prevent local governments from altering their 
behavior to collect more revenues. Local governments can change their grant amount if 
expenditure needs are based on factors that are under their control, such as number of 
hospital beds or number of school classrooms. Th is ﬂ exibility results in ineﬃ  ciencies, 
because local governments design service delivery to maximize revenues. A major diﬀ erence 
from the existing normative system is that a much smaller number of need indicators would 
be included in the formula (population probably would remain). National priorities can be 
reﬂ ected through the speciﬁ c expenditure needs that are chosen for the formula. Similarly, 
objective measures of revenue capacity, such as the amount of revenues that would be 
collected at average tax rates or regional measures of income, must be adopted to prevent 
local governments from reducing their revenues to raise their grant amount. A formula 
based on actual collected revenues gives local governments the incentive to raise less of 
their own revenues.
Accession to the European Union 
Implications of the transfer system after accession to the EU are indirect. Th e main eﬀ ects 
come through the role that transfers play in creating a functioning government structure. 
Th e transfer system needs to encourage eﬃ  cient delivery of services, selection of the best 
projects, and regional equalization. 
Th e EU expects entrants to have coordinated, eﬀ ective regional development strategies. 
To meet this requirement, Hungary has taken the initial step of forming a regional 
development structure, composed both of multicounty regions and county development 
councils. Operation of the two infrastructure grant programs is a responsibility of the 
county development councils, but the multicounty development organizations are not yet 
operational. 
Countries must also have a mechanism for receiving and using EU structural grants. 
Th e multicounty and county development organizations can ultimately serve these purposes 
as they become operational, eﬀ ective units. Th e EU requires matching funds, however, and 
neither organization has any own-source revenue capacity. Both depend on transfers from 
the national or local governments for ﬁ nancing their grants and operational expenditures. 
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As noted above, governments normally make more eﬀ ective decisions when some of the 
money comes from local contributions. So, for these development organizations to be 
most eﬀ ective, a formalized system should be put in place for local money to serve as a 
counterpart fund for EU investments.
Good use of EU structural funds requires a mechanism for identifying optimal 
investment projects. Th e Parliament’s allocation of funds across sectors (through the 
targeted grants, earmarked funds, and centralized appropriations) can serve as the 
mechanism for reﬂ ecting national priorities and for meeting EU objectives, but the existing 
complex, disjointed system for selecting projects to be funded is unlikely to lead to optimal 
choices. Grantsmanship and political criteria appear to play very large roles in the selection 
process. Th e steps the government has identiﬁ ed to fulﬁ ll resolution 263 are a step in the 
right direction. Greater reliance on local revenue sources including user fees, stringent 
evaluation of projects in terms of economic viability (cost beneﬁ t analyses and so forth), 
and tighter application criteria (to reduce the number of applications) would all enhance 
the project selection process and increase the chance that EU structural funds would be 
targeted to the highest priority areas and would be used for the best projects.
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Appendix 7.1 Normative and Normative-like Factors, 1996–1998 (Forint)
Factors 1996 1997 1998
PIT equalization grant 9,940 — —
 Villages Up to 5,170 per capita Up to 7,037 per capita Up to 8,000 per capita
 Cities Up to 6,450 per capita Up to 8,643 per capita Up to 9,800 per capita
Transfer to county local governments for:
 Administration, sport, communal, roads, and bridges 
 (based on permanent residents)
145 per capita 312 per capita 450 per capita
 Institutions operated by the county — 956.3 million 10,800 per beneﬁ ciary
 Lump-sum to counties 65.8 million 150 million 210 million 
Grants to communal, administrative, cultural and 
sport functions of municipalities 1,761 per capita 1,842 per inhabitant —
Municipalities in depressed areas — 1,600 per inhabitant 1,695 per capita
County and capital city administrative, regional, defense, cultural, 
and pedagogical functions
512 per inhabitant  360 per inhabitant 150 per inhabitant
County per capital city cultural activities — — 145 per capita 
General grants for villages 2 million per village 2 million per village 2 million per village
District tasks of municipalities — — 4 million per selected municipality
 For municipalities deﬁ ned in Act 78/1997 paragraph 52 — — 200 per capita
 For municipalities deﬁ ned in Act 78/1997 paragraph 53 — — 70 per capita
Administration, sport, communal activities 
(based on perrmanent residents)
1,637 per capita 312 per capita 1,200 per capita
Matching grant to local tax on tourism 2 per tourism tax 2 per tourism tax 2 per tourism tax
Social welfare grants 2,800–7,000 per inhabitant 3,500–10,500 per inhabitant 2,500–12,500 per inhabitant
Child and juvenile protection 270,000 per beneﬁ ciary 330,200 per beneﬁ ciary 400,000 per beneﬁ ciary
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Factors 1996 1997 1998
Social and child welfare
 Social and child welfare activities (social catering,    — — 933 per capita
 home assistance, family assistance,  and so forth)
 For family assistance institutions — — 300 per capita
 Municipal manager in municipalities with fewer
 than 2,000 inhabitants
— — 900,000 (total)
Permanent and seasonal rehabilitation homes 202,000 per beneﬁ ciary  246,900 per beneﬁ ciary 292,000 per beneﬁ ciary
Daily homes for elderly 36,200 per beneﬁ ciary  48,000 per beneﬁ ciary 60,000 per beneﬁ ciary
Seasonal homes for homeless 87,000 per bed 102,200 per bed 120,200 per bed
Homes for handicapped 289,500 per beneﬁ ciary 337,300 per beneﬁ ciary 391,000 per beneﬁ ciary
Child care institutions (nursery) — — 161,000 per child
Kindergarten 54,000 per child 60,000 per child 67,000 per child
 For part-time kindergarten children 27,000 per child — —
 For  municipalities with fewer than 3,000 inhabitants 59,400 per child — —
 For nonresident children 59,400 per child — —
 For joint operation of kindergarten 62,100 per child — —
 Ethnic kindergarten programs 62,100 per child — —
Primary education in classes 1–6 56,700 per pupil 64,000 per pupil 72,000 per pupil
Primary education in classes 7–8 62,100 per pupil 68,000 per pupil 75,000 per pupil
Education in classes 9–10 
 Primary 64,800 per pupil 70,000 per pupil 76,000 per pupil
 Secondary school (high school and special 
 technical schools with high school exam)
66,200 per pupil 70,000 per pupil 76,000 per pupil
 Vocational school 45,900 per pupil 60,000 per pupil 68,000 per pupil
 Special vocational school 51,300 per pupil 60,000 per pupil 68,000 per pupil
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6 Appendix 7.1 Normative and Normative-like Factors, 1996–1998 (Forint) (continued)
Factors 1996 1997 1998
Education in classes 11-13
 High school 75,600 per pupil 87,000 per pupil 96,000 per pupil
 Special technical schools with high school exam 79,980 per pupil 87,000 per pupil 96,000 per pupil
 Vocational school 48,600 per pupil 60,000 per pupil 70,000 per pupil
 Special vocational school 56,700 per pupil 60,000 per pupil 70,000 per pupil
Training year after high school exam 
 In special technical schools with high school exam 86,000 per pupil — —
 In vocational schools 54,000 per pupil — —
Additional grants for training schools
 At classes 9–11 in special vocational schools — 20,000 per pupil 25,000 per pupil
 At classes 9–11 in vocational schools — 40,000 per pupil 45,000 per pupil
 Classroom training in vocational  
 and special vocational schools
48,600 per pupil 70,000 per pupil 77,000 per pupil
 Classroom training in special technical  
 school with high school exam
— 90,000 per pupil 100,000 per pupil
 Practical training in vocational schools — 36,000 per pupil 45,000 per pupil
 Practical training in special vocational schools 16,200 per pupil 28,000 per pupil 30,000 per pupil
Art training at basic level 35,100 per pupil 40,000 per pupil 45,000 per pupil
Other public education grants 
 For preparation of professional art examinations 
 in special training schools
— 28,000 per pupil —
 For preparation of professional art examinations
 in special vocational schools
— 36,000 per pupil —
 For catching up programs in special training schools — 10,000 per pupil —
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Factors 1996 1997 1998
 For adjustment programs of pupils with behavioral
 problems
— 3,000 per pupil 3,200 per pupil
 For teaching nonresident pupils 
  In primary schools 5,400 per nonres. pupil 9,000 per nonres. pupil 10,500 per nonresidential pupil
  In 9–10 classes of high school and special technical 
  schools with high school exam
8,600 per nonres. pupil — —
  In 11–13 classes of high school 8,600 per nonres. pupil — —
  In 11–13 classes of special technical schools 
  with high school exam
10,320 per nonres. pupil — —
  For training year after high school exam 
  in special technical schools with high school exam
12,040 per nonres. pupil — —
  In special vocational school 5,400 per non-res. pupil — —
  For practical training in special vocational schools 2,700 per nonres. pupil — —
  In vocational school 5,400 per nonres. pupil — —
  For practical training in vocational schools 6,480 per nonres. pupil — —
  Training year after high school exam 
  in vocational schools 
7,560 per nonres. pupil — —
 For joint educational service delivery
  In primary schools 8,100 per pupil 10,800 per pupil 12,000 per pupil
  In 9–10 classes of high school and special 
  technical schools with high school exam
10,320 per pupil — —
  In 11–13 classes of high school 10,320 per pupil — —
  In 11–13 classes of special technical schools 
  with high school exam
12,040 per pupil — —
  For training year after high school exam in special  
  technical schools with high school exam
13,760 per pupil — —
  In special vocational school 6,480 per pupil — —
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8 Appendix 7.1 Normative and Normative-like Factors, 1996–1998 (Forint) (continued)
Factors 1996 1997 1998
  For practical training in special vocational schools 3,780 per pupil — —
  In vocational school 6,480 per pupil — —
  For practical training in vocational schools 7,560 per pupil — —
 For municipalities with fewer than 3,000 inhabitants — — 20,000 per pupil
  Education in classes 1–6 5,400 per pupil — —
  Education in classes 7-–8 2,700 per pupil — —
  Education in classes 9–10 2,700 per pupil — —
 For municipalities with total number of inhabitants 
 between 3,000 and 3,500
— 10,000 per pupil 10,000 per pupil
 For catering in kindergartens and schools — 8,800 per pupil 13,700 per pupil
 For afternoon programs in schools — 3,000 per pupil 3,800 per pupil
 For operation of parental boards in kindergarten, 
 school, or dormitory
— 100 per pupil —
 For operation of pupils’ board — 200 per pupil —
 For sport associations within schools — 1,000 per pupil —
 For library — 2,000 per pupil —
 For bilingual schools 18,900 per pupil — 19,200 per pupil
 For ethnic minority primary school 18,900 per pupil — —
 For ethnic minority secondary school (high school 
 and special technical school with high school exam)
25,800 per pupil — —
 For ethnic minority classes in vocational
 and special vocational schools
18,900 per pupil — —
 For primary school evening and correspondence courses 21,600 per pupil — —
 For secondary school evening and correspondence courses 30,100 per pupil — —
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Factors 1996 1997 1998
 Private pupils in primary, vocational, and
 special vocational schools
16,200 per pupil — —
 Bilingual schools (nonethnic) — 10,000 per pupil 19,200 per pupil
Dormitories 123,200 per pupil  126,000 per pupil 135,500 per pupil
Special care with rehabilitation purposes 
 Handicapped children’s care in special institutions 123,200 per child 90,000 per child 94,000 per child
 Handicapped children’s care at home 96,800 per child 90,000 per child 94,000 per child
 For handicapped children’s care at home or 
 in institutions if they do educational activity or 
 participate in rehabilitation programs
96,800 per child 103,000 per child 130,000 per child
 For preparatory or developmental training 
 of handicapped children
— 103,000 per child 130,000 per child
Cultural services — 157 per capita 555 per capita
Earmarked grants
Grants for theaters (individual allocation)
Fire brigades (discretionary)
 Nonstop service
  For ﬁ re brigade buildings — 2,000 per square meter 3,000 per square meter
  For vehicles — 41 per kilometer 50 per kilometer
  For special supporting equipment — 250,000 per piece 300,000 per piece
  For administrative costs — 23,818 per employed 27,033 per employed
  For special equipment — 225,000 per piece 250,000 per piece
 Temporary ﬁ re brigade services — 1,247,912 per employed 1,309,698 per employed
  Personal expenses — 997,912 per employed —
  Operational expenses — 250,000 per employed —
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Factors 1996 1997 1998
Ethnic programs
 Ethnic kindergartens — 19,500 per pupil 23,000 per pupil
  For minority language — — 24,500 per pupil
 Development programs for Roma — 23,000 per pupil 24,000 per pupil
 Ethnic schools — 23,000 per pupil 24,500 per pupil
 Supplementary grant for ethnic programs for
 small kindergartens and schools
— 18,000 per pupil 20,000 per pupil
 Bilingual ethnic schools — 23,000 per pupil 27,000 per pupil
 Dormitory for Roma children — — 10,000 per pupil
 Library for ethnic schools — 2,000 per pupil 2,200 per pupil
Deﬁ cit grant (ÖNHIKI) (discretionary) (discretionary) (discretionary)
Appendix 7.1 Normative and Normative-like Factors, 1996–1998 (Forint) (continued)
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8Intergovernmental Transfers in Budapest József Hegedüs and Gábor Balás



Budapest holds an exceptional position among Hungarian municipalities, representing 
19 percent of the population and accounting for one-third of gross domestic product and 
capital investment. Th e Law on Self-Government of the Capital City Districts (1991) 
regulates the status of the Budapest Municipality, which comprises 23 districts and the 
city, altogether 24 public service units with no hierarchy between the city and the district 
governments. Th e municipality receives or collects most of its revenues as one entity. Th ese 
so-called joint revenues must be allocated between the city and its districts for ﬁ nancing 
public tasks. Th e central government has established a general guideline for revenue ﬂ ows, 
but made the City Council responsible for the revenue allocation system within the 
municipality. Th e districts receive a wide range of responsibility, although they have fewer 
rights than other local governments in the country (Ebel and Simon 1995). 
Th is chapter analyzes the Budapest revenue-sharing system (RSS), including its 
procedures and eﬀ ects on ﬁ nancing local functions and services. Th e signiﬁ cance of 
this case lies in the technical and political innovations to solve the problems of vertical 
and horizontal inequity in the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system in a complex two-tier 
municipality.
The Legal Framework for Governments 
and Public Finances in Budapest
Th e framework for the revenue allocation system of Budapest is based on two elements: (a) 
the legal relationship between the municipality and its districts, and (b) the regulation of 
the revenue allocation. Th e Act on Local Government and the Law on Self-Government of 
the Capital City Districts stipulate the capital’s government structure. Th e laws provide for 
* Th is chapter is based on Hegedüs and Balás 2000.
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direct election of the lord-mayor, a City General Assembly of 66 members, and 23 district 
governments. Each jurisdiction has its own elected legislature and mayor. No administrative 
hierarchy exists between the municipality and its districts, but each district is represented 
by one nonvoting delegate in the General Assembly.
Th e assignment of tasks and expenditures corresponds to the natural allocation of 
functions, which means that district tasks relate to neighborhood services, whereas the 
municipality’s functions are the ones that aﬀ ect the whole or a large part of the capital. 
In practice it means that the districts must provide kindergartens, elementary education, 
basic health and social care, street lighting, and local road maintenance. Th e municipality 
is further required to provide educational, artistic, sport, water, garbage collection and 
treatment, public transportation, social, and health services, if such services aﬀ ect more than 
one district. One of the critical issues in the expenditure assignment is that the districts 
can oblige the municipal government to take over service institutions that have territorial 
duties. As part of the adjustment process, districts have transferred some educational and 
social institutions to the municipal government to get rid of ﬁ nancial burdens. As a result, 
the task and ownership (for example, of a service building) is now often separated, and that 
separation leads to further ﬁ nancing distortions.
Th e Act on Local Government deﬁ nes a cluster of revenues to be shared between 
the city and the districts in accordance with the services provided or actual expenditures. 
Th e shared revenues are central government grants on the basis of inhabitants (except 
for administration and public education services), local taxes, shared personal income 
taxes, and other central government taxes. Th is sharing method has led to radical revenue 
redistribution.
Th e General Assembly of Budapest annually passes a municipal decree on revenue 
sharing that must take the districts’ opinions into account. Th e districts receive the draft 
bill for comments 10 days before approval. (Before 1995 the municipality and the districts 
were obliged to reach a consensus on the RSS.) Th e law provides that the city government 
receives and ought to channel central government grants to districts before approval of 
the annual revenue-sharing decree. Th is political approval process has been continuously 
questioned by the parties, and a proposal was submitted to the Parliament in early 2000 
to shift the revenue sharing approval from the General Assembly of Budapest to the 
Parliament, but the rules remained unchanged. 
Problems in the Financing System 
of Budapest’s Local Governments
Th e logic of the Budapest revenue allocation system has changed many times since 1991, 
but some core problems remain. Th e municipality runs a multilevel equalization system, 
which must cope with signiﬁ cant vertical and horizontal imbalances. “Vertical imbalance” 
refers to signiﬁ cant disparities between tasks and tools in diﬀ erent government tiers. In 
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Budapest the most important diﬀ erences between the municipality and the districts come 
from the vertical imbalance that originates in the diﬀ erence in service provision.
Expenditure assignment in Budapest basically still follows the pretransition structure. 
Most of the services provided previously by districts (and their budgetary enterprises) 
remained district responsibilities, and services provided previously by the municipal 
government (and its budgetary enterprises) continued to be under municipal responsibility 
(table 8.1). Signiﬁ cantly, tasks vary by nature, and this variation makes the political 
negotiations concerning expenditure needs at diﬀ erent levels very important. For instance, 
road maintenance generates diﬀ erent expenditures for the municipality and for the districts 
because of the diﬀ erent types of roads under their jurisdiction.
Table 8.1 Expenditure Assignment in Budapest, 1997
Expenditure Assignment Task Shares of Costs (%)
City Districts City Districts
Kindergartens X X 2 98
Primary schools X X 3 97
Secondary schools X X 65 35
Dormitory X X 100 0
Basic art schools X X 2 98
Schools for handicapped children X X 45 55
Education and daily care for mentally and physically impaired children X X 100 0
Other schools X X 41 59
Day nursery X X 1 99
Daily social care X X 4 96
Institutes providing accommodation and temporary accommodation X X 94 6
Temporary accommodation for homeless people X X 95 5
Resident nursery X — 100 0
Child and youth protection X — 100 0
Attending and nursing the mentally and physically impaired at home X — 100 0
Th eaters X — 100 0
Social supply without accommodation — X 0 100
Public education and sport X X 55 45
Urban management X X 72 28
Administration X X 20 80
Public transportation X — 100 0
Fire protection X — 100 0
Housing maintenance X X 2 98
Total 39 61
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
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With horizontal imbalance, diﬀ erent ﬁ scal gaps occur between expenditure needs 
and revenue capacity across the districts. Th e lumpy urban development programs of the 
previous regime and historical diﬀ erences have led to a dramatic increase in inequality 
across the districts. Although the center of Budapest is still comparable with western 
metropolises, some outer districts lack basic urban infrastructure, such as a water and 
sewage network. Th ese inequalities result in diﬀ erent expenditure needs. Th us a key role of 
the revenue allocation system is to support a shift toward a more balanced public service 
structure.
Th e inequalities in wealth and personal income are also signiﬁ cant. Budapest has its 
own rich and poor districts; thus, signiﬁ cant social and economic disparities exist across 
the districts (ﬁ gures 8.1 and 8.2). Th ese inequalities lead to diﬀ erent revenue capacity and 
expenditure needs that also favor the rich districts.
Figure 8.1 Personal Income Tax Per Capita by Districts of Budapest
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Many assets were transferred from state to municipal ownership in the course of 
the political transition. Municipalities also inherited assets from their predecessor local 
councils. Th ese assets resulted in a greater disparity across districts (for example, districts in 
the center and the west side of Budapest obtained more valuable real estate than the others). 
Moreover, these inequalities in property value were expanded by a boom in real estate prices 
in the late 1990s that increased the price gap in favor of the center and Buda districts. In 
early 2000 a four-fold diﬀ erence in the residential real estate unit price separated the rich 
and poor districts. Th ese factors have also increased the gap in revenue capacity across 
districts, although these gaps were partly counterbalanced by the need for refurbishment. 
Th us the RSS must cope with signiﬁ cant disparities.
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Figure 8.2 Per Capita Revenue as a Percentage of the Average
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Th e district governments have broad service responsibilities. Some of the services, such 
as public lighting, can be localized, but most of them are accessible by inhabitants of other 
districts as well. Th is spillover eﬀ ect creates diﬃ  culties in deﬁ ning local responsibilities 
and measuring expenditure needs, a situation that, in turn, creates other challenges for the 
revenue allocation system.
Analysts describe three well-known types of policy responses to cope with vertical and 
horizontal imbalances: 
 correcting each imbalance by separate policy measures
 implementing an integrated system of equalization
 correcting only the vertical imbalances and ignoring the horizontal ones. 
Revenue sharing and grants are used to reduce imbalances. Revenue sharing is a key 
tool to handle vertical imbalances, and grants are often used for horizontal imbalances 
(although revenue sharing is often combined with equalizing techniques to manage 
horizontal imbalance). Th e overall intergovernmental ﬁ nance system also aims at handling 
both of these imbalances jointly.
Th e Budapest RSS oﬀ ers a more radical solution in an integrated equalization system. 
Most of the central government transfers are channeled to the municipality as a single ﬁ scal 
entity to become part of joint revenues, and additional revenues are collected directly by 
the districts. RSS is basically a special gap-ﬁ nancing scheme. Th e expenditure needs and 
revenue capacity are calculated according to a mutually accepted method. Th e joint revenue 
is then allocated to ﬁ ll the gap that may occur between the expenditure need and revenue 
capacity in the budget of the districts and the city. In Budapest, 49 percent of the operating 
budget was taken into account in revenue sharing in 1998.
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New Financing and Revenue Allocation System in Budapest
In January 2000 a new ﬁ nancing system was introduced as part of a three-year reform 
program to correct the imperfections of the previous revenue allocation scheme, which was 
established in 1995. As a ﬁ rst step reformers broadened the scope of the allocation system 
and gave the RSS additional tasks besides receiving discretionary ﬁ nances. In harmony with 
the Act on Local Government, the main objective of RSS is to ﬁ nance services provided 
by the district and the capital governments. Th e reform aims to create a system that gives 
inhabitants access to the same level and quality of services no matter where they live in 
Budapest. An implicit but more valid goal is to foster equalization (see box 8.1); the oﬃ  cial 
goal was set under the pretext of introducing an equalization system. Th is introduction is 
becoming more and more important as the inequality across districts increases for various 
reasons. Since 1991 the share of the revenues from RSS has been continuously increasing 
in the budget of the poor districts and decreasing in the rich center and Buda districts (for 
example, districts 1, 5, and 6; see table 8.2).
Although revenue sharing should lead to a more equitable system, eﬃ  ciency issues are 
less signiﬁ cant in the present scheme, albeit local bodies ought to provide public services 
eﬃ  ciently matching their expenditure needs and tax eﬀ orts.
Table 8.2 Th e Share of RSS Revenues in Local Budgets (percent)
Local government Share of considered revenues from RSS in the local budgets data
1993 1998
I. 47.7 28.9
II. 38.9 41.3
III. 59.3 56.2
IV. 63.7 65.4
V. 29.2 20.3
VI. 41.0 23.7
VII. 34.5 22.9
VIII. 52.8 32.5
IX. 45.8 37.8
X. 50.0 29.8
XI. 47.9 45.9
XII. 49.4 42.8
XIII. 59.6 48.9
XIV. 46.1 45.4
XV. 45.0 53.7
XVI. 63.9 56.1
XVII. 47.6 62.6
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Local government Share of considered revenues from RSS in the local budgets data
1993 1998
XIX. 39.5 49.4
XX. 60.2 62.9
XXI. 58.1 62.5
XXII. 29.7 51.4
XXIII. 53.4a 45.4
   Districts average 48.3 42.9
   City 46.3 28.2
   Municipality average 47.2 34.3
Note:  a. Data year 1995.
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Box 8.1 Formulas for Equalization Transfers
Conceptually, four types of formulas describe equalization transfers (Ma 1987): 
  Th e simplest method is a per capita transfer. It needs the least information, but the capacity for 
equalization is also weak. Such a transfer exists, for example, in Germany. 
  Th e second method takes into account only the ﬁ scal capacity, assuming that the per capita expenditure 
needs are the same in the diﬀ erent settlements. 
  A third method is used when the distribution of equalization transfers is based on needs indicators.   
A variety of indicators can reﬂ ect the ﬁ scal needs of a settlement such as per capita income, un-
employment rate, population, density, infrastructure (for example, length of roads). Th is system 
typically ignores ﬁ scal capacity because obtaining relevant data is diﬃ  cult. 
  Th e most complex formula takes into account both the ﬁ scal capacity and the expenditure needs. Th e 
degree of this redistribution depends on the tasks taken into account in the revenue-sharing process.
Basic Principles of RSS
One of the basic principles of RSS is to use a transparent, clear, and fair method of 
calculating the share of resources to be allocated from the joint revenue of Budapest. Using 
normatives, RSS relies on calculating ﬁ scal needs and revenue capacity instead of using 
actual historical data.
On the expenditure side, the principle is to take into account the expenditure needs 
corresponding to the basic tasks of the districts. Between 1990 and 2000 the system 
accounted for only operating expenditures, mainly those ﬁ nanced by central grants (in 
several years some form of depreciation was also included). In 2001 the system took into 
account depreciation and investment needs corresponding to the basic tasks. 
RSS tries to handle the districts and the municipality equally, but calculates diﬀ erent 
RSS grants for services that imply noncomparable tasks for the districts and the 
municipality. For example, for road maintenance, the municipality must maintain the high  
PA RT  2    S E C T I O N  1    M O D E R N I Z I N G  T H E  I N T E R G O V E R N M E N TA L  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M
190
volume main roads and the districts must maintain secondary roads. RSS accounts for 
diﬀ erent technologies and diﬀ erent expenditures in districts and the municipality.
On the revenue side, RSS tries to take into account all kinds of revenues that are directly 
linked to expenditures. Since 2000 investment and amortization are also considered on the 
expenditure side; as a result almost every local revenue is now considered in the system. If 
the district’s revenue capacity can be estimated, RSS accounts the revenue capacity instead 
of actual revenues.
Th e RSS procedure consists of the following steps:
 Expenditure needs are calculated using task indicators and expenditure normatives.
 Fiscal capacity is calculated using ﬁ scal norms (for example, transfer norms and unit 
tax) and natural measurement units (for example, square meters and inhabitants).
 Th e basic deﬁ cit is calculated as the diﬀ erence between expenditure needs and ﬁ scal 
capacity.
 Th e transfer pool (the total amount of joint revenues that are to be shared) is divided 
into four parts: 
 – Th e major part (almost 95 percent of the total pool) is shared by RSS among 
districts and the city in accordance with their basic deﬁ cits.
 – Four percent of the transfer pool is set aside for the correction of RSS that is 
required when data errors are corrected.
 – Th e tourism tax revenues and the central grants for tourist services are separated 
from the pool and included in one special revenue-sharing scheme.
 – Some small special purpose funds (for example, police support or improvement of 
the sewage system) are separated into another special cluster.
Expenditure Side of RSS
To begin RSS, planners determine the expenditure needs of the local governments. Before 
that step can be taken, however, planners must decide which expenditures to take into 
account in the determination. Distinguishing compulsory tasks, voluntary tasks, and the 
tasks fulﬁ lled through outsourcing makes that decision diﬃ  cult, since neither the cost nor 
the revenues of the outsourced tasks is included in the district budget.
Since the beginning RSS has taken into account operating expenditures of tasks 
that are supported by state normatives. Since 2000 amortization and renewal, investment 
and improvement, and housing have also been included. Knowing which services are not 
included in RSS is also important. Th e eﬃ  ciency of the equalization system depends on the 
ratio between the included and excluded cost items. Th is ratio became much higher in the 
poor districts than in the rich ones. Th e system seems to be able to equalize the poor, but it 
is unable to catch the rich districts.
Expenditure needs are calculated separately, task by task, and then aggregated. RSS ﬁ rst 
calculates the municipal average cost per measurement unit, and then multiplies the average 
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cost (as an internal grant of Budapest) with the measurement units of the 23 districts and 
the city. Th us the municipal average, not the actual expenditures, determines the calculated 
expenditure needs for a district.
Despite the problems of this average cost method, the key stakeholders have accepted 
it. Conﬂ icts arise more often when the expenditure needs for certain tasks (communal 
services, public administration, and since 2000, investments, amortization, and housing) are 
calculated by other methods.  (See box 8.2.)
Box 8.2 Allocation Formulas
Th e basic allocation formulas—prepared by an expert team—are the following:
Formula 1 is applied when all or most of the service districts are involved in provision of the given 
services:
ENi,j = TCj/sumi(MUi,j) •  MUi,j   i =  1, 2, ….24       (8.1)
where ENi,j is the expenditure needs of task j in service district i, 
  TCj is the total cost of service j in the municipality, and
  MUi,j is the value of measurement unit of service j in service district  i.
In cases where a service provision is concentrated in some service districts (or often the city), formula 1 is 
virtually the same as if the actual costs of the services were considered.
Formula 2 is applied when the cost calculation for the city services are distinguished from the calculation of 
the other service districts. Th is method is justiﬁ ed when the city provides a task with quite diﬀ erent scope 
or content (for example, maintaining Danube bridges or the main grid of pipe services).
ENc,j = TCc,j/MUc,j • MUc,j   and    ENdi,j  =  TCd,j/MUd,j • MUdi,j    (8.2)
where index c denotes city,  di denotes district number i, and  d denotes the total value for the districts.
Communal Services
Th e communal services include tasks such as road and park maintenance and public 
lighting. Before 2000 expenditure needs for these tasks were calculated diﬀ erently: total 
cost was calculated for the city and per capita average cost was calculated for the districts 
(formula 2 in box 8.2). Th e districts argued that communal services are not proportional to 
the population. Moreover, the diﬀ erence in the content of these tasks is much less than the 
disparity in the calculated expenditure needs. In 2000 the communal services were divided 
into three parts: road maintenance, park maintenance, and other communal services. For 
the ﬁ rst two services, average costs were calculated based on speciﬁ c data (for example, the 
length of the roads or the area of the parks in square meters) both by districts and for the 
city. Th e third task was handled as before. Th is change resulted in a more realistic share of 
expenditure needs across districts, but it has not aﬀ ected the calculation of the city needs.
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Table 8.3 Calculated Expenditure Needs of the Administration Task, 1998
Local 
government
Population
1999
Number of 
oﬃ  cers
Expenditure of 
administration 
(Ft million)
Optimal number 
of oﬃ  cers
Expenditure need 
of administration
(Ft million)
I. 29,405 122 451 150 530
II. 91,101 314 856 286 1,011
III. 134,621 315 963 358 1,265
IV. 107,458 222 1,000 314 1,110
V. 34,735 254 1,198 165 583
VI. 49,195 205 955 201 710
VII. 69,173 287 1,109 245 866
VIII. 84,069 343 1,112 273 965
IX. 66,031 273 896 238 841
X. 82,718 338 1,082 271 958
XI. 142,419 424 1,574 369 1,304
XII. 65,308 285 930 237 838
XIII. 114,779 279 1,104 327 1,156
XIV. 122,100 326 1,469 338 1,195
XV. 87,967 255 814 281 993
XVI. 71,118 218 686 249 880
XVII. 79,914 288 691 266 940
XVIII. 98,635 292 1,294 299 1,057
XIX. 66,541 246 657 239 845
XX. 67,029 223 670 240 848
XXI. 83,485 224 650 272 961
XXII. 52,344 174 614 209 739
XXIII. 21,179 106 374 125 442
Districts total 1,821,324 6,013 21,149 5,952 21,036
City — 1,621 5,464 1,578 5,578
Municipality 1,821,324 7,634 26,613 7,530 26,614
Source: Dóci 1999.
Public Administration
For years public administration presented the greatest number of problems. Reformers 
agreed that the task was similar for the city and the districts, but because of the economies 
of scale, diﬀ erent expenditure needs were justiﬁ ed for districts and the city. Without 
calculating the districts’ disadvantages, the benchmark cost for the districts was determined 
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by a political decision each year. Th is cost was usually signiﬁ cantly less than the actual 
average cost in the districts, but it was higher than the unit cost of the city expenditure 
needs. Th e total cost for the city was accepted, and the resulting disparity was the 
biggest problem with the previous system. Th e method introduced in 2000 measures the 
expenditure needs of the administration services in the districts and the city. RSS assumes 
that the cost of public administration depends on two factors: the number of staﬀ  and the 
average labor cost. Th e optimal number of staﬀ  is related to economies of scale. Th e second 
factor, however, is the independent decision of the respective government.
Planners assumed that the number of staﬀ  is a power function of the population with 
a constant rate of return (NB* = b0Pb1, where NB* is the optimal number of staﬀ , P is the 
population of the local governments, and b0 = 0.426, b1 = 0.57). Th is function provides the 
optimal number of staﬀ , and the total cost of the administration was allocated to districts 
and the city according to these numbers. Th e optimal number of staﬀ  was calculated 
without the city’s data, because they are overwhelming, but the results apply to the city as 
well. Th e key stakeholders accept this method. (See table 8.3.)
In 2000 the renewal, investment, and housing costs were new considerations among 
expenditure needs. All are problems in the sense that the expenditure needs of these tasks 
are calculated diﬀ erently from the general principle (formula 1 in box 8.2) of RSS. 
Renewal
Because the renovation of real estate is essential for providing local services, the expenditure 
needs of such tasks are also subject to RSS. Th is element was built into RSS in the following 
way. District and city real estate was divided into the four categories: buildings, roads, parks, 
and bridges. Th e same average cost is accounted for district and city buildings (formula 1, 
in box 8.2), but diﬀ erent average costs are calculated in the other three categories (formula 
2, in box 8.2). Th is adjustment leads to very diﬀ erent “grants” for the districts and the city. 
Th e city receives 1.79 times more unit grant for parks and 6.07 times more grants for road 
maintenance.
Housing
Th e inclusion of housing in RSS creates other diﬃ  culties. First, as a basic principle, RSS 
considers local budgets to be core data sources, but housing services in most cases are 
outsourced. Second, the data on housing expenditures are not standardized; hence, in some 
districts housing expenditures contain the cost of communal services (for example, water 
and heating). Of course, a corresponding amount of money appears on the revenue side 
as service charges. Th ird, the composition of the housing stock diﬀ ers signiﬁ cantly across 
districts, and planners have no information on the comfort level composition, so the rent 
revenue normatives are inappropriate. Despite these evident data problems, the housing 
sector was also included in RSS 2000.
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Investments
Th e most critical point of RSS 2000 was including the expenditure needs of investment 
for the ﬁ rst time in parallel with respective revenues. Second, investment data in the 
budget depend mainly on the budgeting technique. Because investment depends mainly 
on matching grants and other irregular revenues, some local governments plan all possible 
investments, and over-planning is typical. Some districts plan only those investments that 
are certain to be implemented and change the budget during the year if new revenues 
arise, so the signiﬁ cance of the investment in RSS is larger than the signiﬁ cance of this 
task in reality. Moreover, the draft of RSS 2000 suggested that investments of the city and 
the districts are diﬀ erent (that is, expenditure needs calculated according to the diﬀ erent 
per capita average cost for the city and districts; formula 2 in box 8.2). Th e calculation 
conveyed the message that the city had four times more investment needs than the districts 
altogether. Because it was politically impossible to defend, the ﬁ nal decision was to share 
the total expenditure needs on investment in a ratio 1.5 to 1 in favor of the city.
Revenue Side of RSS
Th e revenue side of RSS consists of two elements: the ﬁ scal capacity calculation and the 
transfer pool (shared revenues).
Fiscal Capacity
As on the expenditure side, RSS tries to estimate ﬁ scal capacity instead of using actual data 
in all cases in which the level of revenues depends on the decision of the local government; 
externally determined revenues, such as central grants, however, are accounted for in their 
actual amounts. Th us local tax revenues are calculated on the basis of per capita municipal 
average tax ﬁ gures and population, and rent revenues are calculated on the basis of the 
total ﬂ oor-space of the district’s housing stock and municipal average rental unit fee. Th ese 
elements of RSS 2000 are new.
RSS accounts for revenues corresponding to housing, renewal, and investment tasks 
(such as rents) in harmony with the expenditure structure. In the case of these particular 
activities, oﬀ -budget revenues, which do not appear directly in the local budget, are also 
included in RSS. Typical oﬀ -budget items occur because of outsourcing, such as revenues 
of legally independent district service enterprises or institutions (for example, housing 
development and maintenance units).
Shared Revenues—Transfer Pool
Th e diﬀ erence between expenditure needs and ﬁ scal capacity provides the basic deﬁ cit of 
a given local government. Th e transfer pool is shared in proportion to the basic deﬁ cits. 
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Th e Act on Local Government deﬁ nes what revenues must be shared among the local 
governments of Budapest. Central government grants are reallocated on per capita basis, 
the shared personal income tax (5 percent of the total personal income taxes in 2000) on the 
basis of origin, other shared central taxes, and local taxes. Th e business tax is the only local 
tax that is channeled to the transfer pool. Th e districts impose diﬀ erent types of property 
taxes (communal, building, and plot tax), so these taxes cannot be shared, but they are also 
taken into account in RSS reallocation.
Although channeling other own revenues into the transfer pool is not legally possible, 
RSS practically reallocates these revenues because they are taken into account in the 
revenue base of the districts (especially those calculated in actual value). RSS allocates 
resources if a district has a basic deﬁ cit and thus needs shared revenue from the transfer 
pool. In 2000 RSS took into account such a wide range of own revenues, that district 5 had 
no basic deﬁ cit and received no resources from RSS. Hence, the district’s own revenues 
become unrelated to RSS.
Th e transfer pool includes two types of revenues, both of which depend either on 
the state budget (shared personal income taxes, central grants, and other shared central 
taxes) or on the local economy and decisions. Th e centrally determined revenues in real 
terms have been declining continuously since 1991, while the locally determined revenues 
have been continuously increasing. Th e declining central sources reduce the transfer pool, 
but the increasing local revenues counterbalance this contraction in both nominal and 
real terms. Th is process has led the transfer pool to become virtually independent of the 
central government sources (see table 8.4). An economic boom would increase business tax 
revenues in real terms, which would reduce the conﬂ icts in the reform of RSS in the near 
future. 
Table 8.4 Share of Sources in the Transfer Pool
Percentage 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Central government grants 36.1 20.3 38.0 31.0 26.0 14.6 13.1 8.7 5.3 0.2
Personal income tax 63.9 62.4 45.9 47.1 49.0 41.5 41.0 41.4 39.3 13.8
Business tax 0.0 17.3 16.1 21.9 25.0 43.9 45.9 49.9 55.4 86.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
RSS Arithmetic
Th e eﬀ ectiveness of the RSS highly depends on the quality of the data used, and the 
adequacy of the revenue and expenditure formula, while the complexity of the allocation 
formula largely inﬂ uences its political acceptability. 
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Th e Data
Th e RSS uses mainly historical data; for example, RSS 1999 was calculated from the 
actual data of the 1998 budgets. Because the districts use diﬀ erent budgeting techniques, 
the planned and actual data could diverge signiﬁ cantly, resulting in many distortions. Th e 
distortions has increased signiﬁ cantly in 2000 and beyond, because data that are diﬃ  cult 
to predict (for example, investment) are now included in RSS. To reduce these distortions, 
the RSS 2000 revenue allocation was calculated twice, in January with the preliminary data 
(planned 1999 budget) and in June with the actual data (closing 1999 budget).
Inaccurate or erroneous data cause additional problems. Th e reported data are often 
false or provided in an incomparable format. To solve this problem, the municipal decree 
on RSS stipulates an external auditor must evaluate the data before the data are submitted 
to RSS. Further necessary data corrections are also possible in the RSS recalculation in 
June. Because local governments must operate continuously, RSS revenues were due and 
paid between January and June as advances based on the preliminary RSS. In June the 
ﬁ nal revenue allocation was calculated and applied for the second half of the year, and a Ft 
3 billion fund was retained to counterbalance the diﬀ erences that occurred subsequently 
between the two revenue allocations.
Calculating the Revenues Provided through RSS
RSS revenue is allocated in accordance with the following formula:
Tri  = TTr • (ENi - FCi )/Sum (ENi - FCi),            (8.3)
where Tri denotes the transfer coming from the revenue sharing process, TTr denotes the 
total transfer pool, ENi denotes the expenditure needs of the service district i, FCi denotes 
the ﬁ scal capacity of the service district i, and Sum denotes the sum of the positive deﬁ cit only.
When Sum (ENi - FCi) = TTr, then all the services are ﬁ nanced equally in all service 
districts (the ratio of ﬁ nancing is 100 percent). When TTr < Sum (ENi - FCi ), and thus the 
system is underﬁ nanced, then in those districts where the basic deﬁ cit to the expenditure 
needs is higher, the local services are ﬁ nanced less than in those that have a lower ratio. If 
districts with higher ratios are poor, RSS has a weak equalization capacity when RSS is 
underﬁ nanced (a usual case).
Calculating the Expenditure Needs in RSS
Th e expenditure needs for district i (ENi ) are calculated from the aggregation of the 
expenditure needs of the diﬀ erent service provisions:
ENi = sumj (ENi,j )             (8.4)
where j is the index of the services, and expenditure needs (ENi,j) are calculated with the 
formula (8.1) or (8.2). (See box 8.3.)
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Box 8.3 Punish Overspending!
Th e Budapest RSS 1999 applied a special technique in calculating expenditure needs for three reasons. 
First, to increase the equalization capacity of the system; second, to promote the equally distributed sectors; 
and third, to allocate more resources for administration costs, which appeared to be the most underﬁ nanced 
task. As a result an additional factor was included into the formula to punish the positive and honor the 
negative diﬀ erence between the districts’s actual and the municipal average cost per tasks. When the unit 
cost of service district i was lower than the municipal average, the average cost was accounted in RSS, 
while the municipal average cost minus a portion of the positive diﬀ erence between the district and the 
municipal average was accounted as relevant expenditure needs for the district that overspent.
UCi = AC – α • (AC-ACi )  if     ACi > AC and    
UCi = AC  if     ACi < AC
  
where UCi is the unit cost for service district i, AC is the average cost of the task in the municipality, ACi 
is the average cost of district i, and α is a positive punishment factor. In this case the punishment factor 
was 20 percent.
Th is method was used only in 1999, because it received no political support from the stakeholders.
As we mentioned before, administration costs raise the problem of economies of scale, 
which means that the relationship between the expenditure need and the measurement 
unit is nonlinear. To resolve this problem, the measurement unit was recalculated with a 
formula, but the general allocation formulas were applied. Th e solution was the following: 
an exponential relationship was recognized between the population and the number of 
oﬃ  cers in Budapest’s 23 districts and the city. Th is regression provides a measurement 
unit, the so-called “optimal number of oﬃ  cers” for the expenditure need estimation. Th e 
regression is as follows:
MUi* = 0.426 • Pi0.57                             (8.5)
where the MUi* is the optimal number oﬃ  cers in local government i; Pi is the population of 
district i (the original measurement unit).
If we build this transformation factor into the original formula (8.1) (see box 8.2), it 
leads to the following formula for calculating expenditure needs for administration:
ENi = (TC/7,356) • 0.426 • Pi0.57             (8.6)
Th e biggest problems of RSS were and are the expenditure needs of the services that 
are provided exclusively by the city (for example, ﬁ re protection, transportation, operating 
dormitories and theaters, and bridge renovation). In these cases the expenditure needs are 
calculated by experimental estimation.
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Calculating Fiscal Capacity
Th e ﬁ scal capacity of local government i (FCi ) is calculated from the aggregation of the 
diﬀ erent estimated revenues:
FCi = sum (FCi,g )                                                                                                      (8.7)
where g is the index of a given revenue.
Th e revenues are calculated for district i in total value (central grants and oﬀ -budget 
revenues) or using an average estimation formula similar to formula (8.1) in the case of 
property taxes and rent revenues (where the measurement unit is the basis of revenues: 
number of houses or total ﬂ oor-space of taxed houses).
Lessons Learned in 2000
Th e total expenditure need considered in RSS 2000 was Ft 257.9 billion. Th e total revenue 
(with the transfer pool) was Ft 215.5 billion. RSS hence was underﬁ nanced by Ft 42.4 
billion,  and the revenues covered 83.6 percent of the expenditures.
Th e city received 56.68 percent of the transfer pool, which represented a decline from 
60.09 percent in 1999. Th e average shared revenue per capita was Ft 19,660, with a 130 
percent relative variance, a signiﬁ cant increase from the 15 percent relative variance from 
1999. Th ese ﬁ gures suggest that RSS 2000 implies stronger diﬀ erentiation across districts 
than previously. Likewise, this system obtains better equalization, if the calculations match 
the goals.
Half of the districts agreed with the new RSS, which represents signiﬁ cantly higher 
support than before, but the other half rejected it, assuming political inﬂ uence in the 
system. District 5 received no revenue from the transfer pool because, according to the 
calculations, it had no basic deﬁ cit. Hence it lost Ft 596 million in transfer resources, a 10 
percent revenue decline from the previous year.
Because of the various data problems, the city council decided that RSS should be 
audited. Despite the fact that this decision was supported by all the political powers, three 
districts did not allow the auditor to check their data until June 2000.
Because the investment need is included in RSS, the districts were obliged to spend 
at least 50 percent of their calculated investment need on investment rather than using 
investment resources to ﬁ nance operating costs. Since the previous years, they all spent 
more on investment than the deﬁ ned obligation in RSS, this increase was a signal for the 
stakeholders rather than a strict limitation. 
Considering that (a) the expenditure side was based on the 1999 data, (b) the 
expenditures did not decline in nominal terms for 2000, and (c) the revenue side calculations 
use data from 2000, RSS cannot consider all the revenue side. Th e equalization capacity 
of RSS 2000 is less than 83.6 percent because the expenditures were calculated on 1999 
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data, but the revenues were calculated on the 2000 basis. Th e same problem arises from 
outsourcing, when both expenditure and revenue of a service are out of the budget. Th us, 
the equalization capacity of RSS depends to a large degree on the oﬀ -budget revenues and 
expenditures (see table 8.2 and 8.3). Th e inhabitants of district 12 are among the wealthiest, 
but the local government has less revenue than some poor districts. Of course, this local 
government provides fewer services through its budget than the average.
Reform Steps and Challenges Ahead
Because of the criticism of the previous system, the city government assigned a group of 
experts to work out a program for further reform of RSS. In 1999, the group prepared 
a three-year program, which the city accepted. Th e ﬁ rst year was 2000, when new 
expenditures and revenues were included in RSS, and the principle of normatives was 
extended to a wider range of tasks.
A serious legal challenge of RSS is that the city government deﬁ nes the revenue 
allocation rules, and it also receives shared revenues. Th e double role of the city leads to 
two types of conﬂ icts between the city and the districts. First is a conﬂ ict of interest; hence 
districts feel that the city centralizes “their revenues” when it gets more than the average. 
Second, when the shares of some districts change from one year to the next, districts that 
are led by parties in opposition to the city government assume that politically biased 
allocation principles were used.
Th e goals of RSS ought to be clariﬁ ed. Th e law and the politicians say that the primary 
objective is to share the revenues in accordance with the tasks and functions. But the 
ongoing reform tends to converge much more to an equalization scheme. Not surprisingly, 
no consensus has been reached in the measurement of system eﬃ  ciency. Th e single indicator 
is the degree of political consensus, meaning how many districts support the system.
Th e revenue allocation system must be suitable to function in a situation of decreasing 
central sources. As mentioned, RSS shares only 95 percent of the revenues, whereas some 
special funds were separated from the transfer pool to ﬁ nance special projects (for example, 
to improve police services, the school milk program, or to expand and renew the main 
sewage grid). Although political consensus supports special programs, these funds are not 
integrated in the overall allocation system.
In 1995 the decision-makers recognized that, although the calculations cover the 
operation deﬁ cit of the local governments, in the end some local governments face severe 
deﬁ cits, while others have signiﬁ cant surpluses. Analysts believe that this disparity was the 
result of imperfections in RSS. Hence a fund was separated from the transfer pool to adjust 
the deﬁ cit of the disadvantaged districts. Th e size of the fund, however, was insuﬃ  cient to 
keep up with the increasing needs. Because analysts discovered that the diﬀ erence between 
planned and actual data was the main reason for the deﬁ cits, this adjustment fund was 
merged into the June recalculation fund in 2000.
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RSS is based on the correct principles. It is rather complex, but it handles vertical 
and horizontal inequalities successfully with moderate costs. Because of the complexity, 
the stakeholders do not understand the system well, which leads to a political distrust 
between the city and the districts. Moreover, in tandem with the increasing complexity, the 
possibilities for cheating and the chance for the stakeholders to inﬂ uence the allocation is 
also increasing, especially for the city, which can inﬂ uence the costs of services when RSS 
provides a higher grant to the city than to the districts in ﬁ nancing those services.
Th e problem of complexity will not be resolved and may even increase with introduction 
of a zero-based budgeting. Determining the investment needs in the zero-based method 
may lead to new political conﬂ icts. Th e stakeholders must agree not only on the scope of 
investment to be included in RSS, but also on the timeframe and conditions concerning 
how these investment needs will be fulﬁ lled. Th e proportion of the investments in the 
whole area of expenditure needs must also be debated. 
Th e importance of the equalization has gradually been growing, but as a negative 
consequence the poorer districts have become more dependent on RSS. How far the 
conditions of local governments should be equalized is questionable. A fully equalized 
system would lead to the end of sovereignty of the districts.
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Th e two major features of Hungary’s local government system are the huge disparities in 
size and local resource bases and the broad scope of responsibility for social services when 
comparable standards are expected. As discussed in chapter 7, Hungary has gradually 
moved from a rather simple transfer system introduced in 1990 toward a detailed transfer 
regulation. Th is is often micromanaged by sectoral ministries and has a growing number of 
equalization factors and an increasing use of deﬁ cit grants for distressed municipalities.
Concerned with the distribution of transfers from the state budget to local 
governments, this chapter proposes two versions of radical change to the transfer system 
and also discusses options for incremental improvement. One of the radical options  would 
replace the normative, equalization, and deﬁ cit grants with a single equalization grant 
(block grant) designed to compensate for both vertical and horizontal imbalance (that is, 
including diﬀ erences in spending need, service costs, and revenue potential). It responds to 
the growing pressure for eﬀ ective equalization mechanisms. Another radical option would 
convert the entire grant into a single deﬁ cit grant similar to the British and Dutch transfer 
system. Th e incremental approach discusses possible changes to the existing system, should 
political will be insuﬃ  cient for the more radical approaches. Finally, the chapter discusses 
issues related to tax sharing.
Equalization through Grant Allocation
Th e Council of Europe has recommended that equalization systems should enable local 
authorities, if they wish, to provide a broadly similar range and level of services while 
levying similar rates of local taxation (CoE 1985).  Th e Council’s recommendation seeks 
complete parity between local authorities in the service levels they can provide with a 
* Th is chapter is based on Davey and Péteri 1998d.
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similar level of revenue eﬀ ort. Only the British and Dutch systems attempt to achieve this 
parity. Others attempt partial equalization. Th e Danish system, for example, aims to halve 
the gaps between the per capita revenues of the richest local authority and those of the rest.
To achieve equalization goals, the following must be mitigated:
 disparities between the local revenue bases (that is, the potential yield of local revenues 
assuming a common level of eﬀ ort in terms of tax rates, collection eﬃ  ciency, and so 
forth)
 disparities in local needs for municipal services, determined by diﬀ erences in, for 
example:
 – age structure (proportion of school age children, elderly, and so forth)
 – social structure (single parent households, unemployed, and so forth)
 – environmental and economic conditions, requiring remedial action
 disparities in the costs of providing equivalent levels of services due to factors such as:
 – diﬀ erences in wage levels or the price of land
 – low population density increasing the overhead costs of institutions such as schools
 – large, high-density populations increasing unit costs of services such as refuse 
disposal or street maintenance.
Diﬀ erent approaches are possible to meet these objectives.
Options for a Single Equalization Grant
A radical departure from the present shredded equalization system would be to consolidate 
all equalization funds into a pool and introduce a general equalization grant allocated on 
the basis of selected socio-economic indicators. 
A Single Grant
Th e most radical option would be to replace the structure of transfers (apart from the 
origin-based distribution of personal income tax [PIT] shares) with a single grant 
calculated to reduce disparities in local revenue bases and reﬂ ect diﬀ erences in spending 
needs and service costs.
Various formulas are in use in European countries. In one category are the British and 
Dutch systems, which attempt full equalization and try to measure diﬀ erences in need, cost, 
and resources comprehensively. Th e United Kingdom developed the revenue support grant 
to equalize needs and local revenue capacity. A second category, typiﬁ ed by the Swedish 
model, attempts to achieve partial equalization and uses simpler and fewer variables.
Th e British and Dutch formulas depend on extremely demanding data requirements. 
Th ey operate in contexts that have far less fragmentation than in Hungary and where all 
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local authorities levy the same one or two taxes on the same base, which is nationally assessed 
and only the tax rates diﬀ er. Given the lack of such uniformity in Hungary, considering a 
simpler formula, similar to that the one used in Sweden, might be more practical.
A Simpler Grant Formula
A relatively simple model for a single equalization grant can be formulated by calculating 
the amount of grant allocated to each municipal area, that is, the area covered by a single 
municipality. Th e grant would be distributed among all self-government units (counties, 
municipalities, municipal associations, and so forth) that provide services in that area.
Using such a model, PIT shares distributed by origin would continue to be paid to 
municipalities just as they are now (unless they are replaced by a surcharge). Th e rest of the 
current transfers (including the PIT equalization element) would be absorbed in a block 
grant. Th e total grant would be divided by national population to yield a standard per capita 
allocation, which would be attributed to each municipal area.
Th e standard per capita allocation for each municipal area would be adjusted (without 
a net addition to the total state budget cost) upward or downward to reﬂ ect local variance 
from national norms in respect to the major factors aﬀ ecting local revenue capacity and 
expenditure needs and costs. For example, adjustment could be made for variations in per 
capita PIT yields, education expenditure (measured by proportions of school age children), 
and health and social care expenditure (measured by proportions of elderly people, children, 
and the unemployed).
Th ese adjustments to the standard per capital allocation would yield an adjusted per 
capita allocation for each municipal area, which would be multiplied by the municipal area’s 
total population and allocated to local authorities as follows
 Cities with county rank: 100 percent;
 Counties and other municipalities: divided according to their overall shares of local 
government expenditure nationwide (excluding cities with county rank and Budapest) 
or in individual counties;
 Budapest capital city and districts: divided according to their respective shares of total 
expenditure in Budapest.
 
One advantage of this model is that it provides a relatively simple way of dividing 
the grant between levels of local government, avoiding speciﬁ c normatives. Diﬀ erences 
in service needs would be reﬂ ected in simple, uniform indicators, such as school-age 
population.
Another advantage of this solution is that it could be varied either nationwide or in 
each area to cover the introduction of districts or regional associations. For example, if ﬁ ve 
municipalities form an association, their respective adjusted per capita allocations could 
be divided between them and the association according to their respective shares of their 
combined expenditure.
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Some reformers argue for using per capita PIT yields as the only basis for equalizing 
local revenue bases. PIT is the only revenue ﬁ gure that can be compared uniformly 
nationwide to liability and assessment. To a certain extent, it should reﬂ ect diﬀ erences in 
local economies that aﬀ ect the potential of local revenues in general. Th is approach will not 
fully compensate for variations in the potential base of business and property taxes if they 
exceed the deviations in PIT. Some analysts argue that diﬀ erences in business and property 
tax potential are matched by diﬀ erences in the demands for expenditure on physical 
infrastructure and, therefore, should not be subjected to complete equalization.
Th is option provides for higher levels of revenue equalization than in the current 
structure. It seeks to reduce disparities in the local tax base, not in the actual local tax 
eﬀ ort. Municipalities that make above-average revenue eﬀ ort do not lose grants as a result. 
Th erefore, the incentive to localize revenue generation is not reduced.
It would be possible, of course, to use further adjustment factors if suitable data were 
available to reﬂ ect relative diﬀ erences in spending need or costs. Regional diﬀ erences in 
mortality rates might be added to the calculation, for example, if they are signiﬁ cant. Over-
complexity and the invitation to special pleading, however, should be avoided.
A comparison of the distribution of this single grant with that of the present transfer 
system shows that the only signiﬁ cant losers are municipalities that have populations of 
fewer than 200. Th is loss is probably due to the elimination of the lump-sum element of 
the grant to villages and could be overcome by a simple adjustment to the formula to apply 
a minimum multiplier in multiplying the adjusted per capita allocation by the population 
of the municipal area.
A radical change to this type of single grant could be phased in over a number 
of years to soften the impact on the losers. In a ﬁ ve-year transition, for example, local 
authorities would get 20 percent of their new grant in year 1, 40 percent in year 2, and so 
forth. Alternatively, the single equalization grant could be ﬁ xed as a proportion of overall 
transfers. For example, one-third of normative grants can be allocated using this method.
More Complex Models
A more complex model would equate with the British and Dutch transfer systems, which 
are sometimes described in U.S. literature as “representative revenue and expenditure 
systems.” Such a model would eﬀ ectively convert the entire grant into a deﬁ cit grant. Each 
municipality would receive a grant bridging the gap between the following two elements:
 Th e central government’s assessment of what it should be spending (excluding capital 
expenditure), bearing in mind:
 – its particular range of competencies
 – standard indices of service needs (school age children, road lengths, and so forth)
 – types of local characteristics aﬀ ecting service costs (for example, population 
density, social deprivation, labor costs)
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 Th e product of its direct revenues, assuming it levied all permitted taxes at either an 
average rate or the maximum rate.
In arriving at assessments of expenditure needs and costs, such a model relies heavily 
on regression analysis. Regression analysis seeks to correlate actual variations in municipal 
expenditure patterns with diﬀ erences in particular local physical, demographic, social, and 
economic characteristics. Such analysis would be diﬃ  cult in Hungary because of the lack 
of uniformity in the exercise of functions (for example, management of schools, hospitals, 
and social care institutions) and the diﬀ erences in coverage of service delivery in municipal 
budgets. Some municipal budgets show the full cost of a service; others may only include 
a net subsidy to an institution or company. By contrast, regression analysis always reﬂ ects 
diﬀ erences in size and character more closely than simple averages. Based on the actual 
spending ﬁ gures, planners can calculate standardized unit costs for a municipality of any 
size, urban character, or other factor.
Similarly, the British and Dutch systems calculate municipal revenue capacity by 
applying uniform standard rates to the local tax bases. Th is method is easy in these two 
countries, where local governments levy only one or two taxes on bases that are assessed 
uniformly. Th is approach, too, would be diﬃ  cult in Hungary because of the lack of 
uniformity in the taxes levied by individual municipalities or in the assessment methods. 
Comparisons of nontax revenues are also diﬃ  cult because in some cases those revenues are 
reﬂ ected in municipal budgets, but in others they are largely absorbed by institutions and 
companies.
Nevertheless, pilot research would be justiﬁ ed in seeing how far objective measurements 
of expenditure need, cost variation, and local revenue capacity could be developed, because 
these ingredients are typical of the most highly developed transfer systems.
Options for Incremental Change
Getting political and bureaucratic consensus on radical change is diﬃ  cult, particularly if 
new legislation is required. Alternative possibilities for improving the current system involve 
continuing the process of incremental change that has been in progress since 1990.
Even if the present transfer system remains intact, reformers could make changes in 
the institutional structure, either in the assignment of competencies or in the framework of 
intermunicipal cooperation. Two scenarios are considered in the remainder of this chapter. 
Th e ﬁ rst looks at options for incremental improvement assuming no major institutional 
change. Th e second looks at the implications for transfers of the types of institutional reform 
that have been under discussion. Finally, possible changes in tax-sharing arrangements 
within the current structure are discussed.
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Incremental Options without Institutional Change
Th e present transfer system has three bases: (a) general normative elements pertaining to 
types of local authority, (b) speciﬁ c normative elements pertaining to particular services 
and payable to the authorities supplying them, and (c) limited equalization of revenue from 
shares of PIT.
Th e priority for incremental reform must focus on the present system’s inadequacies 
that cause the most problems in practice. Th is focus, which means trying to eradicate (or 
at least severely reduce) needs for the deﬁ cit grant, is important for two reasons. First, 
awarding the deﬁ cit grants fairly and adequately causes the central government the most 
diﬃ  culty. Second, despite the absence of systematic allocation criteria, common sense 
suggests that the deﬁ cit grants do go to the three types of local government most likely to 
experience ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culty:
 Counties, which are increasingly taking over responsibilities for secondary education, 
hospitals, and social care institutions from municipalities, but which lack the municipal 
revenue base of local taxes, real estate, and PIT shares;
 Towns providing services for their neighbors without recompense;
 Small villages running services without eﬃ  cient economies of scale.
Th e objective is to ensure that the combination of local revenues, grants, and revenue 
shares is adequate to balance the budgets of the vast majority of local governments, so 
that the deﬁ cit grant is needed only in the most exceptional cases. Th e rest of this section 
examines options for meeting this aim.
Normatives
Th e practical problems of all the deﬁ cit grant recipients would be reduced if service-
related normatives were increased to meet a higher percentage of the costs of running the 
services covered. Although the number of normatives has been increasing in recent years, 
the percentage of coverage has been declining. As a result, local governments have had to 
contribute increasingly to the cost of these services from own revenues, general normatives, 
and PIT shares. But counties get neither PIT shares nor their own taxes. Regional towns 
get no general normatives or PIT shares in respect to nonresident users (although their 
regional status may enhance their business tax revenues in more prosperous areas).
Increasing the size of normatives would certainly help the counties and regional towns. 
Of all the possible remedies, it would also be most accurate in surmounting the lack of 
uniformity in service provision (that is, in assisting only those counties or towns that 
supply such services as hospitals and secondary schools). A 10 percent increase in grants for 
secondary and vocational training schools would equate with the entire deﬁ cit grant paid 
to counties and regional towns.
C H A P T E R  9    T R A N S F E R S :  P O L I C Y  O P T I O N S
209
If applied to the primary school normatives, this solution would also help the small 
villages—although not to the same extent, because it would not cover their higher unit 
costs (unless the normative was weighted inversely to size or included a lump-sum over-
head element).
Th e disadvantage of this solution might be its eﬀ ect on allocation eﬃ  ciency. It would 
further reduce local government discretion over the use of revenue and would encourage 
retention of surplus places in institutions, nonviable small primary schools, and the like. It 
would also beneﬁ t the 85 percent of towns and 75 percent of villages that do not receive 
the deﬁ cit grant.
If the total transfer pool is ﬁ xed by state budget policy, any increase in normatives would 
be at the expense of some other element. Options for cuts may be any of the following: 
 A provision for deﬁ cit grants, which might become unnecessary as far as counties and 
regional towns are concerned
 Regular normatives allocated by the types of settlements, which would cause everyone 
to suﬀ er, regardless of capacity
 PIT shares, which are logical because the biggest losers would be cities that have 
large PIT and business tax revenues that would gain from the increase of normatives 
without needing them.
Counties. What other approaches would increase county government revenues as well 
as—or instead of—increasing speciﬁ c normatives? Th e options are as follows:
 Increasing the counties’ general normative by 17 percent would equate with their share 
of the deﬁ cit grant. Th e general normative does not, however, relate to the scale of their 
actual responsibilities, which varies greatly between counties.
 Allocating to the counties the central government’s 50 percent share of the vehicle 
taxes, roughly ﬁ ve times the size of the counties’ share of the deﬁ cit grant. Th is move 
would simply result in some other form of transfer cut, but would introduce a new 
shared revenue at the county level.
Th e second option gives counties taxing power for accountability reasons and assumes 
that counties would have the same right as municipalities to increase the rates of their share 
of vehicle tax within prescribed limits.
Regional towns. Regional towns are municipalities that provide substantial services to 
residents of smaller, nearby settlements. Increasing normatives would solve part, if not all, 
of the problem, depending on the scale of the increase and the signiﬁ cance of services in 
their spending structure. Other options would be the following:
 Introducing a regular normative for regional service center functions
 Increasing revenue equalization, which would be logical because the more prosperous 
regional towns do get compensating beneﬁ ts from their own tax bases. Th e business tax 
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would be the most logical base, but ﬁ nding an objective statistical base for measuring 
potential rather than actual yield would be diﬃ  cult, and the disincentive eﬀ ects could 
outweigh the beneﬁ ts.
Small villages. Increasing normatives would help if they were applied to primary schools, 
but this move would still fail to compensate for higher unit costs and would be particularly 
ineﬃ  cient because it would encourage retention of unviable units. Alternative subsidies (for 
example, to school transportation) might be more of an incentive. 
Another option to help small villages would be a larger basic lump-sum normative, 
regardless of population size. Th is normative would also beneﬁ t the 75 percent of villages 
that do not qualify for the deﬁ cit grant.
All these options raise the question of how much the central government wants to do 
to keep small village municipalities aﬂ oat and leads to a discussion of institutional change.
Conclusion. None of these suggestions is perfect; all have advantages and disadvantages. Th e 
suggestions which have the greatest advantages are the following:
 Increasing modestly the speciﬁ c normatives for secondary and vocational schools 
(reversing the decline in these grants as a percentage of actual cost)
 Allocating to counties a share in the vehicle tax with the right to vary rates (thereby 
increasing revenues and accountability simultaneously).
Adjusting the scale of these two measures should eliminate the need of counties and 
regional towns for deﬁ cit grant aid, apart from most exceptional circumstances.
Devising solutions to the problems of deﬁ cit villages, which beneﬁ t all villages equally, 
however, is diﬃ  cult. Although the same can be said about help for regional towns, any 
general increase in support to villages carries the additional disadvantage of encouraging 
the survival of uneconomically small service units and leads once again to a discussion of 
institutional change.
Incremental Options under Institutional Change
Although neither the central government nor the Parliament has reached a consensus on 
institutional change, the topic is under discussion. Two directions are possible if the transfer 
system is reformed: 
 Uniform assignment of competencies for services with regional or subregional 
catchment areas could result in counties taking over all hospitals, social care institutions, 
and secondary level schools.
 To improve economies of scale, compulsory subregional associations could be 
formed to provide some services. Th is direction could include a proposal to establish 
multipurpose district authorities.
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Th ese two options have been discussed at the national government level. Th e ﬁ rst 
option was formulated as part of the changes in ﬁ scal policy after 1995. At that time 
reformers believed organizing larger service delivery units by amalgamating small village 
municipalities and transferring regional services exclusively to an intermediate level of local 
governments was the most rational approach. No one evaluated the political acceptability 
of this option or calculated the potential savings.
Th e second, more evolutionary, option seems to be more realistic. Th e introduction 
and development of various ﬂ exible forms of joint service delivery organizations and 
associations require not only ﬁ scal but also legal, administrative, and operational changes.
Counties. If counties and county-right towns received an exclusive mandate for certain 
services (for example, secondary education or hospitals), abolishing the speciﬁ c normatives 
for those competencies and incorporating the funding in a general normative would be 
possible. Th is reform might be population based, with some weighting for school-age 
groups and the elderly. Regional need variations could be introduced if signiﬁ cant 
diﬀ erences in mortality rates, disease incidence, and so forth are found.
Subregional associations and district authorities. Predicting the ﬁ nancial implications of 
subregional association or district authorities is much more diﬃ  cult because they can take 
many diﬀ erent forms. Major guidelines can only be sketched, depending on key variables. 
Th e ﬁ rst variable relates to the type of function undertaken by the associations and districts. 
If they are responsible only for public utility services, then their operating expenses would 
be covered by charges paid directly by consumers.
If associations and districts are responsible for tax- and grant-borne services, then they 
could be incorporated into the normative grant structure. If they are established uniformly 
with exclusive competencies, then they could receive regular normatives, which would be 
excised from the municipal normatives according to their share of previous municipal 
expenditure. But their regular normatives could also absorb any speciﬁ c normatives for 
services they run, with appropriate spending need adjustments (for example, age group 
weights, and so forth). Service-related normatives would have to be retained only if 
expenditure assignments are not uniform.
Giving associations and districts taxing power is similar to the way some British and 
French joint authorities function. If the governing bodies of associations and districts are 
elected directly or nominated by elected municipal assemblies, they could be regarded as 
suﬃ  ciently representative politically to exercise taxing power. Th e simplest way would be 
to allow them to piggyback on the municipal taxes. Th is approach assumes that constituent 
municipalities would be able to reduce their own tax rates because of the transfer of 
expenditure to the association.
If the associations and districts take over a large share of municipal responsibility, then 
they might be given exclusive right to levy a speciﬁ c municipal tax. Th e business tax would 
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be the best candidate because of its disparate incidence within the type of peri-urban area 
that might typify an association’s jurisdiction. Although most of the tax might be paid by 
businesses in a central town, most likely their staﬀ  and customers would be drawn from the 
wider area served by the association or district, justifying the sharing of this tax base.
Th e greatest obstacle to the formation of associations is their lack of access to direct 
revenues and consequent dependence on their constituent municipalities. Previous dis-
cussion suggests that this situation would be improved if:
 Association governing bodies were politically representative and, therefore, able to 
exercise taxing power, with right to the business tax base if they take over the bulk of 
municipal functions.
 Th ey had the right to direct receipt of speciﬁ c normatives for services they administer.
Th e radical changes suggested earlier would give associations and districts a share of 
the total transfers to their area pro rata to their share of local government expenditure.
Tax Sharing
Tax sharing without local decisions over tax rates (that is, without surcharging) is basically 
an alternative form of grant. Its impact is limited. It may stabilize local government revenue 
if the size of the share is ﬁ xed continuously—not the case with PIT in Hungary. Tax 
sharing does not enhance local discretion over taxing and spending levels. It may, however, 
protect local spending choices insofar as it is less susceptible than grants to overuse. It 
may distribute money in favor of wealthier areas, depending on the scope of equalization 
in the rest of the transfer system. By doing so, it aﬀ ords individual local governments the 
psychological satisfaction of sharing in revenue produced by their local economies.
Personal Income Tax
Th e share of PIT distributed to municipalities by origin has declined from 100 percent 
in 1990 to 5 percent in 2000. Given the two-year delay in distribution in 1998, the share 
equated with 14.5 percent of the estimated current levels of collection. By contrast the PIT 
equalization grant has increased so that the minimum PIT share equals the national per 
capita average.
Th e substitution of a local surcharge for the current sharing of PIT is possible if an 
increase in local accountability is suﬃ  ciently desirable to warrant the administrative cost. 
Even without this measure, increasing the percentage of PIT distributed by origin would 
be possible, balanced by a proportionate increase in the minimum per capita level assured 
by the equalization grant.
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Unless the central government decided simply to increase the total quantum of 
transfers, any increase in PIT shares and equalization grant would be oﬀ set by equivalent 
reductions in normative grants. Th e impact on the state budget would be neutral, but the 
result would be a redistribution of transfers between local governments in favor of those 
that have higher PIT yields. 
Local government representatives frequently complain about the reduction of the local 
PIT share, chieﬂ y in the context of the general ﬁ scal squeeze they experience. Increasing 
PIT shares would have a highly discriminatory impact; for this reason we see it as less 
desirable than a general indexation of total transfers. 
Value Added Tax
Another option is to share new national budget revenues with county governments and 
Budapest. Th is approach would stabilize part of the counties’ transfer revenue and give 
them the incentive of a connection between their revenues and the commercial activities in 
the area. Th e principal candidate would be a share of value added tax (VAT), for which local 
government has campaigned in the past.
Th e geographical incidence of VAT payments is hard to determine accurately, but per 
capita gross domestic product, now calculated at the county level, could be a valid proxy. Th e 
percentage of VAT assigned to local government could be divided between counties on the 
basis of their share of gross domestic product.
We estimate that a 5 percent share of VAT distributed on this basis would contribute 
from 7 to 21 percent of county revenues. Th is degree of variation is due to diﬀ erences in 
the size of county budgets, reﬂ ecting diversity in the functions assigned to them. Assigning 
a share of VAT to counties would not increase their discretion and accountability. Th e 
advantages of sharing VAT would be largely psychological.
Business Tax
Th e business tax has been growing both in absolute terms and as a proportion of total local 
government revenue. In per capita terms, major disparities occur in its incidence, mainly to 
the beneﬁ t of the larger urban centers. Th e growth and the disparity of the business tax have 
fueled discussion, particularly within the central government, of ways to equalize it.
Some reformers believe that the business tax base belongs to a whole urban area and its 
periphery, not just to the municipality where a particular ﬁ rm is located. Both its customers 
and its employees may well reside throughout the wider metropolitan area. Th is view would 
support the kind of redistribution that takes place in Budapest between the capital city and 
the districts (see chapter 8). In other urban centers redistribution could take place through 
the operations of some form of intermunicipal association or district level body.
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A national redistribution of the business tax is far less justiﬁ ed, however. Because the 
tax is not levied uniformly, it would not be easy to calculate the diﬀ erences of tax potential 
necessary to an equalization formula. Unlike PIT, this tax is one that municipalities levy 
and administer themselves; redistribution could act as a disincentive to levying the tax at 
the higher permissible rates and assessing and collecting it strictly.
Equalization would be injurious, moreover, unless reformers make an equal eﬀ ort to 
compare and compensate municipal expenditure needs. Th e centers that enjoy the highest 
per capita yields from this tax may well be those with exceptional needs. Larger urban 
centers have congestion costs (for example, greater volumes of traﬃ  c or further distances 
to waste disposal sites). Moreover, they frequently have the highest concentrations of social 
deprivation, leading to exceptional liabilities for social beneﬁ t payments and environmental 
rehabilitation.
Equalization or redistribution of business tax yields should not be attempted as 
an isolated measure. It would have a place only within a comprehensive approach to 
equalization which takes costs and spending needs into account equally.
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In 2000 Hungarian local authorities raised 13.5 percent of their total revenue in local taxes. 
Th is amount is a signiﬁ cant increase over the 4.5 percent raised in 1991, but still a moderate 
proportion. Th ese taxes, which are entirely within municipal discretion, are on business, 
property, and tourism. More unusual, each municipality decides whether to levy the tax at 
all, sets the tax rates (within statutory limits), and is responsible for assessment and collection.
Municipalities also receive a share of the personal income tax (PIT) collected within 
their boundaries (in 1998, their share was 20 percent of actual 1996 collections) and 50 
percent of motor vehicle taxes. Municipalities have limited discretion over vehicle tax rates, 
but not PIT rates, and the percentage of PIT they receive varies radically from year to year 
(it fell to 5 percent in 2000).
Local governments have widely introduced various types of local taxes. Th e actual 
local tax revenues increased signiﬁ cantly after 1995 when severe ﬁ scal restrictions were 
introduced. In 1997 a majority (81 percent) of municipalities levied at least one local tax.
Most analysts believe that this situation is unsatisfactory and that local governments 
are too dependent on grants and revenue shares. Citizens undoubtedly feel overtaxed. 
Reform must be founded on a clearer deﬁ nition of the problem and future objectives. Th is 
chapter discusses core principles and options for reforming local taxation.
Current Situation
Th e most frequently used local taxes are the business tax and the communal tax. Th e 
business tax is a local piggyback on the centrally levied corporate income tax. Communal 
tax on private persons can also be regarded as a property tax because it is levied on 
residential property owners and renters. Communal tax on enterprises resembles a payroll 
tax. Tourism has been taxed for decades.
* Th is chapter is based on Davey and Péteri 1998.
PA RT  2    S E C T I O N  1    M O D E R N I Z I N G  T H E  I N T E R G O V E R N M E N TA L  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M
216
Business Tax
Th e business tax is a turnover tax levied on manufacturers’ and retail sales’ net turnover. Th e 
law also diﬀ erentiates between businesses classiﬁ ed as temporary activity and nontemporary 
activity. Th e maximum rate set by the central government for temporary activity is Ft 5,000 
per day, and the rate for nontemporary activity is 1.4 percent (increased to 2.0 percent in 
2000). Th e business tax may be levied on all enterprises, public and private—initially sales 
revenue net of the value added tax and on other consumption taxes. All businesses liable 
for this tax must report their annual sales to the corresponding municipality although 
registration and place of business can be ambiguous. Some introduced reforms address 
deductions from the tax base. Since 1998 the cost of materials may be deducted, but an 
increase in the tax rate has compensated for this reduction (Garzon 1998). 
Tourism Tax 
Th e current tax on tourism includes rents, guest nights, and summer cottages. Th e 
maximum rates established by the central government are Ft 300 per night for guests, 4 
percent on the rental fee, and Ft 900 per square meter for cottages. Before the tourism tax, 
a local fee on tourism was collected only in resort areas. Th e current taxes may be levied by 
any local government.
Property Tax
Local governments can legally levy property taxes on privately owned building plots and 
buildings (for example, ﬂ ats, single family houses, summer cottages, garages, storehouses, 
workshops, and other residential housing) and on commercial and industrial property. Th e 
tax may be levied on area size (in square meters) or on the assessed value of the property. 
Th e maximum tax rates established by the central government are Ft 900 per square meter 
or 3 percent of the corrected value. Th e corrected value is 50 percent of the assessed value 
as determined by the local government.
Communal Tax
Th is tax can be levied on household dwellings (owned or rented) and on businesses. Th e 
tax on dwellings is payable by the occupant at a maximum rate of Ft 12,000 per dwelling, 
regardless of the number of dwellers per household. From a revenue viewpoint, the 
communal tax on dwellings partially substitutes for taxes on real estate, although a property 
tax could be in principle more equitable than a communal tax because it could be based 
on the market value of property. Th e administration of communal tax on private persons is 
simple. Th e two other types of property taxes (on buildings and plots) produce 10 percent 
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of local taxes. Th e communal tax on enterprises is payable at a maximum rate of Ft 2,000 
per employee. Th is approach resembles a payroll tax and makes the use of labor more 
costly. Its potential eﬀ ect depends on the absolute amount of the tax. Th e gross national 
product per capita is about US$ 6,730 (equivalent to Ft 1,346,000). From this perspective, 
the communal tax would be equivalent to less than 1 percent (0.8 percent) of the average 
annual income, an amount that in principle would not be expected to distort economic 
behavior.
Urban Land Tax
Th e land tax applies to urban land only and is levied on the property owners of idle 
(unimproved) plots. Th e maximum tax rate is Ft 200 per square meter or 3 percent on 
the corrected value of the plot. Th e corrected value is 50 percent of the assessed value as 
determined by the local government. Th e assessed value is supposed to reﬂ ect the actual 
market value of land. Publicly owned land is also taxable. Th e tax rate applied is Ft 15 per 
square meter, substantially below the maximum rate allowed. Ideally, the tax rate should be 
associated with the market value of land rather than the size of the plot. Th is rate would, 
in principle, make the tax more equitable and would be more likely to attain the policy 
objectives implicit in its design.
Objectives of Local Taxation
Conceptually, local authorities may derive revenue from local taxation by any of the 
following: 
 Levying taxes themselves
 Imposing a locally decided surcharge on a revenue levied and collected by other levels 
of government
 Receiving a ﬁ xed share of national taxes collected within their jurisdiction.
 
Which method to exploit and apply to which tax base depends on the objectives of tax 
reform. One must ask precisely what is wrong with the present situation.
Presumably, the present level of local taxation is unsatisfactory for ﬁ scal or accountability 
reasons (or both). Th e central government has been seeking to reduce a large budget deﬁ cit, 
and local government expenditure has been subject to a general ﬁ scal squeeze. Higher local 
tax revenue might reduce the burden of local expenditure on state budget support or halt 
its recent decrease. For convenience, this argument will be described as the ﬁ scal argument 
for enhanced local taxation.
Alternatively, some analysts argue that local governments do not take enough 
responsibility for raising the resources they spend and that the quality and eﬃ  ciency of 
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ﬁ nancial management would improve if mayors and councils had to make harder decisions 
about revenue generation and answer directly to taxpayers for the use of a higher proportion 
of their budget. Th is argument will be described as the accountability argument.
Th e ﬁ scal argument implies that local taxation reforms should increase the overall level 
of taxation either to reduce grants or increase local expenditure. It could be achieved by the 
following:
 Encouraging local authorities to exploit existing local tax sources more thoroughly by:
 – levying taxes they ignore at present 
 – increasing rates of tax
 – improving assessment and collection 
 Vesting local authorities with new tax sources
 Giving local authorities power to surcharge central government taxes within their 
territory.
 
Most analysts recognize that overall tax levels are high, particularly direct taxes on 
individuals and businesses. Th e high social security contributions penalizes employment, so 
any additional taxation should preferably be on consumption rather than income or proﬁ ts, 
and any further direct taxation should be selective and progressive in its incidence, falling 
on those who are best able to pay more.
Th e accountability objective, by contrast, does not demand an increase in aggregate 
taxation. It needs only a shift in responsibility from central to local government for 
deciding tax rates or administering taxes. Th is shift could be achieved by: (a) transferring 
tax sources from central to local government, or (b) reducing rates of some national taxes 
and allowing local authorities to surcharge them.
Th e taxes subject to local decision, however, must ﬁ nance a signiﬁ cant proportion of 
local budgets to make any real diﬀ erence to local accountability, so they must be substantial 
revenue sources. Local government spends 12 percent of gross domestic product, the same 
percentage as in Britain and considerably more than in France (9.2 percent) or Germany 
(8.1 percent). Th is reﬂ ects wide responsibilities, particularly for education, social welfare, 
and health.  
Th us taxes selected for transfer to or surcharge by local authorities for accountability 
reasons need two attributes. First, they must raise substantial revenues, at least 1 percent 
of gross domestic product and preferably more. Second, they must be susceptible to local 
variations in rates. Tax administrators should be able to identify the location of the payer and 
apply a variable rate, and rate variation should have no serious distortionary consequences. 
Th e impact of local decisions should fall on people within the jurisdiction and not simply 
be exported to consumers, shareholders, and others, elsewhere.
One tax device makes no potential contribution to either ﬁ scal or accountability 
objectives: revenue sharing in which the central government determines the tax rates. 
Revenue sharing can meet other objectives, such as enhancing a sense of local autonomy or 
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guaranteeing local government a share of buoyant revenue, but it will not, of itself, increase 
the aggregate level of taxation or enhance the degree of local ﬁ scal responsibility.
Fiscal Objectives
How could more revenue be raised from local taxes, thereby reducing grants or increasing 
local expenditure? Th e earlier discussion stated that any increases in overall tax burdens 
would have to be selective and progressive in their incidence. Comparisons suggest the 
following options: 
 Local government discretion over levying the current taxes could be restricted. Local 
discretion over the tax rate is normal, but the freedom of municipalities to decide 
whether to impose taxes at all is most unusual. Th e taxes could be made mandatory and 
a minimum rate of tax prescribed.
 Th e current yield of property taxes is very low in comparison with other countries 
where they are levied. Th e potential for increases is obvious; international comparisons 
suggest that a target yield of around 0.8 percent of gross domestic product might be 
attainable and could raise up to 7 percent of local government budgets. To target 
increases on those most able to pay, reformers would need to make a major change in 
current assessment systems. Th e current ﬂ at rates per square meter, varying only by land 
use and neighborhood, do not reﬂ ect diﬀ erences in the market or rental value of real 
estate suﬃ  ciently to bear substantially higher rates of taxation.
 Yields of local business tax have been increasing substantially. Th is increase has been 
facilitated by changes in the deﬁ nition of the tax base to make it more equitable. Th ey 
have also brought the tax base closer to that of value added tax, which will be subject to 
European Union (EU) policy restraints after accession. Competition in a single market 
intensiﬁ es pressures on local business taxation, and its potential for further major 
growth is open to question.
 Th e current rates of vehicle taxation are low by international standards and merit 
further review. EU membership may well force substantial increases in commercial 
vehicle tariﬀ s. Vehicle ownership is usually related to wealth, and this form of taxation 
is broadly progressive as well as fair in relation to the costs of maintaining road networks.
 
No obvious new sources of local taxation emerge from international comparisons. Th e 
sources exploited elsewhere are already tapped by central or local government in Hungary.
Accountability Objectives
Th e options just discussed could raise more public revenue overall, but they would not 
make a fundamental diﬀ erence in the balance between transfers and local revenue. Personal 
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income is the only potential local tax base that could support a substantial proportion of 
the expenditures of local authorities; 12.5 percent of the yields were distributed to local 
authorities by origin in 1998, but they have no share in the levy or administration of the 
tax. Turning this, or a larger share, into a local surcharge is probably the only way by which 
municipal leaders could be made substantially more responsible for the levels of their tax-
borne revenue. Th is change would require a commensurate reduction in the basic national 
rates of tax to leave room for the local surcharge. Conversion into a local surcharge would 
also eliminate the current uncertainty and contention over the percentage share of PIT 
allocated to local government in the annual state budget. Th e major issue is whether the 
beneﬁ ts in terms of local accountability outweigh the administrative costs.
Conclusion
Th e major options for increasing local taxation are: (a) introducing a value-related base 
for the assessment of property taxation, and (b) increasing rates of tax on motor vehicles, 
particularly heavy-duty commercial vehicles.
Th ese increases will not, however, make a major diﬀ erence to the overall balance 
between local taxation and transfers. If reformers believe that varying this ratio substantially 
for accountability reasons is important, the only option is to replace the current local 
government share of PIT with a local surcharge on PIT rates. Th e prime objective of such 
change would be to increase local discretion, rather than to raise more revenue.
Options for Reform
Th ere are three areas where signiﬁ cant changes are advisable: increase of local property 
taxes and vehicle taxes, and introduction of a local surcharge on the personal income tax.
Local Property Tax
Th e most important lesson learned from the tax reforms in other countries is that property 
tax policy should be combined with institutional changes. Tax administration procedure 
should be planned ahead and each process of taxation should be executed by the most 
capable institution. Generally, property tax administration has ﬁ ve essential stages: 
identiﬁ cation, valuation, calculation of tax, billing, and collection (which includes the 
appeal process).
Property tax, which is a stable revenue, allows only limited tax exportation. Th e tax 
base is visible, and a rough relationship to ability to pay is maintained, at least in the case of 
residential property, whose value is a good indicator of the owner’s wealth.
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Although levied by an increasing number of local governments, property tax incidence 
is currently low primarily because of area-based assessments. Th ese assessments do not 
diﬀ erentiate adequately between the values of properties and, therefore, between the 
abilities of the owners to pay. Increases in the taxation of the higher value residential 
property could make a signiﬁ cant contribution to municipal revenues. Higher taxation 
of commercial properties is a lower priority, partly because of the technical diﬃ  culties 
involved and partly because their owners are also the target of local business taxes.
Property taxation is suitable as a local government levy because of the clear relationship 
to location and the possibility of applying local variations in tax policies and rates. 
Nevertheless, many national tax policy interventions are possible (for example, exemptions 
connected to income, compulsory categorization of properties, deﬁ nition of value bands, 
and ﬁ xed ratios between tax rates). It would strengthen local accountability if the nationally 
deﬁ ned property tax exemptions, which are based on social considerations, were left to local 
discretion.
Property tax policy design should be combined with planning the administrative 
environment. Th e current priority is to develop the valuation system.
Local governments should be encouraged and helped to adopt value-related taxation, 
with an immediate focus on residential property. Mass appraisal methods provide a possible 
compromise because of their current area-based systems. Th ese systems could continue to 
use the area in square meters as a base, but could be modiﬁ ed by multipliers expressing 
diﬀ erences in value arising from age, location, use, and quality. Th ese multipliers should be 
derived from a regression analysis of sample assessments based on actual sales comparisons 
or a combination of land and construction costs (depending on the information most 
readily available). Th ese costs should also be monitored continually to provide a basis 
for periodic indexation of the assessed values. Th e widely known geographic information 
systems should support the mass appraisal.
Central government intervention should support municipal property tax administration, 
especially in property identiﬁ cation and valuation. Economies of scale, which are needed 
for mass appraisal, can be achieved in the larger cities, but smaller municipalities need the 
services of a regional oﬃ  ce for registration and valuation, perhaps at the county level. Th e 
local duty oﬃ  ces or the County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ces could supply 
tax-base information. 
Th e information needed for a mass appraisal system is available, but it is fragmented. 
Land oﬃ  ces hold the cadastre of property rights and boundaries, local government duty 
oﬃ  ces record transactions and their values, and local administrations possess the technical 
information on zoning, infrastructure, building size, and so forth. Th ese three groups of 
information need to be made available and merged by the city or county valuation oﬃ  ce. 
Municipalities should remain responsible for billing and collection and might pay a fee for 
the registration and valuation service.
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Vehicle Tax
Th is section refers to possible increases in the rates of annual taxes on motor vehicles, 
which are shared equally between the central and local governments. It is based on a 
comparison made in 1994 between Hungarian tariﬀ s and the rates applied by states in the 
EU (excluding the three most recent members, Austria, Finland, and Sweden). It has not 
been possible to obtain more recent comparative EU data.
Trucks
Trucks are taxed in the EU according to maximum loaded weight. Under an EU directive, 
the minimum tax rate for a fully loaded truck should be Ft 189,000. Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain have exemptions from the application of this directive.
In 1994 the Hungarian minimum rate was Ft 4 per kilogram of the vehicle’s own 
weight plus 50 percent of its maximum potential load. Local government may increase this 
rate up to a maximum of Ft 8 per kilogram. On this basis the rate on a 38-ton articulated 
truck would be between Ft 102,600 and Ft 205,200. Th e minimum was, therefore, well 
below the EU directive, but the maximum is above it and in line with average EU levels.
Cars
Th e 1994 comparison showed huge variations between EU states in annual taxation of 
cars. Th e Hungarian rate on small cars was comparable to that in the lowest EU country, 
but minute in relation to EU tariﬀ s with respect to all medium and large cars. When 
comparing tax liabilities on domestic transportation, taking diﬀ erences in income levels 
into consideration is legitimate; these diﬀ erences might discount the diﬀ erentials in 
taxation of small cars, but not those of medium and large size.
An earlier survey suggested that 65 percent of local tax administrative capacity was 
devoted to collecting the vehicle tax (Lados 1994). Collection costs are 30 percent of 
the revenue collected, leaving local government with only 20 percent of the net revenue. 
Administrative costs for local government taxation are relatively high compared with 
national taxes. Th is disparity underlines the case for increasing the eﬀ ective tax yield by re-
viewing the rates. It also suggests the need to examine the eﬃ  ciency of the collection process.
Conclusion
Th e 1994 survey suggested an initial case for a gradual upward revision of minimum vehicle 
tax rates on the larger types of international freight vehicles, which will face the pressure of 
EU directives, and on larger cars. Both Hungarian and EU tariﬀ s have changed since 1994, 
so a fresh comparison would be desirable.
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Local Income Tax Surcharge
Th e two basic types of local government surcharges are: (a) a uniform addition to the 
national tax rates (that is, the rates on income in all brackets), or (b) a ﬂ at percentage addition 
to the whole of a taxpayer’s national tax payment, including the rates on all brackets.
Th e ﬁ rst method applies in the Nordic countries and the second in Switzerland. In 
Sweden the national basic tax rate is zero, so that payers in the lowest taxable bracket pay 
only the local surcharge (up to 30 percent of net taxable income); the central government 
taxes only income in the higher brackets. Th e second method is easier to calculate and more 
progressive in its incidence on taxpayers. Th e second method produces greater potential 
disparities between the yields to individual municipalities than the ﬁ rst, since the surcharge 
applies to the higher as well as the basic rates. Applied in Hungary, however, it would 
only reproduce the existing disparities that arise from a ﬂ at percentage sharing of the tax 
collected in each municipality.
Preliminary discussions with oﬃ  cials in Hungary suggest a preference for the Swiss 
method. It would be simpler to introduce because its impacts on municipal ﬁ nances can 
be predicted from existing tax data and a major redistribution of resources between local 
governments can be avoided. Further discussion in this chapter will assume choice of this 
method—the local surcharge will add a ﬁ xed percentage to the total amount of tax due by 
each taxpayer.
Local discretion to set the surcharge rate is essential to increasing local accountability. 
Varying degrees of discretion are possible, however. Municipalities might be free to levy the 
surcharge at any one of the following:
 at any rate they choose
 at any rate up to a prescribed maximum
 at or above a prescribed minimum rate
 between prescribed minimum and maximum rates.
 
Current legislation gives municipalities freedom not to impose the existing local taxes. 
Th e central government might not want to extend this principle to the PIT surcharge in 
view of the importance of PIT in the structure of municipal revenue.
We assume, as already argued, that the prime objective of introducing a local surcharge 
is to increase local accountability rather than tax burdens. Any surcharge would be 
counterbalanced by a reduction in national rates based on some estimate of the national 
average rates levied by municipalities. Modeling the change from sharing to surcharging 
would, therefore, need some assumption about a standard rate of surcharge at which 
the impact on taxpayers and the initial impact on municipal ﬁ nances would be neutral. 
Municipalities that chose to levy a surcharge above this standard rate would earn a net gain 
in resources; those levying a lower rate would suﬀ er a net reduction in revenue.
Setting any level for this standard rate of surcharge is theoretically possible, and the 
consequent gains or losses to municipalities in relation to the current PIT shares can be 
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adjusted against aggregate grants. A more acceptable approach, however, is to model the 
change on the present quantum of PIT transferred to municipalities; increasing that level 
of local participation in PIT and reducing grants would redistribute revenue between 
municipalities to the beneﬁ t of areas, such as Budapest, that have above average PIT 
revenues. Since this change is unlikely to be acceptable, we base our modeling on converting 
the existing aggregate municipal share of PIT into a standard rate of surcharge.
Multiple Levels of Local Government
More than one tier of local government can levy surcharges. In Sweden, for example, 
county, municipal, and parish councils all impose individual surcharges on personal income 
tax. Th e tax paid is, therefore, a composite of four rates including the national tax. Th e 
administrative burden on employers and tax authorities is clearly increased by multiple 
surcharges, but the process is not intrinsically more complicated.
Th erefore dividing the surcharging power between the capital city and districts in 
Budapest would be possible. Surcharging power could also be given to county governments 
if analysts believed that restoring their taxing authority was appropriate.
Conclusion
Discussions with PIT oﬃ  cials at the national level suggest two beliefs:
 A change from PIT sharing to local surcharging would not require a major modiﬁ cation 
of existing procedures so far as the central government is concerned.
 Th e existing tax administration is capable of the modiﬁ cations needed.
 
Th e main administrative burden would be on employers who would have to apply dif-
ferent rates of tax to their various withholdings. Th is requirement should not cause undue 
problems for employers that have computerized payroll systems; experience and software 
are both available from the Nordic countries. Municipalities, however, would need to deter-
mine their PIT surcharge rates well before the start of the tax year so that they could apply 
them immediately. Th e tax law might provide, for example, that the standard rate or the pre-
vious year’s rate will apply in any given municipality unless speciﬁ cally varied by the muni-
cipal assembly not less than one or two months before the beginning of the tax year.
Local surcharges would apply to income from employment and self-employment. 
Applying it to investment income would not be feasible.
Introducing surcharging would be easier if the impact on both taxpayers and municipal 
ﬁ nance is neutral at a given standard rate. Th is neutrality would mean municipalities must 
impose a ﬂ at percentage surcharge on all PIT obligations (the Swiss system). On the basis 
of 1998 allocations the standard rate would be 17 percent and would have equivalent 
reductions in national rates on all brackets. Municipalities would, however, be free to 
impose rates below or above the standard, with consequent gains or losses to their budgets 
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and their taxpayers’ pockets. Th is discretion might be total or within a prescribed range 
either side of the standard rate. Setting the standard rate at any other level would involve 
a redistribution of funds between central and local government probably involving grant 
structure adjustments.
In short, we have come across no insuperable administrative or ﬁ scal obstacle to a 
change from PIT sharing to surcharging. Surcharging would increase local accountability, 
because the percentage of municipal revenues subject to local discretion would rise from 
28 to nearly 36 percent. It would also stabilize local government’s share of PIT yields 
and avoid the uncertainty and contention that surround the present system of annual 
negotiation and decision.
Th e main costs would be the added inconvenience to employers of withholding PIT 
at diﬀ erent rates and a lessening of national control over the overall tax burden. Th e degree 
of variation in PIT liabilities would be restricted by the minimum and maximum limits on 
the local surcharge, but the central government would still lose its control over the total 
level of the tax.
Surcharging PIT represents the only way of making local government directly 
accountable to the electorate for a substantial proportion of its revenue, given the scale of 
its expenditure. Th e advantages of this accountability and of stabilizing the division of PIT 
revenues between the central and local governments must be weighed in the balance against 
the additional administrative burden and the loss of total control over the tax level.
Extension of Local Taxing Power
Rights to levy local government taxes are limited to municipalities, which can decide which 
optional local taxes they want to levy and at what rates (within prescribed limits). Th e 
question arises whether this right should be extended to other local government bodies.
County Local Governments
When the 1990 Act on Local Government was debated in the Parliament, much controversy 
arose over the retention of a county tier. Th e tier was retained only on conditions that 
weakened county government powers; lack of taxing power is a major example.
In practice the counties have survived as self-governing units, and the number of 
institutions entrusted to them has grown substantially. Since 1994 they have also been 
governed by directly elected assemblies. Analysts see little reason to treat them diﬀ erently 
from other self-governing units. For accountability reasons strong arguments favor giving 
counties some taxing power. Options include the following:
 Tax base sharing with the municipalities, as in Budapest and in France, Britain, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, which would result in either reducing the 
municipal revenues (mainly from the business tax) or increasing tax burdens;
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 Allowing counties to surcharge PIT (simpler than at municipal level);
 Allocating the central government’s share of the vehicle tax and giving counties the 
same right as municipalities to increase the rates of their portion of the tax.
Municipal Associations
Some reformers argue that small municipalities should form associations to run services for 
which they individually lack ﬁ nancial and human resources. A Ministry of Finance proposal 
also promoted establishing district level self-governments to run most local services, leaving 
villages with minor ceremonial and representative functions. Lack of access to independent 
resources and dependence on contributions from member municipalities are often cited as 
major impediments to the formation and eﬀ ective operation of such subregional bodies.
In Britain and France some intermunicipal bodies have the right to levy a surcharge 
on local government taxes. No inherent reason why they should be denied taxing power 
is evident, so long as their governing bodies are elected by the public or nominated by 
elected councils and representation on their governing bodies is roughly proportional to 
population.
If district self-governments or subregional associations exercised most municipal 
competencies on behalf of constituent municipalities, strong ﬁ nancial and political 
arguments for giving them substantial access to the municipal tax base would arise. Th e 
simplest way would be to allow them to piggyback on the municipal taxes. Th is approach 
would assume that constituent municipalities would be able to reduce their own tax rates 
because of the transfer of expenditure to the association.
If the associations and districts are: (a) are run by politically representative bodies, and 
(b) takeover a large share of municipal responsibility, they might be given exclusive right 
to levy a speciﬁ c municipal tax. Th e business tax would be the best candidate because of 
its disparate incidence within the type of peri-urban area that might typify an association’s 
jurisdiction. Although most of the tax might be paid by businesses in a central town, most 
likely the businesses’ employees and customers would be drawn from the wider area served 
by the association or district, justifying the sharing of this tax base.
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11Local Revenues in Selected Municipalities Hernando Garzon


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In light of their current and future ﬁ nancial situation, local governments need to strengthen 
their recurrent revenue sources and look for alternatives in capital ﬁ nancing, such as 
borrowing or the sale of debt instruments. Both of these options require a solid ﬁ nancial 
position to be creditworthy. Th e only feasible path for local governments’ survival is to make 
much greater use of local taxes and bear the increasing political burden. Th is ﬁ nancial policy 
requires modernization of the system, structure, and administration of local taxes, and to 
attract private investors, greater transparency on local ﬁ nances and ﬁ nancial management.
Th is chapter studies the ﬁ scal situation and ﬁ nancial management, with special 
attention to tax administration and management in six medium-size municipalities: 
Nagykanizsa, Orosháza, Püspökladány, Szentes, Szolnok, and Tatabánya.
Revenue Sources
Th e Act on Local Government provides the framework for a range of revenue sources 
to ﬁ nance local government functions. Th ey include ﬁ ve local taxes, a share of the central 
government personal income tax, and several speciﬁ c transfers. Th e transfers include a 
speciﬁ c share of personal income tax allocated as equalizing transfer, normative grants, and 
for investment purposes, several targeted matching grants and earmarked non-matching 
grants (see chapters 6 and 7). In addition, local governments obtain dividends and other 
revenues from entrepreneurial activities, acquire proceeds from the disposition or rental 
of residential and commercial properties, and borrow to ﬁ nance investments and to meet 
overdrafts or budgetary shortfalls.
* Th is chapter is based on Garzon 1998.
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Fiscal Transfers
Central government transfers provide about two-thirds of total municipal revenues. Th e 
normative grants that primarily support current expenditures represent the largest portion 
of transfers. In our sample the relative weight of the normatives in local revenues ranges 
between 43.2 percent (Püspökladány) and 17.1 percent (Orosháza). In general, about two-
thirds of normative grants cover recurrent expenditures on education. Th e rest of the grant 
is channeled to ﬁ nance social services and other local activities. Other grants especially 
for capital expenditures (matching and non-matching) represent a very small portion of 
revenues (less than 5 percent); often, they do not exist.
Th e revenue-sharing system is another important mechanism in local ﬁ nance. It 
includes the share in the personal income tax and vehicle tax. Th e 20 percent share in 
the personal income tax represented between 7 to 13 percent of total municipal revenues 
in 1998. Th is share may vary substantially in particular cases because it is based on the 
origin of the tax. Local governments retain 50 percent of the vehicle tax and transfer the 
diﬀ erence to the central budget. Based on the current tax design, this source provides less 
than 1 percent of local governments’ annual revenues.
Own Revenues
Own recurrent revenues include local taxes, user charges, earnings from entrepreneurial 
activities, and proceeds from the disposition or rental of residential and commercial 
properties. In this section the revenue situation of the municipalities in our sample is 
presented along with their options for increasing tax revenues.
Taxes
Th e 1990 Act on Local Government assigned ﬁ ve taxes to local governments: business tax, 
communal tax (that is, a poll tax, a payroll tax, or both), urban land tax, property tax on 
buildings, and tourism tax. Apart from the business tax, local governments collect the same 
taxes as were collected by the local councils under the previous regime (see Garzon 1998 
and chapter 10). 
Local governments decide, at their discretion and by resolution of their respective 
councils, which of these taxes they want to levy. Table 11.1 shows which taxes are levied 
by the reviewed municipalities. Some of our sample cities do not levy urban land taxes, 
the tourism tax, or the communal tax, and some (for example, Tatabánya) levy only the 
communal tax on businesses as a form of payroll tax. Th e Act on Local Government 
establishes some regulations on cities levying taxes: 
 Two taxes may not be levied on the same object.
 Preexisting centrally mandated tax exemptions may not be restricted.
 Locally set tax rates may not exceed the centrally mandated maximum rate.
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Signiﬁ cantly, all local taxes may be deducted as costs by individuals and businesses 
from the central taxes (for example, personal income and corporate tax).
Table 11.1 Local Taxes Levied in Selected Municipalities
Cities Business tax Communal tax Urban land tax Building tax Tourism tax
Nagykanizsa Yes Yes No Yes No
Orosháza Yes Yes No Yes No
Püspökladány Yes No Yes No No
Szentes Yes Yes No No Yes
Szolnok Yes No No Yes No
Tatabánya Yes Yes No Yes No
Source: Municipalities of Nagykanizsa, Orosháza, Püspökladány, Szentes, Szolnok, and Tatabánya.
Business tax. In four of the six municipalities tax rates are below the maximum, and thus 
have room for adjustments. Some municipalities are considering setting the maximum rate 
to counterbalance future revenue losses. Municipalities that levy the maximum rate (for 
example, Nagykanizsa and Tatabánya) could legally increase their rates in tandem with the 
rise in the national maximum (for example, business tax from 1.4 to 1.7 percent in 1999). 
Some of them could also increase the tax base by lowering the cut-oﬀ  of the yearly turnover 
value that makes business taxable.
Property tax on buildings. Four of the six municipalities levy a tax on buildings, three of 
them on residential property. Keeping residential property out of the tax base is one of the 
main property tax issues. Furthermore, of the two tax-base options, they use ﬂ oor-space 
rather than market value. Püspökladány and Szentes do not levy building tax at all, and 
Szentes does not levy a plot tax on idle urban land. In Orosháza and Tatabánya, as in most 
cities, 25 square meters per dweller is exempt from ﬂ oor-space tax, which leaves most 
housing units out of the tax base. Szolnok, in contrast, levies taxes on most housing units 
and does not grant the 25-square-meter exemption. Poor quality social housing units below 
100 square meters are tax exempt, except in areas of tourism. Finally, properties owned by 
entities exempt from income tax (for example, churches, budgetary institutions, and public 
service organizations) are also tax exempt. 
Because the ﬂ oor-space-based taxation is fairly simple, but also very inequitable, most 
of the cities in the study want to introduce value-based property taxation. Th is option 
requires more information, however, which changes constantly. Among other things, the 
cities would need to develop a cadastre and update it permanently. More than 90 percent 
of housing units are privately owned, and market transactions occur frequently in these 
cities. Th erefore, the information about taxable real estate is ample, particularly because 
sellers pay a transfer duty and the duty oﬃ  ces record the declared transaction price and a 
relevant market price. Because sellers tend to underreport real estate prices, corresponding 
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market values should be examined and registered for taxation and public record purposes 
(see chapter 13). Collecting relevant information about the local real estate markets would 
be fundamental in the transition from area-based to value-based taxation.
Urban land tax. Only the city of Püspökladány levies the land tax.
Tourism tax: Only the city of Szentes levies a tourism tax, at Ft 100 (US$ 0.30) per night 
per guest.
User Charges
Municipalities do not directly collect user charges, such as fees for garbage collection or gas, 
water, and district heating supply. Under the monitoring and regulatory control of the local 
governments, charges are set, managed, and collected mainly by the public utilities that 
provide the services. Fees paid for social services are collected by the independent service 
institutions (for example, schools). A crucial issue is whether or not the charges recover 
the cost of services and, if not, how the losses are covered. Th ough the service providers 
are separate legal entities and independent of the city’s administration, or owned partially 
or fully by private owners, the potential subsidies directly aﬀ ect the local budget. Revenues 
from user charges are accounted as one budget item, which shows a declining trend and 
ranged between 0 and 3 percent of the local budgets in our sample in the 1993–1998 period. 
Th is negative trend reﬂ ects a policy to privatize or give concessions to public utilities.
Revenue Sources for Capital Finance
Capital ﬁ nancing that comprises revenues from asset management, sale of assets, central 
transfers (that is, earmarked and targeted investment grants), and in a few cases bond 
issuance, is fairly important for some of the cities analyzed. In 1998 capital revenues 
represented 26 percent and 30 percent of total revenues in Szentes and Tatabánya, 
respectively. In Püspökladány capital revenues represented only about 6 percent of the 
revenue budget in 1998.
Revenue Structure and Performance
Local government revenues generally increased in nominal terms during the 1993–1997 
period, but most of the cities indicated a decline in nominal revenue in 1998. Th is analysis 
is based on actual revenues of the closing budgets, except the 1998 ﬁ gures which reﬂ ect 
the opening budget. Revenues in constant prices deﬂ ated by the consumer price index, 
however, show a very diﬀ erent picture of the ﬁ nancial situation. From 1993 through 1998 
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local revenues in real terms fell by 40 percent in Püspökladány, mainly because of a severe 
decline in asset revenues. Th e fall in revenue was 18 percent in Szolnok in the same period. 
Th ese trends suggest that the ﬁ nancial situation of these cities, and perhaps that of other 
municipalities, is approaching the critical stage.
In parallel with the decline in real value of the various local revenues, the composition 
of the revenue structure has changed signiﬁ cantly: 
 Municipalities are gradually becoming less dependent on normative grants.
 Th e personal income tax has gained some importance in local revenues because of the 
greater income elasticity of the income tax. (Tatabánya is one exception to this trend.)
 Own-source revenues have gained relative importance in local ﬁ nances. Szolnok has 
obtained about the same amount of normative grants as own-source revenues, which 
represent 27 and 26.8 percent of total revenues, respectively. In Püspökladány, however, 
revenues obtained from normative grants (43 percent) are much higher than the city’s 
own-source revenue (17 percent).
 
Capital funds from own-source revenues are becoming less important. Revenues 
from the sale of municipal assets, particularly from privatization of housing estates, were 
generally growing until 1997. In 1998, however, this trend changed and the reliance on sales 
of municipal assets is becoming less sustainable.
Signiﬁ cantly, revenues from local taxes have substantially gained importance in the 
revenue structure (see table 11.2). Because several taxes are still levied on the basis of 
absolute values, and hence tend to erode with inﬂ ation, municipalities have gradually 
updated these tax rates during the period analyzed. Local taxes range between 5 percent 
and 12 percent of local government total revenues at the end of 1990s. In 1993 local taxes 
provided as little as less than 1 percent or at most 10 percent of total local revenues.
Table 11.2 Share of Local Taxes in the Actual Budget of the Selected Municipalities, 
1993–1997 (percent)
Cities 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Nagykanizsa 9.7 10.7 15.8 16.6 17.0
Orosháza 1.4 1.1 5.5 10.8 10.5
Püspökladány 0.4 0.3 1.7 3.1 2.8
Szentes 3.7 5.7 7.4 7.2 10.6
Szolnok 7.3 5.2 7.0 8.9 8.8
Tatabánya 4.9 4.4 4.2 4.9 6.0
Country total 4.4 4.2 5.1 7.0 7.2
Source: Authors’ questionnaire and County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce data.
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Revenue Authority
Th is section addresses the question of whether local governments have suﬃ  cient legal 
autonomy to set their own revenues so that they can provide the public goods and services 
for which they are responsible. Adequate revenue autonomy determines how far local 
governments are accountable, ﬁ nancially and politically, for the provision of adequate local 
services. Th is section analyzes their authority to establish local taxes, set tax rates, determine 
user charges, and, in this context, how local governments, or their public enterprises, can 
recover the cost of these services is also examined.
Taxation
Local governments have the discretion to levy various local taxes, grant tax exemptions, 
and set tax rates subject to a maximum rate in compliance with the corresponding tax 
law. Despite the fact that local governments have a signiﬁ cant level of autonomy regard-
ing local tax sources, most of them do not levy all legally allowed taxes. Moreover, 
when they levy a certain tax, they set local rates far below the maximum allowable rate. 
Table 11.3 shows how tax rates are set relative to the maximum rates in the selected 
municipalities.
Table 11.3 Relationship of Maximum and Actual Local Tax Rate in the Selected 
Municipalities, 1991–1998
Taxes by law and in sample cities 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Tax on buildings
 Maximum by law  (Ft/m2) 300 300 300 300 300 900 900 900
 Nagykanizsa (nonresidential %) — — — — 100 33.3 33.3 33.3
 Orosháza (residential %) — 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.8 7.8 7.8
 Orosháza (nonresidential %) — 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 11.1 11.1 11.1
 Szolnok (nonresidential %) — 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 22.2 22.2 22.2
 Tatabánya (residential %) — 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.1 11.1 11.1
 Tatabánya (nonresidential %) — 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 17.8
Urban land tax 
 Maximum rate by law  (Ft/m2) 100 100 100 100 100 200 200 200
 Püspökladány (%) — 10.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 7.5 7.5 7.5
Communal tax
 Maximum rate by law (Ft/object) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 12,000 12,000 12,000
 Szentes (%) — — — — — 16.6 16.6 16.6
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Taxes by law and in sample cities 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Communal tax 
 Maximum rate by law 
 (Ft/employees) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
 Nagykanizsa (%) — 100 100 100 100 100 — —
 Orosháza (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 Tatabánya (%) — 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Tax on tourism 
 Maximum rate by law  
 (Ft/guest night) 100 100 100 100 100 300 300 300
 Szentes (%) — — — — — — — 33.3
Business tax 
 Maximum rate by law 
 (rate on net revenues) (%) 0.3 0.,3 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.4
 Nagykanizsa (%) — 66.6 75.0 100.0 100.0 66.6 83.3 100.0
 Orosházaa (%) — — — — 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.7
 Püspökladánya (%) — — — — 100.0 66.6 66.6 92.9
 Szentes (%) — — 7.0 75.0 75.0 66.6 100.0a 78.6a
 Szolnok (%) — 33.3 100.0a 100.0a 100.0a 66.6 66.6 92.9
 Tatabánya (%) 100.0 100.0 37.5 62.5 100.0a 100.0a 100.0a 100.0a
Business tax 
 Maximum rate by law (Ft/day) 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
 Nagykanizsa (%) — — — — — 20.0 40.0 40.0
 Orosháza (%) — — — — — — — 100.0
 Püspökladány (%) — — — — — 10.0 10.0 100.0a
 Tatabánya (%) 20.0 — 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 60.0
Note:  a. Rate set by diﬀ erent categories or diﬀ erent sectors.
Source: Authors’ questionnaire.
User Charges and Fees
Local governments as local price regulators have suﬃ  cient autonomy to determine or 
control local user charges and fees. When the service providers are owned fully or mainly 
by the municipality, local government is represented on the board of directors; hence, the 
price proposal is controlled and the respective losses are covered by the municipality. In the 
case of services given private concession, management proposes charge adjustments, but the 
local government must agree to the adjustments. Th ough in principle local governments 
may recover the full cost of service provision and major price adjustments have been 
accomplished in the 1990s, local public services are often subsidized.
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Autonomy in setting prices and the principle of cost recovery are of crucial importance 
in enhancing both accountability of local governments and eﬃ  ciency of service providers 
and service allocation. From an economic eﬃ  ciency viewpoint, if the beneﬁ ciaries of a local 
service are not charged adequately for the beneﬁ t they receive (that is, they do not pay the 
marginal cost of services), then one cannot expect an eﬃ  cient allocation of economic 
resources to the provision of the particular service. Local governments have been struggling 
with a serious challenge to respond, in parallel, to the equity principles and subsidize several 
social groups, rather than the entire group of users via below-cost service fees (see chapters 
25 and 26). 
In principle amortization costs should be incorporated into the service price, and 
service provision can be handed over to the private sector under international competitive 
bidding. Regional companies owned by several local governments generally provide potable 
water and sewer services.  Th e companies have the legal authority, through their boards of 
directors, to set optimal charges. Th e service companies cover operation and maintenance 
costs, but not capital ﬁ nancing. In Nagykanizsa, for instance, the charge for garbage 
collection recovers the operation and administration of the service. Th e fee does not include 
depreciation costs. A private ﬁ rm provides this service, but the cost of new investment is 
the responsibility of the local government. Th e city has the autonomy to set the solid waste 
collection fee. In the Orosháza region, for instance, diﬀ erent charges apply for diﬀ erent 
settlements within the region, and fees have three categories: residential, business, and 
charges for local government institutions.
Tax Administration
Th is section examines the staﬃ  ng and workload of the tax departments, the productivity of 
the staﬀ , and the eﬃ  ciency of the diﬀ erent taxes. It also analyses the four diﬀ erent stages of 
the tax administration cycle.
Staﬃ  ng and Workload
Most local governments have a tax administration group that works within the economic or 
ﬁ nancial department. Only the city of Tatabánya has these functions organized at the level 
of a tax department. Th e number of staﬀ  working in tax administration across the six cities 
ranges between 4 and 20 employees (in Püspökladány and Tatabánya, respectively). Th e 
population of the six towns examined ranges between 17,000 and 78,000 inhabitants in 
1997 (corresponding to Püspökladány and Szolnok, respectively). In general, the number 
of employees devoted to tax administration is directly related to the size of the municipality 
and the scope of their tax enforcement function. Regarding the latter, the number of staﬀ  
seems low.
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Tax administration workload is often measured by the magnitude of the ﬂ ow of 
documents—between 2,000 and 28,000 tax documents per year per municipality in our 
sample. In Szentes, for instance, which is one of the smallest towns in our group, one tax 
employee handles on average 333 tax documents per year. Meanwhile, in Tatabánya, one 
of the large towns, an employee handles on average 1,400 tax documents per year. Th ese 
numbers suggest that the tax administration staﬀ  do not seem to be overloaded. Whether 
the tax administration is over- or understaﬀ ed, however, depends not so much on what they 
do as on what they do compared to what they should be doing.
Tax Administration Cost
Each of the six towns provided estimates of the cost of administering local taxes. Th ey 
included wages as well as other direct costs of tax administration and compared the actual 
cost with the actual tax collected to assess the eﬃ  ciency of local taxes.
Th e magnitude of tax administrative cost as a proportion of tax revenues ﬂ uctuated 
between 2.8 percent and 8.7 percent in 1997 (see table 11.4), corresponding to Szolnok 
(largest town) and Püspökladány (smallest town), respectively. So the relative cost of tax 
administration tends to be lower, but the productivity of a tax oﬃ  cial is clearly greater the 
larger the town. Th e cost of tax administration for the average town absorbs about 3 percent 
of tax revenues; hence local taxation seems to be fairly economical. One can see that the 
cost of tax administration has not been growing in tandem with the collected tax revenues, 
so tax eﬃ  ciency has been gradually growing.
Table 11.4 Estimated Costs of Local Tax Administration 
as Share of Tax Revenues in the Selected Municipalities (percent)
Cities 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Nagykanizsa 4.2 4.8 3.9 3.2 3.0
Orosháza 29.1 31.2 7.4 4.6 3.0
Püspökladány 31.7 38.5 13.5 7.4 8.7
Szentes 8.1 5.3 3.6 3.6 3.0
Szolnok 3.7 5.0 3.8 3.2 2.8
Tatabánya 7.4 6.8 7.3 6.0 5.4
Source: Municipalities data.
Tax Administration Cycle 
Th is section covers the four main phases of the tax administration cycle: identiﬁ cation, 
assessment, collection, and enforcement.
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Taxpayer Identifi cation
Taxpayers are obliged by law to report to the local tax administration their liabilities for 
the tax on buildings, idle urban land, communal taxes, tourism, businesses, and vehicles. In 
practice they often misreport or ignore their obligation. Th erefore, a key task of the local 
administration is to identify every tax obligation. Several approaches verify how the cluster 
of registered taxpayers corresponds to the cluster of population that is assumed to have tax 
obligations. Eﬀ ectiveness in tax identiﬁ cation, of course, varies across local taxes depending 
on their characteristics.
Th e local governments have vague information about what proportion of potential 
taxpayers is registered. In Nagykanizsa the registration for taxes on nonresidential buildings 
is above 90 percent. Tax liabilities on residential houses, however, are unknown in all the 
reviewed cities. In Püspökladány the only city that levies a tax on the less than two dozen 
idle urban land plots, every tax obligation has been identiﬁ ed and registered. Only the town 
of Szentes levies a communal tax on individuals, and about 96 percent of taxpayers are 
registered. Orosháza, Tatabánya, and Nagykanizsa levy a communal tax on entrepreneurs. 
In Nagykanizsa about 94 percent of potential taxpayers are identiﬁ ed, but the proportion of 
identiﬁ cation is unknown in the other two municipalities. Usually, the tax administration 
knows only the number of active taxpayers. Towns seldom know who should be registered. 
Th e tax on tourism is levied only by Szentes. Th is tax base is fairly small, and apparently 
all potential taxpayers have been identiﬁ ed. All the towns levy a business tax, and the 
registration rate is estimated to be between 80 and 90 percent. As for the vehicle tax, 
only two cities have estimates of the potential number of vehicles, and four of the six 
know how many are registered. Th e identiﬁ cation ratio ranges between 85 percent and 95 
percent. Table 11.5 summarizes the current situation regarding tax identiﬁ cation in selected 
municipalities.
Table 11.5 Identifi cation of Taxpayers in Selected Municipalities
Cities Business tax Communal tax Urban land tax Buildings tax Tourism tax
Nagykanizsa 2,880a
2,718b
94%c
3,060
2,220
73%
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
3,040
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Püspökladány 1,150
950
83%
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
22
21
95%
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Szentes n.a.
1200
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
20
6
30%
Tatabánya n.a.
3,323
n.a.
n.a.
3,297
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
10,795
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Notes: a.  Th e ﬁ rst line ﬁ gure refers to potential (estimated) number of taxpayers. 
  b. Th e second indicates the number of active taxpayers. 
  c.  Proportion (percent) of active to potential taxpayers.
Source: Authors’ questionnaire applied in the selected municipalities.
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One can conclude that for relatively small and easily identiﬁ able tax bases (for example, 
urban idle land and large entrepreneurs), tax identiﬁ cation and registration are eﬀ ective. For 
those tax bases that are much larger (for example, residential property), the identiﬁ cation 
of the tax base is fairly incomplete, or simply unknown. Hence, an important task for most 
local governments is the identiﬁ cation of their potential taxpayers. (See box 11.1.)
Box 11.1 The National Tax Administration Has Signifi cantly Improved, and Benefi ts 
Are Expected to Spill over to the Local Level
In the early 1990s the rapid increase in the number of taxpayers and the introduction of a value added tax 
scheme overwhelmed the capacity of the central tax administration, particularly in Budapest. Th e agency 
suddenly faced a situation of being understaﬀ ed, and it had neither the expertise nor computer capacity to 
respond to modernization. 
A tax administration modernization project, with the support of the World Bank has helped the 
central tax administration to overcome severe diﬃ  culties. Th e measures included, among other things, full 
computerization and rationalization of the tax declaration thresholds to reduce the number of tax returns 
and to make data processing and higher revenue collection cost-eﬃ  cient. As a result the annual number of 
value added tax returns was reduced from 4.6 million to 1.3 million by shifting from monthly to quarterly 
returns in 1996. In addition, the tax rates were substantially reduced, improving tax morale and widening 
the tax base. Th e tightened tax administration reduced tax evasion signiﬁ cantly.
By the end of 1990s the central tax administration became the most modern tax administration in 
Eastern Europe and a model for the transition economies. An indication of its robustness and maturity is 
that the central tax administration was able to take over—virtually overnight—the collection of the social 
security contribution in 1999. Th e overall improvement in the national tax administration has had and is 
expected to have a positive eﬀ ect on the local tax administration disciplines and capacity (World Bank 
2000). 
Tax Assessment
Tax administrators are supposed to determine the tax payment liabilities for every taxpayer 
on every local tax. In practice this step usually requires veriﬁ cation of the self-assessment 
submitted by a taxpayer for the particular tax. Th e ﬁ gures in table 11.5 refer to the number 
of taxpayers or, equivalently, to the number of tax documents. Based on population of the 
sample municipalities, it seems that the workload of local tax oﬃ  cials should be much 
greater than it would seem on the basis of the mentioned number of tax documents per 
staﬀ . Th is discrepancy may be due to the outdated management information system of 
these municipalities.
Th e taxes on buildings and plots require veriﬁ cation of the useful ﬂ oor-space of the real 
estate rather than the current market value. Th is veriﬁ cation has to be done at least once 
onsite. Communal tax has practically no assessment, because it is the same ﬁ xed amount per 
dwelling. Most taxes are subject to tax exemptions granted for various reasons. Exemptions 
also require veriﬁ cation, at least once. In other cases, such as the tax on tourism, the tax 
assessment requires some kind of veriﬁ cation of the accuracy of the taxpayer’s report. Th e 
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business tax also needs some form of review to determine whether the amount reported is 
consistent with the tax rate and the value of the tax base. Most local tax administrations’ 
staﬀ s are insuﬃ  cient for adequate tax identiﬁ cation. As such, the work of local tax oﬃ  cials 
is often limited to management rather than veriﬁ cation of the information. In this sense tax 
assessments in municipalities are primarily the taxpayers’ self-assessments.
Tax Collection
Th e business tax is the most common local tax. Businesses generally pay their taxes through 
bank transfers. When entrepreneurs receive a business license, they have to register with 
the local government. Th e registration list is the basis for identifying business taxpayers. Th e 
local government mails a letter to those who must pay the business tax or other tax, and the 
letter includes either the amount of the tax to be paid or the tax rate and the corresponding 
tax base so that the taxpayer can ﬁ le a tax return. Tax liabilities (or the corresponding pay 
order) may be paid in cash or through bank transfer. Taxes are collected by taxpayers duly 
meeting their obligations; hence tax arrears are quite common (see table 11.6).
Table 11.6 Arrears for Selected Municipalities
Cities Local tax revenues
(Ft thousand)
Total tax arrears
(Ft thousand)
Arrears to revenues
(percent)
Nagykanizsa 563,498 42,328 7.5
Orosháza 516,932 11,334 2.2
Püspökladány 37,630 5,411 14.4
Szentes 292,497 38,540 13.2
Szolnok 916,987 60,520 6.6
Tatabánya 392,384 35,098 8.9
Source: Authors’ questionnaire and County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce data.
Tax arrears vary across municipalities and may be as high as 14 percent or as low as 2 
percent of current local tax revenues (see table 11.6). Note, however, that arrears refer only 
to taxpayers who have made partial payments of their tax obligations. Municipalities do not 
account for the arrears of those who are not registered or those who registered but have not 
made any payments and have pending tax obligations. Th erefore, the potential magnitude 
of the outstanding tax payment obligations is much greater than the estimated arrears.
Tax Enforcement and Penalties
Non-ﬁ lers and stop-ﬁ lers of tax returns are identiﬁ ed by comparing the list of those 
who have paid with the list of those registered at the local government. Of course, this 
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comparison is possible only when the list of taxpayers is properly updated and readily 
available. A second way to identify noncompliance is to compare those who have paid with 
the list of the registration court or, for the communal tax, with the land registry. Th e local 
tax administration notiﬁ es those whose tax returns are missing.
Th e ﬁ rst sanction on nonpayment is a delay ﬁ ne. In principle failure to pay after a 
certain period may result in immediate collection of total tax due, and if this step does not 
work, the government initiates a process to withdraw the business license. For the vehicle 
tax the sanction is removal of the circulation license. For communal and building taxes the 
possible sanctions are withholding of beneﬁ ts, wages, pensions, or conﬁ scation of mobile 
assets (vehicles). In the case of a large amount of public debt, the taxpayer’s property can 
be mortgaged or a foreclosure request can be ﬁ led. In practice use of these sanctions is very 
rare.
Constraints of Tax Administration
Th e major constraints are the shortage of staﬀ  and computer capacity, which reduces 
operational eﬀ ectiveness. Another constraint is that the municipalities do not have an 
enforcement oﬃ  cer. To this extent, tax payments are practically voluntary. Furthermore, 
the city administration oﬃ  ce seems to lack commitment to strengthen the local tax 
administration. In addition, municipalities do not support one another nor do they form 
agreements to learn from one another’s experiences. Each local tax administration has had 
to develop its own collection and checking techniques. Finally, the political will of the local 
politicians and other decision-makers does not seem to be strong enough to levy more local 
taxes.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Revenue Structure 
Several policy implications emerge from the analysis of the revenue structure of the selected 
municipalities. First, the current ﬁ nancial situation suggests that local governments need to 
look for alternatives to capital ﬁ nancing other than sales of municipal assets. Two obvious 
sources would be ﬁ nancial institutions or private investors (bond issuance). Either of these 
two borrowing options, however, requires a solid ﬁ nancial position to be creditworthy. One 
strategy for local governments is to strengthen their recurrent revenue sources. Th is option, 
however, requires modernizing and making much greater use of local taxes.
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Tax Structure and Performance 
Th e need for modernization of local taxes and a change in tax structure is evident. First, 
the property tax should be levied on the basis of market value rather than physical size 
(ﬂ oor-space). Only two municipalities in Hungary, Nyíregyháza and Németkér, currently 
use market values. Present legislation enables local governments to levy value-based 
property tax, so introducing it is a matter of local political priorities. Second, the property 
tax base must be expanded by including residential properties and reducing tax exemptions, 
particularly tax-free living space and maybe the ﬁ rst-owner exemption. Th ird, the vehicle 
tax should be levied on the basis of market value rather than on the weight of the vehicles.
Local governments should charge the marginal cost of service provision. Th is step 
would help provide the eﬃ  cient amount of services to those willing to pay, make providing 
the services ﬁ nancially sustainable, and increase the level of political accountability and 
responsiveness of the local authorities toward citizens. Th e charge should include the cost 
of capital and depreciation. Compensation to social groups that cannot bear the cost-
recovery service fees should be subsidized separately (see chapter 25).
Tax Administration
First, not all local governments levy all authorized taxes. Second, compliance with the taxes 
levied is left very much to the intention of the taxpayers to meet their obligations. Legally, 
sanctions and penalties penalize noncompliance, but tax enforcement is weak or nonexistent. 
Th ird, those who levy some of the taxes generally do not have enough information to levy 
them accurately. Local governments lack estimates regarding the potential number of 
taxpayers and updated records of tax registers. Fourth, without key data and adequate 
reporting, measuring a tax administration’s performance is simply impossible.
Local governments must make greater and better use of local taxes. More revenues may 
be mobilized through more eﬀ ective taxpayer identiﬁ cation, tax assessment and veriﬁ cation, 
tax collection, and enforcement. Local tax administrations need increases in staﬀ  and 
computer equipment. More complete and better databases for tax administration purposes 
are needed. New management information systems must be developed and implemented.
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Hungary’s municipal tax system and tax practice have changed radically in the 1990s. To 
achieve greater political popularity in the early 1990s, most municipalities terminated 
the previous taxes on residential properties and imposed the majority of local taxes on 
nonresidents. Th e business tax, a very conjuncture-dependent tax levied on a mobile tax 
base, is used by 90 percent of municipalities (see chapter 10). Th e need for more local 
revenue, however, has gradually driven many local governments to reinstate the building 
tax, plot tax, or communal tax, pushing property taxation into the spotlight again at the end 
of 1990s.
Despite the unfairness of the system, many municipalities continue to levy size-based 
building taxes on business properties and communal taxes on residential properties. 
Academic studies have suggested that the correlation between property size and the 
taxpayer’s ability to pay (ability-to-pay principles) and between property size and the 
beneﬁ t from the local public services (beneﬁ t-taxation principle) are very weak. Most 
analysts agree, however, that local public services, education in particular, have a positive 
impact on property value.
Th is chapter highlights the rationale of value-based property taxation and seeks 
to establish a form that would be well suited to Hungarian circumstances. Th e chapter 
also identiﬁ es the policies necessary to enable municipalities to implement and properly 
administer this form of taxation.
* Th is chapter is based on Szalai and Tassonyi 1999.
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Rationale for Property Taxation 
in the Context of European Union Accession
Property taxation has several well-known problems: it is unpopular because it is a visible 
tax burden; it is regressive; and its assessment can be complex. In many cases, property 
tax is the only tax that citizens directly confront because they must pay it as a lump sum 
periodically; other taxes are deducted from income or are hidden in the price of goods. 
Despite its problems, property taxation would seem to be the most appropriate local tax 
form. Th e most important positive feature of the property tax is its stability. Th e tax acts as 
a rough form of beneﬁ t charge as well: the value of real estate is strongly inﬂ uenced by the 
level of local services (that is capitalization eﬀ ect; see Inman 1999; Oates 1969), as well as 
location factors. Construction values and physical characteristics often are less signiﬁ cant 
as explanatory variables. Property taxation is often portrayed as a tool to inﬂ uence the real 
estate market to encourage eﬃ  cient land use (Bahl 1998; Barati and Szalai 1999; Boadway 
and Kitchen 1999). 
An additional argument for implementing property taxation is that European Union 
accession requires signiﬁ cant changes in the Hungarian tax system, making the problems 
with the value added tax (VAT) system more apparent. Th e high rate will have to be 
reduced, the ﬁ scal system must be prepared for the loss of signiﬁ cant VAT revenues, and 
alternatives must be found. Th e untapped property tax is an important alternative to VAT.
A reduction in VAT and an increase in property taxation require signiﬁ cant reforms 
in intergovernmental ﬁ nance. VAT revenues will be withdrawn from the central budget, 
but property taxation will increase subnational revenues. Revenue sources will have to 
be reallocated. Because of the political desire not to increase the overall tax burden per 
household, the introduction of property taxation will require reduction of some other 
household taxes. One option is to reduce the local share of the national personal income tax 
(PIT) to make room for additional property taxation. Th e potential beneﬁ ts are as follows:
 It would make implementing and strengthening the value-based tax possible before 
the VAT reduction.
 More stable revenue would be guaranteed for the municipalities.
 A shift to property taxation would broaden the range of taxpayers, so the average tax 
on all local taxpayers will diminish.
 
Moreover, the administration of the property tax carries many predictable and many 
unforeseeable risks. PIT was implemented more than 10 years ago, so by now the problems 
of income tax are known and more or less solved. Th e proposed shift to this form of taxation 
could temporarily lower administrative eﬃ  ciency and tax revenues.
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Major Forms of Property Taxation
Th ree main forms of value-based property tax are in use worldwide: (a) the bundled ﬂ at 
rate, (b) the land value (or graded rate), and (c) the unique English banded lump-sum tax 
(council tax). To analyze the type that would be most appropriate in Hungary, we ﬁ rst 
discuss two possible impacts of a property tax system.
First, the value-based property tax is not absolutely neutral. In terms of making a 
choice among diﬀ erent types of investment, a property tax may discourage the development 
of real properties because the net return may be decreased. All else being equal, other forms 
of investment (for example, bank accounts and the stock market) will be more popular, and 
property development may therefore be reduced.
Second, the property tax is a dynamic source of revenue: as the prices on the real estate 
market increase, the tax base broadens. Many experts list this buoyancy among the positive 
eﬀ ects of the tax. (Politicians will be happy to see the increasing revenue without having 
to make the unpopular decision of increasing rates.) We must stress, however, the threat 
of this dynamism. If property values increase more quickly than incomes, the proportion 
of property tax in the household expenditure will increase, generating resistance to the tax. 
Values in the real estate market are likely to appreciate for two reasons: investors are likely 
to diversify their portfolios after the ﬁ rst collapse in the stock exchange, and European 
Union membership requires opening the real estate market to foreign capital. With these 
considerations in mind, we can compare the diﬀ erent forms of property taxation.
Bundled Flat or Variable Rate Tax System
Th is form of property taxation is the most prevalent worldwide. Land and improvements 
are assessed together (bundled) for a given piece of real estate, based on some method of 
estimating market value (see “Assessment Method” below), and their total value is taxed 
using the same rate. Rates and assessment methodology may vary by type of property. 
Th is form of the tax has some advantages and disadvantages. From the perspective of 
assessment, obtaining the total value of a property, including both land and buildings, is 
simpler and this total value is easier for taxpayers to understand. Municipal tax calculations 
are also simpliﬁ ed.
Tax revolts against this form, however, have occurred in many states in the United 
States. North American literature (O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheﬀ rin 1995) explains these 
tax revolts as a consequence of the rate-driven characteristic of the ﬂ at rate system. In a 
period of economic boom, income increased and real estate prices rose with the higher rate, 
but municipalities did not lower their tax rates. Th e taxpayers objected to paying a higher 
share of their income to the government. In California, where the tax revolt (Proposition 
13, 1978) caused the most dramatic changes, another problem arose. In 1971 and 1976, 
the California Supreme Court held that the use of the local property tax to ﬁ nance local 
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schools was unconstitutional if educational opportunity was dependent on the local taxable 
property values. Because many taxpayers see education as the most important public service, 
they see the (reduced) property tax to be cost without relevant output and consequently are 
willing to limit taxes even at the expense of local accountability (Fischel 1998). 
Th e state legislatures have been forced to limit the automatic increase in the tax burden 
caused by market conditions. Th ey have used a variety of methods, including limits in the 
increase of assessed value (for example, the current year value may not be higher then the 
105 percent of the previous year). Practically, this type of limitation severs the relationship 
between the assessed value of the properties compared to the true market value with the 
consequence that properties with higher-than-the-limit increases in value bear a lesser 
share of the cost of local services than if the assessment base fully reﬂ ected the appreciation 
in values.
Land Value Tax
Th e principal diﬀ erence between the property tax system just discussed and a land value tax 
system is that land is taxed, but the improvement on a parcel is either absolutely exempt 
from tax or is taxed at a reduced rate. 
Th e eﬃ  ciency of a particular form of taxation depends on the elasticity of supply of 
taxed goods. Th e property tax base may be divided into two parts. Th e supply of land is 
ﬁ xed, but the quantity and value of improvement depends on the decision of investors. 
Consequently many countries (Australia, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, and South 
Africa) use the land value tax. In Australia and South Africa some jurisdictions use the 
land tax, but others levy the bundled tax. In North America the well-known example is 
Pittsburgh, where a graded rate system works with tax rates on land set two times higher 
than the rates on improvements. Many other cities and states or provinces (for example, 
Washington, DC; Quebec; and Winnipeg) are studying the possibility of implementing 
the graded rate system. Its other advantage may be a greater equity eﬀ ect. For example, the 
owners of condominiums in a real estate development must pay only their fraction of the 
value of the land parcel (one-hundredth in case of a building with one hundred ﬂ ats), while 
the individual house owner must pay the whole tax.
In Hungary, as in many transition countries that have no long tradition of value-based 
taxation, taxation of land only has an administrative advantage. Th e required information 
about the land is complete in the land oﬃ  ce, but data about the physical parameters of the 
improvements, although available from the municipal building authorities, are imperfect. 
Moreover, the duty oﬃ  ces assess the values of lands and buildings separately.
By contrast, when land taxation was implemented, many issues arose concerning the 
appropriate deﬁ nition of “unimproved land,” for example, whether to include or exclude the 
impact of providing networks of public services such as water, sewer, gas, and electricity in 
the values of the tax base. In the context of a pure land tax, another problem arises from the 
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lower value of the aggregate tax base; namely, the lower the aggregate tax base, the higher 
the tax rate that is needed to raise the same revenue. Higher rates may impede eﬃ  cient land 
use. Eﬃ  ciency requires that the decision-maker be rewarded by a competitive proﬁ t or rate 
of return, but a high tax rate could reduce this gain signiﬁ cantly. Consequently, the use of 
a pure land tax is very rare, so the tax rate on land is limited and the necessary additional 
revenue must be obtained from a tax imposed on improvements. Current legislation would 
need signiﬁ cant amendment to implement land value (graded rate) taxation. Th e Law on 
Local Taxation explicitly exempts the land under the house from the urban land tax instead 
of allowing a higher rate on land.
Banded System (English Council Tax)
In the United Kingdom properties are classiﬁ ed into bands according to their capital (market) 
values. Th e assessment roll contains only the band value, not the actual assessed value for 
each property. Th e municipalities levy the same lump-sum tax on each property in the band 
regardless of its speciﬁ c market value. Th is method seems to have three main advantages. 
First, the threat of rate-driven taxation and its consequences—an increasing tax share 
of household income—is avoided. Greater tax revenue in this system requires setting a 
higher lump-sum tax. By contrast, municipalities could create automatic buoyancy as well. 
Th e tax decree could state that the year-to-year increasing rate is linked to inﬂ ation, to the 
level of increasing nominal average household income, to the average increase of real estate 
prices, or to a combination of the three factors. Th ese indices seem to be far removed from 
the real estate market, but many property tax systems use similar indices to modify assessed 
values between two general assessments (for example, the consumer price index or the 
interest rate on government bonds), although the correlation of these indicators may not be 
signiﬁ cant with the increase in real estate values.
Second, taxpayers elsewhere seem to accept the band more easily than the current 
actual value. Th is system may reduce the number of appeals.
Th ird, the administrative cost of this method is likely to be lower than with a ﬂ at rate 
taxation system because some of the requirements of current assessment may be avoided. 
Reassessment may be required less frequently and may become important only when 
relative values among properties change signiﬁ cantly. In the current value-based system, 
reassessments must take place even if relative values have not changed, but the general value 
has increased. Where reassessments are avoided over longer periods, taxpayers may suﬀ er 
from sticker shock when they are confronted with new assessments, particularly if rates are 
not ﬂ exible downward.
Th is form of property taxation also has its disadvantages. Th e lump-sum eﬀ ect may 
result in large gains or losses when the property value is close to the border of any band. 
Th e English system cures this problem with small gaps between the tax amounts, but this 
factor results in a regressive scale of banded rates.
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Th is method appears to be consistent with the current practice in Hungarian local 
taxation. Most municipalities levy a lump-sum communal tax on real estate, generally for 
reasons of administrative simplicity and cost reduction. Th is tax, however, yields very small 
amounts of revenue because of the very low rate, which is limited to Ft 12,000 (about 
US$ 40) per year. Th e only necessary change in the local tax legislation would be to increase 
this limit.
In the remainder of this chapter, we assume that Hungary implements a property 
taxation system using the banded method, but other issues that may arise if another 
method is selected are also addressed.
Main Issues of Property Taxation—National Legislation
Property tax policy has three main components: (a) the deﬁ nition of tax liability (who pays, 
on what basis, and at what rates); (b) the assessment method; and (c) mitigation issues. 
Th is chapter also summarizes the tasks of central legislation and municipalities in the 
policymaking and administrative process.
Tax Liability
Current legislation deﬁ nes the owners of each parcel of local real estate as the taxpayer 
in the case of building, parcel, and tourism tax. In the case of the communal tax, the 
taxpayer is the private owner of the residential property or the tenant of a dwelling not 
owned by a private person (for example, municipal ﬂ ats). Another option is also possible: 
the ﬁ rst liability would be on the occupier (tenant) in the absence of owner-occupancy, 
as in England, but because tenants outnumber owners, administrative costs would likely 
increase. We should also acknowledge that taxation based on the current taxpayer deﬁ nition 
is functioning without any signiﬁ cant problems.
Th e choice of the base for value-based property taxation will also have to address 
the issue of whether to assess and tax nonresidential properties. One argument for such 
taxation is that similar assessment and tax treatment may encourage the most eﬃ  cient land 
use since change in the use of property is not encouraged by higher or lower rates. Owners 
of nonresidential properties consume local public goods as well, so some analysts argue 
that they should bear some of the costs. For example, in Ontario, a rough estimate has 
suggested that the nonresidential sector beneﬁ ts directly from approximately 40 percent 
of the local public services provided (Bird 1999). Th e counterarguments are based on the 
theories of tax exporting and tax competition. Th e owners of nonresidential properties do 
not vote in local elections, so they suﬀ er “taxation without representation,” which reduces 
local accountability. Concerns about accountability were cited as a principal reason for the 
British government’s centralization of the rate setting. 
C H A P T E R  1 2    VA L U E - B A S E D  P R O P E RT Y  TA X AT I O N  I
247
Many analysts believe that tax on nonresidential properties may be exported beyond 
the boundaries of the municipalities through the pricing of exported goods. It is worth 
remembering that tax exporting is also likely with any locally levied tax, including the 
business turnover tax and other taxes on any local business. Generally, the nonresidential 
tax base is also likely to be more sensitive than the residential base to tax competition. Firms 
will generally seek out low-tax jurisdictions; other considerations being equal (labor force, 
transportation, other social infrastructure, and so forth). Tax competition is the principal 
reason why many legislatures consider the harmonization of nonresidential taxation across 
municipalities or the centralization of nonresidential taxation. Th is harmonization does not 
mean that the municipalities lose this revenue. With centrally managed rate setting and 
collection, the municipalities may receive back this tax on a derivation or on an equalization 
basis. Because of the lack of tax competition (rates that are too low), the overall revenue 
may be higher in this centralized case.
In Hungary local businesses pay a signiﬁ cant local business turnover tax, and the 
imposition of a local nonresidential property tax should be considered only as a replacement 
for this tax rather than as an additional tax. Th e replacement of the current, very unstable 
tax base with the value-based tax would be rational from the perspective of local ﬁ nance. 
Furthermore, it would be useful to maintain the distinction in the form of property tax 
paid by the residential versus the nonresidential property owner. Th is distinction would be 
consistent with the current local taxation method—in many municipalities, the communal 
tax is paid on residential properties, and the owners of nonresidential properties pay the 
building tax.
As discussed above, the other main issue concerning the deﬁ nition of the tax base is 
whether land and improvements should be treated equally, either from an assessment or 
from a rating perspective. If the government chooses to implement a property tax with a 
higher burden on the land, two main options are available: (a) the base can include the 
land and improvements, assessed using similar methodologies and principles, and the rates 
diﬀ er between them, or (b) the base can be deﬁ ned diﬀ erently. In the latter case, the central 
government should deﬁ ne the assessment ratios diﬀ erently for land and improvements. 
Th e assessment ratio is the portion of the value on the assessment roll (subject to taxation) 
relative to the market value. In a banding system, the only possible solution is the 
second—the assessment ratio for the improvements may be 50 percent (100 percent for the 
land), so the tax base will be less sensitive to the value of improvements, as in the case of 
the graded rate system. (Zero percent for a building means a pure land tax.) In the ﬂ at rate 
system, actual tax rate alteration would be the better solution, because the introduction of 
an assessment ratio would be an unnecessary complication.
In banding, the central government would likely want to deﬁ ne the boundaries of 
the bands, as was done in England. Th is step may not be essential, however, because 
municipalities would be able to shape the bands according to the local real estate conditions. 
Th ere may be room for central parameters and local ﬂ exibility here.
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A signiﬁ cant feature of the Hungarian local tax system that will have to be confronted 
is the lack of a mandatory tax (for example, municipalities are not required to implement 
local taxes). Th e implementation of a mandatory tax requires deﬁ ning a minimum amount 
(rate) for the tax. In the ﬂ at rate system, if the central government is concerned about the 
likelihood of assessment base value increases, it could consider measures to mitigate rate-
driven taxation. As experience in U.S. jurisdictions has shown, local tax increases (caused by 
constant rates and assessment base growth during inﬂ ationary periods) can create a strong 
opposition to the property tax. Such opposition could be problematic in Hungary because 
of the interrelation between the proposed property tax and other taxes consonant with 
European Union accession. Several possible options are available, including rate capping 
and limits on assessment increases. A capped rate with increasing assessed value will result 
in signiﬁ cant increases in revenues. But if limits are applied only on assessment increases, 
the tax treatment of similar properties can be distorted. Relying on some form of revenue 
or rate limits may be necessary. In 1991, 30 American states limited the local property tax 
revenue, and in 1992, 10 limited annual assessment increases. Arizona, Nevada, and New 
Jersey limit both the property tax revenue and the overall revenue (ACIR 1992; O’Sullivan, 
Sexton, and Sheﬀ rin 1995).
Assessment Method
Assessment or the valuation of property is the most vulnerable and often the most 
controversial aspect of a property tax system. Th e choice of assessment method is a critical 
issue in the implementation of value-based property taxation. International experience 
indicates that real estate assessment takes three main forms. Valuation can be based on: 
(a) market value—the probable best price of the real estate arrived at in an open market 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller; (b) annual rental value—the rent paid by 
the actual user (in case of owner-occupied property, the probable rent); or (c) acquisition 
value—the price at the time of purchase or construction. Having deﬁ ned a methodology, 
the key issue is not necessarily to deﬁ ne the value of a property absolutely accurately but to 
achieve equity among similar types of property and among diﬀ erent classes of property.
Market Value (Capital Value)
Th is method of valuation is generally seen as the fairest because all property is assessed 
at the same time, and the valuation is done with the assumption of highest and best use. 
Assessors presume that the highest price comes from the bidder who will use the property 
in the most eﬃ  cient way—the market (highest) price presupposes the best use.
Experience in many countries stresses that a simple legal declaration that market value 
could be applied (as in the current Hungarian legislation) is not enough. In implementing 
a market or capital value system, deﬁ ning the valuation date of the assessment base is 
essential—the assessed value of properties has to be estimated with the market prices 
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prevailing at that time. In the absence of a declaration of this date, valuations may be 
inconsistent and out-of-date. In Ontario, before the assessment reform of 1998, some 
bases were on 1940 values and some were on 1992 values, based on historical choices by 
municipalities. Consequently, the assessment of similar properties even within a large single 
jurisdiction was often inequitable. As a matter of preference, reasonably frequent updates 
may avoid large shifts in assessed value and large tax impacts. Deﬁ ning a status date is also 
important because the probable transaction has to be estimated using the condition of 
the real estate at this time. Th ese two dates need not be the same as the current status of a 
property, and this can be reﬂ ected on an assessment roll, even if the assessed value reﬂ ects 
historical prices for the characteristics of the property.
Annual Rental Value
Th e basis of this system is deﬁ ned as the notional or expected rental value of the property 
based on the estimated or actual amount of the annual rent. Th e countries that use this 
method tend to adopt rentals based on current use rather than highest and best use, 
which may somewhat reduce the total value of the assessment base (McCluskey 1999). 
Employing this method may also reduce the cost of assessment because the value of the 
rented property is known from contracts. Th e owners of rented properties may accept this 
method more readily because the actual rent is similar to the taxation of income. Th e one 
problem with this method is the exclusion of properties for which rents are subsidized or 
are not determined on an arm’s length basis, which might lower the level of fairness more 
than the capital value method would. Annual rental value is used only in countries where 
tenancy is widespread (such as England, France, and many of the former colonies of the 
British Empire).
Acquisition Value
Th is method is used only in California, where it was introduced as a consequence of the tax 
revolts. From a valuation perspective, this method is simple because general reassessments 
are not needed. Th e validity of the purchase price is the main item to be conﬁ rmed. Th is 
method is quite unfair—in a period of 5 percent annual inﬂ ation, the diﬀ erence in the 
value of two identical houses would be more than 100 percent if one of these properties 
was purchased 10 years before the other. Acquisition value provides protection to senior 
citizens and low-income households because they have tended to be immobile. By contrast, 
this system has provided a rather hostile welcome for new homeowners who must pay tax 
on the current value of the house.
Current Hungarian law deﬁ nes assessment as a local task. Th is assignment of 
responsibility seems to be one of the main impediments to the implementation of value-
based property taxation system. In other countries the system may be either central or 
regional. In the ﬁ rst case an agency of the central (state or provincial in North America) 
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government is responsible for assessing each property and transmitting the assessment roll 
to the municipal tax authorities. Th is type of arrangement is in place in Ontario, British 
Columbia, and many European countries (France, Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom). Th e regional solution is common in the United States and in some Canadian 
provinces. Agencies at a county level are the most prevalent assessment authorities (in the 
United States, towns and cities assess in only 14 states.). Even in states (provinces) with 
local assessors, some very important tasks remain with the state governments. 
 Th e parameters and methods used to assess properties are usually regulated by the state 
government; training and accreditation are also usually a state responsibility.
 Many American states have had problems with the equalization system for grant 
and cost-sharing calculations. When equalization is based on the tax capacity of 
municipalities, the quality of local assessment may vary and result in misallocated 
grants and bias in cost sharing. If the state has accepted the results of local assessments 
without scrutiny, local governments would be encouraged to under-assess local 
properties, and the gap would be ﬁ lled by state grants. Th e states use so-called ratio 
studies to monitor the quality of local assessments.
 Multi-jurisdictional infrastructure networks are usually assessed at the state level. State 
governments also often have retained the right to terminate a local assessment and 
to order a reassessment by another source in the case of permanent and uncorrected 
equity problems. Based on the experience of North American jurisdictions and the 
tradition of other European countries, it is rational to keep the assessment function 
under the control of the central government. Th is solution is also likely to be a more 
economical one. Economies of scale in property assessment are evident in America. 
Sjoquist and Walker found that a 10 percent increase in the volume of assessments 
reduces the average cost of assessment by approximately 6 percent in Georgia, where 
assessment is conducted by the counties (Sjoquist and Walker 1999). Th is solution is 
also likely to be less vulnerable to local political pressure; in many cases local assessors 
may face political pressure to undervalue the property of politically important owners. 
Th e centralization of this function can also provide direct information for tax-base 
equalization.
Ratio Studies
Ratio studies analyze the accuracy and fairness of assessments. Assessed values are 
compared with the real market value of a large sample of actually sold properties. Th ese 
studies measure three main indices in each municipality (assessment district).
 Assessment ratio—the ratio of the assessed value to the sales price. Th is ratio can be 
measured as total value or at the average (median) level of the assessed and real values. 
Th is measure indicates the accuracy of the assessment.
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 Coeﬃ  cient of dispersion—the average absolute deviation expressed as a percentage of the 
median ratio. Th is average indicates the uniformity of assessment, acting as a measure 
of horizontal equity because if the coeﬃ  cient of dispersion is greater than zero then the 
properties with the same market value bear a diﬀ erent assessed value. (Th e greater the 
coeﬃ  cient of dispersion, the greater the diﬀ erences.) Th e International Association of 
Assessment Oﬃ  cers (IAAO) standards for coeﬃ  cients of dispersion are 15 percent for 
single-family residential properties, 10 percent in newer and fairly homogeneous areas, 
and 20 percent for other properties.
 Price-related diﬀ erential—the mean of the assessment ratios for individual properties 
divided by the aggregate ratio. If the price-related diﬀ erential is higher than 1, regressive 
assessment is revealed, that is, a tendency to assess low-valued properties at a relatively 
higher percentage of market value than higher value properties. Th e IAAO standard for 
price-related diﬀ erentials is a range of 0.98 to 1.03 percent (Bell and Bowman 1997). 
Mitigation Issues
One important issue concerning implementation of property taxation is mitigation. Th e 
central and local governments will need to implement some relief mechanisms for certain 
speciﬁ c social groups or particular uses of property. Where the property tax may partly 
replace some other taxes (PIT, VAT), mitigation is an especially sensitive issue because the 
changes in the overall tax system may cause unintended shifts in tax incidence. To deﬁ ne a 
system of tax relief, three questions will need responses: 
 What principles will deﬁ ne the social groups or property use that should be eligible for 
tax relief?
 How will the mitigation policy be deﬁ ned in legislation?
 How much relief should be given?
 
Th e tax treatment of vacant lands (idle building plots) falls into two distinct categories. 
In a few cases (for example, Ontario and some Latin American countries), vacant lands 
are taxed at lower rates than developed properties on the theory that the absence of an 
occupier reduces the impact on local services. Th e opposite argument is that vacancy is a 
waste. In many cases, land is being held vacant as a form of speculation, so the imposition 
of a property tax should encourage development. Th is incentive mechanism imposes a 
penalty if the lands are not used in the best way. Hungarian legislation provides the option 
of imposing a separate urban land tax and belongs to the second category. Th is higher tax 
may be rational, but this method has a positive eﬀ ect only where developed lands could 
meet unsatisﬁ ed needs.
Generally, properties owned by the government are exempt from taxation. In general, 
a subordinate level of government does not have the power to levy a tax on the property 
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of the upper level, and a tax on governmental properties would only be a transfer from 
government to government. By contract, several reasons are clear for payments or grants-
in-lieu of taxes by the higher levels of government. Th ey are appropriate if the property 
tax is viewed as a means of apportioning the costs of local services among properties. 
Second, considering land use eﬃ  ciency, these properties also should be taxed. In North 
America, many higher level governments make payments for otherwise exempt properties. 
Th e range of lands subject to this in-lieu payment includes not only government-owned 
properties, but also other properties, where the activity is quasi-governmental, substantially 
government funded or is deemed to be worthy of encouragement (for example, churches, 
nonproﬁ t organizations, educational institutions, or public hospitals).
In Hungary, if the introduction of a property taxation system is accompanied by a 
parallel reduction in personal income taxation, the taxpaying base will be broadened and a 
reduction in the tax burden on the former PIT-payers will be possible. Th e broadening of 
the base will likely include not only those who formerly managed to hide their income, but 
also those who do not pay income tax (or pay very little). Political acceptability will require 
protection for such taxpayers from signiﬁ cant increases in their overall tax burdens. Two 
methods are generally used to deﬁ ne eligibility for tax exemptions: (a) an exemption based 
on income level—households with income under a deﬁ ned threshold should pay no taxes 
or pay a reduced amount—and (b) an exemption based on deﬁ ned target groups—some 
taxpayers become eligible for preferential treatment regardless of their income.
In the 1990s Hungarian social policy proved that income-tested programs were not 
successful, primarily because of a high level of income from the black and gray economy. 
When the share of the gray economy decreases, Hungary could use circuit-breaker programs 
in which the maximum amount of property tax is deﬁ ned as a percentage of household 
income—a portion of the tax in excess of this threshold may be deducted from the central 
PIT payment. Th e alternative criteria for preferential tax treatment would be based on some 
demographic or other observable characteristics, such as seniors over a deﬁ ned age (not 
necessarily the retirement age), disabled people, families that have more than two children, 
and families that have at least one unemployed parent. Maintaining the current methods 
to solve their problems would appear to be rational. Actually, the municipalities can lower 
the tax or pay more social assistance for the poor based not on an income test, but on 
ﬁ eld investigation. Th e government could also consider providing a tax credit for property 
taxes paid or setting a portion of these taxes against income tax liability for certain eligible 
groups, thus further integrating the two systems.
Although setting an income-based limit may not be advisable, setting a property value 
limit would be rational. For properties that have very low value, the amount of tax forgone 
is likely to be minimal, but the cost of billing will approximate the average per property and 
the cost of collection and enforcement will likely be above the average.
In many states or provinces in North America, owner-occupied principal residences 
receive a partial exemption from taxation. Although the economic (distribution) eﬀ ects 
of these practices may be questionable, politically enacting some variant of this type of 
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mitigation in Hungary would seem to be essential. To the extent that relief is targeted 
to owner-occupiers, such policies may discriminate against low-income households, who 
are usually tenants rather than owners. Th e issue of tax incidence between landlords and 
tenants has been debated, and the general consensus seems to be that the owner can pass 
through a portion of the tax to the tenant who then pays a higher rent.
Mitigation has two basic forms: (a) tax base or assessment reduction, and (b) 
exemption from payment. In the North American property tax system, the state or province 
governments deﬁ ne eligible groups. Municipalities receive assessment rolls for which the 
tax base has already been reduced, and the same tax rate is used for all reduced or non-
reduced property value. Tax base reductions can cause very complex problems in the case of 
changes in ownership, which may aﬀ ect eligibility for a tax preference. In North America, 
most states and provinces require annual assessment, and this frequency is able to handle 
these changes. Th e English tax payment reduction is accomplished by a less complicated 
method. Each property is classiﬁ ed according to full, non-reduced value and the exemption 
is linked to the taxpayer—the amount of tax is reduced in case of eligibility for relief. 
Tax abatements are a special form of tax exemption when the municipality does not 
levy and collect tax on the higher value of property after the completion of an improvement. 
Th e old Hungarian house-tax exemption was a form of abatement, but with a very long 
period. Th e house tax was terminated in 1991. Previously, the local council could give 
30-year exemptions for new houses. Th is practice reduced the tax base for a long time. 
Although this type of exemption constrains the disincentive eﬀ ect on investment, it makes 
the system unfair because the abatements have the eﬀ ect of exempting from the property 
tax the part of hidden income invested in real estate, and the owner does not contribute to 
the ﬁ nancing of the new infrastructure required by his or her new investment.
Tax deferral is a form of assistance frequently employed in North America. Th e eligible 
taxpayer may delay a portion of the tax payment and the deferred tax accrues on the 
property as a lien that increases year to year by normal or market interest. Tax and interest 
must be paid at the time of transfer of the property. Although this form of mitigation can 
be deﬁ ned either by target group or amount, it can cause revenue uncertainty at the local 
level. Th e number of taxpayers that may apply for deferral is not predictable, especially in 
the ﬁ rst year of a program. In general, the take-up rate in North American jurisdictions 
is low. Eligibility can be restricted to a narrowly deﬁ ned group, such as seniors and the 
disabled. Th e limitation of the value of the deferral is worth considering, for example, 
setting the upper limit of this lien as a portion of the property value. If the citizen reaches 
this limit, he or she should start to pay the lien.
If the central government declares the value-based property tax to be mandatory 
and other taxes are reduced to create tax room or an ability to pay for this tax, then some 
national tax relief policy must be enacted as well. Such a central policy will be essential for 
Parliament to accept the new tax structure. Th e failure of previous value-based property 
tax proposals submitted to Parliament in Hungary can be explained partly by the fact that 
neither the issue of a national mitigation system nor the issue of reducing other taxes was 
addressed.
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Local Tax Administration
One of the main impediments to the implementation of a local property tax system in 
Hungary is that the local tax administration is not ready. Some of the problems stem from 
gaps in the legislation and others from the lack of experience in property taxation. Some of 
the most important constraints and the possible remedies for them are outlined below.
Th e current legislation deﬁ nes assessment as the function of local governments. Th e 
municipalities, however, do not have enough experts to appraise the value of all properties in 
their districts. Moreover, the central government currently does not provide municipalities 
with enough information or legislative authority to make these assessments. In Hungarian 
legislation, the term “market value” is not a proper basis for mass and correct assessment for 
the following two reasons: 
 Market value may change from month to month, and the base date is not deﬁ ned. In 
a ﬂ at rate system, the main issue related to the base date deﬁ nition is the frequency 
of reassessment. If the assessment cycle is too long, the increase in assessed value can 
be enormous from one assessment to another, so the ﬂ at rate system requires frequent 
reassessments—the best option is annual assessment. Th e banding system does not 
need such frequency because the tax does not depend on the current value, but on the 
relative value, which is likely to be more stable than the market price.
 Th e Law on Duty requires that valuation be based on the sales comparison method, but 
Hungary has no tradition of property taxation and thus lacks an understanding of the 
main technical issues of making comparisons. 
 
Th e administration of all taxes is regulated in a single law that has been designed to suit 
the administration of other forms of taxation, especially income and sales taxation. Th e key 
implication of the applicability of this statute is the legal requirement that each tax process 
is based solely on the information collected from the taxpayer’s tax returns. As long as self-
assessment is the only way to establish the tax base (that is, the value of property), potential 
tax revenue will remain below its possible level as a result of the tax evasive strategies of 
the landowners. Because higher property value (that is, a higher tax base) translates to a 
higher tax for the landowner, when self-assessment is used, all citizens will be encouraged 
to undervalue their properties. Th e Law on Tax Administration should be changed, or an 
independent Law on Assessment should be created, to make governmental assessment 
possible.
Given the lack of a governmental inventory process, citizens should be required to 
provide information about the physical parameters of real estate, but it is unlikely that 
each citizen will be able to correctly complete a very detailed tax return containing detailed 
questions.
Th e Law on Duty requires that assessment be based on a comparison of sale prices, but 
the duty oﬃ  ce may not provide the municipalities with precise information on the actual 
C H A P T E R  1 2    VA L U E - B A S E D  P R O P E RT Y  TA X AT I O N  I
255
prices because of conﬁ dentiality provisions. Th e legislation should be changed to require 
that the duty oﬃ  ce provide the municipality with sale prices from recent transactions 
in the area, and the assessors in the duty oﬃ  ce should participate in the valuation. 
Communication between the land oﬃ  ces and the municipalities varies signiﬁ cantly 
from city to city. Legislation should require that the land oﬃ  ces give complete lists of 
the local properties and their owners to municipalities at the time of valuations and in a 
computerized format, should this be requested. Property records should also be forwarded 
to the local tax administration in cases of changes in ownership.
In addition, municipalities have very little information that can serve as the basis 
for picking out false and suspicious tax returns. Although as part of building permit 
documentation the building oﬃ  ce has collected the main parameters of each building 
that has been built or renovated since January 1, 1998, these data have three important 
problems—they have not been stored in a computerized database, the older information is 
incomplete, and the older information is not readily available.
Central legislation should allow the municipality to publish the assessment roll as 
a cadastre of local properties. Th is cadastre should show: (a) the name of owner, (b) the 
physical parameters, and (c) the band of value of properties. Publicity is essential to appraise 
the fairness of the assessment and to impede undervaluation in the self-assessment process.
When the assessment roll prepared by governments, some taxpayers may have an 
incentive to appeal against the stated value. A large number of appeals may result, unless 
the ﬁ ling of frivolous appeals has some negative consequences. Th e main forms of penalty 
should be that: (a) the assessed value reﬂ ects the real market price of property, for example, 
through the so-called golf course rule (that is, the owner has to sell the property to the 
municipality for the assessed price), or (b) the appeal process may impose a penalty in 
the case of obvious nuisance appeals. By contrast, the appeal practices indicate that a 
minimum of three levels of appeal should be deﬁ ned. Th e ﬁ rst phase should be an informal 
negotiation between the taxpayer and the assessor. Th e problems not resolved in this process 
may be appealed to the speciﬁ c assessment review board—such a tribunal is lacking in the 
current system. Th is board should be the ﬁ nal level considering the question of quantum 
of assessment. Th e judicial, or third, level should deal only with questions of law. Only two 
cities (Nyíregyháza and Németkér) base the property tax on current value. Th is levy is only 
on nonresidential properties. In these two cities, negotiation (the ﬁ rst phase) was the ﬁ nal 
point of appeal: the tax returns were reconsidered with the owners. Th e disputes had to 
ﬁ nish at this level because of the absence of an appeal mechanism. Eﬀ ectively, the taxable 
value is determined in a negotiation between the taxpayers and the municipality.
Enforcement remains a problem. A large percentage of the unpaid taxes are from local 
businesses. Th is fact should make enforcement easier because the companies are required 
to inform the tax administration of their bank practices, and in many cases they have assets 
such as vehicles that can be seized. Th e administration has the right to stop payment from 
this account until the business pays the tax. Non-businesses, however, do not have to 
register their bank accounts with the tax administration and do not always have high-value, 
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movable properties to be seized. Th e seizure of the movable and immovable properties of 
non-payers, either physically or by securing a lien, should serve as an adequate enforcement 
mechanism. Th e seizure of movable properties is a well-functioning tool, especially in case 
of vehicles. Garnishing from personal income should be made easier, and the municipalities 
should get information about the employer of the taxpayers from the social contribution 
databases at the Central Tax Oﬃ  ce. Stopping PIT-repayment could also be employed. 
Stopping the company tax repayment is a well-functioning method to collect the unpaid 
business receipts tax.
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13Value-based Property Taxation: A Policy and Impact AnalysisGábor Balás and Róbert Kovács



Over the 1990s central transfers have decreased signiﬁ cantly in real terms in tandem with 
the steady growth of local own revenues. Th is trend, which is likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future, is desirable because local revenues also motivate more citizen control 
over local ﬁ nancial management. Restructuring the present taxation system, introducing 
new taxes, and further increasing local revenues are key challenges during the ﬁ rst period 
of the country’s membership in the European Union (EU). For the vast majority of muni-
cipalities, one possible alternative is the introduction of a value-based property tax, which 
has been legally available since 1990. Only two local governments have introduced it till 
2000. 
Th is chapter examines the conditions of and arguments for the introduction of 
value-based property taxation, which is both a realistic and desirable alternative for local 
governments. Th e chapter considers policy alternatives and challenges to show how a value-
based property tax may be introduced, what problems the local governments might face in 
the present legal framework, and what remedies may be available. Th e chapter presents an 
appraisal method based on calculated value that can be introduced within the conﬁ nes of 
current legal regulation and that would make appraising properties at relatively low cost 
possible. Based on the current data from Püspökladány, a secondary city, the chapter also 
presents an impact analysis on eﬃ  ciency, fairness, and equity factors to show how diﬀ erent 
valuation methods and tax exemptions would inﬂ uence various social groups, the tax 
revenue envelope, and tax dynamics. Th e study focuses on residential properties because 
taxing business properties is socially less sensitive and their appraisal is simple.
* Th is chapter is based on Balás and Kovács 1999.
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Why Is Restructuring the Tax System Necessary?
At the beginning of the 1990s, newly elected local governments were reluctant to introduce 
local taxes for three reasons:
 Central transfers and shared taxes provided a convenient base for ﬁ nancing local 
services.
 Th ey had received a signiﬁ cant amount of state assets and, hence, expected capital gains 
and proceeds from divestitures.
 Th ey assumed political popularity in not levying taxes.
As a reaction to the ﬁ scal squeeze, however, ﬁ rst the local governments increased asset 
sales to counterbalance the steadily decreasing central transfers and used privatization 
revenues primarily for investment and debt amortization. Th ese measures, however, do not 
oﬀ er long-term solutions for ﬁ nancing recurrent expenditures. As a result, more than 80 
percent of local governments now levy local taxes, and although these revenues more than 
tripled (from Ft 37 billion to 135 billion), they remained insuﬃ  cient to counterbalance the 
Ft 400 billion drop in central transfers from 1991 through 1998. 
Th e 1990 Law on Local Taxation stipulates that the following taxes can be levied 
locally: property tax (on residential and nonresidential buildings and plots), communal 
tax (private and corporate), tax on tourism, and business tax (see table 13.1 and chapters 
10, 11, and 12). Every type of tax has advantages and disadvantages. Of concern, however, 
is that the business tax provides more than 80 percent of local tax revenues. Despite its 
disadvantages, local governments like the business tax, because they expect less resistance 
from entrepreneurs than from residents. Th is expectation is reinforced by a common 
view that residents are overtaxed and, hence, are unable and unwilling to pay more. Both 
the personal income tax and the value added tax are too high in comparison with other 
countries. Th ese taxes ought to be reduced in parallel with EU membership, so Hungary’s 
entire taxation system must be reconsidered and restructured in the near future.
Several arguments favor the value-based property tax, but the key policy challenges 
before a new type of tax is introduced are as follows:
 How much revenue is needed to maintain local services at a rational level?
 Which social strata should bear the burden of public expenditures, and to what 
extent?
 What eﬀ ect may local taxes have on local businesses and employment?
In April 1999 we conducted a survey that in part forms the basis for our simulation 
modeling on local taxes. Th e survey took representative samples of 400 residents from each 
of the following medium-sized cities: Nagykanizsa, Orosháza, Püspökladány, Szentes, 
Szolnok, and Tatabánya. Experiences from our survey suggest that residents paying local 
taxes monitor local governments’ activity more closely (for example, they attend assembly 
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meetings more often and are more informed). Local governments and the population have 
a choice between more public services and higher taxes or scaled-down public services and 
lower taxes.
Table 13.1 Local Taxes Levied in Hungary, 1998
Tax type Number of 
local governments 
levying tax
Tax revenue
Amount
(Ft billion)
Proportion (percent)
Property tax 
 Residential buildings a 215 — —
 Nonresidential buildings a  633 13.5 10.0
 Plot 388 2.0 1.5
Communal tax 
 Private 1,525 2.4 1.8
 Corporate 825 1.2 0.9
Tourism tax 482 2.1 1.6
Business tax 2,527 113.7 84.3
Total 2,672 134.9 100.0
Note: a. Th e amount of taxes on residential and nonresidential buildings taken together.
Source: Ön Kor Kép, March 1999.
Analysts assume that local governments select a new type of tax after considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives. Arguments listed in table 13.2 suggest 
that among all types of taxes available now, the value-based property tax has the most 
favorable characteristics. Only the business tax levied in prosperous industrial regions 
oﬀ ers signiﬁ cant revenue capacity comparable to property taxes. Because of some of its 
characteristics, however, the business tax is not ideal as a primary source of revenue even 
in prosperous municipalities. Th e application of communal taxes is not justiﬁ ed because 
of the many problems they entail and because other alternatives are better. Most of the 
municipalities have not introduced the tourist tax or the tax on plots because of their small 
revenue capacity, but wherever possible these taxes can be recommended as supplementary 
elements of the local tax system.
When selecting one of the two types of property taxes (area-based and value-based), 
several factors need to be considered, such as revenue capacity, equity and fairness measures, 
and technical feasibility. Both value-based and area-based property tax schemes are suitable 
to create the necessary revenue capacity for local governments, but the revenues derived 
from the value-based property tax grow together with inﬂ ation in most cases, whereas the 
area-based tax tends to decrease in real terms, particularly in an inﬂ ationary period. Hence, 
given its dynamic nature, the value-based property tax is much more advantageous. Th e 
strongest argument for the value-based tax is that it is more equitable than the area-based tax.
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Table 13.2 Characteristics of an Ideal Tax System
Characteristics Business
tax
Tourist tax Communal tax Property tax
Area-
based
Turnover Corporate Resi-
dential
Area-
based
Value
Paid by those who use services X X X X
Stable tax base X X X X
Transparent tax system X X X X X X
Generates suﬃ  cient revenue X X X
Equitable and aﬀ ordable X X X
Causes the lowest possible 
economic distortion
X X X X X
Not levied on citizens who are 
not part of the local community
X X X X
Simple administration X X
Politically acceptable X X X X X
Wide tax base and low tax rate X X X X
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
Based on the data of Püspökladány, a small city in southeastern Hungary, a simple 
simulation compared the possible impact of an area-based and a value-based property tax 
scheme assuming collection of the same total revenue (see table 13.3). Area-based taxation 
would tax the poorer strata of the population more heavily than value-based taxation 
would, because property value and family income have showed a higher correlation than 
the size of the housing units and the family income. Wealthier citizens would pay a greater 
portion of the tax in a value-based taxation. Moreover, reformers caution that the local 
government can collect more revenue with area-based taxation only by collecting more tax 
from the poorer clusters of residents.
Table 13.3 Comparing Area-based and Value-based Property Tax in Püspökladány
Factor Type of property tax
Area-based Value-based
Revenue capacity 90.0 Ft million 89.6 Ft million
Tax rate 200 Ft/m2 1.25%
Percentage of total tax paid by household clusters
 Lower status households 
  (37.7%  of households)
32.6 28.5
 Upper status households 
  (24.6% of households)
29.4 35.0
Notes:  Lower and upper status households are represented by the lowest and highest quintiles.
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
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Th e simulation results suggest that value-based property taxation can provide stable 
revenue for the local government and is more equitable than other taxation schemes. 
Th e remaining questions, then, are whether local governments are able to: (a) overcome 
the technical problems of levying value-based taxes, (b) meet the legal and operational 
requirements, and (c) develop an eﬃ  cient, politically acceptable, and ﬁ nancially viable 
appraisal procedure.
Tax Policy Challenges
Should the political leadership of a municipality decide to introduce value-based property 
taxation, they will need to: (a) examine some legal conditions and limits, (b) appraise the 
market value of the properties and develop a reliable property register, and (c) analyze the 
revenue potential. 
Th e Legal Conditions and Limits of Property Taxation
One of the most important questions when introducing a new tax is its expected revenue 
capacity. Legislation sets strict limitations for local governments in imposing the property 
tax. Both housing and non-housing properties can be taxed, but the range of exemptions 
is wide. Th e following are tax exempt: temporary lodgings below standard; the properties 
of social, health care, child care, and education institutions; the properties of budgetary 
organizations; properties of organizations supplying social services (for example, churches); 
the supplementary premises of dwellings; and agricultural storage facilities. Th e law deﬁ nes 
a term “corrected market value,” which is 50 percent of the “commercial value” of the 
property. Another limitation is that tax exemptions granted to new housing units for 25 to 
35 years before 1990 will remain in force until their expiration and will exempt about 30 to 
50 percent of the housing in the country.
Although at ﬁ rst glance the legal framework appears to set serious restrictions, 
simulation results suggest that local governments have signiﬁ cant tax revenue potential, 
and the law provides them ample latitude to attain local priorities.
Th e Market Value of the Properties
It is easy to state but it is diﬃ  cult to measure market value of properties. In this section we 
brieﬂ y summarize a number of methodologies and then introduce a simple method suitable 
for appraising market values in the Hungarian circumstances.
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Options for Appraisal Methodologies
Th e success of value-based property taxation depends on the accuracy and recognition of 
the property appraisal (table 13.4). Despite the fact that owners are evidently interested 
in having their property appraised below market value for the tax base, self-appraisal is 
one of the most accessible initial solutions. Moreover it requires some generally applicable 
control mechanism to preserve equitable taxation and to avoid levying very diﬀ erent taxes 
on similar properties. In the long run, however, self-appraisal may lead to erosion of the 
real value of tax revenues because owners are not interested in appraising their property 
in tandem with increasing market value. In smaller settlements, however, say with a few 
thousand inhabitants, self-appraisal could be a long-term solution because inherent 
transparency and close personal contacts in small communities curb drawbacks. Self-
appraisal could substitute other methods in small municipalities where tax administration 
capacities are limited.
External appraisal could be carried out as individual appraisal with the help of real 
estate experts or through a formula-based mass appraisal. Th e ﬁ rst solution is expensive 
and time-consuming and requires signiﬁ cant expert capacity and continuous training. 
Th e second method requires an appraisal formula, standardized technical and economic 
qualiﬁ cation indicators, and the average value estimate of the local properties. Th e legal 
background for this solution is underdeveloped, so the appraisal technique must be chosen 
with care to prevent local governments from mass appeals.
Mass appraisal based on a market-value formula seems to be suitable. It would not 
require a signiﬁ cant increase in administrative capacity and is unlikely to run into an 
uncontrollable number of appeals. Mass appraisal is initially also expensive, but it enables 
savings in ﬁ nancial and political costs in the long run. Private and government experts 
involved in developing the framework for value-based property taxation support the idea 
of a formula-based appraisal.
Appeals cannot be avoided by choosing either appraisal method because some taxpayers 
would appeal at any price. Th ose who appeal mass appraisal, however, will be confronted 
with considerable expenses and, hence, presumably will appeal only if a dramatic reduction 
or exemption is very likely. Th e number of appeals will be moderate if the formula contains 
a conservative estimate of the average property value and reﬂ ects a lower range of possible 
sale prices. Th e appraisal will be better accepted politically if the formula is published to 
allow residents to understand and review the value estimates.
Th e banded system, as described in chapter 12, also oﬀ ers a cheap and simple solution. 
Th is method makes annual corrections simple, but distorts the relationship between 
property value and the level of taxation. It reduces the likelihood of appeals at the top 
and middle of the bands, but appeals remain likely at the bottom of the bands. Another 
problem is that this method is not properly legislated, though the law allows it. It might be 
a temporary solution for smaller settlements, say with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants.
Appraisal based on calculated value maintains property value proportions and is 
relatively inexpensive, but it requires an increase in administrative capacity and may distort 
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the equitability of the taxation system. With the current conditions, successful introduction 
of value-based property taxation depends to a large extent on the possibility of elaborating 
a calculated-value method.
Table 13.4 Comparing Appraisal Techniques
Appraisal technique Advantages Disadvantages
Self-appraisal Inexpensive
No appeals
Inequitable
Expensive to verify
Tendency to underestimate
Unstable tax base
Expert appraisal Realistic value Expensive to establish and maintain
Subjective (each expert will give a 
diﬀ erent value)
Encourages appeals
Area-based diﬀ erentiated 
by area within the city
Inexpensive
No appeals
Diﬀ erent from real value
Inequitable
Leads to segregation
Annual political decision
Deﬁ ning areas will be a political 
(not a professional) decision
Appraisal using bands Inexpensive
Lowers number of appeals
Diﬀ erent from real value
Inequitable
Legality uncertain
All at the bottom of each band may 
appeal
Deﬁ ning bands will be a political 
(not a professional) decision
Calculated value Realistic value
Objective
Value-modiﬁ cation inexpensive
Lowers number of appeals
Lowers chances of successful appeals
Relatively high introduction costs 
(database)
Does not prevent appeals
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
Th e Legislative Framework for Appraising Market Value
Th e Law on Local Taxation and the 1990 Law on Duty create the legislative framework 
for a value-based property taxation. Th e Law on Local Taxation vaguely states that property 
tax can be levied on the basis of adjusted market value of the properties (section b, article 
15 of the law). In principle this provision allows both individual and mass appraisal of fair 
market value. Th e Law on Local Taxation further refers to the Law on Duty, however, 
saying that the adjusted market value is equal to the 50 percent of the market value 
appraised in compliance with the Law on Duty (paragraph 13, article 52 of Law on Local 
Taxation). Th e latter stipulates that the market value is appraised and registered by the duty 
oﬃ  ces on the basis of the ﬁ led sale contract. Duty ﬁ les, in principle, reﬂ ect fair market value, 
recorded on either the reported or a corrected sale price. Reported sale price is reappraised 
and increased to a comparative market price by the duty oﬃ  ces only when a qualiﬁ ed 
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underreporting is assumed. Th e annual maximum rate of property tax shall be 3 percent of 
the adjusted market value (section b, article 16 of the Law on Local Taxation).
Th e laws and regulations do not specify methods for property appraisal; they require 
only realistic valuation. Th erefore, appraising property value without site inspection, based 
on key data about the property, is legal. Most of the properties have never been sold, or have 
not recently been sold, so the market value must be assessed indirectly. Another problem 
is that the law ties long-term commercial value to the historical sale price, subject to 
adjustment to a generally attainable price. In short, the current regulation does not prohibit, 
but clearly does not support, the use of a calculated value in appraising property.
A Suitable Method for Appraising Property Value
Th e method we elaborate and recommend for appraising property value is based on a linear 
equation formula that can be applied to all properties of a settlement with a standard 
procedure. Th e formula for appraising property value is (Balás and Kovács 1999):
P V = (AV + T1• Sz1+ ... + Tn• Szn) • Useful Area
where: PV denotes property value
 AV denotes the average value (average of actual sale price per square meter)
 T1 to Tn are factors that inf luence property value (location, material, age)
 Sz1 to Szn are factor coeﬃ  cients that indicate how a given factor aﬀ ects the 
  property value (a coeﬃ  cient might have a minus sign).
Th e average property value and the coeﬃ  cients can be derived from a representative 
sample of local properties containing physical parameters and value estimates provided by 
one (or more) real estate experts (for example, location zone, status, infrastructure access, 
age). Calculating the formula with a multivariable regression is practical to ensure that 
the calculated property values are closely correlated with market prices. In elaborating the 
appraisal formula, identifying parameters that are relevant and easy to verify is of critical 
importance. Th is formula provides for a transparent, simple, and acceptable appraisal that 
is close to the real market value.
Th is formula makes annual reappraisal simple, because the average value is the only 
variable that needs annual adjustment, and a few other factors may need casual adjustment 
(for example, refurbishment, extension, utility development). We recommend, however, 
changing the correction factors and coeﬃ  cients only every ﬁ ve years. Th e legislation 
stipulates actual market value, but the undesirable ﬂ uctuation of the tax base can also be 
avoided by using a three- to four-year moving average of the actual sale prices.
A reliable database could be obtained from the land cadastre and duty oﬃ  ces. Detailed 
supplementary data can be obtained from taxpayers, who should be encouraged to provide 
information about their own property. Taxpayers’ data need cross-control, but relatively 
simple procedures are available for that. Land and duty oﬃ  ces are, for secrecy reasons, 
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very reluctant to share property data with local governments, although the latter, by law, 
must have automatic and free access to property ﬁ les. In practice most local governments 
access this information when they need it, but their clear legal right should be stipulated by 
amendment to the Law on Local Taxation. Data ﬂ ows across various departments within 
the local public administration should also be improved signiﬁ cantly.
Tax Revenue Potential
Local governments have a broad range of competency to: (a) introduce or modify local 
taxes in accordance with local priorities and political objectives, and (b) decide how much 
tax revenue is required, which social groups will bear major tax burden, and which ones will 
receive tax exemption. With the use of a simulation model, local governments can easily 
test these objectives, expectations, and potential eﬀ ects to work out the ﬁ nal tax rates and 
other parameters (for example, exemptions).
When deﬁ ning potential tax revenues, local governments must take legal limitations 
and residents’ ability to pay into account to avoid mass appeals and enormous tax arrears. 
A sophisticated and sustainable system of equity-based exemptions, based on an impact 
analysis, is indispensable. Th e impact analysis can help deﬁ ne the tax level at which the 
average resident and various social groups can aﬀ ord to pay. Equity-based exemptions are 
crucial to recognize diﬀ erences. Th ese methods are rarely used; instead, to avoid social and 
political tensions, local governments impose a narrow tax base and low tax rates, collecting 
much less than is legally allowed.
In every city in our survey, a value-based property tax levied on housing units at the 
highest rate would provide much higher revenue than the combined revenue collected 
through all local taxes today. Needless to say, taxes levied at the maximum rate, as assumed 
in table 13.5, would bring such an unbearable burden on citizens and amount to such huge 
political risks that no local government, even in prosperous municipalities, would be willing 
to impose such high taxes. If the taxes levied on corporate properties are added, then we 
see clearly that the property tax alone could provide an adequate level of local revenue and 
could substitute all kinds of other taxes presently collected or received as shared revenues. 
Because the property tax has such a high revenue potential, even within the framework of 
present regulation, it gives local governments a great deal of freedom in imposing tax rates.
How local revenues might change over time is a crucial feasibility indicator of any local 
tax scheme because resources rarely change automatically, but local expenditures follow 
price increases. Th e tax base of value-based property taxation, however, could increase 
dynamically for two reasons. First, the quantity of taxable properties increases over time in 
most municipalities. Second, the market or capitalized value of real estate increases in parallel 
with long-term ﬁ nancial market trends. Th e quantity grows because of new construction, 
expansions, refurbishment, and from the gradual phasing out of tax exemptions (a serious 
issue). Th e tax base also expands through periodic property reappraisal in accordance with 
local business prosperity.
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Table 13.5 Property Tax Revenue Potential
Estimated 
property tax revenue a
All local taxes combined
City Value-based tax with 3% 
maximum rate (Ft billion)
Revenue 1998 Percentage of total revenue
Nagykanizsab 967.7 561.6 7.8
Orosháza 574.2 517.0 12.2
Püspökladány 215.2 43.5 4.9
Szentes 570.7 270.0 9.2
Szolnok 1,356.3 1,050.0 10.9
Tatabánya 756.9 420.0 5.9
Notes:  a. Revenue from residential building tax only, taxes on commercial property are excluded.
  b. Nagykanizsa data are from 1997.
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
Although the net growth of the number of buildings is generally slow though steady, 
the increase in property value is far less predictable. (Because of the gradual removal of tax 
exemptions that had been granted since 1974, the tax base will steadily increase until 2007. 
In addition, by imposing consistent tax rates via reappraisal and because of the increase in 
the number of taxpayers, local governments can count on a dynamic increase in tax revenues 
without increasing tax rates, or even with lowering them.) Th e increase in property value 
depends on, among other things, general price changes, local economic conditions, and the 
demand for local properties. Although the relationship between the value of properties and 
inﬂ ation is uncertain, because real estate prices can temporarily lag behind the growth in 
capitalized value of other assets, experience shows that the two tend to change in tandem in 
the long run. Because of the economic crisis, the value of real estate dropped by 30 percent 
in real terms from 1992 through 1997, but real estate prices started to catch up with the 
inﬂ ation as long-term economic growth began in 1998. A further increase is expected 
because of Hungary’s membership in the European Union. No country has an automatic 
relationship between the change in property value and tax revenue. 
Foreign experiences show that adjusting the tax base or rate is one of the most diﬃ  cult 
and politically sensitive issues. Often suﬃ  cient rate increases are not approved and the 
success of taxation is put at risk. Th ese consequences should be addressed in choosing the 
appraisal method and drafting the local tax ordinance. We recommend a solution that does 
not require annual political approval. Figure 13.1 shows a projected change in tax revenue 
in Püspökladány, comparing area-based and value-based taxation in constant prices in a 
period of notable inﬂ ation. Th e ﬁ gure shows results assuming: (a) that local governments 
levy either a Ft 200 per square meter area-based tax or a 1.25 percent rate value-based tax, 
and (b) that a 3 percent annual increase in real value of housing units occurs and inﬂ ation 
gradually decreases. (We assumed 8.0, 6.0, 4.0, 3.5, 3.0, 2.8, 2.6, 2.5, 2.5, and 2.5 percent 
inﬂ ation from 1999 through 2008, respectively.)
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Figure 13.1 Th e Dynamics of Tax Revenues in Püspökladáy–Constant Price (Ft million)
Source: Balás and Kovács, 1999.
Local governments can choose among several reappraisal methods, such as indexation, 
direct price adjustment, or banded value increase. Property value can be indexed to monetary 
indicators such as inﬂ ation or the yield of state securities. Reappraisal can be based on real 
estate current sale price data from previous years; meanwhile, large public investments that 
may aﬀ ect property value should be considered. Automatic indexation is unsuitable when 
some extraordinary factor (for example, EU accession or war in a neighboring country) 
changes property values sharply up or down in the span of one year. A sharp decrease of the 
tax base is undesirable for the local budget, and a sharp increase may be unacceptable for 
taxpayers. Th ese situations can be avoided in several ways. Th e local government can restrict 
the range of annual changes in the tax base, allowing, say, only a 15 percent annual increase 
and gradually dispersing a striking 50 percent change in a three-year adjustment period. As 
a result, property values might catch up with market value in three to four years, but local 
tax revenues will be less volatile than market value. Another method is to use a ﬁ ve-year 
moving average of current real estate prices. Th ese methods lead to similar results, but the 
ceiling method is safer. We advise reconsidering and maybe changing appraisal schemes 
with a deﬁ ned regularity (say ﬁ ve years).
Impact Analysis
Th e goal of an impact analysis is to: (a) measure the potential socio-economic eﬀ ects 
of a taxation scheme; (b) estimate and test the optimal benchmarks and coeﬃ  cients 
determining the tax base, tax rate, and tax dynamics; and (c) test tax revenue capacity and 
the eﬀ ects of potential tax exemptions on local revenues. An impact analysis conceptually 
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performs a simulation in a complex taxation model based on real data available at the local 
administration and from a survey of citizens. 
Th is section ﬁ rst summarizes the conceptual issues of an impact analysis, and then 
shows the major results of the analysis performed on the basis of detailed data from 
Püspökladány. In our simulation modeling we have addressed four important sets of issues, 
tested the tax aﬀ ordability, measured the impact of tax exemption on various social groups 
and on local budget revenues, and ﬁ nally drew conclusions for political decisions.
Types of Exemptions
Exemptions are granted essentially for two reasons: ﬁ rst, to make the tax aﬀ ordable and 
reduce arrears and, second, to follow local political priorities. 
Exemptions Based on Aﬀ ordability or Fairness
Exemptions based on aﬀ ordability conceptually improve equity and prevent overtaxation. 
Developing an aﬀ ordability exemption scheme, however, is just as complicated as develop-
ing the taxation scheme itself. Instead of improving equity, exemptions may distort the 
basic role of property taxation, which is to tax higher wealth and bring otherwise untaxed 
incomes into the support of the local public burden. To improve fairness, exemptions are 
often tied to the income of taxpayers. About 30 percent of personal income remains hidden 
and is concentrated in certain social strata and professions. As a result, income-based 
exemptions may increase inequality. One solution could be to link a wealth test to income-
based exemptions, that is, an exemption for low-income people can be granted only if 
the value of their properties falls below a ceiling (for example, Ft 4 million). Imposing an 
inheritance tax could be a solution for a critical group of single elderly people living in 
valuable housing with low income; however, as mentioned, this exemption would require 
legislative changes. Various forms of exemptions are often granted in parallel. Exemptions 
might be full or partial; they might be tied to household income brackets (for example, the 
sum of the tax cannot exceed 2 percent of household income, but up to this level even the 
poorest must pay); they might be temporary (for example, for the unemployed); they might 
be time-delayed exemptions granted to single elderly persons and often passed on to their 
heirs. Th is type of exemption is known as inheritance tax in Europe. Hungary’s current 
legislation does not allow institution of the inheritance tax, although introducing it would 
be a step in the right direction.
Exemptions Based on Local Political Priorities
Th is sphere of exemptions is virtually boundless (for example, poor families or urban policy 
objectives can be supported with speciﬁ c or general exemptions). When introducing such 
exemptions, three important points should be taken into consideration. First, will the 
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tax revenue collected be suﬃ  cient for the local budget after the exemptions are enacted? 
Second, can the desired positive eﬀ ect of the exemption be eﬀ ectively ensured (for example, 
exemptions based on the number of children may serve family policy rather than social 
purposes)? Th ird, is the tax system transparent? Hence, the number of exemptions should 
be limited. Because exemptions can distort each other’s eﬀ ects, a complicated and detailed 
exemption system might be less eﬀ ective than restricting exemptions and applying lower 
tax rate.
Forms of Exemption
Th e form of exemption depends also on the objectives and the forms of local tax regulations. 
Exemptions based on aﬀ ordability must be limited to those who have real diﬃ  culties, and 
exemptions that are too broad mean full freedom from taxation. Temporary exemptions are 
applicable to the unemployed because this disadvantage is temporary. When a disadvantage 
is long term, but a valuable property is involved, the tax can be pledged to pass the burden 
to the time when the property is sold or when the owner dies. Th ese regulations allow the 
local government to be fair, but able to plan and receive the revenue eventually. Citizens 
must have the opportunity to receive exemptions anytime throughout the year when 
changes in life circumstances justify them.
Aﬀ ordability Test in Püspökladány
Citizens are more willing to pay if they feel the local taxation is equitable. A well-prepared 
tax system imposes aﬀ ordable taxes with the lowest possible rate, encourages citizens to 
pay, and generates suﬃ  cient revenue. Once the local government has decided the expected 
tax revenue, it should decide how to distribute this burden among residents in the fairest 
manner, while matching social and political goals. An impact analysis is a crucial instrument 
in deﬁ ning a suitable and eﬃ  cient taxation scheme.
Consider a hypothetical example. Th e local government of Püspökladány chooses to 
earn Ft 90 million revenue through a value-based property tax on residential real estate. 
Th e simulation shows that a 1.25 percent tax rate would enable the local government to 
collect Ft 89.7 million in revenue, if everyone pays. Using the method described above, we 
simulated the average tax payment for households in various social groups (tables 13.6, 13.7, 
and 13.8). Th e annual property tax is projected to amount to about Ft 12,000 (US$ 40) 
for an average household. We estimated not only the average tax paid by households, but 
also the burden on their incomes. Based on simpliﬁ ed calculations, we show the burden 
by social strata in income quintiles, though attention should also be paid to indicators of 
income per family member.
Th e impact analysis shows unambiguously that the highest status group, mostly 
residents of large homes, would pay more tax, but the lowest status group would pay not 
quite half of what the best-oﬀ  would pay (see table 13.6). Disparities are even wider because 
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of the diﬀ erences between wealth (property value) and family income. As the property tax 
portion of family income, the poorest group would pay 10 times more than the highest 
status group. One reason for this is that Hungary has no social housing, and because of 
previously heavily subsidized home construction, families with very low income are owners 
of sizable and valuable houses. Th e analysis also revealed that the highest tax-to-income 
burden is put on single active and inactive (retired) people (see table 13.7). Th e Ft 10,000 
annual tax payment (table 13.6) seems to be too high for owners in the lowest strata; hence, 
the tax amount ought to be mitigated. Th e local government ought to provide preferences 
according to family types, particularly large families, though this issue is not necessarily a 
social one. Th e data in table 13.7 show that large families hardly pay more than the average 
(just Ft 3,000 per year), while single retired people pay only Ft 4,000 less than the average 
and the tax represents an almost unbearable burden on their pension income. 
Table 13.6 Tax Burden by Income Strata of Households in Püspökladány
Status group 
(from lowest to highest)
Property tax 
(Ft per year)
Tax per Income
(percentage)
Number of households
1. 10,151 7.2 2,510
2. 12,694 1.2 1,460
3. 13,548 0.8 1,098
4. 16,058 0.6 826
5. 22,394 0.7 811
 Püspökladány average 12,362 3.3 6,652
Note:  Calculations are based on a 1.25 percent tax on the corrected market value of households’ residential 
properties, and estimated annual family income.
Source:  Balás and Kovács 1999.
Table 13.7 Tax Burden by Types of Households and Families in Püspökladány
Type of household Tax to be paid 
(Ft per year)
Tax per Income 
(percentage)
Number of 
households
Single person, active 13,337 6.4 512
Single person, inactive 8,342 5.6 1,271
Minimum 2 working, maximum 2 children 15,126 2.2 4,020
One working, minimum 3 children 11,000 0.9 146
Minimum 2 working, minimum 3 children 17,511 1.9 81
Old couples 13,476 3.6 622
Püspökladány total 12,362 3.3 6,652
Note:  Th e tax is based on a rate of 1.25 percent of the corrected commercial value.
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
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Household composition results in serious tax disparities consistent with the observations 
mentioned earlier (table 13.8). Households with an entrepreneur family member, which are 
usually in a better income and overall wealth position, pay on average 50 percent more tax 
based on their residential property. Th ey may also have a separate property for business that 
is taxed according to a diﬀ erent ordinance. Nevertheless, the property tax will be a burden 
mostly for households that include one or more retired persons. Without tax mitigation, 
these households would pay a 4.8 percent share of their income for property taxation.
Table 13.8 Tax Burden by Household Composition in Püspökladány
Household Tax to be paid 
(Ft per year)
Tax per Income 
 (percentage)
Number of households
Entrepreneur in the household 19,548 2.0 661
Unemployed person in the household 11,304 1.9 960
Retired person in the household 12,286 4.8 3,852
All Püspökladány 12,362 3.3 6,652
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
Measuring the Eﬀ ects of Tax Exemptions
Reformers should carefully analyze the tax burdens on diﬀ erent social groups and on 
various kinds of households in the course of the impact analysis of exemptions. When 
establishing exemptions, the size of the social group in question is a serious issue. If tax 
exemptions are granted to a populous group of citizens, then the local government faces a 
signiﬁ cant revenue decrease and the entire tax burden may need to be increased or put on 
other social groups.
Fairness-based Exemptions
Fairness exemptions are a complicated but very important part of property taxation. Among 
the several possible variations, reformers have examined income-based exemptions. Th e two 
key issues to be addressed in deﬁ ning exemptions are how to achieve the desired goals and 
obtain an adequate level of revenues. Table 13.9 shows the eﬀ ects of various income-based 
exemptions in Püspökladány. We analyzed three basic cases to estimate the impact of the 
exemptions on overall local revenues and on various households’ clusters. We considered 
three possible tax limitations by family income: 1 percent, 2 percent, and 3 percent ceiling, 
as well as three possible limitations by value of properties: Ft 2 million (US$ 7,000) per 
house, Ft 6 million (US$ 20,000) per house, and no limitation. Th e eﬀ ects of the two sets 
of limitations on tax exemption were estimated in combination.
Simulation results show that the local government of Püspökladány could lose con-
siderable revenue (Ft 15–30 million, see column 4 in table 13.9, “no limit”) if tax 
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exemptions are granted without limit (that is, irrespective of the value of their housing unit) 
to every household when its tax would surpass 1, 2, or 3 percent of family income. Clearly, 
applying a property value limit (that is, easing the burden only for homes under a set 
value) could improve tax revenue potential signiﬁ cantly (see columns 2 and 3 in table 13.9). 
Th e low limit of Ft 2 million means that exemptions are granted only to poor families 
who not only have low income but also live in a low-value housing unit. As a result of 
this conservative principle in granting exemptions, the local government would only lose 
Ft 4–7 million (4.5–8 percent) of tax revenue, while the higher social strata would continue 
to bear the tax burden of the municipality. Th e results suggest that local governments 
can easily establish a limit on exemptions that makes the tax bearable to poor families, 
but enables them to collect suﬃ  cient tax revenue.
Table 13.9 Th e Eﬀ ects of Income-based Exemptions on Local Revenues and on Households
Income limit 
(percent)
Property value limits in exemptions
(Ft million per household)
Income limit 
(percent)
Property value limits in exemptions
(Ft million per household)
Ft 2 million Ft 6 million Ft 6 million Ft 2 million Ft 6 million Ft 6 million
Local government annual revenue
(Ft million)
Tax paid by lower status household
(Ft per year)
1.0 82.2 64.3 59.5 1.0 7,300 2,700 2,000
2.0 84.4 74.4 71.3 2.0 8,100 4,400 3,700
3.0 85.8 78.4 76.5 3.0 8,600 5,700 5,000
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
 
Simulation results summarized in table 13.10 illustrate a case in which the local 
government seriously considers both the need for revenue and easing the burden on the 
most disadvantaged households. Th e local government, as in our earlier example, opts for a 
Ft 90 million revenue from property tax that can be obtained by taxing at a ﬂ at 1.25 percent 
rate on property value. After an impact analysis, local politicians may decide they would like 
to ease the burden of the lowest income citizens, who should not use 7.2 percent of income 
for paying property tax (original scenario). Th e diﬀ erence between present income and the 
value of real estate owned by a family might be a consequence of inherited (taxed) wealth, 
but often it results from misreported (untaxed) revenues. Th us, limiting tax exemptions by 
property value is equitable and justiﬁ ed because of hidden revenues.
Th is simulation assumes that a tax exemption can be granted only if a housing unit 
falls below the upper-middle price category based on the real estate ﬁ les of the local public 
administration. If only properties under Ft 5 million value were eligible for the exemption, 
the local government would face a revenue gap of about Ft 20 million (scenario 2 in table 
13.10). Th e system would be much more equitable because the tax burden of low-income 
households would drop from Ft 10,000 to less than Ft 4,000, and the average tax burden 
would decrease from 7.2 to 2.3 percent of their income.
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Th e case can also be simulated when the local government is not able to reduce its 
expenditures or to collect revenues elsewhere, and so it must obtain Ft 90 million property 
tax revenue. Scenario 3 (in table 13.10) summarizes the simulation results assuming that 
the overall rate of local property tax raises from 1.25 to 1.71 percent, but tax exemptions 
are still granted in accordance with the scenario 2. Because of the higher tax rate, the tax 
payment of households in the highest income strata would grow from Ft 22,000 to 30,000; 
albeit their tax burden would increase negligibly from 0.7 to 0.9 percent of family income. 
At the same time, the tax payment of the lowest income strata would grow by only Ft 500. 
Such simulations reveal that the local government faces a good range of opportunities in 
deﬁ ning the most appropriate property taxation.
Table 13.10 Optimal Exemptions and Maximum Revenue
Local government revenues Scenario 1: 
Original taxation
Scenario 2: 
Original rate 
with exemption
Scenario 3: 
Adjusted rate 
with exemption
Expected revenue from residential tax 
(Ft million)
89.6 70.3 90.1
Tax rate percentage 1.25 1.25 1.71
Household burden Ft per 
year
percent Ft per 
year
percent Ft per 
year
percent
Low-income strata 10,200 7.2 3,700 2.3 4,200 2.7
High-income strata 22,400 0.7 21,900 0.7 30,000 0.9
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
 
Exemptions Based on Local Policy Preferences
Local politicians have boundless opportunities to grant partial- or full-tax exemptions 
for preferred groups, neighborhoods, or by property types based on policy considerations. 
Well-targeted exemptions not only support fairness; they can even motivate residential 
investments. In most cases such exemptions are harmonized with social principles, as in 
Hungary’s present rule that “everyone has a constitutional right to 25 square meters of 
living space” without paying tax (Article 25, Law on Local Taxation). Th is principle, though 
very generous, leads to a very signiﬁ cant limitation of taxable properties because an average 
three-member family lives in a 60 square meter housing unit. As a result, a small number 
of residents would have to pay very high taxes, or the local government of Püspökladány 
would have to give up its expected revenue envelope.
Simulation results in table 13.11 show that poorly measured or ill-targeted exemptions 
could reduce revenue capacity dramatically (to 1/80 in our example). Property tax 
exemptions are commonly granted by area or by number of residents. Th e ﬁ rst is not 
recommended at all, and we have serious reservations about the second. Area-based 
exemptions (per dwelling, per resident, or per child) undermine the fairness of value-based 
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taxation, because they grant greater relief to those living in more expensive housing units. 
Such exemptions, which are common in Hungary, have two additional problems: 
 When they are too large, they overwhelmingly reduce the number of taxpayers. 
 When they are too small, they lead to the same result as a tax with a lower rate.
 
Th e calculations in table 13.11 take into consideration the desire of some local 
governments to drop the minimum payable tax to a certain level (in which the taxpayer 
would be exempt), because the administrative cost of collecting such sums is higher than 
the tax collected or because it would aﬀ ect groups that deserve to be exempted (see table 
13.11). Just as some arguments advocate forgoing taxes under a certain minimum, other 
arguments advocate setting a maximum limit. For example, the tax may represent the 
contribution to local expenditures, and thus disproportionate diﬀ erentiation is unjustiﬁ ed. 
Furthermore, property taxes that are too high can scare taxpayers away from the city and 
negatively aﬀ ect local economic development.
Table 13.11 Th e Eﬀ ects of Local-preference-based Exemptions on Local Revenues 
Area-based tax and space-based exemptions Exemptions by family revenue
Exemption 
per child 
Tax-free area-based in square meter Exemption of 
smallest tax 
Maximum tax payment (Ft/household)
No 
exemption
50 m2 100 m2 20,000 
Ft/year
50,000
Ft/year
100,000
Ft/year
Tax due Ft Tax due Ft
10 81,954 23,702 1,264 1,000 77,788 85,875 87,370 
15 79,251 22,076 1,090 2,000 77,686 85,773 87,267 
20 76,581 20,919 1,004 3,000 77,652 85,739 87,233 
Note:  Th e tax rate based on area-based valuation used in the tables is 250 Ft per square meter, while the 
value-based tax rate is 1.25 percent of corrected market value.
Source: Balás and Kovács 1999.
 
Impact Analysis and the Willingness to Pay
Th e most diﬃ  cult task is to estimate in advance citizens’ willingness to pay due taxes. 
Th is estimate is the most uncertain part of the impact analysis. Indirect tools are in place 
to study residents’ willingness and resistance to pay and the reasons behind them, so a 
communication strategy can be designed to persuade residents to pay. In practice local 
governments and public service companies often build the costs of arrears into their price, 
so they punish those who pay instead of those who don’t. When designing taxation, if the 
local government takes into consideration the citizens’ willingness to pay, and if it designs 
fair exemptions for those in needs, then imposing measures against those who do not pay 
is important. Otherwise tax morale will deteriorate.
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Political Decision Challenges: Approving the Tax Ordinance
A local tax ordinance must regulate a new taxation scheme, and the local government 
assembly must approve it. As mentioned, mostly political fear of the assembly, rather than 
the lack of technical or legal conditions, prevents the introduction of a residential property 
tax. Should a local government want to introduce value-based property taxation, then the 
local tax ordinance must cover the basic tax rules, tax dynamics, and a method of property-
value appraisal. Because of the aforementioned shortcomings in the legislative framework, 
the local tax ordinance must deﬁ ne rules for estimation of market value. For instance, one 
can state that in tax-base appraisal, the local government ﬁ rst calculates an average market 
value for the municipality based on current real estate prices, then applies correction factors 
stipulated in the ordinance.
Given that appeals may challenge the appraised market values of properties, the appraisal 
formula and rules must be very precise. Making the formula public is also important, even 
if it is not part of the ordinance, given that it may not have been completed by that time. In 
Canada, for instance, taxpayers can use computers accessible in the mayors’ oﬃ  ces to get tax 
information, ensuring that the process is open and transparent. Th e ordinance must clearly 
spell out all key issues concerning property appraisal: the annual correction method and 
its limits, the establishment and maintenance of the property-related information system, 
the upgrading of the formula every four to ﬁ ve years, the conditions of indexing, and the 
handling of unacceptably large shifts.
Recommendations
Th e above results support two sets of conclusions: recommendations for local governments 
and for central government organs responsible for changing the legal framework for local 
taxation.
 
Recommendations for Local Governments
Th e merits of value-based property taxation are profound, tested, and reassured in the daily 
practice of developed economies. Experiences in transition economies show, however, that 
legal and policy shortcomings, political awareness, and also historical and cultural traditions 
from the previous regimes have prevented the use of value-based property taxation, despite 
its strong revenue potential. Th ese countries, and Hungary in particular, are more and more 
open to the eﬀ ective use of this taxation scheme, whose success depends greatly on deﬁ ning 
a simple, equitable, transparent, and well-communicated system.
 Th e local assembly or local political leadership ought to determine the expected 
amount of tax revenue, while taking into account the socio-economic priorities, the 
acceptable tax burden, and tax preferences.
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 Th e calculated property value, based on a simple mass appraisal formula (presented in 
this chapter) could be a useful tool in appraising property. Th e formula and the process 
of appraisal must be well articulated and transparent to receive public recognition and 
support, which is also critical to reduce the likelihood of successful appeals and mass 
reduction of announced due taxes.
 An impact analysis based on simulation modeling is instrumental to deﬁ ne a suitable 
appraisal formula; to test the parameters of a fair and aﬀ ordable taxation; to test the 
potential eﬀ ects on various social groups, and to deﬁ ne the principles, target groups, 
and methods of tax preferences and exemptions. Th ese procedures are time-consuming; 
hence, the new tax could be successful only if preparations begin at least one year before 
the planned introduction.
Recommendations for Changing the Legal Framework
Although current regulations allow for the introduction of value-based property taxation, 
several modiﬁ cations of the legislative framework would increase local governments’ ability 
and willingness to introduce this form of taxation.
 Th e law must deﬁ ne the term “market value” more precisely to allow the use of mass 
appraisal and formula-based calculated value. Current legislation conceptually allows 
these, saying that market value should be estimated in compliance with the rules of the 
Law on Duty. Th e latter evidently prescribes a market-conforming estimation, but the 
present cross-reference might be insuﬃ  cient to prevent mass appeals and to maintain 
maximum ﬂ exibility for local governments. Th e law should state that the elaboration 
of an appraisal formula is the right of the local governments. Self-appraisal should be 
stipulated as a supplementary method. Th is method could be instrumental in small 
settlements that lack appraisal capacity but have greater local control.
 Th e law should enable and force the land cadastre, the duty oﬃ  ces, and the local public 
administration (for example, building authority) to share their datasets about local real 
estate (see also chapters 16 and 21) for taxation purposes, among other things. 
 Th e legal framework of an inheritance tax should be introduced. Elderly people living 
in valuable housing units represent a critical group in property taxation. Countries with 
developed property tax systems have solved this problem by creating the inheritance 
tax category, so instead of granting tax exemptions, they defer the tax obligations to the 
heirs or new owners.
 Collection of local taxes should be made more even. Currently, local taxes are due twice 
a year (March 15 and September 15), and these payments are often simultaneous with 
other tax payments (for example, mandatory insurance). Adjusting the law to make 
possible a more even distribution of tax payments would make it easier to collect and 
increase local tax revenues.
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 Th e central government, as a matter of policy, needs to support increased autonomy in 
local income generation. Local taxes need to be well positioned in the overall taxation 
framework. For example, the central government should seriously consider reducing 
several central taxes, such as the personal income tax and the value added tax, the latter 
unavoidable on membership in the EU.
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A strong tradition of public provision of services has remained the last resort of public 
ownership during and after the political system transition in eastern Europe. Th e inherited 
views about the nature, role, organizational setup, and ﬁ nancing of public services have 
served as theoretical and political underpinnings for the policies to keep the provision of 
these services under municipal or state ownership and strong central control. Far ahead of 
its neighbors, Hungary has decentralized and transferred to mixed or private ownership the 
vast majority of public services, but numerous challenges remain.
Th is chapter summarizes the conceptual framework for modern service provision. 
Although no sole optimal solution exists, following the principle to provide services 
in the most eﬃ  cient organizational, ownership, management, ﬁ nancing, and regulatory 
framework is crucial.
Issues and Choices
In dismantling the socialist state in Hungary, both the central and local governments had 
to decide what types of activity should remain in the public sector (that is, they had to 
distinguish between those that involve an element of public service and those that are 
truly commercial). Th e general principle of a mixed economy is that government should be 
involved in managing a service only if some public interest is at stake.
* Th is chapter is based on Davey 1998c.
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Local Public Services
Reformers are tempted to hold onto public ownership of a purely commercial enterprise 
because it is proﬁ table, but doing so presents at least two dangers: ﬁ rst, that the enterprise 
will compete unfairly with the private sector (because, for example, it gets some overhead 
services free) and, second, that its proﬁ ts come at the expense of poor service or high costs 
to its customers. Th e general principle in Europe is that municipalities should not engage 
in commercial activity, except when it is ancillary to a genuinely public service (for example, 
a snack bar at a swimming pool). 
Th e ﬁ rst question, therefore, is whether a task or a service should remain within the 
public sector. What is a public service? Most analysts agree that public services fall into 
four, often overlapping, categories:
 Services that beneﬁ t everyone indiscriminately, so that charging is impossible, for 
example, policing, ﬁ re protection, roads and street lighting (except when access can be 
restricted to payers), parks, and environmental health control
 Services that are provided to individuals, but that have wider beneﬁ ts to society, for 
example, education, medical care (for disease protection purposes), sewerage, waste 
disposal, and in some circumstances, public transportation
 Services that are essential to quality of life and require such heavy investment that mono-
poly provision is likely, and for which people can be exploited because they depend on 
the service and have no choice of supplier—piped water supply is the prime example
 Services that are essential to the quality of life but that are too expensive for low-
income groups if left purely to market provision—public transportation to work or 
schooling and recreational facilities may be examples.
 
Although these principles are clear, their precise application is not. Whether a service 
has a wider beneﬁ t to society or is essential to the quality of life is a matter of judgment. 
Sometimes these judgments are made at the national level, sometimes locally. Parliament 
may stipulate a national entitlement to basic and secondary education, but each municipality 
may decide how far nursery education constitutes a public service.
Public Service Provision
If a municipality deﬁ nes a service as public that service lies within the municipal 
competence, the next question is how best to provide it. Traditionally, municipal budgetary 
organizations have carried out most local public services. Many Hungarian municipalities, 
however, are now transferring service functions to diﬀ erent types of companies that are 
being established with varying degrees of municipal ownership and control.
Although municipalities are responsible for ensuring that a service is provided, they 
do not need to provide it through organizations they own or control directly. Private 
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enterprises, some of them under foreign ownership, are becoming involved in the provision 
of local public services, sometimes as partners in a joint venture, sometimes as contractors. 
Nonproﬁ t organizations oﬀ er further options for the management of educational, cultural, 
and social services; the growth of nongovernmental organizations is increasingly providing 
municipalities with scope for new partnerships in these spheres of activity.
Using private organizations to deliver public services has one major theoretical 
advantage. If a municipality provides a service through its own organization, it is faced with 
a conﬂ ict between its duty to provide a satisfactory level of public services at a reasonable 
cost and its interests as owner of the assets and employer (directly or indirectly) of the 
staﬀ  involved. Municipalities can avoid this conﬂ ict of interest completely only if services 
are delivered by external organizations and the municipality restricts its role to regulating, 
monitoring, and when necessary, subsidizing their activity. Involving more than one 
supplier of a service also has potential advantages because competition gives consumers 
some choice between alternatives.
Th is situation is, however, the ideal one. Its success depends on conditions that may be 
hard to achieve or may take time to develop. Th ese include, critically, the following:
 Th e existence of private organizations—commercial or nonproﬁ t—willing and able to 
undertake delivery of public services, preferably in competition with each other
 Th e capacity of the municipality to award contracts and regulate and monitor the 
performance of external organizations in an eﬀ ective and transparent manner.
Municipalities may need to consider a range of alternative forms of organization for 
their services, including municipal subsidiaries, commercial companies, and nonproﬁ t 
organizations.
Organizational Choices
Th is section discusses the way in which choices between types of organization and legal 
relationship can best preserve the public interest. Th e discussion is divided into two parts. 
Th e ﬁ rst part looks at provision of services under direct municipal control and discusses 
the respective advantages of: (a) municipal organizations (departments and budgetary 
institutions) and (b) municipally owned companies. Th e second part discusses the choice 
between municipally controlled organizations (that is, companies in which municipalities 
have few or no shares) and external organizations (that is, nonproﬁ t organizations).
Choices between Municipal Organizations and Municipal Companies
Assuming that a municipality wants to maintain provision of a public service within 
its direct control, is it preferable to delegate it to an internal municipal organization 
(department or budgetary organization) or to a municipally owned company?
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Th e biggest practical diﬀ erences between companies and budgetary organizations lie in 
employment, property ownership, and investment. Companies are not subject to any special 
restrictions on the terms and conditions they oﬀ er to staﬀ  and can, therefore, compete in the 
market for technical, managerial, and professional skills. As with all potential advantages, 
this feature carries a corresponding risk of nepotism. Higher remuneration for a company’s 
staﬀ  can simply push up its costs, leading to higher tariﬀ s, poorer services, or both.
Responsibility for the maintenance and renewal of assets is more clearly deﬁ ned 
when a municipality entrusts a service to a company. Municipal assets used in a service 
undertaken by a company must either be transferred or leased to it by a formal agreement 
that provides for the payment of rent and deﬁ nes responsibility for maintenance and repair. 
(Th is requirement for transfer or lease does not necessarily apply to a purely management 
contract, in which the company does not retain the operating revenue.)
Delegation to a company potentially improves the prospects of investment. A company 
is free to raise capital for the expansion or improvement of the assets, although at some risk 
to the municipality if the municipality’s assets are pledged as collateral or if it is used as a 
guarantor. Bringing in private entrepreneurs either as joint or sole owners may also attract 
investment capital, a major reason for the prevalence of joint ventures in the ﬁ eld of waste 
management.
Company management also provides a framework for achieving greater economies of 
scale. Th is consideration is important given the wide variation in the size of municipalities. 
Several options exist. Joint ownership by several municipalities allows a single operation to 
serve a wider catchment area. A company owned by one municipality can be contracted to 
serve or manage the facilities of smaller, neighboring jurisdictions.
Quite apart from their legal and technical characteristics, companies have a more 
entrepreneurial ethos. Th is ethos derives not only from their greater freedom in recruiting 
and rewarding staﬀ , but also from their popular association with the world of business. Th is 
can encourage greater eﬃ  ciency, a sense of self-dependence, a willingness to innovate, and 
a more positive attitude toward their customers.
Again, however, these potential advantages carry corresponding risks. Companies may 
lose a sense of public service. Th ey may focus too much attention on the consumers who 
provide the most revenue and neglect others. Bus companies may neglect unproﬁ table, 
often rural, routes; utility suppliers may be slow in connecting or repairing services to low-
revenue or remote consumers. Monopoly may encourage insensitivity and ineﬃ  ciency.
Risks of corruption and nepotism arise if the ownership of a company is predominantly 
municipal and its direction is concentrated in the hands of the political leadership. Th e 
relative autonomy of the company may simply allow its board members and directors to 
avoid the transparent scrutiny under which the more direct forms of municipal organization 
must operate.
Th ese dangers can be overcome if municipalities make companies accountable for 
clearly deﬁ ned outputs and standards. External participation in ownership can dilute the 
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opportunities for nepotism. Direction and board membership can be entrusted to persons 
independent of the political leadership. Competition, when possible, can help to maintain 
both eﬃ  ciency and quality. When necessary, municipalities can ensure that citizens get 
equal access to services by providing targeted subsidies solely for serving disadvantaged 
customers. But all these processes require that the municipal oﬃ  ce has the executive 
capacity to specify and enforce eﬀ ective contractual relationships with the companies.
Two additional risks attached to the establishment of companies are redundancy 
(outliving their original purpose) and insolvency. Closing down a company when it is 
mismanaged, bankrupt, or simply no longer necessary takes time and eﬀ ort, particularly in 
the case of a joint stock company. Municipal organizations can be abolished overnight.
If a company is at risk of bankruptcy, a founding municipality may stand to lose the 
physical assets it contributed to the capital. Th is situation illustrates that contributing 
cash or know-how as initial capital is preferable to providing physical assets, which the 
municipality can instead lease to the company. Th is arrangement may not be possible when 
the company involves partnership with an external investor, and the municipality needs to 
contribute the physical assets to secure a controlling share of the equity. Th is situation may 
simply provide an additional argument for a municipality choosing to contract and lease 
assets to an essentially private company rather than retain ownership.
Choices between Municipal and External Providers
Th e second choice is between provision by municipally owned organizations or by external 
providers. Th e latter includes commercial companies and nonproﬁ t organizations and may 
include companies in which a municipality has a minority shareholding. External providers 
may provide services through service contracts, management contracts, leases, concessions, 
licenses, or unregulated operation.
Th e Role of Market Mechanisms
Underlying these choices is whether the public interest can best be served by administrative 
or market mechanisms. Direct provision by municipally managed organizations relies on 
traditional bureaucratic processes for making policies, supervising staﬀ , and controlling 
costs. Th e alternatives assume that market mechanisms of competition and choice will, at 
least in part, secure eﬃ  ciency and eﬀ ectiveness.
Reliance on market mechanisms is not conﬁ ned to private sector involvement. 
Municipally owned schools may compete with each other for pupils. Apartment owners 
may be able to choose between municipally and privately owned companies for estate 
management or central heating. In Britain municipal organizations compete with privately 
owned companies for service contracts to collect refuse, repair streets, maintain parks, and 
run sports centers.
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Th e Public Interest
Th is chapter starts from the assumption that a municipality’s duty to the public comes 
ﬁ rst, above its interest as an owner of property and an employer of staﬀ . Th e relative merits 
of direct and market provision in relation to the protection of the public interest should 
guide the choice of how to organize and manage public services. Five aspects of public 
service (access and coverage, price, quality, environmental impact, and service develop-
ment) are discussed below. Each discussion begins with an italicized deﬁ nition of the 
public interest.
Access and coverage—Essential public services should be adequate to meet demand and should be 
accessible to the whole population (for example, public transportation should not be conﬁ ned to 
proﬁ table routes, libraries and sports facilities should be open beyond general working hours, and 
recreational facilities should make provision for the disabled).
In theory, these objectives should best be served by direct municipal provision for two 
reasons. Th e ﬁ rst is its direct accountability to the public. Th e second is the absence of proﬁ t 
motive; a municipal organization should not be deterred from providing service, such as 
those noted above, to customers who cannot aﬀ ord to pay the full cost or whose needs are 
particularly expensive.
In practice, an external provider may improve service coverage simply through greater 
eﬃ  ciency, making resources go further. A municipality can insist on equality of access to 
services by a mixture of contract speciﬁ cations and targeted subsidies (or cross-subsidies). 
Certain types of service, particularly to socially and ethnically deprived groups, may reach 
their intended consumers only if provided through nongovernmental organizations that 
can develop acceptance and trust.
Price—Ineﬃ  ciency and overpricing because of monopoly provision should be avoided. Costs to 
consumers or taxpayers should be aﬀ ordable and reasonable. Subsidies should be conﬁ ned to cases of 
genuine individual need or wider public interest.
Th e discussion of quality will cover ways of making direct municipal provision more 
eﬃ  cient. Th ese methods include benchmarking to compare municipal costs with those 
of other providers, and delegation to cost centers, such as budgetary organizations or 
companies that have some freedom and incentive to deploy resources eﬃ  ciently.
Market competition through tendering and franchising should be a better guarantee 
of eﬃ  ciency. In the social and cultural service ﬁ eld, choosing nonproﬁ t organizations to 
provide services may also reduce cost, simply through the use of unpaid volunteers, either 
in service delivery or management.
Th e eﬃ  ciency of external contracting and franchising does depend, however, on the 
existence of genuine competition. Genuine competition means the presence of alternative 
providers in the external market, and an absence of nepotism in the award and supervision 
of contracts and franchises.
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Quality—Services should be of an acceptable standard deﬁ ned either by law or deliberate political 
choice. Performance should be monitored. Standards should apply both to the physical character of 
the service and the behavior of the staﬀ  providing it.
Direct accountability to the public and the absence of the proﬁ t motive should 
again help to ensure the quality of direct municipal provision. Th e additional danger that 
contractors will reduce quality to keep their prices competitive and maximize proﬁ t is 
always present.
In practice, external provision may be just as conducive to quality. Provision under 
contract or license will usually involve the speciﬁ cation and monitoring of performance 
standards, which are often absent from direct municipal provision. Competition may also 
oﬀ er the public a choice of provider, oﬀ ering both an incentive to performance and an 
opportunity to provide variety of service for diﬀ erent needs and tastes.
When services are contracted to companies or nonproﬁ t organizations operating 
regionally or nationally, they may also gain from experience and expertise that is not 
available to a purely local organization. Companies may bring innovation and new 
technology to services such as waste or leisure management, and nongovernmental 
organizations may bring newer, more eﬀ ective methods to the care of the disabled or the 
treatment of drug addiction and alcoholism. 
Environmental impact—Individual public services have an impact on the general quality of 
life and on a municipality’s economic competitiveness; improvements in public transportation, 
recreational facilities, or cleanliness may, for example, be critical to the attraction of new private 
investment.
Th at external contractors will ignore environmental standards to cut costs and increase 
proﬁ ts—particularly in sensitive ﬁ elds such as waste management—is clearly a risk. Th is 
risk can be avoided by strict speciﬁ cation and monitoring of standards, but such standards 
can be undermined by collusion between municipal oﬃ  cials and contractors.
Direct municipal provision does not necessarily avoid these risks because municipalities 
may have diﬃ  culty disciplining its own operations. Environmental regulators may more 
easily apply sanctions to an external organization than to their own employer. In either case 
the vigilance of public opinion is the best safeguard.
Service development—Public services should not stand still. Development of technical methods 
and human skills should be constant to reﬂ ect changes in demand (such as local age structure or 
economic activity), technology, and experience.
Changes in demand and potential supply have contradictory implications for the 
organization of local services. On the one hand, they favor the use of specialized external 
organizations, through contracting, concessions, or licensing. Such organizations can 
operate widely enough to accumulate and disseminate professional experience in fast-
moving markets such as waste or leisure management in ways rarely possible for an 
in-house agency rooted in a single town or subregion. On the other hand, contracts and 
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concessions can lock a municipality and its providers into an inﬂ exible pattern of services 
and costs enshrined in the basic agreements.
Only a few broad recommendations are possible in these respects. Th e ﬁ rst is the need 
to incorporate ﬂ exible provision for variations in the contractual agreements between 
municipalities and service organizations. Types, quantities, and standards of provision 
should be clearly speciﬁ ed, but procedures for amending them to ﬁ t new demands or 
methods should not be an obstacle.
Second, professional networks are extremely important. Municipalities need national 
or regional networks of specialists involved in the oversight of particular types of service and 
who inform one another of changes and innovations. Th ese networks might be organized 
through associations of municipalities or through professionals working for local govern-
ment. Service providers, whether municipal or commercial, also need networks, either at 
the level of the organizations or of the professionals working within them.
Nonproﬁ t Organizations
Th e use of foundations and other nonproﬁ t organizations has clear ﬁ nancial advantages 
in terms of their tax exemption and their ability to involve people who are willing to give 
services free or signiﬁ cantly below market rates. Foundations operating nationally may well 
provide economies of scale and a focus of expertise, particularly in very specialized ﬁ elds 
such as care of the disabled.
Risks are also present. Leaders of nonproﬁ t organizations are very committed people 
who have strong opinions that can weaken their accountability to the municipality, 
particularly if they are giving their personal services without charge. Th ey can be committed 
to types and standards of provision that the municipality cannot aﬀ ord or that diﬀ er from 
majority preference. Partnerships with nonproﬁ t organizations may be highly beneﬁ cial, 
but dogged by controversy.
Financial Relationship
Th e ﬁ nancial aspects of local public service provision are just as important, and sometimes even 
more important, than their technical conditionalities. Th ere are four major areas of concern: 
whether municipal taxpayers or the consumers of services should cover the cost; how to 
account for various cost elements such as overhead, capital and ﬁ nancial costs; how to ensure 
eﬃ  ciency through cost allocation and control; and how to regulate the size and changes of 
tariﬀ s.
Taxpayers and Consumers
Th e descriptions in the previous sections reveal many diﬀ erences in the ﬁ nancial relations 
between municipalities and the organizations delivering local public services. At the heart 
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of these diﬀ erences lies the apportionment of cost between the taxpayer—met through the 
municipal budget—and the consumer—met through service charges and fees. At one end of 
the spectrum, all the service costs are met by the taxpayer. Th is relationship would be typical 
of a municipal department or a budgetary organization and would apply to services such as 
education, for which the municipal budget meets the entire cost (including revenue from 
government grant) and the service is free to the pupil. At the other end of the spectrum are 
services such as car parking, for which consumers pay all the costs. Th ese services are usually 
undertaken by companies, and the revenue may even subsidize other services. In the middle 
of the range are services for which subsidies from the municipal budget augment consumer 
charges, often the case with public transportation or waste management (that is, when costs 
are shared in varying proportions between taxpayers and consumers).
Who should pay for a particular service, taxpayer or consumer? Th is issue is basic. Of 
course, most consumers are also taxpayers. In which capacity they pay determines their share 
of the cost. If they pay for refuse collection through charges, their liability depends on the 
amount of refuse they produce. If they pay through municipal subsidy, their contribution 
depends on how much tax they pay, which depends in turn on the size of their income, the 
scale of their property, even perhaps the amount of beer they drink.
In distinguishing between the duties of consumers and taxpayers, two factors are basic: 
equity and eﬃ  ciency. Starting with equity, analysts normally categorize public services as 
private or public goods. 
A service is classiﬁ ed as a private good if it is possible to identify how much each 
consumer beneﬁ ts from it, so the amount of individual consumption must be measurable 
and exclusive (that is, others are excluded from any beneﬁ t). A domestic telephone can be 
called a private good because it is possible to measure and cost its use precisely and no one 
but the household has access to it.
A public good beneﬁ ts the public collectively and indiscriminately. Even if it can be 
broken down into individually costed units of service, the consumers cannot be identiﬁ ed 
accurately because it is diﬃ  cult to exclude anyone from beneﬁ t. Streets are a public good 
because anyone can walk or drive on them. Th us, a private good should be charged to the 
consumer, and a public good should be funded by taxes.
Th ese principles are easier to state than to apply, however. For some services individual 
consumption can be measured and costed, but those services also confer some wider beneﬁ t 
on society. Having a literate population and people with speciﬁ c skills is in the public 
interest, so education is publicly funded. Other services are individually consumed but may 
be regarded as essential human needs of which individuals should not be deprived through 
poverty, so housing for those unable to meet its full costs is publicly subsidized. Still other 
services have a degree of subsidy that is primarily aimed to encourage consumption; public 
transportation is a prime example.
Eﬃ  ciency is the second important consideration. A correct balance between individual 
and collective payment for a service is essential to ensure the best use of resources. Some 
services require individual charging to discipline consumption of an expensive resource, 
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so supplies of water and heating are individually metered and charged. In some cases, 
however, some subsidy may be needed to ensure that individuals use a service suﬃ  ciently 
for the wider public interest. Public transportation may be subsidized from taxes to attract 
passengers who would otherwise add to pollution and congestion by using cars.
Th ese principles lead to a range of practices:
 Full funding by the municipal budget when the beneﬁ ts of a service are entirely 
collective (for example, street lighting or environmental health)
 Full charging to consumers when the beneﬁ t is entirely private (which might involve 
charging above direct costs when individual use needs to be discouraged in the public 
interest, city center parking being a prime example)
 A combination of budget subsidies and consumer charges when the balance of 
individual and collective beneﬁ ts depends on the respective strength of public and 
private interest and the need to encourage or restrain consumption
 Consumer charging but with targeted subsidies when beneﬁ ts are individual but 
essential to basic human need.
Th e Calculation of Costs
Apportioning costs fairly and eﬃ  ciently between taxpayers and consumers (and between 
individual consumers) depends on measuring them accurately and comprehensively. Th is 
requirement raises three major issues: (a) the charging of overhead and common service 
costs, (b) the treatment of capital costs, and (c) the diﬀ erence between the average cost of a 
service and that of individual units.
Overhead and Common Service Costs
Many service organizations provide several services. Th eir budgets may show the costs 
of individual sections dealing with speciﬁ c services, but certain expenses may be pooled. 
Th ese pooled expenses are likely to include the costs of central management, shared inputs 
such as energy or telephones, and common services, such as vehicle maintenance, stores, 
or accounting. Th e costs of individual services cannot be accurately identiﬁ ed unless the 
shared costs are divided between them.
Th e simplest solution is to apportion the central service costs to individual activities 
in proportion to their share of total expenditure. A more accurate solution is to apportion 
the costs according to each activity’s use of the central services. For example, the costs 
of the ﬁ nance department should be apportioned according to the total of each activity’s 
revenue as well as expenditure, because it probably devotes as much attention to revenue 
transactions as to expenditure.
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Th e Costs of Capital
Th e second issue is whether capital investment costs are included and, if so, on what 
basis. Service organizations may not reﬂ ect capital costs in their budgets and accounts 
(and consequently in their consumer charges) because these costs have been met (usually 
from general revenue) by the parent municipality or from loans that have been discharged. 
Any true calculation of costs, however, should include the capital costs of assets employed; 
even if these costs have been fully discharged, making provision for their depreciation and 
replacement is wise.
Capital costs may be calculated in a number of ways, including:
 Debt amortization—which reﬂ ects the actual annual costs of repayment of loans taken 
to ﬁ nance construction or purchase of assets together with interest charges
 Depreciation—in which the value of the assets is reduced in the accounts by 
annual installments over their estimated life, the notional cost being charged as an 
expenditure
 Asset rental—by which the service budget is charged with an annual payment of rent to 
the owner of the assets employed (normally the municipality); the rent would usually 
be calculated on the basis of a market rate of return on the asset value.
 
One major issue is whether the annual charging of capital costs of assets should be based 
on their historical costs or current replacement costs. Charging amortization, depreciation, 
or asset rental on the basis of the historical costs may reimburse the municipality for 
its actual cash outlay, but it does not prepare the ground for the renewal of assets when 
necessary. Regular charging on the basis of current replacement costs has two advantages: it 
builds reserves to help ﬁ nance, and it avoids a radical increase in annual costs and charges 
when renewal takes place.
Pooled or Individual Service Costs
Th e third issue is whether costs are calculated according to the actual expense of a unit 
of service or as a pooled average. Th e actual costs of an identical level of service may vary 
considerably. Amortization of capital costs will vary with the age of the asset and interest 
rates prevailing at the time of construction. Supplying heating to outlying areas will cost 
more because of transmission costs (length of mains, leakage, pumping, and so forth). A 
small school will probably have higher overhead costs per pupil. A half-empty bus serving a 
sparsely populated area will cost almost as much to run as a crowded one in the city center; 
depreciation and labor costs may be almost constant, and fuel consumption will not be 
proportionately lower.
Should these diﬀ erences in unit costs be reﬂ ected in the calculation of costs and the 
consequent charges to users? Conﬂ icting arguments arise. If a service is a purely private 
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
294
good, some analysts argue in favor of charging each user the full cost of provision to him 
or her speciﬁ cally. If a factory chooses to locate in a remote and hilly place with excessive 
water pumping costs, these costs should be included in its water charges; the consequence 
may encourage it to locate in a cheaper place to supply. Th e opposing argument is that the 
circumstances which increase the cost of a service may not be of the consumer’s making. 
If they involve an essential service, a consumer should not be penalized if the costs are 
above average in his or her case. Poorer people driven to the outskirts of a town by land and 
housing costs should not have to pay extra fares for transportation to work or school.
Municipalities have generally chosen to charge uniformly: a single bus or metro fare for 
a whole city, a ﬂ at rent per square meter of apartment, a uniform charge per cubic meter of 
water. Th is uniformity may not be justiﬁ ed, however, when people or businesses voluntarily 
choose high-cost or low-density locations because it could involve cross-subsidization by 
consumers in less favorable environments.
Cost and Eﬃ  ciency
A municipality should be concerned that a public service is run eﬃ  ciently (that is, that the 
public gets the best possible value for the money it spends on a service, whether through 
taxes or charges). Th is goal may be reached by three possible means: (a) competition, (b) 
improved budgetary management, and (c) comparative performance measurement.
Competition
Inviting tenders to provide a service should ideally determine its market price. Competing 
companies (which can include those owned by municipalities) will vie with each other to 
oﬀ er either the cheapest service or the best combination of price and quality. Th is incentive 
to eﬃ  ciency will apply also in cases in which companies undertake a management contract 
on a proﬁ t-sharing basis.
Whether public tendering actually secures eﬃ  ciency depends on genuine competition. 
Th e market must have alternative providers, each capable of undertaking the work and 
willing to compete for it. Th e process of awarding the contract must be transparent, and 
the municipality must have the technical capacity to monitor performance and enforce its 
provisions. Th e municipality may also face  dangers that quality will suﬀ er in the eﬀ ort to 
keep costs down. Th is risk underlines the importance of specifying quality standards in the 
tender and monitoring delivery.
Improved Budgetary Management
If no competitive process is in place, cost eﬃ  ciency will depend on the system of budgeting 
and budgetary control. Th e system has at least four aspects that aﬀ ect eﬃ  ciency. Each is 
described below.
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Discretion given to the service organizations—Does the municipality control its 
expenditure by line item? Does it determine how much it can spend on salaries, transporta-
tion, energy, equipment, and so forth? Or does it provide a lump sum that the organization 
can allocate between cost elements at its own discretion? (If lump-sum provision is made, 
organizations may still have to present line item estimates to justify the total amount.)
Line-item control may be useful in avoiding unnecessary expenditure on aspects 
attractive to service managers (for example, staﬃ  ng, hospitality, furniture). Experience 
generally suggests, however, that lump-sum provision increases overall eﬃ  ciency, partly 
because operating managers know best where savings can be made and because they have 
an incentive to make compensating savings in cases where overruns are inevitable for a 
particular item. Th ey may, for example, defer some non-urgent repairs if a severe winter 
increases heating costs. Lump-sum provision can still be accompanied by some controls 
over detail, such as the need to secure municipal approval to increasing staﬃ  ng levels or 
bonus payments.
Determination of annual increases in budgeted expenditure—Traditionally, public authori-
ties take an incremental approach to annual budgeting. Th ey take the previous year’s 
budget as the baseline and apply all the scrutiny to the margin of increase (rate of inﬂ ation, 
proposed growth in items such as staﬃ  ng, and so forth). Th e municipality determines its 
growth items in a bargaining process in which it juggles with its revenue forecasts, on the 
one hand, and the competing demands of diﬀ erent service organizations, on the other.
Th e incremental approach presents several problems. Final allocations depend heavily 
on the political weight of the individual organizations within the municipality. Th ey do not 
reﬂ ect the service outputs required by public demand (for example, how far the percentage 
increase in waste management costs corresponds with the percentage increase in refuse 
collected). Funds are allocated basically on the basis of what was done last year, not on what 
is needed now. Service provision becomes stale and ineﬃ  cient because providers have no 
incentive to control costs or improve working practices.
Th e alternative is some form of zero-based budgeting. Budget planners ignore previous 
provisions and construct a fresh budget on the basis of the current demand for a service, the 
resultant output, and its cost. A zero-based system is valuable in establishing a new budget 
baseline. It is a time consuming process, however, involving complex data analysis and 
argument over levels of demand and response. Two intermediate approaches to budgeting 
are possible. One generally uses the incremental approach, but applies zero-base analysis 
selectively, perhaps taking a few areas of expenditure each year. Th e second approach also 
uses the incremental base but adds a few output and unit-cost measures to compare the 
growth of expenditure with service performed (for example, the number of library books 
purchased or loaned, the number and unit cost of swimming pool admissions). Th is method 
would highlight areas in which costs were growing without commensurate increases in 
workload.
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Treatment of year end balances—If an organization underspends its budget, can the 
balances be carried over to the next year? Without some system of retention, service 
providers have no incentive for eﬃ  ciency; organizations are encouraged to spend unused 
funds on low-priority objects at the end of the budget year. Discretion to retain and use 
such balances usually enhances eﬃ  ciency, but subject to two restrictions. First, the right to 
award staﬀ  beneﬁ ts (bonuses and so forth) needs to be restricted or staﬀ  will be encouraged 
to reduce service to the public to beneﬁ t themselves. Second, one-oﬀ  savings should not 
be used to ﬁ nance expenditure that would increase regular commitments (extra staﬀ , for 
example).
Distributing funds between parallel organizations—Th is situation arises particularly in 
the case of schools, but in larger towns it could apply to other institutions, such as housing 
estate maintenance, social care homes, or leisure centers. Th e question is whether allocation 
to individual institutions is based on historical costs or some formula.
If historical costs are used, the treatment of individual institutions may be inequitable. 
One school is able to oﬀ er more activities and facilities than another simply because it 
has always been treated more favorably, its parents are more inﬂ uential, or its director is 
better connected politically. Using a formula has an advantage because a formula basically 
distributes funds between institutions on the basis of their clientele—the number of pupils 
in schools, residents in social care homes, and so forth. Planners would have to take care, 
however, to compensate for genuine and objective diﬀ erences in running costs, for example, 
variations in energy and repair cost due to the age and construction type of building.
Substituting formula distribution for an historical base may involve a substantial 
redistribution of funding between institutions, which in turn may call for a transitional 
system to phase in the changes over a number of years, so the losers are allowed to adjust 
their expenditure gradually. Some form of limit, say 5 percent, might be applied to the gains 
and losses of an individual unit in a single budget year.
Formula funding can leave small units in a ﬁ nancially weak position because of their 
relatively high overhead costs. If a municipality is making deliberate policy to retain the 
smaller units—village schools, for example—the formula might contain two elements: a 
ﬁ xed lump-sum to cover overheads and a variable addition depending on clientele.
Comparative Measurement
A further instrument in promoting cost eﬃ  ciency is benchmarking. Th is procedure involves 
comparing the costs of similar services as provided by diﬀ erent municipalities. Th ese costs 
are usually compiled per unit (for example, cost per ton of refuse collected, per kilometer of 
road or hectare of park maintained, per cubic meter of water supplied, and so forth). Such 
comparisons may well direct attention to particular services in particular municipalities that 
are run at costs signiﬁ cantly above average.
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Benchmarking has two problems. Th e ﬁ rst is securing comparable data. For reasons 
discussed above, service-cost records of diﬀ erent municipal organizations may vary 
extensively in the extent to which they reﬂ ect the costs of capital or of overhead and central 
services. Second, higher costs may reﬂ ect greater quality rather than ineﬃ  ciency. Intro-
ducing cost comparisons will require eﬀ orts to achieve greater uniformity in accounting 
standards. Variations in costs also need to be investigated to distinguish between diﬀ erences 
in provision and in working practices.
Such comparisons and investigations have been the basis of the many studies of value 
for money and good practice published by the British Audit Commission. Its experience 
has shown that benchmarking can lead to substantial improvements in working practice, 
but only on the basis of careful comparative analysis.
Tariﬀ  Regulation
An earlier section argued that consumer charges should pay for services that beneﬁ t 
individuals exclusively, so long as their individual consumption can be measured. Th e 
general rule, therefore, would be that tariﬀ s should be set at a level suﬃ  cient to meet all 
costs, both capital and operating.
Municipal Subsidy
Exceptions to the principle of full cost recovery would arise when the following conditions 
occur:
 Individual consumption carries wider public beneﬁ t, as in the case of education or, 
sometimes, public transportation
 Poorer people would be unable to meet the full costs of a service that is a basic human 
necessity, such as housing.
 
In the ﬁ rst case, contributing to service costs from general municipal revenues is logical 
so that all consumers enjoy the reduction in charges. In some cases, such as schooling, taxes 
might fund the service in full. In others, the tariﬀ  might be set low enough to enable and 
encourage everyone to use the service.
In the second case, a general reduction in tariﬀ s would not be justiﬁ ed and municipal 
subsidy would be restricted to the speciﬁ c cases of need. Th ese cases would basically assist 
poorer sections of society, but subsidies might also be targeted to communities where 
services were exceptionally costly for reasons beyond their control.
In the case of bus services, for example, a municipality might want to subsidize the 
following:
 Services to and from a particular area (for example, certain villages outside a main 
town)
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 Services at particular times (for example, early morning services for people traveling to 
town for work or school)
 Services for particular clients (for example, reduced fares for the elderly or school-
children).
Bus companies would be expected to charge for other services at full cost, but would 
be invited to tender for the amount of subsidy they would need to operate these particular 
loss-making services.
Capital Costs
Municipalities frequently subsidize a service by meeting capital investment costs directly 
through the municipal budget and leaving the service organization to fund operation and 
maintenance from charges. Th is arrangement creates two problems. First, it may impose 
a very large and lumpy cost on the municipal budget in one year. Second, the relief from 
capital costs will be enjoyed by all consumers, whether they can aﬀ ord them or not.
A better method is for capital costs to be charged to the service organization either 
directly or through an asset rent or depreciation charge paid to the municipality. Th e latter 
will help the municipality amortize any loan it may have used to fund the investment. If 
capital costs result in an unaﬀ ordable user charge, the municipality may reduce it through 
an operating subsidy. But this approach will provide an opportunity to target the subsidy 
more fairly and eﬃ  ciently.
Charging Above Cost
In some cases setting tariﬀ s above the level necessary to recover the capital and operating 
costs of service is justiﬁ able. Th e ﬁ rst case would be if the municipality wanted to discourage 
consumption of a service because of its indirect costs or to restrain consumption levels. An 
example might be town center car parking. Th e tariﬀ  variation must meet its objective. 
Some car parking tariﬀ s, for example, penalize only long-term parking; high charges for 
duration over, say, ﬁ ve hours discourage people commuting to work by car at peak hours 
without discouraging others who visit the town center for shorter midday or evening 
periods for shopping or entertainment.
A second case arises when a municipality is selling an essentially commercial service 
that is also available from the private sector. Generally speaking, municipal organizations 
should not compete for purely commercial activity, but such services may be ancillary to a 
public service, such as the café at a sports center. Th ey have every reason to charge what the 
market can bear, and undercutting private competitors simply because capital or overhead 
costs have been met by other means would be wrong.
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Tariﬀ  Adjustment
Th e health of a municipal service requires that its tariﬀ s be adjusted regularly to take 
account of inﬂ ation and other cost variations. If tariﬀ s remain unchanged for several years, 
service funding deteriorates and, with it, service quality. Major increases are then necessary, 
but are politically unpopular both because of their scale and because of the poor standard 
of service.
Conclusions
Th e arguments in the previous paragraphs generally favor either of the following:
 External provision of local public services under contract or concession or 
 A mixed economy in which municipal and private organizations provide services in 
some form of competition (that is, in parallel oﬀ ering public choice or competitive 
tender).
 
In both cases, the municipality retains a clear responsibility to set standards, monitor 
performance, and subsidize service operators when justiﬁ ed by the general public interest 
or social justice.
Th e potential advantages of external provision or a mixed economy lie in: (a) competi-
tion, (b) speciﬁ cation of outputs and standards, (c) transparent arm’s length regulation of 
performance, and (d) access to external experience and expertise. Th ese advantages can be 
realized only under favorable circumstances, however, such as the following:
 Competition depends on the existence of alternative providers in the market and an 
absence of collusion and nepotism inﬂ uencing municipal choices.
 Speciﬁ cation of outputs and standards requires expertise within the municipal oﬃ  ce or 
access to independent external advice in drawing up tenders, concessions, and so forth
 Regulation of performance requires skills and integrity on the part of municipal oﬃ  ce 
staﬀ , or professional assistance from an independent source.
 Access to external experience and expertise assumes that private companies, non-
governmental organizations, and so forth that have accumulated experience in running 
speciﬁ c services are available.
 
When these conditions are absent, direct provision by municipal organizations without 
competition may continue to be the only eﬀ ective option open to a municipality. Even so, 
developing a formal contractual relationship between the municipality and the institution 
or municipal company providing its services has advantages. Th ese advantages would be 
based on contracts or service agreements that specify outputs, standards, and the conditions 
for any subsidy, similar to those governing an external provider. Performance would be 
monitored by municipal oﬃ  ce staﬀ  or independent professional advisors and auditors.
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Delegation does not mean abdication of responsibility, however. Key roles remain for 
the municipality, at the levels both of the City General Assembly and the mayor’s oﬃ  ce.
First, municipalities must make choices about the type, level, and standard of service 
the delegated organization is expected to give. Th ese choices are political, and an eﬀ ective 
process by which elected oﬃ  cials consider them must be in place. Th e professional staﬀ  
who supervises the services, however, must also have an opportunity to give their opinions 
and advice.
Second, in most cases, municipalities must make choices about the ﬁ nancing of the 
service and how costs are to be divided between customer and taxpayer (that is, about 
the levels of consumer tariﬀ s and municipal budget subsidies, if any). Th ese decisions are 
ﬁ nancial and require careful analysis, but they are also political since they interact with the 
choices over levels and standards of services, and tariﬀ s are always politically sensitive.
Th ird, the mayor’s oﬃ  ce must have the professional capability to specify what is 
expected of the service providers and to supervise their performance. Th is oversight can be 
diﬃ  cult if the technical expertise is concentrated in the service organizations themselves, 
provides an added argument for cooperation between smaller municipalities in the delivery 
of services, and suggests a growing role for the provision of advisory services by associations 
of local governments and of professionals serving local government.
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15Contracting Out Municipal Services: Transparency, Procurement, and Price-setting Issues
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In recent decades, as a part of the trend toward the incorporation of cost concepts and 
competitive market principles into the provision of public services, a movement has been 
underway throughout the world to contract out more government services on a competitive 
basis. Almost every type of public service has been contracted out, including utilities, 
schools, prisons, and cemeteries.
Th is chapter addresses transparency, procurement, and price-setting issues related to 
contracting out public services from both a policy and practice perspective. Numerous 
interviews with local oﬃ  cials form part of this study, and are central to its analysis. We refer 
only to the case of Eger because the purpose of this chapter is to address overall policy issues 
rather than to provide critical analysis of the practices of particular cities. Brief comparative 
information is provided on European and U.S. experiences (see also Baar 1998). 
Principles of Contracting Out
A principal theory behind contracting out is that it decreases the cost and increases the 
quality of public services. Since government services involve large portions of national 
and local economies and employment, the pros and cons of contracting out have been the 
subject of a large body of literature. Th e switch from government provision to contracting 
out places local government in the role of regulator of the price and quality of services. 
When services are contracted out for a substantial period, price adjustments are required.
* Th is chapter is based on Baar 1999. 
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Contracting out has been actively advocated by international ﬁ nance organizations, 
including the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
the International Monetary Fund, and national governments, especially Great Britain, on 
the basis that it reduces the cost and increases the eﬃ  ciency of public services, and helps 
develop the private sector (Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997). By contrast, some scholars 
have reached mixed conclusions or have concluded that contracting out is no more eﬃ  cient 
than in-house provision of public services (Ascher 1987). Others have concluded that 
contracting out public services may serve other purposes, such as avoiding the constraints 
or rigidities associated with public provision of a service or decentralizing the blame for 
failures (Perry and Kendall 1997).
In fact, each type of public service has its own characteristics and demands its own 
set of strategies and institutions, which should be explored before contracting out is 
undertaken. For example, some services may be contracted out on a short-term competitive 
basis, but others require long-term contracts with price adjustments based on cost reviews. 
Contracting out has worked much better for some types of services than for others. 
Furthermore, the national and local institutional circumstances of various public services, 
relating to their level of eﬃ  ciency and corruption, diﬀ er greatly.
Although much of the literature cites the savings, substantial diﬀ erences are evident 
between contracting out public services that can be provided on a competitive basis, with 
periodic renewal of competition, and those services that require longer term monopoly 
provision. As a United Nations report notes: “Th e transfer of a public monopoly into 
private hands is not an ideal solution, as eﬃ  ciency gains might not be transferred to 
customers, but retained by the operator in the form of monopoly proﬁ ts” (UN 1995: 156). 
In this light, unbundling the various aspects of service provision and contracting out the 
portions that can be provided on a competitive basis make sense. Typically those portions 
are less capital intensive.
In the course of their eﬀ orts, various international organizations (for example, 
United Nations, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) have compiled lists of best practices in implementing contracting out 
policies. (See Caseates 1993; Council of State Governments 1993; OECD 1997; UN 1995; 
U.S. GAO 1997.) Th e following is a composite of criteria and procedural prerequisites 
based on criteria set forth in these reports.
 Secure top management and encourage reevaluation of tasks and processes.
 Focus on staﬀ  issues and consult with current employees.
 Specify service requirements in terms of outcomes or outputs.
 Monitor performance and foster cooperative relationships.
 Ensure valid comparisons, by considering all of the real costs and beneﬁ ts of contracting 
out.
 Evaluate in-house bids according to the same criteria as outside bids.
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 Foster competitive markets by selecting the appropriate size of contracts.
 – Develop and maintain the necessary skills to oversee contracting out. 
 – Use competitive public procurement procedures.
 – Establish an independent and competent review and regulatory mechanisms 
before privatizing.
 – Establish transparent procedures for public action. 
Contracting Out by Local Governments
During the socialist era, local governments served almost solely as agents of the central 
government with very little local revenue and discretion. Th e 1990 Act on Local 
Government granted substantial power and responsibility to local governments. Now, they 
are in a particularly diﬃ  cult position in regard to the provision of public services. Th ey must 
charge for services that were provided without charge for decades, upgrade service quality, 
and usually are required to make up for decades of deferred investment. Th ese steps need 
to be taken within the context of severe budget constraints (see chapter 7). Furthermore, a 
signiﬁ cant portion of the population cannot aﬀ ord to pay for services, trapping the service 
provider between cost recovery and welfare functions. Th e most extreme example is the case 
of low income and retired households served by district heating, which commonly costs 
more than half of household income in winter months.
Contracting Out Practices
Frequently local governments services contract out to private ﬁ rms on a competitive basis, 
for example, solid waste disposal, park and street maintenance, parking fee collection, and 
water provision. In addition, some cities have entered into long-term concession contracts 
(in the range of 20 years) for the operation of district heating. Most likely, contracting out 
will increase in the coming years because private ﬁ rms are often needed to obtain ﬁ nancing 
for capital improvements, which are necessary to maintain public services. Although 
contracting out to private ﬁ rms may be new in Hungary, outsourcing of many public 
services to semiautonomous publicly owned corporations has been a tradition.
Typically park maintenance services are divided into sections of the city and sub-
contracted out by section, resulting in numerous subcontractors for this service. (Th e 
typical length of such contracts is 3 to 5 years). Refuse collection services are commonly 
contracted out to foreign ﬁ rms when signiﬁ cant capital investments are required to create 
new disposal sites. In such cases, 15- to 25-year contracts are common, and about 10 
percent of all water services are contracted out to private investors. Interviewees commonly 
indicated that contracting out led to more eﬃ  cient provision of services, and under the 
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threat of organizational or ownership changes, municipally owned service providers 
operated in a more eﬃ  cient manner.
Institutional Incentives for Contracting Out
Although much of the world institutional and theoretical support for contracting out is 
based on the concept that such an approach is in itself more eﬃ  cient, in Hungary regulatory 
factors provide major economic incentives for contracting out. First, private enterprises 
can employ labor far more cheaply than public entities. Second, companies, unlike public 
entities, may be able to subcontract a substantial portion of their labor tasks to independent 
contractors and thus avoid social security payment requirements, which constitute about 
42 percent of wages. Depending on their bargaining power, workers at an independent 
contracting ﬁ rm may require that some of these savings be passed through to them. Such 
subcontractors are subject to the social security taxes that are not paid by their ﬁ rm, but 
can deduct business expense before calculating the tax. Unlike employers, independent 
contracting ﬁ rms can decide whether they will make social security contributions. Th ird, 
the independent contractor arrangements enable ﬁ rms to terminate their subcontractors 
at will. Fourth, companies may obtain refunds of their value added tax payments, but 
government entities cannot obtain a refund. Th is tax adds about 20 percent to the cost of 
local services.
Procurement Standards and Practice—Public Services Contracts 
Hungarian versus European Union Public Procurement Standards
Hungary has adopted detailed legislation on procurement standards, the 1995 Act on Public 
Procurement, modeled after the standards set forth in European Union (EU) procurement 
directives. In keeping with the price diﬀ erences between Hungary and western Europe, 
however, the contract sums that trigger coverage by the procurement law (thresholds) are 
far lower in Hungary (see table 15.1). In accordance with the Act on Public Procurement, 
the Hungarian thresholds are set forth in the annual Budget Act.
Th e Council on Public Procurement indicated that it has discussed raising the 
thresholds to EU levels. Although such a step may be literally consistent with EU policy, 
in practice it would exempt a segment of public services that are covered in the rest of the 
EU.
In addition, two other laws govern public procurements: section 4–10 of the 1991 Act 
on Concessions, which includes in its coverage contracts for the operation of local public 
utilities (section 1(d)) and section 11 of the 1995 Act on Water Management. Both of these 
acts contain additional tendering standards beyond those set forth in the Act on Public 
Procurement.
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Table 15.1 Coverage of the Act on Public Procurement
Type of Contract
 
Th resholds for coverage by procurement law, 1999
Hungarian standard EU standard
Ft million EURO EURO
Goods 16 62,600 400,000
Public services 8 31,300 600,000
Public works 32 125,200 5,000,000
Source: Council on Public Procurement data.
Th e Extent of Tendering Out
Th e Council on Public Procurement prepares reports on the volume of tendering by 
public agencies. Overall in 1997, tendered contracts equaled approximately 7 percent of 
government expenditures (Ft 291 billion of Ft 4,166 billion; see table 15.2). In the case 
of local governments tendered contracts equaled about 15 percent of total expenditures 
(Ft 135 billion of Ft 914 billion total municipal budget). 
Table 15.2 Public Procurement Contracts, 1997
Tendered contracts Amount of contracts awarded
Ft billion US$ million
Type of tender procedure
 Open procedures 209 1,000
 Invitation procedures 11 55
 Negotiated procedures 74 350
Level of government
 Municipalities 135 675
 Public service providers 81 405
 Central budgetary organizations 55 275
 Other 20 100
Type of contract
 Products 108 540
 Construction 135 675
 Services 48 240
Note:  Th e totals in the tables diﬀ er slightly due to rounding.
Source: Council on Public Procurement, database. 
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Th e Council on Public Procurement
Th e act (in part II, sections 11–23) provides for a Council on Public Procurement which 
monitors the implementation of the law by local and national agencies.  Th e council has a 
staﬀ  of 12 full-time arbitrators, who review complaints. Th e arbitration committee received 
267 complaints in 1997. According to council staﬀ , most of the complaints involved claims 
that a local government failed to follow its own criteria in awarding a contract.
In a recent report the council commented that in Hungary—and such is the case in 
the other countries in the region—budget entities particularly lack the trained staﬀ  needed 
for a professional management of public procurement. Th is is particularly relevant in the 
case of small local governments and smaller budgetary institutions (Council on Public 
Procurement 1998). 
Public Services Contracts—Exemptions from the Act on Public Procurement
Although the act applies to public procurement generally, several key information sources 
indicated that commonly it is not applied to contracts for the provision of services that are 
supported solely by user fees (see section 9(1)). Th e exemption is based on the concept that 
the contracting public agency does not provide any consideration for the service; instead, 
the service is paid for by private citizens.
In reality the principal exemptions created by this provision are for solid waste services 
supported solely by user fees. (If the service is partly paid for from user fees and partly 
subsidized, it is covered by the procurement act.) Furthermore, although a contract with a 
private company to provide user-fee-funded services is exempted from the procurement law, 
purchase activities of that private company (for example, the purchase of trucks by a waste 
disposal company pursuant to the performance of public service) is covered. A separate act 
covers contracting out of refuse collection and chimney services (Act on Refuse Collection 
and Chimney Services 1995), but it does not set forth standards for these tenders.
In some interviews directors of municipally owned companies indicated that the 
activities of their companies were not covered by the procurement legislation and that 
their subcontracting for public services was not subject to the procurement act. Other 
knowledgeable sources indicated that localities were claiming exemptions on the basis 
that under the Act on Public Procurement “public service providing activity” covers 
only activities “qualiﬁ ed ...by-law as public service, activity provided by an institution 
in the public service, public utility or communal service” (Act on Public Procurement, 
section 10(e)). One procurement expert indicated that the central and local governments 
commonly conclude that transfers of public services to private not-for-proﬁ t organizations 
are not subject to procurement requirements based on the concept that the service is for 
a third party rather than for the government. Th erefore, under this concept, the contracts 
do not involve public purchases of products or services (the government agency is giving a 
quasi donation to the not-for-proﬁ t organization rather than paying for its service).
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In our opinion, exemptions for public service contracts from procurement requirements 
are contrary to the purposes of the procurement legislation which include “...establishing 
the transparency of the use of public funds and its wide-ranging public controllability; 
furthermore, providing for the purity of competition in the course of public procurement...” 
(Act on Public Procurement; “Introduction”). Th e concept that there should be an 
exemption or a less stringent procurement rule because the payment for a public service 
comes directly from the private users rather than with public funds or that the service goes 
directly from the private company to the user exalts form over substance. Funds for all 
services come from taxes or fees paid by private individuals. Furthermore, in the case of a 
public service performed by a private contractor, the latter has received a monopoly position 
from the public sector with economic value which certainly implies a form of consideration. 
Th e interests of the public in securing the beneﬁ ts of the procurement act are the same 
whether the service or the payment for the public service is directly from the citizen to the 
service provider or via a government agency.
In contrast to the Hungarian practices, the EU directives regarding the applicability 
of procurement regulations contain broad deﬁ nitions of “public authorities” and “public 
undertakings” which include authorities that are eﬀ ectively controlled by public entities 
(box 15.1). Th is coverage includes entities that “operate on the basis of special or exclusive 
rights granted by a competent authority of a Member state” (title I, article 2, section 1(b)).
Box 15.1 Th e European Community Deﬁ nitions of 
“Public Authorities” and “Public Undertakings”
Public authorities—shall mean the State, regional, or local authorities; bodies governed by public law; or 
associations formed by one or more of the authorities or bodies governed by public law. 
Public undertaking—shall mean any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly 
or indirectly a dominant inﬂ uence by virtue of their ownership of it, their ﬁ nancial participation therein, 
or the rules which govern it. A dominant inﬂ uence on the part of the public authorities shall be presumed 
when these authorities, directly or indirectly, in relation to an undertaking:
 hold the majority of the undertaking’s subscribed capital, or
 control the majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the undertaking, or
  can appoint more than half of the members of the undertaking’s administrative, managerial, or 
supervisory body. 
Source: European Commission directive 93/38/EEC, title I, article 1; 1993.
In the course of interviews, we found substantially diﬀ ering opinions about the scope of 
the Act on Public Procurement and heard statements that the law clearly did not allow for 
some of the interpretations that other experts claimed were common. Further clariﬁ cation 
and possibly simpliﬁ cation, which obviates the need for substantial cross-referencing to 
other legislation, might bring about greater uniformity of interpretation.
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EU Conclusions about Hungary’s Public Procurement Standards and Plans for 
Future Amendments to the Procurement Act
Th e European Community (EC) Commission, while commenting that “Hungarian 
legislation on public procurement is largely compatible with EC directives in this ﬁ eld,” 
has noted that: “... the Hungarian legislation does not meet all the requirements of EC 
directives regarding the utilities sectors (namely energy, telecommunications, water, and 
transport)” (European Community 1997: 36). Interviewees from the Ministry of Justice 
and the Council on Public Procurement indicated that plans were underway to take the 
steps necessary to bring the Hungarian standards in conformity with the EU standards. 
Interviewees expressed diﬀ erences of opinion, however, about the extent of diversion 
between the EU standards and Hungarian law.
Interim Preferences for Hungarian Companies
Under the current law, a public agency may prescribe that the tender will be awarded to 
residents of Hungary, or that the Hungarian bidder will be favored if its bid is not more 
than 10 percent above a foreign competing bid (Act on Public Procurement, sections 26(3) 
and 59(2)  and (3)). In accordance with EU accession agreements, these preferences have 
been phased out.
Enforcement and Implementation of the Act on Public Procurement Standards
Staﬀ  of the Council on Public Procurement stated that most noncompliance was not 
intentional and that the most serious problems result from a lack of understanding of the 
law. It indicated that frequently local agencies draft implementation regulations that are not 
consistent with law. Th e council is considering preparing a procurement package for localities. 
Several interviewees noted that bidders are hesitant to complain about violations of the rules 
out of fear of retaliation in future tender evaluations. In a study extending to the end of 1996, 
the State Audit Oﬃ  ce concluded that “a considerable part of public procurement procedures 
were conducted in deviation from the rules” (Bonifert and others 1998: 30). (For a general 
critique of the operation of the procurement law, see Dezsériné-Major 1998.)
Non-transparency of Public Contracts and Information Used to 
Justify Price Adjustments
Th is section summarizes the present Hungarian practice and legal framework that disfavor 
access of citizens to public records on service contracts. Following a brief summary of 
international rules on access to public records we address the issue whether maintaining the 
secrecy of public contracts has a rational policy basis.
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Hungarian Practice
Most of the time, local oﬃ  cials took the position that contracts by public entities with 
private companies were not public records and, therefore, citizens do not have the right to 
obtain such documents. In some cases inquiries about whether such records were public 
made local oﬃ  cials rather uncomfortable and they gave mixed responses. A local oﬃ  cial 
responded that in principle the contracts were public, but that in practice nobody had 
requested copies of contracts so they were not given out. Th e same public oﬃ  cial also stated 
that should someone ask, the consent of the contracting company would be required in 
order to release a copy. In other cases such requests were viewed as unreasonable. As a result, 
information about what might be in the contracts was limited to information contained in 
the tender announcement.
Hungarian Law
Contrary to the nearly universal public practice, Hungarian lawyers who were interviewed 
believed that contracts by public entities are public records. Although Hungarian author-
ities are more restrictive than western European authorities in regard to access to public 
contracts and commercial information submitted to public authorities, Hungarian law 
appears to have stronger public access standards than those of western Europe.
Under the Hungarian Constitution (article 61) “... everyone has the right to ... information 
of public interest....” Furthermore, under the 1992 Law on the Protection of Personal Data 
and Accessibility of Data of Public Interest (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union 1997), the 
authorities are required to grant access to anyone for “data of public interest,” unless the data 
are speciﬁ cally restricted by law (article 19(3)). Th e law provides no speciﬁ c exemption for 
commercial information. Moreover, “data of public interest” is broadly deﬁ ned to include 
“tasks of state and local governments and any other data, utilized by such organ or person who 
performs public tasks according to legal rules except data deﬁ ned as personal data” (article 2, 
section(3)). Another section of the law states that: “Access to data of public interest may not 
be restricted to protect those data of a person acting within his or her authority within the 
scope of power of organs mentioned in the ﬁ rst subsection” (article 19 (4)). 
One exception to these rules is that: “Unless an Act provides otherwise, data generated 
for internal use and in connection with the preparation of decisions shall not be public within 
30 years following their inception” (section 19(5)). According to the legal experts interviewed, 
however, the intent of this section is to protect drafts of proposed regulation prepared by a 
ministry, rather than to protect commercial information. Hungary also has a business secrets 
law, which protects “any fact, information, solution or data, connected to economic activities, 
the secrecy of which is in the reasonable interest of the entitled party” (section 4(3)a of the Act 
on Unfair Market Behavior and Prohibition on Interference with Free Competition).
Hungarian law does not set forth the relation between the accessibility of data and the 
business secrets laws. In two opinions regarding the relationship between public funds and 
private business, however, the ombudsman clariﬁ ed the issue. Th e ombudsman stated in the 
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
310
ﬁ rst opinion that: “Th e transparency and controllability of the privatization processes, as 
public interest, takes precedence over the private interest of protection of business secrets” 
(case number 528/A/1996, November 28, 1996). In the second opinion, which involved the 
refusal of the Ministry of Transport, Telecommunication, and Water Management to provide 
a copy of a concession contract, the ombudsman stated:
 “Th e right to have information on public data and the right to have business secrets 
can contradict each other when organs with public activity have business relations 
with private companies, e.g., when they engage in a public procurement procedure, 
privatization or concession or through the process of state and municipal property 
management or in cases when a state or municipal budgetary subsidy or favor is 
granted to a private company.
 State or municipal organs learn business secrets very often when they deal with asset 
management and when they manage public funds. In these cases the principle of 
publicity has priority, since the utilization of public ﬁ nances and the state economy 
should be transparent. Since free access to information is a constitutional right, the 
right to have business secrets cannot come before that. Private companies that apply 
for state or municipal subsidies or enter for a competition for subsidies or companies 
that have business relations with the state and municipality where public ﬁ nances are 
involved, or if they manage public assets, often are exposed to the restriction of the 
right to have business secrets. 
 It is obvious from the data protection law and also from the above mentioned 
regulations of the concession law that when the state, municipality concludes a 
concession contract, it disposes over public funds. Th is explains why the content of 
this contract cannot be considered as business secret, given the present system of 
information right” (case number 528/A/1996, November 28, 1996).
Access in Other Nations to Public Contracts and Pricing Data
Access to public documents has been an area of increasing concern in recent decades. In 
1982 the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers adopted a “Declaration on the 
Freedom of Expression and Information” (70th Session, 29 April 1982). It states that they 
“… seek to achieve the… following objectives: … the pursuit of an open information policy 
in the public sector, including access to information, in order to enhance the individual’s 
understanding of, and his ability to discuss freely political, social, economic and cultural 
matters…” (Declaration, section II(c)). Commonly, nations have adopted some type of 
freedom of information legislation. 
National constitutional provisions or legislation governing access to public information 
usually contain some type of exemption for commercial information that has an undeﬁ ned 
scope. Interpretation is largely left to the administrative agencies and the courts. In central 
and eastern Europe, contracts for public services are generally considered secret. In some 
western European nations such contracts are considered public records.
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French law governing access to administrative documents (Code Administratif, loi no. 
78–753 section 6 du 17 juillet 1978) provides an exception for commercial and industrial 
secrets. Th e Commission d’Acces aux Documents Administratifs (CADA) is responsible 
for administering the law and making administrative determinations about access to 
particular documents. A commentary on the French act notes the scope of the exception 
is not precise and that it has not been deﬁ ned by the courts (CADA 1998). Each of the 
sources we contacted, however, indicated that contracts were considered public records.
British law contains a non-statutory Code of Practice on Access to Government 
Information, which includes an exemption for “commercial conﬁ dences, trade secrets or 
intellectual property whose unwarranted disclosure would harm the competitive position 
of a third party.” Th e “Guidance on Interpretation” issued by the Cabinet Oﬃ  ce advises 
decision-makers to ask a three-part question when determining whether to withhold 
commercial information: Is the information: (a) a trade secret, (b) a commercial conﬁ dence, 
or (c) intellectual property? 
 If the answer is “no,” then the exemption does not apply.
 If the answer is “yes,” would its disclosure be likely to harm the competitive position 
of the subject or source of the information? If so, disclosure is unwarranted unless an 
overriding public interest in disclosure exists. If not, would its disclosure be likely to 
prejudice the future supply of information to the government? If so, then disclosure is 
unwarranted (Cabinet Oﬃ  ce 1994).
Presently, the Freedom of Information Unit of the Cabinet Oﬃ  ce is drafting freedom 
of information legislation for consideration by the Parliament which would replace the 
Code of Practice.
Under Austrian law, public agency contracts are not public record, but a losing bidder 
in a tender has the right to see the contract made with the winner of the tender (Federal 
Law Gazette I, 1997/75, (Reissue), section 56).
Under Swedish law, “access to oﬃ  cial documents may be restricted only if the 
restriction is necessary having regard to… 5. the public economic interest; 6. the protection 
of… economic conditions of private subjects” (Freedom of Press Act, chapter 2, “On the 
Public Nature of Oﬃ  cial Documents,” article 2). In article 3 of the same act, the term 
“document” is broadly deﬁ ned to include any document in the possession of a public 
authority.
Under U.S. law, contracts by public entities are public record. Th e Federal Freedom 
of Information Act contains an exemption for “trade secrets and commercial or ﬁ nancial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or conﬁ dential...” (U.S. Code Annotated, 
section 9(b), (4)) (see also American Civil Liberties Union 1992; Kuersteiner and Herbach 
1976). State laws, which govern contracts by state and local governments, contain similar 
provisions. Typically the commercial exemptions are interpreted narrowly. Generally 
they provide an exemption for commercial information that is used to demonstrate that 
a company has the ﬁ nancial resources to undertake a project or to protect trade secrets. 
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Th e common judicial test of whether a government agency can refuse to disclose business 
information is whether the release of the information would be damaging to the business 
or would discourage future competition for public contracts.
(For discussion of the commercial exemptions under the laws of Australia, Canada, 
France, Great Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States, see Baxter 
1997b.) 
Does Maintaining the Secrecy of Public Contracts Have a Rational Policy Basis? 
Maintaining the secrecy of public contracts seems to be based on a combination of 
European civil law distinctions between public and private matters, reactions to invasiveness 
of the communist regimes, and a common view that private companies will be damaged by 
public disclosure of critical business data. Maintenance of the secrecy of public contracts is 
common in western Europe, as well as central Europe, although recent decades have seen a 
strong trend toward allowing increased access.
Th e concept of secrecy of public contracts based on a theory that disclosure would be 
damaging to a company does not stand up under scrutiny. Th e best evidence of the truth 
of this statement is that the wide scope of access allowed in the United States, including 
access to public contracts, has not deterred private initiative and commercial activity. On 
the contrary, such disclosure has increased the credibility of government use of private 
companies in the provision of public services.
Th e Drafting of Public Service Contracts and Th eir Substance
An original purpose of my eﬀ ort was to provide comments on public contracts with private 
companies for public services. To a substantial extent, this objective has been frustrated 
by the practice of keeping these contracts secret. I could obtain information about signiﬁ -
cant provisions in contracts through interviews, but I could not determine what critical 
information may have been omitted. Usually I could not determine what rights and 
economic returns were granted to private investors who provided capital for public works.
Interviewees consistently indicated that they had not had problems under their 
contracts and that they would not draft their contracts any diﬀ erently if they were rewritten 
today. Th e few contracts I obtained, however,  were very brief, leaving the details of payment, 
the level of service provision, remedies for service breaches, and other matters to the scope 
of the tender invitation or to oral or unstated possible misunderstandings. Under these 
circumstances, frustration of objectives and expectations and future misunderstandings and 
disputes are inevitable.
Th e contents of public service contracts are governed by a combination of some or all 
of the following components:
 Th e Hungarian Civil Code
 A tender announcement, which may be governed by the national procurement law
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 Th e national legislation governing service provision
 A local decree governing the provision of the particular service
 Th e contents of the contract.
Presently, a substantial portion of municipal contracts for public services do not 
adequately protect the interests of the contracting municipality. In the course of my 
research, I found that contracts for public services were typically very brief. Commonly 
they do not contain adequate descriptions of the scope of services, thus enabling the 
contractor to perform less work than was envisioned by the municipality when the contract 
was entered into, or they contain weak penalty provisions, so that the municipality has no 
real remedy if the contractor fails to provide the required work. Some long-term contracts 
authorize excessive annual price adjustments. In some cases cities have made critical 
omissions in their contracts. For example, they have not been aware that in the absence of 
a clause stating that a contract is an “entrepreneurial” contract, the contractor is entitled to 
payment whether it performs its obligations or not. Local decrees may address what the 
service provision must consist of, but they do not address the question of remedies in case 
of a breach.
Th e switch in the government’s role from service deliverer to service overseer places the 
local government in the role of a regulator of the quality of services provided by an entity, 
which may be guided primarily by the motives of maximizing its proﬁ t and preserving 
its existence. Often these basic transformations are overlooked because of the long-term 
familiarity between the actors involved. When services are contracted out for a substantial 
period, provisions for price adjustments must be included in the contract and the local 
government also becomes a price regulator.
Th e Process for Drafting Public Contracts
Many of the failings of municipal contracts may be attributed to the process by which 
contracts are drafted. Typically they are formulated by a city staﬀ  person, without review 
by an attorney, after a contractor has been selected, a price has been agreed to, and any 
negotiations are over. Under these circumstances, the contract is viewed merely as a 
formality that puts into eﬀ ect a relationship that has been agreed upon, rather than as a 
tool for clarifying the issues and resolving the disputes that may emerge during the life of 
the contract.
Often the party that is awarded the project drafts the contract for execution by the 
city staﬀ  without amendment. Under section 62 of the Act on Public Procurement, when 
open procedures are used, a contract must be complete at the time of the written decision, 
but the invitation for bidding may specify that the contract shall be complete within 60 
days of announcement (30 days for construction contracts). Some interviewees recounted 
circumstances in which any objection to some of the terms in the contract by a city staﬀ  
person or attorney was viewed as an obstacle rather than as useful input. One interviewee 
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who now works for a city-owned company indicated that when he drafted major contracts 
with municipalities on behalf of privately owned companies, the city oﬃ  cials who reviewed 
the contracts had little understanding of their meaning, and he felt compelled to advise 
them even though it was not part of his job.
An alternative to the foregoing type of approach would be to develop the contract 
before the selection of the contractor begins.
 If a tender procedure is used, the contract would be attached to the tender as a part its 
conditions. Th is approach is standard in the United States and Great Britain. 
 A local decree enacted before the contract is undertaken may describe the scope of 
services that are involved in the provision of a particular service.
 A draft of the proposed tender conditions could be subject to public review.
 Th e results of the bidding, along with an explanation of how the winner was selected, 
should be published in the local press.
 
When these approaches are used, the contracting process is more open and subject to 
public review. Th is openness places pressure on the drafters to prepare a better contract and 
allows for public input into the drafting process. Attaching a contract to a tender creates 
certainty as to what the competitors can expect, ensures that contractors are competing for 
contracts with the same provisions, and prevents possible favoritism through contractual 
provisions that are formulated after the selection of a contractor. It is suggested that 
contract drafters do the following:
 Compile a list of the tasks to be provided by the service provider, with a view toward 
including speciﬁ cations (inputs and outcomes) for these tasks in the contract. An 
expert in the provision of the particular service should undertake this task.
 Review the national and local laws applicable to the provision of the service.
 Consider the issues raised by the models in this report.
 Review the proposed contract with experts on the service covered by the contract.
 Review the proposed contract with representatives of the industry to be covered by the 
contract and civic groups. 
Box 15.2 provides a list of what should be covered in a contract or applicable decree.
Cities must use experts on the provision of the particular service in issue and the law. 
Generally the beneﬁ ts of such expertise far outweigh their costs. Local governments may 
save costs by pooling resources to obtain adequate counseling. Although foreign models of 
contracts and procedures may not be appropriate for local circumstances, they may provide 
useful lists and discussions of the issues that should be considered in a contract and the 
overall contracting out process (See, for example, (supra note 1) in ICMA 1992). In the 
United States and Great Britain, the trade associations of most industries and counterpart 
government agencies have prepared model contracts. In addition, often trade industry 
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and scholarly literature contains information about the problems and issues associated 
with contracting particular types of services. Another approach to improving the quality 
of contract preparation would be to create separate council committees, which include 
nonvoting representatives of nongovernmental organizations and experts, just for the 
purpose of reviewing contracts. 
Box 15.2 Issues Th at Should be Covered by the Contract or the Applicable Decree
 
1. Introductory summary of the subject matter of the contract
Basic Conditions
2. Reference to applicable decree
3. Deﬁ nitions
 4. Duration of the contract: (a) ongoing or periodically renegotiated; (b) notice period required for 
termination
Scope of Services
5. Unit of service
6. All the types of facilities served by the contractor
7. Standards for work performed by the employees of the contractor, including treatment of the public
8. Time schedule of activities
9. Hours the service may or must be performed
10. Holidays when the service is not required
11. Location of service
12. Access to service
13. Required equipment
14. What equipment may or may not be used
15. Where equipment may be stored
16. Equipment and facilities supplied by the municipality
17. Maintenance obligations of the contractor
18. Maintenance obligations of the city
19. Standards for maintenance of the equipment and the storage facilities
20. Condition of equipment and facilities at the end of the contract
21. Information pamphlets to be supplied to the public by the municipality or contractor or both
 22. Hours and facilities maintained by the contractor to receive complaints and reporting of complaints 
to the municipality
23. Responsibilities for billing customers and collecting fees
24. Prohibited activities
Fees and Compensation
25. Total fee
26. Breakdown by speciﬁ c portions
27. When invoices must be submitted
28. When payment must be made (connection to when invoice submitted)
29. Permitted fees to public for services
30. Adjustments of fees 
31. Responsibility for tax payments
32. Ownership of improvements at the end of the contract
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Box 15.2 Issues Th at Should be Covered by the Contract or the Applicable Decree
(Continued)
Monitoring by the Local Government
33. Th e content, format, and frequency of the reports that must be submitted by the contractor
34. Frequency of monitoring
 
Communication with City; Interpretation and Resolution of Disputes
35. Contractor designation of person and place to receive municipal communications
36. City designation of an oﬃ  cer to administer the contract
37. Interpretation of the contract and governing rules
38. Requirement that municipal interpretations of the contract must be in writing
39. Procedures for communicating disputes
Remedies
40. Warning procedures before termination
 41. Monetary remedies, in addition to a return of the funds received by the contractor if the contract is 
terminated without any service being performed
42. Reductions in payments tied to speciﬁ c measures 
43. Adjustments in compensation to the contractor
44. Penalties for late payments by municipality
Modiﬁ cations
45. Terms and conditions for modifying the contract
46. Termination—because of an unexpected or uncontrollable event
Other Provisions  
47. Permits that the contractor must obtain
48. Requirement for the contractor to maintain continuous ﬁ nancial ability to perform the services
49. Requirement that the contractor comply with all applicable laws relating to the service provision
Long-term Contracts
As previously indicated, long-term contracts are often made to obtain the beneﬁ ts of 
private access to ﬁ nancing for necessary capital expenditures. Th is approach, however, poses 
substantial risks and has substantial drawbacks. Such contracts may eﬀ ectively preclude the 
public from obtaining the economic and service beneﬁ ts of future innovations that increase 
eﬃ  ciency or quality because a company with a long-term contract would not feel compelled 
to make the improvements or pass through the cost reductions to consumers. In eﬀ ect, they 
remove many of the advantages associated with contracting out public services and lead to 
the loss of future cost control.
In one case a major city has awarded a 25-year contract for refuse collection, with an 
annual cost price index adjustment, which does not require capital improvements by the 
private company. Th e justiﬁ cation for this contract was that the private company would 
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have the funds to upgrade the rolling stock, but shorter contracts may have accomplished 
the same result. Other cities have executed similar length contracts in conjunction with 
private investment in the creation of new waste disposal site. Such contracts may have 
greater justiﬁ cation, but they carry the same risks.
For example, greater competitiveness in the provision of waste disposal may be obtained 
by dividing service provision into separate contracts for the creation of a waste disposal site 
(which requires a long-term investment) and waste collection. One city services manager 
believed that such an approach would create unworkable conﬂ icts of interest and that it 
would have to contract out the whole solid waste disposal process when it needed a new 
disposal site. A private company representative commented that if collection and operation 
of the disposal site were divided, companies would use other illegal sites that charged lower 
fees. Other cities, however, are using this approach.
Setting Prices for Public Services
Th is section describes some of the basic concepts and issues, associated with price setting, 
but a more important purpose of this section is to address the issues associated with price-
setting procedures in Hungary.
Transparency and Secrecy of Financial Information 
in Price-setting Proceedings
As in the case of public contracts, submissions used for public price settings are not public 
record. Th e most signiﬁ cant example of this practice is that submissions to the Ministry 
of Transport, Telecommunication, and Water Management—used to set water price for 
the ﬁ ve regional companies, which in turn set rates for 45 percent of the country—are not 
accessible under current practice. Furthermore, the submissions used to justify local tariﬀ  
subsidies for hundreds of water districts are not accessible.
Interviews revealed that local assemblies are not given suﬃ  cient information to make 
informed price-setting decisions. Without access to the data submitted to the assemblies 
and decisions setting forth their reasoning, knowing if they had adequate expertise and if 
their decisions were reasonable is not possible.
Without public access to cost data, the process cannot possibly viewed as democratic, 
and developing the independent expertise that is essential to formulating critical inde-
pendent understanding of price-setting standards will be impossible.
To review requests for price increases, information must be obtained in a manageable 
form. When speciﬁ c application forms are not provided to regulated entities, they 
commonly provide too little information or more information than the price-setting 
agency can possibly digest.
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Price Adjustment Formulas
Th is section summarizes the characteristics of the two major brands of price adjustment 
formulas—the rate of return standards and the price indexing.
Types of Formulas
Price setting is necessary whenever a service has to be contracted out for a substantial 
number of years, or a monopoly supplier cannot be replaced. Th e institution of price 
regulations in modern economies has been accompanied by continual debate over what 
formulas or standards should be used. Setting prices for public services has never been a 
simple task, and no single best approach is clear. In Great Britain and the United States 
price-setting formulas and practices have been constantly revised (Beesley and Littlechild 
1989; Klein 1996).  Price-setting formulas (table 15.3) may be divided into two rough 
categories: (a) rate of return and (b) price index. Rate of return standards provide that prices 
shall cover actual operating expenses plus a speciﬁ ed rate of return on capital investment. 
Price index formulas range from simple formulas that use only one price index to adjust 
prices to complex formulas that use a weighted price index reﬂ ecting the types of expenses 
incurred by the regulated service.
Th e cities contacted in this study used both rate of return and overall price index 
formulas for adjusting prices. Weighted price indexes were used in only a few instances. Th e 
city of Eger uses a weighted index for adjusting water prices. Th e weights in its formula are 
as follows: materials, 12 percent; wages, 44 percent; amortization, 11 percent; other costs, 
17 percent; and energy, 16 percent. 
Table 15.3 A Hypothetical Weighted Index Formula
Factor Index Percentage increase 
over prior year
Weight Adjustment =(c)•(d)
(percent)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Wages National wage index 12 0.55 6.60
Fuels Fuel price index 18 0.12 2.16
Materials 10 0.10 1.00
Vehicles accessories and parts 20 0.23 4.60
Total adjustment 14.36
Source: Beesley and Littlechild 1989; Klein 1996.
Comment on Rate of Return Standards
Th e strength of rate of return regulation is that it rewards increased investment and provides 
security for the investor. Th e criticism of the approach is that it provides no incentive for 
eﬃ  ciency and encourages overcapitalization.
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As a practical matter, administering periodic reviews of cost increases to determine 
if they are reasonable is diﬃ  cult. Determinations must be made about whether particular 
expenditures are reasonable, when in reality tradeoﬀ s (or a lack thereof ) are constant between 
quality and price. Determining what types of expenses can be expensed in one year and what 
types should be amortized (and if so over what time period) is necessary. Use of standards 
from other codes, such as a tax code, for determining how expenses should be treated may 
or may not be appropriate. Fair return calculations may become political, with a commission 
selecting the desired result and then working backward to justify that result. In the United 
States rate decisions may be appealed to the courts, but the judicial decisions provide little 
guidance in the form of speciﬁ c principles that can guide future commission decisions.
Comment on the Use of Price Indexing
Indexes oﬀ er certainty, which protects the investor and shields the public agency from 
having to make repeated unpopular price adjustments. By contrast the index selected may 
or may not be an indicator of what price adjustments are reasonable. Th e overall price index 
may not reﬂ ect cost increases for a particular type of public service, which has a far diﬀ erent 
basket of expenses than the basket of expenses of a typical household, which is used to 
construct the price index. In light of the complexities and shortcomings of rate of return 
formulas, price indexes may be most appropriate. By contrast, use of the overall consumer 
price index may lead to excessive increases, especially if real wages are decreasing.
In Britain a combination of rate of return analysis and price indexing is used to 
determine water prices. Th e initial price is set based on a cost review. Th en annual 
adjustments are based on the overall price index. Th e annual adjustment formula, however, 
includes an adjustment so that the annual price adjustment is a speciﬁ ed percentage below 
the full percentage increase in the index. (Th e adjustment = retail price index – X.) Th e X 
factor is based on the theory that the water companies should become more eﬃ  cient over 
time. Periodic reviews are then conducted to readjust the base price. Th e ﬁ rst review was 
conducted after 10 years, but now the water regulatory authority is planning on reviews 
every ﬁ ve years. Although this approach may work well in Britain, investors may feel that 
operating under this type of price control is far more risky in a nation that has a short 
tradition of private ownership and the application of price regulations to private ﬁ rms.
Conclusion
Hungary is undergoing a rapid transition. In the area of local service provision, within 
a relatively short period, it is introducing market economy public procurement systems, 
privatization of public services, and standards for setting allowable prices for privately 
owned public services. Th ese tasks are complex, and more economically advanced nations 
are still trying to master them.
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Finding the best method of privatizing public services may even be more diﬃ  cult 
and complex in Hungary than in advanced western economies, because Hungarian public 
agencies, rather than just searching for greater eﬃ  ciency, are dependent on private ﬁ rms to 
bring needed capital into a transition economy
Th at contracts carefully spell out each of the obligations of the government and the 
private company providing the service is essential. In the absence of speciﬁ c contract 
terms, diﬀ ering understandings about what is and should be expected from each party are 
certain to occur. Th e rapid introduction of long-term contracting out of public services, 
necessitated by the need to bring in capital for public services, requires rapid growth in 
national and local government sophistication about public service contracting and pricing. 
Otherwise, long-term damage can occur, in the form of long-term public service contracts 
that fail to ensure adequate services, forestall innovation, or permit excessive prices. 
Local governments must obtain adequate representation and expertise to undertake 
the contracting out of programs. To reduce the costs associated with such eﬀ orts, local 
governments should pool resources to obtain adequate counseling and expertise. In any 
case the costs associated with obtaining such expertise are usually small compared to the 
costs of operating without it. One Hungarian consultant indicated that some localities saw 
their high costs for particular services as laws of nature rather than understanding how the 
pooling facilities with other municipalities would drastically reduce costs. In the course of 
consulting in the United States, I frequently faced situations in which municipalities incur 
substantial administrative and legal expenses because they wanted to save on initial legal 
fees for drafting legislation or because the municipal manager or attorney did not want to 
acknowledge that he or she needed outside expertise.
Th e lack of transparency serves little or no purpose at the expense of allowing corruption 
to be concealed, forestalling the development of independent expertise, and excluding 
public input on public matters. It leaves decision-making in the control of government 
without review and accountability. Although interviewees repeatedly explained that the 
secrecy of contracts and data submitted to justify price adjustments was pursuant to law and 
was the way that things are done, no one oﬀ ered a persuasive rationale for such practices. 
It may be necessary to maintain the secrecy of some pieces of information associated 
with private provision of public services, but the broad cloak of secrecy now in eﬀ ect is a 
vestige of an old historical concept that places government in a role of master rather than 
servant of the public. Th e best results in a market economy occur when information is open 
so that the most honest competition and the best critical public review can be obtained. 
In light of the fact that Hungary is starting from a weaker economic position and a lack 
of contemporary tradition in contracting to private companies, it needs to be even more 
skillful at contracting out than governments in more advanced economies.
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16Off-budget Revenues and Expenditures: A Challenge to Subnational FinancesJózsef Hegedüs



Th e share of a nation’s local government expenditures and revenues in total national or 
public expenditures and revenues is supposed to reﬂ ect the role of the local government 
sector and indicate the extent of ﬁ scal decentralization. Municipal expenditures amounted 
to 12 percent of gross domestic product and 27 percent of Hungary’s general government 
sector in 2000. I should note, however, ﬁ rst, that some revenues only pass through the local 
budgets, hence the extent of decentralization is overestimated. For instance, health services 
and their respective cost normatives are determined by the central government, and local 
governments reimburse the cost of the provided services and medicines. Second, numerous 
local revenues and expenditures are oﬀ -budget items in the local governments’ ﬁ nancial 
statements. Hence the role of the municipal sector is underestimated. Public services are 
often provided by various independent legal entities: public or private enterprises, public 
purpose corporations, nongovernmental organizations, or charity foundations (see chapter 
14). Analysts estimate that these entities provide services in the range of 6 percent of gross 
domestic product in Hungary (see chapter 17). 
Th is chapter analyzes the underlying organizational structure, consequences of, and 
incentives for oﬀ -budget revenues and expenditures (OBRE). Based on case studies in 
medium-sized Hungarian cities (mainly Berettyóújfalu, Szentes, and Tatabánya), my 
ﬁ ndings suggest that both inter-temporal and cross-sectoral or regional comparison of 
municipal service activities should ideally be based on standardized consolidated ﬁ nancial 
statements. Th us reformers must properly take into account the various organizational and 
ownership structures and the eﬀ ects of the oﬀ -budget revenues and expenditures.  Cross-
sectoral and cross-country comparisons in the European Union face similar challenges.
* Th is chapter is based on Hegedüs 1999.
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
324
On- Versus Off-budget Activities and Accounts
Th e general government sector includes organizations whose primary activity is to assume 
responsibility for the provision of goods and services to the community or to individual 
households free of charge or at prices that are not economically signiﬁ cant, and to 
redistribute income and wealth by means of transfer (EC 1993). Th is broad deﬁ nition 
draws the functional boundaries of the provision of public services; these services, however, 
are increasingly out-sourced by local governments. As a result, the government ﬁ nance 
statistics (GFS) system deﬁ nes quasi-government operations (QGOs) as the activities 
of entities performing government functions outside the legal boundary of the general 
government sector.
Th e principles of QGOs, however, do not give a straightforward and comprehensive 
solution to the problems we are facing in analyzing local government activities. Th ree major 
cases of QGOs are apparent: (i) Government units may compensate the units concerned 
directly for some or all of the costs incurred. In this case the amount of the compensation is 
fully reﬂ ected in the GFS system as a subsidy or similar type of transaction. (ii) Government 
units may provide no compensation or only partial compensation to the units concerned 
for the costs incurred. In this case part or all of the costs of the QGO will be reﬂ ected in 
the GFS system if the units concerned are partially or wholly owned by units of the general 
government sector. (iii) Even if the units concerned are not owned by units of the general 
government sector, part of the costs of the QGO may be indirectly reﬂ ected in the GFS 
system (EC 1993). 
Local governments have ownership stakes and interests in thousands of units that 
provide solely or partially public services such as water supply or cultural and educational 
services. Th ese units have accounts, budgets, ﬁ nancial reports, revenues, and expenditures 
separate from the municipal budget. Although the ﬁ scal indicators give a good picture of 
the local government budget items, the treatment of the OBRE is unresolved. Th e revenue 
and expenditure ﬂ ows corresponding to the public services include central transfers (current 
and investment grants), local own revenues (transferred from the local government to the 
service units), nontax revenues (user charges and donations from companies or private 
persons), and in principle, but not in practice, earmarked tax revenues (see table 16.1).
Table 16.1 Types and Clusters of Local Revenues
Type of entities Local revenues
Tax revenue Nontax revenues
Budget Building tax, local business tax, 
communal tax, land tax
Fees, building ﬁ nes, 
school revenues from meals
Oﬀ -budget Earmarked tax levied by service entities, 
for example, special purpose district
Rent, charges, revenues from selling assets 
Source: Hegedüs and others 1999.
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With very few exceptions, outsourcing the provision of public services is the trend in 
Hungary. As a result, more and more municipalities shift service provision to oﬀ -budget 
service units, so oﬀ -budget revenues could even surpass on-budget revenues (see table 
16.2). Th is trend highlights the urgent need to enhance the capacity of local governments 
to exercise tight regulation of price and quality and assure equity in public service provision 
(see chapter 15).
Table 16.2 Oﬀ -budget and On-budget Revenues in Berettyóújfalu, 1998 (Ft thousand)
Source Oﬀ -budget On-budget
User charges 223,334 174,226
Revenues from property 4,576 52,389
Donations 27,490 —
Total 255,860 226,615
As a percentage of the local budget 12.1 10.7*
Note:  * Th e local government budget without the budget of the local hospital.
Source: Local government of Berettyóújfalu data.
Subnational governments often select special organizational or ownership forms of 
service provision for taxation, budget, or revenue allocation rather than service eﬃ  ciency 
purposes. Th e organizational setup and the shift from on- to oﬀ -budget items, however, 
have serious impacts on the accountability of providers, the predictability of costs and 
revenues, the distortion between supply and demand, and the equity and regulation of 
service provision (see table 16.3). 
Table 16.3 Th e OBRE in Relation to Equity and Eﬃ  ciency Factors
Source Budget Account-
ability
Predict-
ability
Distortion Equity Regu-
lation
User charges fees, ﬁ nes, and so forth On-budget ++ ++ + ++ ++
User charges fees, ﬁ nes, and so forth Oﬀ -budget + ++ + + +
Revenues from property On-budget + – – 0 --
Revenues from property Oﬀ -budget -- -- -- 0 --
Donation On-budget ++ – ++ ++ 0
Donation Oﬀ -budget +– – ++ ++ 0
Note:  + positive eﬀ ect, – negative eﬀ ect, 0 neutral eﬀ ect, -- very negative eﬀ ect, ++ very positive 
eﬀ ect.
Source: Hegedüs and others 1999.
My ﬁ ndings suggest that user charges, when set and regulated appropriately, have 
generally a positive impact irrespective of the organizational and accounting form of service 
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provision. On- and oﬀ -budget revenues and expenditures are equally suitable from the 
eﬃ  ciency and equity viewpoints. When managing and divesting assets, however, OBRE 
might have a rather negative impact on accountability, predictability, regulation, and supply 
and demand. Oﬀ -budget donations might have a negative impact on both accountability 
and predictability, but they could play a positive role in supply and demand relation and 
equity in certain services.
Organizational Structure of Local Service Provision
Th e share of local own revenues is one of the key indicators of ﬁ scal decentralization, 
particularly in transition economies, although it depends greatly on the changing 
organizational structure of service provision. Th e 1990 Act on Local Government sets 
an extremely general deﬁ nition of municipal tasks and conceptually provides local 
governments with great ﬂ exibility in creating new legal or organizational structures for 
local service provision. Th e analyses, however, have underscored a strong inertia of the 
inherited institutional structure, which fueled the initial ambitions of local governments to 
maintain and operate local institutions and provide basic services directly. Already in the 
early 1990s, subnational governments moved toward changing the organizational forms of 
service provision. Th e changes in the organizational structures were stimulated not only by 
the well-known legal requirements but also by the following factors: (a) new responsibilities 
introduced by sectoral laws (for example, ﬁ re protection and active unemployment policy 
services), (b) positive or adverse incentives embedded in ﬁ nancial and taxation policies, and 
(c) local interests groups.
Municipalities provide services through various forms of organizations (see ﬁ gure 
16.1):
 Line departments of the executive oﬃ  ce of the local government (for example, building 
departments, administrative notary oﬃ  ces, or tax oﬃ  ces)
 Municipal budgetary institutions (for example, schools, libraries, or homes for the 
elderly)
 Not-for-proﬁ t municipally owned organizations (for example, public purpose corpora-
tions or foundations)
 Business enterprises in full municipal ownership (companies or limited corporations)
 Joint ventures (with majority or blocking minority above 25 percent stake)
 Majority private enterprises with little or no municipal ownership
 Nongovernmental organizations, charity organizations, and private foundations.
 
Th e alternative structures of service delivery can be analyzed from two aspects: (a) 
administrative and management characteristics (such as taxation, bookkeeping, property 
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rights, control, or legal standing), and (b) ﬁ nancing models (such as cost and revenue 
mechanisms and impacts on the local budget).
Figure 16.1 Organization Framework for Local Functions and Services
Source: Authors based on Hegedüs and others 1999.
Several questions arose in relation to the transition in terms of local service provision. 
Most analysts assume that this development is a positive one through which municipalities 
ﬁ nd more sophisticated solutions in substituting direct public provision with more eﬃ  cient 
organizations and broader inclusion of the private sector. Th ese views are one-sided for 
several reasons. 
First, the market and regulatory environment largely inﬂ uence the eﬃ  ciency of a new 
organizational setting. For instance, most transitional economies lack the conditions for 
market competition, which would guarantee eﬃ  ciency gains. In Hungary the appropriate 
legal and regulatory reforms did not precede the contracting out, privatization, or 
transferring of public service delivery to nongovernmental organizations or foundations 
(see chapter 15). 
Second, a solid regulatory background does not only imply laws on, say, price regulation 
and procurement; they also imply that public and business entities know and observe 
the laws. If laws are bypassed or if they contradict each other, they will neither enhance 
eﬃ  ciency nor result in lower prices, improved quality, and reliability of public services. 
Moreover, any reform implemented without the appropriate legislative and regulatory 
framework would result in adverse eﬀ ects and behaviors.
Th ird, the privatization or concession agreements between local governments and 
private partners should entail clear and operational conditions for regulation; only then the 
organizational or ownership form of service provision may, in principle, not matter. Local 
On-budget Sphere
Local Government
Mayor and City Council
Independent municipal 
budgetary organizations
Service provider 
line department units
Public administration 
oﬃ  ces
Oﬀ -budget Sphere
Oﬀ -budget entities A
Enterprises in full, majority, or blocking 
minority municipal ownership
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Regulated private enterprises, 
nongovernmental and 
charity organizations
Line departments
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governments ought to have capacity to control and regulate prices, quality, and performance 
of private service providers.
As a consequence of these caveats, both inter-temporal and cross-sectoral or regional 
comparisons of municipal service activities should ideally be based on standardized con-
solidated ﬁ nancial statements. Th us planners should take the various organizational 
and ownership structures, the legislative and regulatory framework, and the eﬀ ects of 
oﬀ -budget revenues/expenditures properly into account. Nevertheless, combining the 
institutional characteristics with the ﬁ scal indicators, which often cause misinterpretation 
of the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system, is technically diﬃ  cult.
Types of Nontax Own Revenues
Hungarian local governments are not only very innovative in creating various legal and 
organizational forms for service provision, but they also collect a broad range of nontax 
own revenues. In this section I summarize the nature and importance of the major nontax 
revenue categories: (a) user charges, fees, and ﬁ nes; (b) asset revenues; (c) donations; and 
(d) revenue collection through not-for-proﬁ t foundations.
User Charges, Fees, and Fines
Th e authority for setting user charges and fees, previously under the purview of central 
government, was passed on to local governments during the transition. Price setting is a 
political process everywhere, but is especially contentious in central and eastern European 
countries. Th e price-setting process is regulated by sectoral laws and decrees, and the actual 
procedures are under the control of political forces. In Hungary laws and decrees prescribe 
how the operators of the various service units can calculate the proposed user charges; this 
calculation, however, must be approved by the city council, which in most cases has little 
or no capacity to review the companies’ calculations (even if they are in full municipal 
ownership). Th us the process is inﬂ uenced by asymmetric information and is often ﬁ nally 
decided through political negotiation. In the case of regulated private companies, the city 
council has two options: either ﬁ nding the proposed price politically acceptable or rejecting 
it and paying the diﬀ erence out of the budget. Th e latter option is the typical case of public 
transportation tariﬀ s.
From an analytical point of view, user charges and ﬁ nes can be considered to be implicit 
taxes. Th ey also can be characterized according to the degree of discretion of the local 
government:
 Fixed, prescribed price by law (for example, fees for schools, transfer fees, and payments 
for meals).
 A pricing procedure set by law, with the price negotiated between the local government 
and the service company (for example, water, garbage collection, and sewage fees).
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 No central regulation, with the price at the full discretion of the local authority (for 
example, parking fees and charges for use of public space).
 
Typical user charges (such as water and garbage collection) can be either on- or oﬀ -
budget revenues depending upon the organizational setting for local service provision. Oﬀ -
budget user charges are very common now. Th e sectoral laws and the Price Act deﬁ ne the 
rules and procedures for setting prices, but sometimes companies levy special—unlawful—
fees to cover operational costs. In principle the price-setting procedure could be under the 
democratic control of the local council, but the elected representatives seldom rely on the 
support of independent specialists.
Communal services are usually delivered by municipal enterprises. Th e revenues of the 
enterprises include user charges paid by the beneﬁ ciaries or users of the services as well as 
municipal grants. In addition, these companies can undertake non-service entrepreneurial 
activities (see box 16.1). Th e proﬁ t gained from such supplementary activities is often used 
to cover the losses on core services or the company’s deﬁ cit. Often, municipalities keep 
user charges at artiﬁ cially low levels for political reasons while subsidizing enterprises 
or supporting them in engaging in business activities that help compensate for missing 
revenues. Th e major problem with this practice is that local governments carelessly ﬁ nance 
risky business investments without having the capacity to control the supplementary 
operations of the municipal enterprise and the ﬂ ow of cross-subsidies.
Box 16. 1 Supplementary Business Activities Cover the Revenue Gap
In the city of Püspökladány a municipal enterprise provides garbage collection services. Th e fee is set by 
the local government and the municipal council decides on any increase in the fee. Th e company needs to 
cover operating and capital expenses from the fee revenues. Th e municipal council, however, can set the 
fee below cost for social purposes. Th e company can use its revenues freely and must report to the council 
twice a year. Th e company, together with a municipal committee, decides on the use of the proﬁ t. Th e fees 
do not cover the expenditures; therefore, the company undertakes supplementary business activities to 
obtain additional resources. Th ese activities include the operation of an auto repair shop, a timber plant, 
and a hotel, in addition to renting out the vacant rooms in the company’s headquarters. Th e supplementary 
revenues are used to cover operating and capital costs of the enterprise’s core activities.
Setting User Charges at Szentes Water Works Ltd.
Szentes Water Works Ltd. involves a majority ownership of the city of Szentes (33,000 
inhabitants and about Ft 3.5 billion annual budget). It provides services for a microregion 
setting diﬀ erent prices according to municipalities and users: that is, Szentes, two partner 
municipalities (Eperjes and Nagytőke), and several satellite village suburbs of Szentes. In 
each of these settlements water and sewage treatment tariﬀ s are diﬀ erent for households, 
municipal service institutions, and business organizations. Th e Water Works management 
prepares alternative proposals for the upcoming year’s tariﬀ  in coordination with the 
supervisory board of the company.
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Th e following cost factors are taken into consideration in compliance with the law on 
water production:
 Operational costs (for example, electricity and wages)
 Amortization cost
 Other expenses (for example, emergency fund to cover large expenses of major 
repairs—the most debated element of the water fee, because some representatives do 
not accept the need for such extra cost)
 Projected amount of water production and sale.
Th e fee proposals are submitted for the approval of the Financial Committee and 
the urban development committee of the city council. Th e Water Works also submits 
its ﬁ nancial reports to the city council which makes its decision on the water fee with 
full knowledge of the alternative proposals and the justiﬁ cation of the board and the two 
committees. Th e council representatives usually vote for lower household fees and higher 
institution and business organization fees. Th is diﬀ erentiation is also advantageous for the 
service company because the fees are easier to collect from business organizations and 
institutions.
Cross-subsidies in Berettyóújfalu (Herpaly Team Ltd.)
Th e Herpaly Team Ltd. is owned by the city of Berettyóújfalu (17,000 citizens and Ft 
2.5 billion annual budget). Th e company provides various community services, including 
water supply, sewage, heating, park maintenance, and garbage collection, and undertakes 
entrepreneurial activities, for example, building construction. On the basis of the company’s 
proposal, the local government sets the water, heating, sewage, and garbage collection fees, 
primarily aiming at social and political objectives rather than covering the real cost of 
services. Th e company has sovereignty in setting fees for swimming pools and rental fees 
in open markets.
Although the company is an individual legal entity that has separate accounts and 
ﬁ nancial reporting, it cannot make ﬁ nancial decisions freely. Th e local government 
decides which activities should be cross-subsidized from the company’s budget and which 
services ought to generate the required revenues to cover total expenses. Gross revenues 
and expenditures of the company are not reﬂ ected in the municipal budget; only the net 
balance is recorded as “revenues from asset management,” a budget line item. Although 
the municipality does not give a free hand to the company’s management, it nonetheless 
expects dividends. Even though the local government determines the fee policy, the 
management of arrears remains the sole responsibility of the company. Although this 
policy reduces the potential ﬁ nancial burden for the municipality, it distorts the balance of 
expenses and revenues.
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In Berettyóújfalu, Herpaly Team Ltd. is the only municipally owned company 
that generates oﬀ -budget user charge revenues (see table 16.4). Th e net revenues from 
construction, one of the supplementary activities of Herpaly Team Ltd., amounted to Ft 
6 million in 1998. In parallel to Herpaly Team Ltd., other municipally owned institutions 
(for example, schools) also rent out rooms or equipment. Th ese revenues, however, 
seldom appear in the local government budget, and sometimes not even in the budget 
of the institution. (For example, a foundation of the primary school rents out computer 
equipment, but the small revenue it receives is not accounted in the school’s budget.)
Table 16.4 Service Revenues of Herpaly Team Ltd., 1998
Service activity Revenue  (Ft million)
Water supply 60
Sewage 92
Heating 100
Swimming pool 3
Market place rental 8
Garbage collection 8
Garbage collection in containers 2
Landﬁ lls 4
Total 277
Source: Herpaly Team Ltd. data.
Asset Revenues
Local governments own and manage a wide range of assets (residential units, commercial 
spaces, land, public works, and securities), so asset management is a crucial issue (see 
chapter 19). Th e large amount of assets transferred from state to municipal ownership, 
which initially was assumed to generate a steady revenue ﬂ ow, apparently put ﬁ nancial 
stress on local governments because services were provided below costs with huge state 
subsidies. Several properties conceptually had a negative capital value, because of negative 
cash ﬂ ow. Th e question thus arose: how could this process be reversed? Local governments 
have gradually adjusted service charges because they had both the right and incentive to 
cut costs and increase charges, although the capital value of their assets has yet to become 
positive. Managing swimming pools, district heating, and housing rental still require 
subsidies. Th e housing stock still generates a loss, because rents do not cover maintenance 
costs, mainly because tenants are unable to pay.
Property, however, can provide local governments with proﬁ t or sizable proceeds. Th e 
large losses on housing services fueled housing privatization. Although housing might have 
been a give-away divestiture, it resulted in huge revenues. Typically, the urban residential 
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and commercial land could also result in important revenues and in most cases simply 
windfall gains.
Municipalities generate sizable revenues from securities and ﬁ nancial assets (such as 
shares, bonds, and cash). Th ey received securities in the course of privatization of local state 
enterprises, but they were also active in investing in various securities (for example, treasury 
bills). In high inﬂ ationary environments, cash is a potential source of revenue at least in 
nominal terms. Local governments have been rather innovative in generating revenues 
even from the state transfers. Current grants were initially transferred in advance quarterly. 
Municipalities immediately invested the cash ﬂ ow temporarily available and resulting 
from the time lag between the receipt of transfers and eﬀ ective expenditures. In reaction, 
the central government introduced in 1998 a net ﬁ nancing system managed by the state 
treasury, which decreased the revenues of the local government sector by Ft 1.5 billion, 
more than 1 percent of the sector’s total budget (Government Decree 217/1998).
Municipalities are quite active in privatizing core public services to generate one-time 
revenues, prevent huge investment expenditures, or simply get rid of management tasks 
and excessive current losses. Th e ﬁ scal squeeze in the mid-1990s motivated municipalities 
to privatize core services, thus generating signiﬁ cant own revenues (box 16.2). Nevertheless, 
they often underestimated the monitoring and regulatory challenges inherent in public–
private partnerships. When local governments sell their service companies, the activities 
involved are no longer treated as municipal operations. Th e contract between municipality 
and private service provider, therefore, is crucial in specifying how fees are set and where 
and how revenues, expenditures, and subsidies ﬂ ow within the new ownership framework 
(see chapter 15). 
Box 16.2  Privatization of the Garbage Collection Services in Tatabánya
Th e City Management Co., an 80 percent municipally owned enterprise, provided garbage collection and 
treatment services in Tatabánya. Th e company often received various types of subsidies and other ad hoc 
ﬁ nancial support from the local government. In 1993 the local government decided to sell this service 
company and a concession for service provision to provide suﬃ  cient funding for modernizing the facilities 
and to ﬁ nance the necessary developments. Th e possible oﬀ -budget revenues and expenditures had an 
impact on the privatization conditionality, the concession fee, and the investment decisions. Th e German 
RWE company took over this service provision by buying the company’s assets and paying oﬀ  the total 20 
years of concession fee in advance. Th ese measures provided a one-time revenue from asset management 
for the city budget. By selling the company, the ad hoc municipal supports are no longer expected, though 
some budget expenditures may occur in the form of investment or social subsidies.
Local governments often invested assets in market services or other business entities 
(for example, restaurants and industrial parks) with the hope of generating own revenues. 
Th e mixed (public–private) ventures often fail to generate signiﬁ cant proﬁ ts or dividends 
for municipalities, because the private partners easily wipe out proﬁ ts as a result of 
uncontrolled expenditures. Moreover, in several instances local decision-makers, in the 
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hope of high proﬁ ts, jeopardized local public assets in business investments where they 
often lose the assets because they lack the right incentives or because of corruption. Th e 
municipal bankruptcy cases have mainly resulted from investments in risky, noncore 
activities (see chapter 30). 
In shifting services from on-budget entities to oﬀ -budget organizations, the assets in 
question often become part of a joint venture; often the returns on these investments are 
far from being suﬃ  ciently controlled by the line divisions or the local government council. 
Th e accountability issue should become more important, since local decision-makers, in 
most cases, consider joint investments to be simply private business. Th ey consider business 
secrecy more important than public interest and advise “never discuss business decisions in 
front of a wide audience to prevent losing your advantages in business negotiations.” Local 
government control is often exercised through the delegation of sometimes inexperienced 
passive local public servants to the company management or supervisory board. As a result, 
the public audience and public interest are often ignored soon after the entity had been 
transferred from on-budget to oﬀ -budget legal status.
Donations
Donations and voluntary contributions for public purposes by physical or legal persons are 
becoming increasingly important sources of local revenues, particularly in the education 
sector. In principle, no rewards accrue to the donors, though in practice these contributions 
often yield hidden beneﬁ ts. 
On the one hand, municipalities increasingly encourage their on-budget institutions 
to collect own revenues to ﬁ nance the additional costs of quality services by oﬀ -budget 
revenues (for example, to provide more language courses or extracurricular activities). 
Th e own revenues of municipal institutions include rental fees, fees paid by students for 
extracurricular courses, and donations. Donations are usually provided to a foundation 
established and managed by the donor institution. Municipal transfers to the institution 
are usually set independently from the supplementary revenues (box 16.3). 
On the other hand, donations are given to support activities that donors prefer (for 
example, sport, leisure, and social care). In addition, donations are tax deductible, which 
creates special incentives for donors. Th ese incentives often coincide with the institutions’ 
aim to raise soft money through foundations as a substitute for regular fees. Direct 
substitution of fees with donations was initially very popular, but it is now illegal—although 
such donations can be made in several indirect ways. For example, taxpayers can assign 
1 percent of their annual personal income tax to donate anonymously to any publicly 
registered foundation. Beyond the direct donations, schools and social service organizations 
gain sizable resources through personal income tax donations.
Vocational training contribution is another signiﬁ cant revenue source for schools. Th is 
voluntary contribution is paid by local entrepreneurs annually to support the operation of 
vocational schools. Th e amount of donations depends largely on the informal relationship 
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between the vocational school and the entrepreneur. Table 16.5 shows that this contribution 
can represent a signiﬁ cant amount of the school budget (36 percent of the own revenues 
and 4.4 percent of the total budget in the case I studied). Th e revenues from user charges, 
grants from applications, and grants from the decentralized vocational training funds are 
earmarked subsidies, so they should be used for the intended purposes, but donations can 
be used to cover all kinds of expenditures of the institution.
Box 16.3 Pay a Donation to Receive a Service!
In Berettyóújfalu parents can sign up for tennis courses and pay the fees as donations to the foundation of 
the school. Th e extracurricular language courses are ﬁ nanced in the same way. 
In a primary school in Berettyóújfalu two parents volunteered to provide computer system 
management services. In this way the school can assure competitive prices. Th e fees do not produce a 
signiﬁ cant revenue source; however, the school provides an important type of extracurricular education.
Above and beyond the regular municipal transfers, a home center for the elderly collects signiﬁ cant 
revenues from donations. Th e relatives of the elderly residents often make contributions to the foundation 
of the home or oﬀ er to transfer the real estate of the elderly residents after the residents have died. As an 
exchange, the residents expect and receive exclusive services or better rooms. Th e center has full sovereignty 
in managing and using these additional resources without including them in its budget and even without 
reporting these revenues in any form to the local government.
A primary school in Berettyóújfalu developed its computer network with the help of a 
school foundation. Th e grants collected by the foundation ﬁ nanced the purchase of modern 
computers and other equipment. Th e foundation, however, also leases the computers and 
generates revenues that are sometimes used to support other school activities.
Table 16.5 Th e Budget of a Vocational School in Berettyóújfalu in 1998 (Ft thousand)
Budget item Amount
Th e total budget 118,132
Transfers (central normative grants plus local government support) 103,811
Own revenue of the institution 14,321
User charges 5,225
Grants received through application 2,100
Decentralized vocational training fund 1,850
Vocational training contribution 5,146
Th e own revenue in percentage of the school’s budget 12%
Th e vocational training contribution in percentage of the own revenues 36%
Source: Local government of Berettyóújfalu data.
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Foundation: A Path between the Informal Fee and the Donation
Th e Clever Love Foundation was established in November 1995 by a kindergarten to 
support a child day-care center in Berettyóújfalu. Th e founders included 21 parents of the 
children in the kindergarten that year. Th e initial budget of the foundation was Ft 66,000. 
Th e board of the foundation decides on the use of the ﬁ nancial support and proceeds on the 
basis of the foundation’s charter. Th e key objectives of the foundation are as follows:
 To promote the integration of kindergarten education with school education con-
sidering the requirements of the diﬀ erent age groups
 To help children develop skills beyond the scope of their regular activities (for example, 
crafts workshops, drama groups, and special physical training)
 To purchase additional equipment (for example, sports equipment, a small weaving 
loom, books, videotapes, and musical instruments; for drama groups, purchasing 
puppets, costumes, and equipment, and ﬁ nancing stage arrangements)
 To provide ﬁ nancial support for part-time teachers in extracurricular activities (for 
example, crafts artists, painters, drawing teachers, and music teachers).
 
Th e donations to the foundation are voluntary, but almost every parent has paid 
something every month since the beginning. Th e kindergarten assures the accountability 
by classes and the use of this resource solely for professional improvement. In 1998 the 
donations from the parents’ contribution amounted to Ft 218,000 and expenses amounted 
to Ft 188,000 used mainly to buy toys and education-related equipment.
Conclusions
Local governments have been innovative in implementing various legal forms in local 
public service provision. Th ey shift activities from the on- to oﬀ -budget forms partly on the 
basis of good understanding of the best policy alternatives, and partly as a positive reaction 
to the challenges that emerged from the ﬁ scal squeeze, from the local business cycle, and 
from market and regulatory failures. Some evidence indicates that they still tend to follow 
the routines of the hidden economy inherited from the previous regime (Kenedi 1981). 
Moving activities between on- and oﬀ -budget forms has become a key local policy 
instrument. One can ﬁ nd municipalities where virtually all kinds of local services are under 
the tight control of local government (for example, the Debrecen Public Works Company). 
Often, however, local governments carelessly outsource the provision of local public 
services and shift them to oﬀ -budget activities. As a result, many municipalities have more 
oﬀ -budget than on-budget revenues and expenditures.
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From a policy point of view, key issues are what might be the major eﬀ ects of 
the changing service provisions and, in parallel, the growing role of OBRE on ﬁ scal 
decentralization, on local democracy, on eﬃ  ciency, and on equity. My ﬁ ndings suggest 
that analyzing the nature of the diﬀ erent types of OBRE is crucial. I have identiﬁ ed ﬁ ve 
key criteria for evaluation of OBRE: (a) accountability, (b) predictability, (c) distortions in 
investment decisions and between supply and demand, (d) equity, and (e) challenges in the 
regulatory capacity of local governments. My key ﬁ ndings are as follows:
 Accountability—Decentralization can be interpreted as a step toward a more eﬃ  cient 
system, in which locally elected representatives are more responsible to voters and 
make decisions on scarce resources giving more weight to local priorities and citizen 
needs. Th e role of OBRE should be evaluated against this expectation.
 Predictability—A revenue source should be predictable because most of the local 
government services need longer term planning. OBRE might have an eﬀ ect on 
predictability, because windfall gains are easily left out of the democratic decision-
making process.
 Distortions—OBRE could cause supply–demand distortions in the local economy, since 
it may give incentives for adverse behavior to both local governments and citizens.
 Equity—OBRE may increase rather than decrease the inequity among the citizens. 
A good example is the informal price on allocation of scarce goods and services.
 Regulation—OBRE could decrease the eﬃ  ciency of the central government in 
managing the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system, and local public administration 
may not have suﬃ  cient capacity to regulate the outsourced provision of local public 
services.
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In 1991 democratically elected local governments took over nearly Ft 4,000 billion of 
assets, although the legal transactions were not concluded until the end of 1990s. Th is 
initial subnational portfolio represented about one-third of the total public assets and was 
twice as big as the competitive sector portfolio of the privatization agency. As a result of the 
immense transfers in and out of the municipal budget sphere, a sizable municipal enterprise 
sector emerged. Th e total assets of enterprises in full or partial municipal ownership 
amounted to Ft 4,300 billion  of which the municipal stake was Ft 480 billion; the turnover 
of these enterprises was about 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998. Th e 
municipal sector now represents the largest sectoral stake in the Hungarian economy.
Given the overall weight, role, and importance of municipal enterprises (MEs) the 
purpose of this study is to identify and assess their scope of activities, describe their multiple 
relations with municipalities, and analyze their economic performance and behavior. Based 
on a broad and comprehensive picture of the MEs and their transition over the 1990s, 
we summarize the key policy challenges related to exercising ownership rights, price and 
performance regulation, equity and eﬃ  ciency, funding, ﬁ nancing, and management of the 
ME sector.
Municipal Wealth and Municipal Enterprises
Th e principle of ﬁ scal decentralization and the aim to decentralize the former socialist 
state were the driving forces behind the transfer to municipalities of all local public wealth 
and assets in support of their broad responsibilities in public service provision. Th e initial 
legislative framework and basic property registers, however, were largely incomplete or not 
* Th is chapter is based on Kopányi and Hertelendy 1999. 
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in harmony with policy objectives. Hence, asset transfer became a long, gradual process, in 
which legal and accounting transactions often remain unclear in the context of lax political 
decisions on transfers. As a result, many assets remained without clear legal status for years; 
moreover, only few retrospective estimates, rather than opening balances, are available to 
measure the initial size of the state and municipal wealth and the transfers between the 
two.
Th e national wealth in 1990 was estimated to be in the range of Ft 15,000 billion 
(about US$ 240 billion in 1990 prices) (Pitti and Varga 1995). Th is comprised a Ft 5,000 
billion treasury, Ft 3,000 billion competitive assets in state ownership, and about Ft 4,000 
billion in municipal assets (assuming completion of the approved transfers), and the rest 
were in private ownership. Local governments inherited assets from their predecessor 
councils, received assets from the state, and had invested subsequent proceeds from own 
revenues, state grants, and household or private donations. In addition, the book value of 
municipal assets was subsequently changed through asset reappraisal, privatization, and a 
change in the legal form of service units from on-budget to oﬀ -budget municipal entities 
(see table 17.1). 
Table 17.1 Increase in Municipal Assets between 1990 and 1999
Asset Value (Ft billion)
Residential and business real estate transferred from state 286
Public service companies inherited from predecessor local councils 333
Compensation in cash and shares from the State Privatization Agency 199
State transfers (targeted, addressed, and extra-budgetary grants) 297
Donations and hook-up contribution from residents and enterprises 72
Revaluation of assets of public utility services companies 400
Total increase in assets 1,587
Source: State Audit Oﬃ  ce Report 2000.
Th e Emergence of the Municipal Enterprise Sector
Th e initial book value of municipal assets, however, was and still remains underreported 
because of uncompleted transfers, missing real estate cadastre, outdated accounting records 
(for example, land accounted as zero value), and unclear rules in accounting spin-oﬀ s from 
on-budget to oﬀ -budget organizations. Moreover, the major part of local assets is recorded 
only in terms of physical inventory (for example, square meter of parks or roads) with no 
value-based accounting (see chapters 16 and 19). 
Th e book value of the municipal invested assets increased by Ft 1,300 billion (see 
table 17.2) between 1991 and 1998. Roughly half of the amount was the result of the asset 
transfer process (table 17.1) and net ﬁ xed investments contributed the balance of some 
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Ft 700 billion. Th e proceeds from asset divestitures (Ft 270 billion) were partly reinvested 
and partly used for current expenditures. Th e vague accounting system made current 
expenditures hard to value. A signiﬁ cant sum of assets simply bypassed the municipal 
budget, because it was transferred from the state at the very time when the legal form of 
state enterprises was changing to limited or joint-stock corporations, so only the share of a 
company’s registered capital, rather than its total assets, is reﬂ ected in the municipal budget. 
As a result (and taking account of subsequent divestitures), business entities that had full 
or partial municipal ownership held about Ft 4,300 billion in asset value—of which about 
Ft 1,100 billion was the municipal stake, owned through the Ft 480 billion municipal 
shareholdings in the MEs’ equity capital in 1998. 
Table 17.2 Municipal Assets, Divestiture, and Investments, 199–1998 (Ft billion)
Stock of assets end of the year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Invested assets 313 600 827 1,029 1,095 1,299 1,440 1,639
 Fixed assets 304 391 476 566 608 669 800 960
 Invested ﬁ nancial assets 9 208 289 380 401 540 529 527
Current assets 83 101 110 125 158 232 348 386
Asset total 396 701 937 1,154 1,253 1,531 1,788 2,025
Divestiture and investment per year
 Sale of ﬁ xed assets 9 17 25 38 44 47 46 60 
 Investment in  ﬁ xed assets 49 79 89 141 109 116 187 236
Net investment 39 62 64 104 65 68 141 176
Sources: Assets: State Audit Oﬃ  ce Report 2000; divestiture and investment: Ministry of Finance, government 
ﬁ nance statistics (GFS), authors’ estimates. 
Table 17.3 Number of Enterprises Th at Have Municipal Shareholdings by Legal Form, 2000
Limited partnership 47
Association 9
Public purpose nonproﬁ t corporation 324
Limited 1,067
Joint-stock company 99
Source:  State Audit Oﬃ  ce Report 2000.
Municipalities have been innovative in selecting among various legal forms of 
municipal oﬀ -budget entities. Th ey took over, established, or invested in nearly 1,200 
limited and joint-stock business entities in fee-base or market services, sometimes in 
manufacturing or agricultural production (see table 17.3). Nearly 400 oﬀ -budget entities, 
mainly public-purpose not-for-proﬁ t corporations, were established to provide non-
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fee-based public services (for example, road or park maintenance, social services, and public 
libraries).
Major Groups of Municipal Enterprises
MEs are primarily providers of public services, but in Hungary a declining, yet still sizable, 
purely business portfolio remains in municipal hands. MEs often fall beyond the scope of 
studies on governmental issues, because in terms of statistical classiﬁ cation they are not 
part of the general government system. Th eir economic and ﬁ nancial performance is not 
consolidated in the national accounts. Yet they are closely linked to, and have an eﬀ ect 
on, public ﬁ nances in the following areas: (a) funding of MEs (in- and outﬂ ows to the 
local budget), (b) ﬁ nancing of MEs (guaranteed and non-guaranteed liabilities), (c) MEs’ 
operation (factors aﬀ ecting ﬁ nancial and operating performance), and (d) contracts and 
concession arrangements between MEs and local governments (Arthur Andersen 1999).
In a broad sense we refer to MEs as business organizations that have full or partial 
municipal ownership regardless of legal form or focus of activities. Th is deﬁ nition, however, 
does not reveal the diﬀ erences and diversity in the universe of MEs. In harmony with 
the Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce classiﬁ cation, and for analytical purposes, we considered four 
clusters of MEs according to the main focus of their activities:
 Basic public services, such as district heating, water management, sewage and waste 
treatment, local transportation, local roads and maintenance of parks, and public domains
 Supplementary services, such as supporting and auxiliary transportation activities, 
telecommunications, real estate rental and trade activities, and other service activities
 Energy sector, including local gas, district heating, and electricity supply
 Non-service enterprises, including companies in which municipalities acquired share-
holdings mainly in the course of privatization of manufacturing and market service 
enterprises (for example, hotels, restaurants, and trading units).
 
Each sectoral or activity group can be further divided into subgroups in terms of the 
share of municipal ownership:
 100 percent municipal ownership
 50–100 percent municipal ownership (majority MEs)
 25–50 percent municipal ownership (blocking minority MEs)
 5–25 percent municipal ownership (minority MEs)
 Less than 5 percent municipal ownership (portfolio investment).
 
Th is chapter focuses on enterprises that provide basic and supplementary public 
services (the ﬁ rst two activities in the list of four above). Th is focus, however, does not 
preclude highlighting some features of the other groups of companies.
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Th e Legal Framework of Asset Transfer
Most MEs were established as an independent and ﬂ exible means to fulﬁ ll municipal 
obligations in providing compulsory or voluntary public services. Besides, municipalities 
acquired shareholdings as heirs to the properties of predecessor local councils and as a 
consequence of the transformation and privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 
context of the following legislative framework. 
Assets were transferred to municipalities: (a) by the force of the 1990 Act on Local 
Government (ALG), (b) based on the decision of property transfer committees set up by 
the 1991 Act on State Property (c) by virtue of the 1992 Act on the Transformation of 
Business Entities, or (d) in connection with the reallocation of public service functions, 
which entailed ownership change for service providers.
Th e ALG sets forth that “[state] assets managed by the [socialist] councils or their 
organs and institutions, shall be transferred to municipal ownership” (paragraph 2, article 
107). In addition “property transfer committees should be set up to manage the asset 
transfer to municipal ownership, and for the distribution of physical and ﬁ nancial assets 
of public utilities” (paragraph 3, article 107). Th e Property Act stipulates that committees 
shall transfer to municipal ownership assets exclusively to the extent that meets the needs 
of a community, including buildings, networks, and equipment of public utility companies 
(article 11).
Th e 1989 Act on the Transformation of Business Entities states that “an ownership 
stake equivalent to the value of the inner area land stated in the balance-sheet of the 
state enterprise to be transferred should be conferred on the municipality of the relevant 
administrative area.” (Article 18).  Th e interpretation of the term “equivalent” was a subject 
of controversy between municipalities and the State Property Agency. While munici-
palities claimed ownership stakes equal to the value of the respective inner area lands, the 
State Property Agency oﬀ ered shareholdings in the proportion of the land value to the 
company’s total assets. Because municipalities refused to assume the companies’ liabilities, 
the State Property Agency deducted the companies’ debts from the land value. Th e 
subsequent 1992 amendment of the Act on the Transformation of Business Entities gave 
precedence to the State Property Agency’s interpretation. Disputes and lawsuits that were 
underway before the 1992 transfers were in process till the end of the 1990s.
Th e 1995 Supplementary Act to the ALG regulates the municipal ownership rights 
in electricity and gas supply companies and stipulates that a 25 percent stake of the local 
electricity suppliers and 40 percent stake of the local gas suppliers should be transferred 
to municipalities. Th e shares were delivered by the State Property and Holding Co., 
but disputes arose about whether shares should be distributed among municipalities 
in accordance with their populations or their investment contributions to the network 
development. About three-quarters of the municipalities had still claims against the 
property agency (the State Property and Holding Co.) in 1997, and the share transfers 
were still incomplete in 1999.
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Th e Composition and Weight of the Municipal Enterprise Sector
Th e composition of the ME portfolio changed signiﬁ cantly during the 1990s. Five major 
factors have inﬂ uenced this process: (a) the gradual transfer of state ownership stakes to 
municipalities, (b) divestitures aimed at cash generation, (c) privatization for outsourcing 
purposes, (d) portfolio restructuring, and (e) new infrastructure investments primarily 
supported by state investment grants (for example, potable water, gas supply, and sewage 
treatment programs). As a result the ME portfolio has become concentrated in basic 
services, and their weight increased from 59 to 78 percent of municipal shareholdings. 
Meanwhile municipalities have divested a signiﬁ cant part of their energy sector and non-
service sector shareholdings, and their weights decreased from 15 to 8, and from 13 to 4 
percent, respectively (see ﬁ gures 17.1 and 17.2).
Figure 17.1 Municipal Shareholdings by Sectors (1993)
Figure 17.2 Municipal Shareholdings by Sectors (1998)
 
Soon after taking over, municipalities radically divested their energy sector share-
holdings, mostly to generate cash. Full municipal ownership, which was 79 percent of 
shareholdings in local energy supply (mainly gas) companies in 1993, dropped to zero 
by 1998 (see table 17.4). Municipalities usually retained only minority—mostly blocking 
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minority, (25–50 percent)—shareholdings (57 percent of portfolio) in those companies, 
although often they kept simple minority (less than 25 percent) or negligible (less than 
5 percent) holdings. Because of the lack of eﬀ ective legal protection of minority interests, 
minority shareholdings serve mainly as reserves for future cash generation rather than as 
strategic municipal concerns in local service enterprises.
Table 17.4 Change in Municipal Ownership by Sectors (percent)
Municipal 
ownership share
Basic services Supplementary 
services
Local energy supply Non-service activities
1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998
<5 0 0 4 3 20 19 27 19
5–25 1 0 7 13 1 23 56 52
25–50 1 0 4 5 0 57 6 11
50–100 2 15 12 19 0 0 6 8
100 96 84 73 60 79 0 5 10
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
Much outsourcing has been taking place in basic local public services. Full municipal 
ownership declined from 96 to 84 percent between 1993 and 1998. In parallel, simple 
majority interest increased from 2 to 15 percent of the portfolio (table 17.4). Minority 
holdings in basic services have disappeared, however. ME portfolio in supplementary 
services shows a much more diversiﬁ ed ownership composition with much less, albeit still 
signiﬁ cant (60 percent), full municipal ownership share.
Municipal ownership stakes in MEs have ﬂ uctuated at around 25 percent of total 
municipal assets since 1992 (see ﬁ gure 17.3). As a result of the diverse changes described 
above, municipal portfolio in MEs grew dynamically both in value and in proportion until 
1996, when a gradual decrease started and average municipal ownership decreased from the 
peak of 28 to 26 percent in MEs’ equity by 2000.
As shown earlier, a signiﬁ cant municipal portfolio is still associated with low minority 
ownership in MEs. Th is portfolio might be a good source for further divestitures, cashing 
out, or shifting from non-service to core or supplementary service activities. Small minority 
stakes, however, although accounted at face value in municipal books, are often overvalued, 
so real market value is lower than book value or is even zero. Majority owners of MEs often 
seek to take over for free the minority shareholdings, because no third party is willing to 
buy them (see chapter19). 
As a net result of the immense portfolio restructuring, divestiture, and new investments, 
the value of municipal assets increased from the initial Ft 4,000 billion to Ft 5,300 billion 
by the end of 1997. Yet the assets value stated in municipal accounts increased only from 
Ft 400 billion to Ft 1,800 billion (SAO 1998). As mentioned earlier, just a physical 
inventory is ﬁ led for the other assets, and this estimated asset value is not stated in the 
balance sheets of the municipalities. 
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Figure 17.3 Municipal Shareholdings, 1991–1998 
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
Although municipalities have fully divested their interest in more than 400 MEs over 
the 1990s, the total number of MEs shows no substantial changes. Th e number of MEs 
ﬂ uctuated and was as high as 1,821 companies in 1994, but dropped to 1,668 by 1996. 
Municipalities sold mainly their non-service portfolio investments, and hundreds of new 
MEs were established in the meantime to provide mandatory and supplementary public 
services. In particular, the ill-targeted water supply grant system resulted in hundreds of 
small, ineﬃ  cient water works that serve substandard quality water, often at high prices and 
with poor maintenance standards (see chapter 30). 
MEs have played a signiﬁ cant role in the economy since the early 1990s in terms of 
employment, investments, and contribution to GDP (see ﬁ gure 17.4). Th e annual turnover 
of basic and supplementary public service enterprises amounted to 6 percent of GDP—
nearly 35 percent of GDP when including the other MEs. Basic and supplementary service 
MEs together have some 110,000 employees (nearly 2.5 percent of the active work force). 
An additional 46,000 employees work in the energy sector in which municipalities have 
retained substantial ownership and inﬂ uence. Non-service MEs show a declining number 
of employees, because an increasing number of companies are no longer included in the 
group of MEs since municipalities have fully sold their shareholdings.
Regarding economic performance, MEs have been contributing between 2.2 and 2.6 
percent to GDP. Th e contribution of the energy sector steadily increased from 1.9 percent 
to 2.5 percent by the end of 1990s.
Th e most remarkable performance indicator, however, is the role of MEs in subnational 
infrastructure and other public service investments. While local governments have spent 
2.2–2.5 percent of GDP on infrastructure investments annually, municipal public service 
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enterprises have carried out investments for an additional 1.5 percent of GDP annually. 
With respect to their sectoral contribution, MEs’ investments in the basic activities 
accounted for 30 percent of the total sectoral investments (20 percent in the supplementary 
service sectors). Of the total investments in basic services, about one-third was carried out 
in energy supply services, and district heating, sewage, and solid waste service investments 
each represented about 12–13 percent of local public investments between 1993 and 
1998. More than half of the investments in supplementary services have taken place in 
the telecommunication sector, where, however, most of MEs have been subsequently 
privatized.
Figure 17.4 Annual Turnover of Municipal Enterprises 
as a Percentage of GDP, 1993–1998 
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
The Municipal Enterprise Portfolio
Th is section summarizes the development of the municipal asset portfolio and the 
performance of municipal enterprises over the 1990s.
Asset Takeover and Register of Municipal Enterprises
Th e 1990 ALG reﬂ ected a broad political consensus that any state properties that are 
or could be used to provide local public services and functions shall all be transferred to 
municipal ownership, but carrying out the eﬀ ective takeover of the assets received by law 
turned out to be a complicated and slow process for the newly elected local governments. 
Th e local governments received no one-time opening balance, register, or appraisal of 
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municipal assets; nor did they have clear rules for taking over assets, exercising ownership 
rights, and managing municipal properties. Th is lack resulted in, among other things, 
numerous ownership disputes, double accounting, illegitimate takeovers or divestitures, 
outdated real estate and enterprise registers, and overall poor management of municipal 
assets. Th e major shortcomings are described in this section.
Legal regulations did not stipulate rules for allocating state assets among the respective 
municipalities. Th e property rights of most public utilities were passed on to municipalities 
for which the public utilities exclusively provided the services. Debates arose, however, in 
the cases in which public works were serving the needs of several municipalities. Often 
political decisions were made on whether the municipalities shall operate and maintain 
these public works collectively or instead transfer the assets to one municipality with the 
task to continue providing services for the small region as was previously done. When 
asset separation happened to be relatively easy, posing no danger to service provision, 
questions still arose about what portion of assets and liabilities should be allocated to 
each of municipality. In this regard the most remarkable case relates to the assets of the 
local gas supply utilities distributed among respective municipalities and privatized soon 
thereafter under the oversight of the state property agency in 1995. Th e vague distribution 
and compensation rules, however, resulted in a legal dispute between municipalities and the 
central government, a dispute unresolved till 2000.
Th e contradictions created by divergent legal interpretations of various acts (for 
example, ALG, the Property Act, the Act on Corporation raise several questions. Th e vague 
distinctions between “core” and “non-core” municipal assets, and between “marketable,” 
“restrictedly marketable,” and “non-marketable” municipal assets (see box 17.1) have 
resulted in substantially diﬀ erent form, appraisal, and structure of asset takeovers across 
municipalities. Most local governments considered utilities to be core assets, recorded them 
as non-marketable properties, and transferred them under a management contract to an 
operation company usually in municipal hands also. Numerous local governments, however, 
transferred all the utility’s assets to MEs right after the takeover from the state. Moreover, 
only the municipal share of the enterprises’ registered capital was recorded in municipal 
accounts. Th e utility’s assets, as in-kind investments, were either coupled with an increase 
in the enterprise’s share capital recorded and controlled by the Registry Court or often only 
accounted as capital reserves to prevent the recording and control of the Registry Court.
For instance, about Ft 206 billion of water works’ assets were directly transferred to 
MEs. Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce ruled only in 1996 that the transfer of property rights of 
public works to joint-stock companies had been illegitimate and contradicts the principles 
of the ALG. Th e legal nature of a joint-stock company requires full marketability of its 
assets, whereas public works used to fulﬁ ll compulsory tasks of the municipality and were, 
hence, not fully marketable. Th e spin-oﬀ  of restrictedly marketable core assets endangers 
the provision of compulsory services, because the independent enterprises could freely and 
without any restraint dispose of them; as a result, municipalities may have no longer power 
to exert inﬂ uence directly on the management of these properties (SAO 1996). 
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Box 17. 1  Vague or Flexible Classiﬁ cation of Municipal Assets?
 (1) Property of the local government, which serves directly the carrying out of compulsory duties and 
authority of local government or the enforcement of public rights and powers, may be declared as core 
assets.
 (2) Property belonging to the range of core assets is either non-marketable or restrictedly marketable:
  (a) Non-marketable are the local public roads and their structures, squares, and parks, and also 
any other real and personal property which is designated as such by an Act, or by the local 
government;
  (b) Restrictedly marketable are the public utilities, assets of municipal institutions, and public build-
ings, as well as real property and movables so designated by the local government. Disposition 
of items of the core assets to be restrictedly marketable may be made in accordance with the 
conditions deﬁ ned in an act or in a decree of the local government (article 79, Act on Local 
Government).
Th e Act on Addressed and Targeted Grants makes only municipalities eligible for 
receiving these state investment grants. It initially prohibited the divestiture of utilities 
built with the support of these grants. Th e 1994 amendment of the Act on Addressed and 
Targeted Grants heightened the controversy of public utility ownership because under 
certain conditions it allows the transfer of property rights from municipalities to MEs.
Local governments had insuﬃ  cient information about the methods and techniques 
to appraise, account, and register municipal properties. According to a State Audit Oﬃ  ce 
report, 40 percent of the surveyed local governments interpreted the ALG in such a way 
that they had no obligations in connection with the asset takeover (SAO 1993). Minority 
shareholdings in hundreds of non-service local enterprises were, by law, allocated to 
the respective municipalities in the course of the privatization. Th e Registry Courts 
accordingly registered municipal ownership (like any other ownership), but did not notify 
the municipalities, so these ownership stakes were often not reﬂ ected in the municipal 
accounts. Local governments are very passive owners who do not monitor their minority 
shareholdings, so these investments are often recorded at face value in municipal accounts 
even when the respective enterprises are already bankrupt or closed down.
Municipalities have failed to comply with ALG and Property Act provisions that require 
the preparation of an asset inventory and a comprehensive analytical register for municipal 
assets. A SAO survey pointed out that almost three-quarters of municipalities had not pre-
pared any asset register by 1998. About the same proportion of municipalities failed to record 
their core assets separately from their non-core assets (SAO 1998). Because of the outdated 
real estate records, municipalities have not been capable of identifying the entire set of assets 
inherited from their predecessor local councils. Assets, the values of which were not recorded, 
did not appear in the analytical registers either. Th e other parts of the assets are often 
registered at an inaccurate book value, far from the appropriate market value. Assets are 
often appraised only when sold or invested as an in-kind contribution (see chapter 19). 
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Most local governments have not adopted a local property decree (prescribed in the 
ALG). When such a decree is adopted, it includes only general statements and does not 
specify any requirements regarding the rules for managing municipal assets and enforcing 
municipal ownership rights. Exercising ownership rights is often very weak and limited to 
a politically driven delegation of members of the local assembly or public servants to the 
management or supervisory boards of MEs in majority municipal ownership. Municipal 
representatives often show up in board meetings without a clear mandate and acting power. 
As a result, a few years after the transfer of municipal assets from on-budget items to 
independent MEs, many local governments still have neither eﬀ ective control nor reliable 
appraisal of their oﬀ -budget investments. Th ese shortcomings, among others, also prevent 
local governments from implementing an active asset–liability management policy; as a 
result the eﬀ ective use of municipal assets for backing credit market transactions remains at 
best suboptimal (see chapters 29 and 30). 
Performance of Municipal Enterprises
Municipalities not only inherited shareholdings in business enterprises, but local govern-
ments also have sovereign rights to establish for-proﬁ t entities to provide public services 
and market services (for example, hotel catering and trade) and to carry out any other 
activities (including manufacturing, agriculture, or even banking and brokerage business 
entities). Th e eﬃ  cient operation and management of municipal marketable assets are 
regulated in the 1992 Act on Public Finance and government decree 137 of 1993. Th ese 
laws stipulate that municipalities shall undertake entrepreneurial activities only as long 
as they are proﬁ table. Compliance with such a provision is evidently hard, because local 
governments always make good arguments for maintaining a loss-maker unit temporarily. 
Likewise, in investment plans local governments assume that the new enterprise will 
become proﬁ table over time.
Before they took over state assets, municipalities were not prepared. Th ey could neither 
develop the proper organization within the local administration responsible nor set up, 
operate, and control business activities. Municipalities often jeopardize public money 
when they invest in and run non-service, for-proﬁ t MEs without suﬃ  cient caution. In 
a State Audit Oﬃ  ce survey, auditors found that municipalities neither prepare analyses 
to evaluate investment risk nor work out alternatives to ensure the most eﬀ ective use of 
asset. Th e in-kind contributions and money transfers to business entities were often not 
supported by rational and economic considerations. As a consequence, most MEs where 
municipalities were the sole stockholders were running deﬁ cits (SAO 1994). Th e nine 
municipal bankruptcy cases revealed that investments in risky non-service activities with 
the hope of extraordinary gains were often the key factors behind municipal insolvency (see 
chapter 30). 
Local governments, moreover, can freely and independently decide whether an activity 
is recorded as basic or entrepreneurial. If a service is provided as basic activity, then the 
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proﬁ tability requirement can be often disregarded. Consequently certain activities (such as 
operating a marketplace, public bath, or parking facilities) are listed as basic activities in one 
municipality and as entrepreneurial activities in another. Solid waste collection and water 
supply are mostly organized as core activities, but a number of municipalities provide these 
services through for-proﬁ t business organizations.
Despite these shortcomings, a profound learning process and a steady improvement 
in MEs’ performance occurred by the end of 1990s. Th e proﬁ tability ratios, that is, return 
on assets and return on equity, reveal that the non-service MEs, overall, have increasingly 
fulﬁ lled the proﬁ tability objectives (see ﬁ gures 17.5 and 17.6). Basic service enterprises are 
steady loss-makers and, in spite of their slight improvement, generated losses throughout 
the 1993–1998 period primarily because local governments have been reluctant to set cost-
recovery charges. Th e energy sector MEs experienced a sharp downturn in 1995 (the year 
of their privatization). Because collective irresponsibility was replaced by the individual 
responsibility of private owners, the performance of energy suppliers improved, and they 
became proﬁ table. Th e recovery for energy suppliers clearly reﬂ ects the fact that enterprises 
in minority municipal ownership under strong private management could perform 
proﬁ tably. Analysts are concerned that supplementary service MEs have steadily been 
even less proﬁ table than the basic service enterprises (although the latter receive various 
municipal subsidies in covering cost of capital and ﬁ nance).
Figure 17.5 Return on Assets, 1993–1998 
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
Th e proﬁ tability of enterprises was also aﬀ ected by a reduced demand for public utility 
services (hot water, district heating, and potable water). In the last few years, residents have 
changed their consumption behavior and become more economical and cost conscious, 
mainly as a result of increased user fees and the installation of meters.
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 Figure 17.6 Return on Equity, 1993–1998 
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
Labor productivity ratios show evidence of the cost-eﬀ ective measures taken by 
enterprises. MEs in the public service sectors considerably reduced the number of 
permanent staﬀ . In the basic service sector, the average staﬀ  number decreased by nearly 
44 percent. In the supplementary service and energy sectors, staﬃ  ng decreased by 40 and 
34 percent, respectively. Th is important downsizing resulted in a sharp upsurge in labor 
productivity in all categories of MEs (see ﬁ gure 17.7). Th e per capita value added has 
tripled in each cluster of MEs despite the diﬀ erent asset speciﬁ city in the various sectors.
Figure 17.7 Value Added per Employee, 1993–1998 
Source:  Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
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Th e ability to meet maturing current liabilities through the conversion of current assets 
into cash had a slightly negative eﬀ ect on the current liquidity of basic service and energy 
MEs in 1993 and 1994, but it stabilized in the second part of the decade. Th e liquidity ratio, 
both in supplementary service and nonservice MEs, remained balanced over the whole 
period according to the ECOSTAT Research Institute of the Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce.
Th e indebtedness of MEs was very low in the early 1990s given the access to various 
direct municipal funding schemes. Basic activity enterprises still ﬁ nance their assets 
primarily with owner’s equity, rather than external borrowing. For these enterprises, the 
debt-to-total-assets ratio hardly exceeds 15 percent (see ﬁ gure 17.8). Th e supplementary 
service MEs started a more active borrowing right after their privatization, although their 
steadily growing indebtedness is still moderate, the debt-to-total-assets ratio was slightly 
below 50 percent in 1998. Th e rise in the indebtedness ratio for the supplementary service 
enterprises might be somewhat alarming should it continue to grow at the same pace. High 
indebtedness may result in the escalation of ﬁ nancial expenditures, and greater ﬁ nancial 
risks may lead, in turn, to an increase in the cost of capital and a reduction in the ability to 
withstand ﬁ nancial distress. Th e energy sector MEs show a steadily increasing but rather 
moderate indebtedness, partly because of their restored proﬁ tability.
Figure 17.8 Debt to Total Liabilities Ratio, 1993–1998 
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
Th e capital and cost structure of MEs, like the proﬁ tability, indebtedness, and liquidity 
ratios in the period of 1990–2000, ought to be treated with some reservations. First, the 
asset takeover was a gradual process and involved numerous unclear transactions between 
Supplementary
Basic
Energy
Non-service
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
352
the state and municipalities as well as between municipalities and MEs. Second, the base 
capital of MEs is often artiﬁ cial because local governments, who were always short of cash, 
often established MEs with the legally required minimum registered capital irrespective of 
the total asset size. For example, the municipality of Vértestarcsa transferred its water works 
to a limited partnership entity with a capital investment of Ft 20,000, and the similar-sized 
Gyál es Vidéke water works was established as a limited liability company with Ft 1 million 
own capital (the minimum by law for a limited corporation). Th ird, the cost of funding and 
amortization are mostly not provided in MEs’ budgets, because diﬀ erent rules apply for 
business entities and assets in municipal hands. Currently, diﬀ erent depreciation rules and 
rates apply for assets owned by private corporate entities and for assets owned by central 
governments, municipalities, or local government budgetary entities. Th e ﬁ rst is regulated 
by the 1991 Act on Accounting and the second, by government decree 54 of 1996. Th is 
enables local governments to interpret the accounting rules in a way that hides depreciation 
costs from MEs’ budgets, and postpones them or shields them from the local budget (see 
chapter 28). 
Managing, Controlling, and Regulating Municipal Enterprises
Th is section summarizes the legal framework and the local governments’ capacity and 
behavior in four key ﬁ elds: exercising ownership rights, price regulation, managing 
household arrears, and funding and ﬁ nancing MEs.
Exercise of Municipal Ownership Rights
Th e Act on Corporation, the ALG, and various local government decrees regulate 
municipal ownership rights. Line departments of large and medium local governments 
are entrusted with asset management functions. For this purpose, in most cases asset 
management departments are set up, but in certain municipalities the ﬁ nancial department 
and a city management division also takes part in the management of real and ﬁ nancial 
assets. Special property management oﬃ  ces are established in cities where the number and 
variety of assets of MEs are high. Th ese departments and oﬃ  ces are responsible for the 
administration and operational management of municipal asset portfolio within the local 
government. Th e asset management oﬃ  ces primarily supervise the legal compliance, but do 
not control the activities, eﬃ  ciency, and performance of MEs. Th ey work under the control 
of the local assembly, the mayor, and sometimes permanent or ad hoc committees, which are 
authorized to make strategy decisions.
A number of municipalities have set up a so-called “property committee,” to pro-
fessionally assess the ﬁ nancial statements and analyze the performance of the MEs. 
Th e objective is to enforce the municipal interests within the enterprise management.
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In several cities an additional economic and entrepreneurial committee is established often 
to tackle problems arising from conﬂ icting goals in ownership, control, and regulation of 
MEs. Th ese committees are also authorized to request special reports or even hearings from 
the management of the MEs. Th e tasks, functions, and responsibilities of these committees, 
however, often overlap. Although these responsibilities were set forth in the property 
decrees of most municipalities, in practice these committees have been passive watchdogs 
rather than eﬀ ective bodies able to exercise their ownership rights and inﬂ uence the 
management of the MEs. Local governments seldom make asset management decisions 
for operating companies.
Municipalities also delegate representatives to the managing and the supervisory 
boards of MEs, mostly those with majority municipal ownership. Th ese delegates act 
in compliance with the Act on Corporation under general ﬁ duciary liabilities. Local 
governments, however, even when they are in an overwhelming majority position, do not 
specify special duties or even reporting terms for municipal delegates. Th ese representative 
positions are often considered to be primarily a means for supplementary personal income 
or party representation rather than a key function for active asset management or protection 
of municipal ownership rights.
Shares transferred by law in exchange for the value of inner area lands mostly represent 
only a tiny portion of the issued capital and hence provide less than a blocking minority 
position for the municipality. In these cases especially, local governments do not exercise 
basic inﬂ uence, control, and supervision and have no permanent representation in these 
MEs. Municipalities by law can be represented in the annual assembly meetings of MEs, 
but even if they are, they have no voice in the approval of investment plans, spin-oﬀ s, or 
management composition, so the enforcement of municipal interests is very limited because 
of the minority position. Under these circumstances, majority private owners are very likely 
to strip hidden assets and tunnel proﬁ ts by excessively increasing expenditures.
Most local governments do not assume that they would receive proﬁ ts from their 
MEs. Th ey do not make any forecast for the potential yield, dividends, and earned interests 
either, so these income sources are not reﬂ ected in the local budget plan (Bernáth, Jókay, 
and Szmetana 1999). Th e yields on municipal investments in MEs were very low in basic 
and supplementary service MEs (see ﬁ gure 17.9). Th e close to zero yield on basic activity 
enterprises occurs primarily because the price-setting formulas allow for zero or minimal 
proﬁ t. Dividend rates, however, vary between enterprises as well as over time, depending on 
the investment requirements of the enterprise and its operating performance. Th e dividend 
ratio increases in parallel with the rise in proﬁ tability. Municipalities gain a moderate but 
increasing dividend on their investments in energy and non-service MEs. Th e dividend was 
already above 4 and nearly 3 percent on non-service equity, in 1998, primarily because of 
the achievements of private owners and their willingness to pay dividends to themselves 
and to the other owners as well.
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Figure 17.9 Dividend per Equity, 1993–1998  (percent)
 
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
Price Regulation
Because of the changes in ownership structures, the 1990 Act on Price transferred to 
municipal authority the power to set tariﬀ s and prices of public utility services. Th e annex 
of Act on Price speciﬁ es by items which products and services fall within the pricing 
authority of municipalities and which ones fall within the authority of the sectoral 
ministries. Municipalities are given the power to set the prices of steam, hot water, and 
potable water and to set the tariﬀ s for district heating and local transportation, when the 
relevant public utilities belong to the municipality. By law, local governments cannot set, 
but only monitor and approve, prices for services provided by private service providers or 
public works owned by counties.
Local governments have not been well prepared for the role of price regulator. Th eir 
mixed obligations, such as to act as a price authority, protect the interests of residents 
(and voters!), and fulﬁ ll managerial and ownership duties, are diﬃ  cult to reconcile. Th ese 
conﬂ icting interests made setting prices and tariﬀ s more diﬃ  cult for local governments. 
Th e city councils did not formulate rules or concrete requirements for the service supplier 
with regard to the cost structure or rules and extent of tariﬀ  increases, nor did they specify 
the information needed to set fees and tariﬀ s appropriately.
Th e price- and tariﬀ -setting behavior of local governments was markedly inﬂ uenced 
by the availability of central current grants (price subsidies). Municipalities have delayed 
the decisions on prices until the central government had set the price limit under which 
municipalities could apply for current grants. In many instances, municipalities increased 
tariﬀ s at a higher rate than they had planned after they became aware of the pricing 
conditions of the central government.
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In the early 1990s the central government adopted the principles to reach cost-recovery 
prices gradually; as suppliers’ subsidies were discontinued, utility service tariﬀ s rose by 60 
percent on average by 1992. To mitigate excessive price increases, the central government 
started to grant subsidies to residents instead of municipalities or MEs. Th e upsurge in 
tariﬀ s, however, unevenly aﬀ ected residents in diﬀ erent settlements and resulted in large 
disparities across municipalities.
When determining prices, municipalities took into account the needs and requirements 
of residents. In most cities, local governments set prices allowing for limited or no proﬁ t 
margins. Th e extent of proﬁ t rates varied among cities and by types of services. In most 
cities, tariﬀ s did not cover the cost of funding or depreciation, and that shortfall made 
raising money for replacement, reconstruction, and new investments diﬃ  cult.
Today, public utility companies submit for approval by the local government the annual 
rate proposals based on their own cost calculations. Local governments, however, have no 
real insight into the feasibility of the MEs’ proposals, so decisions on rates are often based 
on political and other subjective considerations. Municipalities, in most cases, have failed 
to follow and control the realization of the planned cost ﬁ gures and seldom make any 
comparison between the actual and budgeted costs and revenues of service provider MEs. 
Th erefore, neither ex ante nor ex post, do they exercise eﬀ ective price control.
Th e Act on Price allows for a reasonable proﬁ t margin for MEs providing services at the 
oﬃ  cially set prices, assuming that the supplier takes all necessary steps to operate eﬃ  ciently. 
Public service suppliers, however, have often increased tariﬀ s without implementing cost-
improvement measures. Having been natural monopolies, MEs have not been urged to 
reduce network losses and increase eﬃ  ciency. Only the limited consumers’ capacity to 
pay puts a stop to tariﬀ  increases in tandem with an escalation of user-charge arrears. 
Municipalities still receive central grants to compensate consumers for the higher prices 
(although such subsidies are not always allocated exclusively to the needy and poor), but 
sometimes the central government makes the grants on a ﬂ at basis to all local consumers.
Arrears
Before the political changeover, public utility companies often provided services free of 
charge or for payments well below the cost of services. As tariﬀ s became gradually closer 
to cost-recovery prices, payment arrears have mounted, sometimes reaching unsustainable 
levels. Th e increasing volume of arrears caused ﬁ nancing problems for MEs, compelling 
them to incur debt. Th e increased debt service expenses (interest paid) forced MEs then to 
raise tariﬀ s, further burdening consumers. Th e insuﬃ  cient cash inﬂ ow hindered the MEs’ 
ability to carry out new investments even to the level of the depreciation costs charged. 
Th e main portion of the arrears was incurred just after the withdrawal of state subsidies 
for public utilities. Accumulated arrears almost doubled in the basic service sector between 
1992 and 1994. Th is fact, however, is not clearly reﬂ ected in the present accounts, because 
receivables were subsequently sold through factoring transactions.
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Th e accumulation of arrears placed a heavy burden on public service enterprises, 
which were compelled to ﬁ nd additional ﬁ nancing sources to solve liquidity problems. Th e 
respective incremental costs included interest payments and commission fees of borrowing. 
In addition, because value added tax is due on accrual basis, that is, when the service is 
provided and not at the time of settling the bills, MEs also had to pre-ﬁ nance the value 
added tax. Notably, an interest on the amount of debt-ﬁ nanced value added tax or an even 
higher tax penalty also had to be paid in the case of overdue value added tax. User charge 
arrears may result in incremental burden on MEs in the form of forced tariﬀ  increase, 
decrease of consumption, further increase of arrears, increase of the number of users with 
overdue payments, and extra burden on those paying on time (see chapter 25). 
Th e decrease in consumption may lead to further deterioration in the economies of 
scale and cost eﬃ  ciency of MEs. If enterprises cannot tackle their liquidity problems either 
through debt or equity ﬁ nancing, they ﬁ rst postpone investments, then suspend paying 
their state and then suppliers’ liabilities or ﬁ le for bankruptcy. Local governments either as 
owners or as parties responsible for local public services must intervene ultimately, risking 
bankruptcy themselves (see chapter 30). 
In the course of the 1990s, under a process of learning by doing, municipalities and 
MEs learned to exert pressure on consumers to pay. Initiatives arose to mitigate the high 
level of arrears by providing well-targeted support schemes for low-income consumers, 
choosing the appropriate rate structure, and determining the appropriate future price 
increases. Moreover, such means include adjustment in collection techniques (such as 
increasing frequency, checking, and consumer contacts), sanctions, and allowing for 
installment payments (Péteri and Tausz 1999).
Funding and Financing Municipal Enterprises
Municipalities have been providing various supports for MEs. Th ey provide equity, 
investment and current grants, lending, in-kind contributions, and often issue guarantees 
for MEs’ debt. In the last few years municipalities oﬀ ered guarantees for public water 
associations and investment in telephone and gas networks (SAO 1994). Th ese providers 
represent speciﬁ c and identiﬁ able contingent liabilities of the municipalities. MEs, however, 
have been increasingly relying on debt ﬁ nancing.
Basic service MEs’ indebtedness increased progressively during the 1990s. Although 
it amounted to less than three-quarters of total municipal debt in 1993, it surpassed the 
total by more than 10 percent in 1997. Th e combined debt of basic and supplementary 
service MEs exceeded 300 percent of the municipal debt in 1997 (see ﬁ gure 17.10). An 
implicit municipal guarantee always stands behind the debt of these two groups of MEs 
because of their majority municipal ownership. When an ME cannot meet its operating or 
performance targets, it may impose unexpected ﬁ nancial burden on the municipality either 
through unexpected funding requirements (such as increases in subsidies) or through an 
unexpected ﬁ nancing requirement.
C H A P T E R  1 7    M U N I C I PA L  E N T E R P R I S E S  I N  H U N G A R Y
357
Figure 17.10 Total Municipal Enterprise Liabilities as a Percentage of Municipal Debt, 
1993–1997 
 
Source: County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce and Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce–ECOSTAT data.
Some MEs seem to be inherently unproﬁ table because of ineﬃ  cient public service 
obligations such as local transportation, sewage treatment, or district heating. Municipalities 
often provide these services with both investment and operating subsidies. Th ese enterprises 
receive compensation for operating losses in part because of local governments’ desire to 
keep user charges low, arguing the need to support low-income users.
Subsidies can be classiﬁ ed in the following categories: investment in equipment 
and land, non-capital subsidies, subsidies from the central budget, and other expenses. 
Municipalities provide signiﬁ cant cash transfers and ﬁ nancial assistance to entities outside 
the general government both for mixed and fully private enterprises and residents. Th e 
annual municipal grants for both operational and investment purposes amounted to about 
Ft 50 billion in the second part of 1990s. Out of these municipal grants, the ones devoted to 
ﬁ nance public works investments of MEs amounted to Ft 1.2 billion. Other public works 
investments subsidized costs by Ft 1.9 billion in 1995, 8.4 billion in 1997 (SAO 1998). 
Although municipalities contributed to these investments, neither the developed public 
works nor the respective increase in asset value was reﬂ ected in municipal accounts. Th is 
practice is a matter of concern, particularly in the case of developing core assets (such as 
public roads or public water utilities). 
Conclusions
Th e weight of MEs and their role in the national economy have considerably increased 
in the 1990s. Th ey have become key actors in local public service delivery, infrastructure 
investments, and regional development. According to the diﬀ erent international public 
ﬁ nance classiﬁ cations, MEs do not belong to the general government sector, although 
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they form a very important part of the public functions. Th e system of national accounts 
does not consolidate public enterprises in the national accounts. A clear speciﬁ cation, 
however, was not made until 1993. Before 1993 the system of national accounts had 
a deﬁ nition for “government enterprise” that formed part of the “general government 
sector.” Th e government ﬁ nance statistics system also uses some confusing speciﬁ cations 
for “departmental enterprises,” and their presence in the general government sector is 
dependent upon the volume of services or products sold either to the government or to 
the nongovernment sector. Th ese deﬁ nitions have gained greater signiﬁ cance for new 
European Union member states trying to meet the EU’s strict criteria. Th is speciﬁ cation, 
however, is now under review with the aim to extend the sphere of general government to 
MEs in majority municipal ownership.
MEs in basic and supplementary services: (a) represent a signiﬁ cant proportion of 
public capital, in both relative and absolute terms; (b) have negligible indebtedness; and 
(c) are capital intensive, so rate of return considerations are vital. Moreover, the magnitude 
of MEs’ capital depends on the capability and willingness of the municipality to confer 
assets upon the MEs. MEs’ proﬁ t has been negative throughout 1990s and MEs’ liquidity 
position has deteriorated signiﬁ cantly by the end of 1990s.
Local governments do not exert eﬀ ectively municipal ownership rights partly because 
of their various conﬂ icting and seemingly irreconcilable roles and partly because of 
their inability to control these natural monopolies. Th e basic service MEs will probably 
remain longer in municipal ownership unless the rules of state investment grants are 
changed. Under present circumstances, several basic public services are unproﬁ table, so 
intergovernmental ﬁ nancing sources will further play a signiﬁ cant role at least in ﬁ nancing 
their investments.
Although MEs are normally required to operate commercially and usually take the 
same legal form as any private enterprise, standard ﬁ nancial ratios need to be cautiously 
applied, because MEs often enjoy a monopoly position, while operating in a sensitive 
socio-economic context. Hence, reformers must formulate speciﬁ c performance measures, 
which enable the real assessment of their eﬃ  ciency and eﬀ ectiveness. No best practices 
or guidelines are available in Hungary to deﬁ ne how or in what form MEs’ performance 
might be reported to: (a) assist in the formulation and implementation of policies; (b) 
support planning, implementation, and accountability in service provision; (c) monitor 
service standards and organizational eﬀ ectiveness; and (d) ensure fair distribution and 
accessibility of public services.
Th e challenge that faces Hungary (and other new EU members) is how to get an 
acceptable balance between commercial concerns and social responsibilities of MEs. Th e 
general worldwide trend of improving the ﬁ nancial performance of MEs is to impose 
limits on the extent to which these organizations can undertake unproﬁ table social 
responsibilities. One promising way is to increase tariﬀ s gradually to cost-recovery levels 
and provide well-targeted subsidies for those who cannot otherwise aﬀ ord to pay for basic 
services (see chapter 25). Th is emphasis on the rate of return principle may lead MEs to give 
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a lower priority to their social obligations at a time when public awareness of organizations’ 
responsibilities to the environment, clients, and employees is growing.
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18Strengthening Local Management Capacity: Institutional Development in Transition
Gábor Péteri



Decentralization of the state was interpreted and used in various ways during the past two 
decades of Hungary’s transition. First, the economic and political aspects were emphasized. 
Later, reformers focused on the creation of a better public sector. As a result, ﬁ scal and 
administrative issues became more important. Local organizational and management 
practices, as part of the broad institutional environment, were rarely the focus of reforms, 
and without suﬃ  cient local control decentralization will not visibly improve allocative, 
ﬁ scal, and economic eﬃ  ciency; transparency; and accountability in service delivery.
Th is chapter summarizes the institutional and organizational transition of Hungary’s 
subnational system in public administration, human and physical services, regional deve-
lopment, and ﬁ scal management. Th is analysis is an institutional one of the emergence, 
gradual rationalization, and parallel top-down and bottom-up evolution of a multifaceted 
decentralization. Empirical evidence supports the conclusions that: (a) in the Hungarian 
circumstances, starting the process by introducing a highly decentralized local government 
system was justiﬁ ed, and (b) the legal and regulatory steps in the previous restrictive ﬁ scal 
environment have reached their limits in establishing a modern local government system. 
Th e national government should now focus on supporting local governments in increasing 
their institutional capacity in realizing the full advantages of decentralization.
* Th is chapter is based on Péteri 1999. 
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Decentralization and New Institutions at the Local Level
Without suﬃ  cient institutional development, the beneﬁ ts of decentralization will never be 
achieved, even if all other necessary political and ﬁ scal conditions were fulﬁ lled (Litvack, 
Ahmad, and Bird 1998). Th e past period of economic decline and social reconstruction 
would have not been manageable had decentralization not started with the introduction 
of a decentralized local government system. Local governments successfully developed 
responsive local welfare measures in a restrictive economic environment by crossing the 
traditional political divide between left and right. Local governments not only follow top-
down rules and initiatives, but also very often develop new methods and policies, which 
are later espoused at the national level or built into regulations. Local innovations and 
incentives push changes in the public sector from below (Clark and Ferguson 1974). 
Another example of locally initiated changes is the local governments’ intense 
cooperation with nongovernmental organizations for service delivery. Th is cooperation 
later forced the introduction of uniform normative current grant schemes accessible to all 
kinds of public service delivery organizations. In addition, various local economic develop-
ment arrangements raised issues related to changing the regulations on planning urban 
land use. Performance-based budgeting and ﬁ scal information eﬀ orts were also imple-
mented ﬁ rst at the local level.
Despite these changes, local institutional development has remained insuﬃ  cient and 
lagged behind the overall decentralization process, primarily because ﬁ scal pressure on the 
economy was so high that austerity measures had to be taken. Th e ﬁ scal deﬁ cit and the 
weight of general government expenditures on the economy had precedence as the focus of 
ﬁ scal policy—a priority justiﬁ ed in a period of distress and need for economic restructuring. 
In the public sector, austerity measures were rather successful: the central budget deﬁ cit 
dropped to a manageable level (3–4 percent of gross domestic product) and general govern-
ment spending decreased signiﬁ cantly to 40 percent of gross domestic product. Local 
government expenditures dropped by 21 percent in real terms, and employment in local 
governments was cut back by 13 percent between 1993 and 1997 (László 1998). 
Reformers intentionally postponed local institutional development and used high 
inﬂ ation as the primary technique for managing the austerity program. According to the 
Ministry of Finance, the driving force of economic transition, major cutbacks had to be 
implemented through reductions in the real value of wages and services. “Had inﬂ ation 
been small,” comments László (1998 p.173), “it would have been impossible to carry out 
nominal reduction in public wage…. Th e signiﬁ cant rearrangement of the structure of the 
budget was deﬁ nitely facilitated by inﬂ ation. Th e issue is what the next steps should be now 
that ﬁ scal austerity programs have fulﬁ lled their goals and economic growth seems to have 
stabilized.”
To keep the achieved development sustainable and realize the beneﬁ ts of past eﬀ orts, 
local governments must take one further step: they must develop their institutional 
environment. Decentralized adjustment has to be supported through various development 
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activities, otherwise the desired macroeconomic stabilization cannot be achieved (Shah 
1998). 
The Development of Institutions and Organizations
Th e present municipal system is based on very liberal principles set forth initially in the 
Hungarian Constitution and the Act on Local Government. Th e ﬁ rst declared in 1989 the 
rights of any local community to establish independent local self-government. Th e 1990 
Act on Local Government provided full sovereignty for local governments in fulﬁ lling 
virtually all local administrative, legislative, regulatory, and management functions, and 
made them responsible for providing all kinds of local public services. Hence, con-
ceptually, the national government had no need to impose any further regulation on local 
governments.
Th e major steps in the central regulation of local: (a) public administration, (b) human 
services, (c) public utilities (including communal services), (d) regional development, and 
(e) intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations (see table 18.1), suggest that the general framework 
of the local government system was established before any changes were made in the 
centralized system of public service delivery. As a result, the liberal values of the local 
government system came into play and soon combined with the demand for sectoral 
laws based on such arguments as the need to provide equal access to services, to impose 
hierarchical control, and to support professional standards. Moreover, basic local govern-
ment institutions were gradually operating in line with sectoral laws, sometimes in 
contradiction with the original concept of decentralization. Th ese conﬂ icts were even more 
intense with ﬁ scal issues, because many of the new sectoral obligations had to be ﬁ nanced 
subsequently by municipalities without respective increases in local revenues.
Th e ﬁ rst general characteristic, which is rooted in the French–German tradition of 
public sector management, is that legal regulatory factors now dominate local management. 
Th is narrow interpretation of regulatory environment is based on the belief that local 
governments, being subject to laws and government decrees, are able to follow the rules 
and intend to do so. Otherwise, central control mechanisms will force compliance. Local 
governments’ capabilities, organizational and management capacity, and staﬀ  conditions 
are not taken into account in this central regulatory approach. Without supporting local 
government operations in developing the required conditions, the eﬀ ectiveness of the most 
sophisticated legal regulations would remain low.
Th e second general characteristic is the strong inﬂ uence of sectoral legal regulations. 
Brieﬂ y summarizing the regulatory actions in the ﬁ ve major areas, the most active 
component seems to be ﬁ scal management. Th is activity does not mean that other areas 
are less regulated. In all other sectors, the allocation of functions, competencies, and 
mechanisms of regulation and control are even more complex—for example, allocation of 
intergovernmental competencies in public education (Balázs 1998). 
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4 Table 18.1 Th e Emergence of the Institutional and Organizational Framework of Local Governments
Public administration Human services Utility services Regional development Fiscal management
Constitutional changes, 
functions, and competencies 
(1991)
Regulations on civic and public 
employees (1992)
Public administration oﬃ  ces: 
legal control and coordination 
(1991, 1994, 1997)
Minority local governments 
(1993)
Urban authority: child 
protection (1996), building 
permits (1997)
Forms of municipal 
cooperation and associations 
(1990, 1997)
New sectoral laws: social 
policy (1993), public 
education (1993), vocational 
training (1993), culture (1997)
Limited own revenue raising, 
enterprise activities
Centralized cash management 
practices (optional local 
treasury 1997) 
Postponed reconstruction, 
capital investment
Education: demographic wave 
(decline) 
Health care: failed 
rationalization, selective 
bailouts
Welfare policy: decentralized 
adjustment
Eliminated tariﬀ  subsidies, 
control transferred to local 
level (1990)
Concession (1991)
Utilities in municipal hands 
(1991–)
Commercial entities in 
communal services
Privatization with foreign 
involvement: solid waste, 
water, and wastewater 
companies
Public procurement (1995)
Limited compulsory 
competitive tendering (1995)
Law on Environmental 
Protection (1995)
Increasing social 
consciousness (high arrears)
Municipal ownership after 
privatization of state-owned 
enterprises
Limiting local participation 
in enterprise activities.
Local economic development: 
employment through 
investments.
Local tax exemptions.
Infrastructure deals with 
investors.
National regional 
development network: 
-county based
-corporatist 
-decentralized grant 
allocation (1996)
Structure plan and regulatory 
plan (1997) 
Elimination of extra-
budgetary funds (1999)
State Audit Oﬃ  ce (1989)
Government information network 
(County Treasury and Information 
Service Oﬃ  ce 1991)
Uniﬁ ed accounting (1991)
Deﬁ cit grant (1991) 
Matching and addressed grants 
(1992)
Budgeting procedures (1992, 
1995) 
Budgetary institutions (1996) 
Property registration: physical 
indicators (1992)
Certiﬁ ed local audit (1994)
Bankruptcy regulations (1996)
Coordination of appropriations, 
extra-budgetary funds (1997)
Compulsory feasibility studies of 
capital investments (1998)
Weak interest representation 
(lobbying)
Source: Péteri 1999.
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Laws, government decrees, and ministerial bylaws now regulate the functions and 
competencies of local governments (including the council, committees, mayor, chief 
executive, and municipal employees). Th e paramount number of regulations reﬂ ects that 
these detailed rules are self-reinforcing toolkits for unnecessary micromanagement by 
sectoral ministries (table 18.2). Furthermore, the overlapping between the legal rules and 
the large number of regulations shows that various, and sometimes divergent, concepts and 
legislative policies aﬀ ect local governments, motivating them to act as agents of the central 
organizations rather than to be self-cautious local agents who primarily respond to the local 
citizens.
Table 18.2 Number of Legal Regulations by Local Functions, 1999
Sector Number of regulations
Health care and social services 58
Administration (interior) 42
Agriculture 42
Industry, commerce, tourism, price setting 35
Administrative (justice) 34
Transportation, water, and telecommunication management 33
Finance, ﬁ scal management 31
Environmental protection, regional development 30
Labor 27
Culture and public education 21
Local government and minority self–government operation 8
Defense 3
Total 364
Source: Line ministries’ data.
Public Administration
Public administration at the local level requires uniﬁ ed and similar practices. Lawful 
procedures and professionalism of decisions should be ensured both for general 
administration matters and discretionary cases. Various attempts were made to improve the 
professional level of local actions and guarantee a standardized treatment of local public 
administration employees (for example, on employment, childcare, and building licensing 
by urban authorities). Administrative expenditures are on average 15 percent of local 
budgets, but miscellaneous expenditures also are usually accounted under this function. Th is 
accounting happens often in small municipalities, where the cost of administration is often 
the largest expenditure item, representing more than 30 percent of local expenditures.
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Th e public administration oﬃ  ces of the government went through a transformation in 
this period. Th eir main function has always been the legal control over local government 
decisions, but their role slowly moved toward coordination, government information 
system development, and training. First, a few regional public administration oﬃ  ces 
were established, but later these oﬃ  ces opened in every county under the control of the 
Ministry of Interior. After 1997 they became deconcentrated county oﬃ  ces of the central 
government, and plans are under way to reestablish regional public administration oﬃ  ces.
Human Services
Human services represent the largest municipal expenditures. Public education, health care, 
social services, culture, and sports together absorb almost two-thirds of local government 
budgets. Th ese functions have always been local services, but the economic and regulatory 
environment substantially changed in the early 1990s. Design and approval of the sectoral 
laws on these activities took two to three years, because lawmakers had to achieve a sensitive 
balance of central control on service quality and allocation of functions to municipal and 
county local governments.
At the end of the 1990s evidence is clear that sectoral legislation on human services 
is not in harmony with the principles laid down in the initial legal local government 
framework. Allocation of service institutions to certain types of local governments, control 
of service performance, employment and salary regulations, introduction and regular 
changes in normative current grants (for example, in education) all have a strong impact 
on local government structure and behavior. In the period of ﬁ scal austerity, the minimum 
level of service provision was always a higher priority compared to the decentralization 
principles in the early legislation.
Th e ﬁ scal management regulations and the forms of organization and management 
developed in the traditional budgetary sector of human services supported uniﬁ ed and 
controlled service provision. Budgetary organizations had limited own-revenue raising 
capacity, and their business activities were scaled down by law. Th is attitude was somewhat 
diﬀ erent from the general one developed in the 1980s. At that time, the entrepreneurial 
spirit of public service entities was supported. Th e positive consequences of those changes 
were that local government units have learned both autonomy in their daily practices 
and how to counterbalance cutbacks in grants. Th e negative side of the entrepreneurial 
character was that sometimes a shift from the main activities of the service organizations 
toward revenue raising was too radical.
Parallel to these nationally initiated changes, local governments also developed new 
forms of ﬁ scal management. Consolidated cash management of local budgetary institutions 
was introduced as municipal treasuries began adopting the design of the national treasury 
system. Local treasuries proved to be very successful in decreasing idle cash, introducing 
more precise planning rules, and using appropriations (see chapter 22). In parallel with 
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the eﬃ  ciency gains at municipal level, the autonomy of budgetary service institutions is no 
longer as wide.
Public Utilities
Public utilities and other communal services, including housing, also went through a major 
reorganization. Th e ﬁ rst steps were the immediate elimination of the national charge and 
rental subsidies and the transfer of price- (rent-) setting authority to local governments, 
with two exceptions, however: a ﬂ at-rate subsidy remained for water and sewer charges 
above a certain level and for the collection of liquid waste from septic tanks.
Local governments became owners of public utility networks and service companies. 
Th e water, sewage pipes, and wells became, by law, core assets of local governments and 
restrictedly marketable properties that could be sold only by a council’s decision. Th e service 
companies and the operating assets were often privatized. Th e former state-owned water 
companies and the county water companies were transferred to local governments, which 
owned the network, and they have created more than 250 new service organizations and 
operating companies.
Th ese changes forced local governments to develop new organizational and 
management forms in the ﬁ eld of public utilities. Th e concession law was one of the early 
regulations in this area, but later local governments developed contractual relationships 
with various service organizations. My survey in 1994 showed diﬀ erent arrangements 
of various services (Péteri 1996). In-house (budgetary) organizations were used mostly 
for housing management, and public services were ﬁ nanced by general budget revenues. 
External service providers or contract-based service management by in-house units were 
more frequently used in fee-based services (see chapter 17). Now, foreign companies are 
involved mainly in the municipal solid waste sector, but investment also extended to large 
cities in water management.
Th e lack of comprehensive, detailed information on public utilities, communal services, 
and contracts is a matter of concern (see chapter 21). Even the arms-length companies are 
not reported in the public ﬁ nance information system. Model contracts and comparative 
information on service performance are not available. Ministries do not feel responsibility 
for these tasks, and professional and local government associations are not capable of 
collecting and managing this information and do not have the technical assistance that 
may be required.
Th e legislature made limited attempts in 1995, when solid and liquid waste collection 
and disposal and chimney sweeping were declared mandatory local services, and a reporting 
system was established. At the same time, the national government introduced compulsory 
competitive tendering. Th is legislation was misinterpreted by some ministries and also 
by several local governments. Th e Ministry of Interior sent out a circular in which only 
the new (and not the extended) contracts were subjects to tendering. Local governments’ 
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argument was that they have a constitutional right to deﬁ ne how a municipal service 
is provided, so tendering is unnecessary. Th e lack of administrative capacity to manage 
competitive tendering and insider transactions was often behind the reluctant behavior of 
local governments.
Regional Development
Regional development has always been regarded as a high-priority local government 
function. Mayors often see it as a more signiﬁ cant local task than providing some traditional 
local public services. Surveys show that local economic development, as a component of 
regional development, was especially important in towns (2,000–10,000 inhabitants) and 
in large cities (more than 50,000 inhabitants).
Local government involvement in business activities is partly inherited from the 
Soviet-type local government system, in which local authorities had direct responsibilities 
not only for public services but also for production. Th is attitude was reinforced in the 
modern local governments for two reasons: (a) because they became minority owners of 
former state-owned companies through the privatization process, and (b) ﬁ scal austerity 
measures forced them to increase their own sources through business-related revenues. 
Local taxes, especially business taxes and capital revenues from the sale of assets, became 
increasing and important discretionary local revenues in the late 1990s.
Local government participation in enterprise activities is subject to constraints. Th ey 
are allowed to take ownership only in commercial entities that have limited liability and 
ﬁ nancial investments only in state securities. Even those constraints could not prevent 
losses. During the recent period of stock market decline, some brokerage companies mis-
handled the municipal portfolios, and local governments did not exercise proper oversight 
over their contracts.
Th e goals of local economic development are diﬀ erent in major groups of municipalities. 
In cities that have more favorable conditions for domestic or international investors, inward 
investment is the primary aim. In villages that have been hit by unemployment job creation 
is the primary goal. In Budapest attracting investments into public and market services 
is a key development factor. Th e most frequently used methods for supporting inward 
investment are building public utilities, roads, contacting future partners, and lobbying at 
the central government level. Industrial parks (for example, in Győr) have proved to be a 
very successful means of local and regional development.
Parallel to local eﬀ orts, the national network of regional development councils was 
established in 1996. Th rough this channel, the national government intends to manage 
regional development in a coordinated way and in partnership with the national funds. 
A system of subcounty, county, regional (NUTS2), and national regional development 
councils was created. All the important players in regional development are represented 
in these councils: local governments, national government, chambers of commerce, and 
labor oﬃ  ces. Th e county development councils have a crucial role, because they manage 
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and reallocate the decentralized appropriations for capital investments. In short, rather 
than being the driving force for local and regional development, the regional development 
councils still focus on allocating minor (0.5 percent of gross domestic product) funds 
primarily for equalization purposes. Th is focus has proven to be insuﬃ  cient in building 
local capacity for absorbing European Union structural funds.
Fiscal Management
Changes in local government ﬁ nances and ﬁ scal management started in the legislative 
modernization process in the late 1980s. Th e goals were  to increase own revenues, launch 
a uniﬁ ed and nondiscretionary capital investment grants scheme, and establish joint ﬁ scal 
management units for fragmented budgetary organizations. Th e legislature introduced a 
signiﬁ cant transformation of intergovernmental transfers, however, just before the political 
and administrative changes.
Audit
Municipalities and their governing bodies were initially assumed to enjoy a degree of 
sovereignty, because no organization beyond Parliament had authority to issue binding 
regulations or exercise any direct control over local decisions. Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce 
(SAO), responsible to Parliament, was established in 1989 to monitor the operation of all 
kinds of government and budgetary organizations, including the ﬂ ows of state funds (for 
example, treasury). As part of the overall government system, SAO monitors the operation 
of municipalities, though only to control legal compliance and the use of national funds, not 
to review the substance of local decisions. In principle, all other governmental or general 
overseeing organizations (for example, line ministries or Constitutional Court) exercise 
monitoring within the boundaries of their functional competency.
SAO carries out comprehensive annual audits of 30–50 municipalities’ reports and 
reviews their use of state funds; it also runs investigations on selected issues across munici-
palities (approximately 1,000 local governments were included in these investigations). 
SAO audits were focused on national budget connections (30 percent), comprehensive 
audits (26 percent), and sectoral audits (19 percent). Th e rest of SAO’s eﬀ orts addressed 
issues such as property management, budgeting, and ﬁ nancial reporting (Kusztosné 1998). 
SAO reports and recommendations are presented to Parliament and submitted to the 
local governments concerned; however, presenting local ﬁ ndings to the local council or the 
general public of the municipality is not compulsory.
SAO has regional units by county, but their capacity is not suﬃ  cient to audit local 
governments properly. Some reformers attempted to establish a separate local government 
audit oﬃ  ce, but it turned out to be too expensive. Since 1994 larger municipalities that have 
over Ft 100 million (US$ 0.5 million) in the budget and that have loans must be audited 
by an independent external auditor. As a result, 559 local governments contracted with 
auditors in 1997 (SAO 1997). 
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External audits focus on the validity of information and analyze the municipal ﬁ nancial 
position. Th e minimum requirement is to review municipal budgets, ﬁ nancial reports, and 
balance sheets. Th e auditor’s report is presented to the local government, and the auditor 
has the right to call for an extraordinary council meeting if any serious illegal actions are 
found. If the mayor does not call the meeting, then an appeal process is also stipulated.
Th e external auditor must be a member of the chamber of auditors and hold a special 
qualiﬁ cation in public ﬁ nances. Often the heads of large city ﬁ nance departments or 
employees of the County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce are qualiﬁ ed external 
auditors (for third-party municipalities). Th e auditor is appointed through a competitive 
tendering process, and that process sets conditions regarding disclosure of conﬂ ict of 
interests. Th e local auditors are experts regarding up-to-date analysis of municipal ﬁ nances 
and preventive actions to provide support for local governments.
Local governments establish their own internal audit systems. Th e ﬁ nance audit 
committee, to be set up by law, gives its opinion on the budget and the reports and 
examines the ﬁ nancial process, focusing on own-source revenues, changes in municipal 
assets, and changes in local borrowing. Th is audit also covers public service institutions. Th e 
committee’s reports should be presented to the council, and in case of disagreement, the 
committee reports would be subject to SAO review.
Cities and major towns have an internal ﬁ nancial auditor who provides management 
support and prepares the organization for the external audit. Service organizations are 
also subject to internal audits, even if they are separate budgetary entities of the local 
government. Th e methods for internal audits are slowly developing and spreading among 
practitioners.
Th e present local government audit system has two major problems: (a) lack of capacity 
at the SAO for running the external audit eﬃ  ciently, and (b) undeveloped methods of 
supportive and preventive audits as a tool of management in all types of audit. In small local 
governments, joint audit oﬃ  ces should be used. An audit should be developed further into 
a supportive, professional advisory activity.
Th e only way to increase the quality of local government audits is to develop the 
professional capabilities of the internal and external auditors and to establish transparent 
processes for selecting independent and qualiﬁ ed auditors. Th is technical assistance might 
be provided through the chambers of auditors and local government organizations. Th e 
Loan Administrative Change Initiative (LACI) of the World Bank should be used as a 
model in a ﬂ exible way, as local auditors’ capacity and professional standards are being 
developed.
Budgeting and Financial Reporting
Preparation of local budgets and development of ﬁ nancial reporting rules are two 
important elements of ﬁ scal management. All major components of local budgeting and 
reporting have strictly regulated, uniﬁ ed rules. Th is uniﬁ ed system is based primarily on the 
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information needs of the national budget, though local governments typically follow these 
planning rules and presentation forms even if they do not serve local budgeting purposes.
Several types of ﬁ scal plans are mandatory at the local level. According to the spatial 
planning regulations, local governments must design a long-term urban development 
strategy. Th is strategy might be a basis for the four-year-term economic plan, which must 
be approved right after the inauguration of a new local government. Th e Act on General 
Government Finances also speciﬁ es that a rolling plan should be elaborated and approved, 
together with the annual budget, for an additional two-year-period.
Th ose medium- and long-term plans are not widely used by local governments. Some 
analysts have serious doubts about the practical use of the strategies and forecasts in the 
present local government ﬁ nance system. First, such a strategy depends heavily on grants; 
second, recent experiences have shown that intergovernmental transfers and national 
regulations on local own revenues cannot be forecast. Th e ﬁ scal austerity programs of the 
past years did not help design valid and stable medium-term local prognoses.
Annual budgeting procedures, contents, forms of presentation, and reporting are 
strictly regulated by law and government decrees. Fixed deadlines exist for preparing local 
budget concepts (November 30), presentation of budget proposals (February 15), approval 
of budgets (within 30 days after presentation), and semiannual (September 15) and annual 
reports (within four months). Th e form of budget classiﬁ cation is also uniﬁ ed: budgets are 
approved by organizational units and, within each unit, by groups of expenditures (such as 
salaries, operating expenses, welfare payments, and capital expenditures).
Local government current and capital expenditures and revenues should be presented 
in two separate balance sheets. Th is separation serves only presentation purposes, because 
cross-ﬁ nancing among current and capital budgets is allowed. Th is separation of current 
and capital budgets provides useful information for the councilors on general trends in local 
government ﬁ nances and use of assets. According to aggregate data on local government 
capital and current budgets, current revenues are often used for capital expenditures.
Annual ﬁ nancial reports follow general principles of reporting on economic activities. 
Local government budgetary organizations follow double-entry bookkeeping and cash-
based accounting. Gross accounting principle is used for main (public service, budgetary) 
activities and for enterprise activities. Special rates of depreciation are used in the public 
sector for tangible assets.
Financial reports include local government balance sheets, cash-based budget reports, 
reports on cash reserves or savings, statements on proﬁ ts and losses, and the supplementary 
annexes. Th is supplementary annex focuses on performance indicators of municipal 
functions and services. Local government ﬁ scal information is based on the chart of 
accounts for budgetary organizations, supplemented by analytical registers. Details of 
the system of accounts are deﬁ ned by the local governments within the general legal 
framework.
Information on local budgets, budgetary organizations, balance sheets, and property 
registers are collected by the County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ces. Th ese are 
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
372
deconcentrated units of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Interior. Information 
collection is highly computerized, and limited comparative information is disseminated 
among local governments.
Analysts cite three basic problems regarding local government budgeting and reporting 
systems: (a) confused expectations about budgeting, (b) lack of modern planning methods, 
and (c) limited access to comparative information on municipal ﬁ nances and service 
performance. Most of these problems cannot be solved simply through new regulations, 
but require that innovative techniques and methods be disseminated among and learned by 
professionals and practitioners.
First, local governments do not deﬁ ne long-term goals and strategies for their major 
services and functions, and they do not build their plans on a hierarchy of decisions on 
general mission statements, local values, and general sectoral plans. Lacking this strategic 
view (and being strongly dependent on transfers), local governments use plans as a simple 
vehicle to allocate funds among service organizations. In practice, local budgets serve 
primarily as tools of control over public spending rather than for implementing ex ante 
strategies.
Second, this planning concept is supported by methods for designing expenditure 
and revenue appropriations. Line-item budgeting is used for planning expenditures by 
organizational units to calculate inputs of service. Th is traditional method prevents local 
governments from having a general view on service areas (such as functions and programs). 
Inputs are weakly connected to the level of services and performance of the service 
organization.
Th ese two sets of problems are mutually reinforcing: because no clear strategy for 
services exists, output criteria (performances) cannot be identiﬁ ed. Th e lack of performance 
indicators prevents quantiﬁ cation of measurable service goals and standards. To solve this 
problem, any move away from the present organization-oriented, input-based planning 
could improve local budgeting methods (Kassó 1997). One step in the right direction 
would be to develop and introduce more detailed service performance indicators, 
which would support output-oriented budgeting under the present system, focusing on 
organizations. Another step could be to support planning by functions and programs. 
Experiments to develop zero-based budgeting methods, which help design inputs by 
functions or programs, are underway.
Th ird, access to information by the general public and the local governments is 
a problem. Several hundred expenditure and revenue items are collected by the ﬁ scal 
information system from each municipality’s budget and ﬁ nancial reports. Th is information 
is public at the local level, but conﬁ dential at the national level after being collected. Only 
the two ministries that control the County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ces have 
access to detailed information by municipalities. Some comparative average data by several 
clusters of municipalities are returned in printouts to local governments, but these data are 
not suﬃ  cient to allow local government associations and think tanks to conduct analyses 
or evaluate alternative policies.
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Capital Budgeting and Investment Process
Th e present capital budgeting practices and the capital investment management capacity 
have been strongly inﬂ uenced by the changes in the ﬁ nancial environment. In the 1990s 
local government capital expenditures declined from 18 to 13 percent of total local budgets. 
In this period covering current expenditures was the highest priority for local governments. 
A restrictive ﬁ scal policy has reduced funds for both regional and sectoral investments 
and raised local needs for own-capital budgets. Now only urban municipalities might 
have capital budgets, and no signiﬁ cant capital investment is made in the rest of 2,800 
municipalities in the countryside.
Th e sectoral composition of capital expenditures has changed signiﬁ cantly. In 1991 
almost half of local capital investments were in the area of human services (that is, 
education, health care, and culture). By the end of the 1990s this share has declined to 30 
percent, but capital investments in physical infrastructure, housing, and market services 
account for 50 percent of total capital budgets. Th is trend was explained by the decrease in 
education needs and the lack of national budget grants in the health sector.
Parallel to the sectoral changes, the ﬁ nancing schemes of capital investments also 
changed. Th e traditional form of grant ﬁ nancing of human services did not work: in the 
period 1991–1998, only Ft 155 billion were used for matching grants and an additional 
Ft 128 billion as targeted grants. Among matching grants, public utility services had the 
largest share, because no grants were allocated for educational purposes after 1996; instead, 
water, wastewater treatment, and solid waste landﬁ lls had a high priority at the national 
level. Th e targeted grants (non-matching for large projects above Ft 200 million) were 
used mostly for reconstruction of large hospitals, homes for the elderly, and theaters. In 
addition, extrabudgetary funds of line ministries also served local capital investments in 
water, environmental, and road funds ( Jókay, Kálmán, and Kopányi 1998). 
Th e change in the structure of local capital investments has modiﬁ ed the methods and 
techniques of investment management. Th e former line department units rarely operated 
as implementing agencies for local government investments. Th eir function was to prepare 
investment plans and control the process of tendering out, contracting, and activating 
the object. Local government decrees on capital investments also deﬁ ne value limits for 
the decision competencies of various elected bodies (such as the council, committee, and 
mayor).
Th ese changes were greatly needed in this period, when the national government 
ﬁ nanced most of the local capital investments in partnership with the private sector. 
No information is available on the scale of private involvement in ﬁ nancing local public 
services, but major projects (such as landﬁ lls, sewage plants, and public transportation) 
always needed ﬁ nancial contributions from the private sector. No estimates are available on 
private capital investments under urban development deals (such as building roads, water, 
and sewage networks in exchange, for example, for land or tax exemption).
Th e second half of the 1990s saw signiﬁ cant changes in the local management of 
capital investments. Th e most important one was to set the rules and value limits for public 
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procurement (that is, the purchase of goods and services). Conditions, types, procedures, 
timing, and appeal processes were deﬁ ned by law. Minimum value limits for using 
the legislation on public procurement are deﬁ ned by the annual budgets. Th ese limits 
are rather low (US$ 140,000 for capital investments in 1999). Th e new legislation on 
public procurement followed European Union regulations on competitive tendering. 
Public procurement rules are often bypassed by issuing the tenders through independent 
municipal enterprises (see chapter 15). 
Another requirement is to prepare a feasibility study on capital projects if they are to 
be supported by national funds. Changing rules of urban planning will also modify the 
relationship between the public and private sectors because local governments have more 
bargaining power as far as construction plans are concerned.
In a market environment, public servants and elected oﬃ  cials must learn new tech-
niques in planning, negotiating, and implementing capital investments. Because more and 
more local investments are revenue producing by private or privately operated facilities, 
new ﬁ nancial planning methods are called for. Local governments and their arms-length 
companies must establish funds for future reconstruction and capital investments. Th is 
long-term thinking, however, is not part of the typical operation at local governments so 
far.
Cash ﬂ ow project ﬁ nancing will modify the relationship between the local governments, 
the operating companies, and the ﬁ nancing institutions (generally, banks). National budget 
grants will still have a strong inﬂ uence on investments, but because other sources are also 
needed, local behavior will change. Concession agreements and build-operate-transfer 
schemes require developed contracting techniques between local governments as clients 
and the operating companies. Local governments usually want to keep the ownership of 
the utility network, site for the landﬁ ll, and so forth.
Th e lead bank of a municipality is often the major lender for investments. In this 
case, the ﬁ scal information is easily available. For many decades, the lead bank for local 
governments used a very simple rule-of-thumb for evaluating a local government’s 
borrowing capacity: if the ratio of capital expenditures in the total budget was below a 
speciﬁ ed limit, then it had access to loans. Th e high level of grants and transfers guaranteed 
the repayment. Now that Hungary has several domestic and international banks, public 
information on local governments’ borrowing capacity is needed.
Local Debt Management
Municipal ﬁ scal strategies have signiﬁ cantly changed as the economic conditions and 
ﬁ nancial regulations substantially changed, and local governments learned new methods 
during the 1990s. My survey showed that the newly elected mayors’ ﬁ rst attempts were to 
cut back expenditures (Péteri 1998). Expectations were high (and so perhaps were reserves) 
in spending and service management. Later, by the end of their ﬁ rst terms, mayors’ 
preferences had changed. On the expenditure side, local governments made more radical 
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steps: they canceled programs or transferred functions to county governments. At the same 
time, more local governments used new revenue, raising options, such as introducing local 
taxes, borrowing, and selling local assets.
Th is shift in local ﬁ scal strategies resulted in a more businesslike operation at the local 
government level. Th e entrepreneurial approach was always present in local governments, 
because the lack of public revenues coupled with the transfer of state property provided 
good conditions for ventures. Th e rules of the public and private sectors were mixed in 
the decisions of many councils and local oﬃ  cials. After the new ﬁ scal austerity program 
was launched in 1996, however, a regulated procedure of municipal debt management and 
limitations on local borrowing were introduced.
Th e purpose of these regulations was to separate local governments’ ﬁ nancial 
responsibilities from the national budget. Th ough the Act on Local Government already 
declared that insolvency of local governments was subject to court resolution on the request 
of creditors, the legislature did not deﬁ ne detailed procedures until 1996. New procedures 
decentralized the management of municipalities in ﬁ scal crisis and deﬁ ned the conditions 
for applying for deﬁ cit grants only in ultimate situations. Th e limitation on local borrowing 
served similar decentralization purposes.
According to the legislation on local government debt management, the mayor has the 
main responsibility to start the legal process. In principle, after 60 days of overdue invoices, the 
local government or the creditor can initiate the debt resolution court process. Local 
governments are responsible for their budgetary institutions, too, but not for independent 
municipal companies (except when guarantees are involved). In 1998 the hospitals became 
part of the local bankruptcy procedures, despite the fact that they are ﬁ nanced by the 
national health care fund.
In practice, the local bankruptcy law was used only in the cases of nine small local 
governments. Th ese cases were typically locally initiated procedures and closed mostly 
under an agreed settlement. Th e main causes for bankruptcy were typically unrealistic plans 
for capital investments. Although most of these investments were in the public sector (such 
as schools or sport halls), some also were in the private sector (for example, to promote 
local tourism). In these cases, lending banks had accepted core (nontransferable) property 
as collateral, which also caused problems (see chapter 30). 
Debt management procedures were introduced together with limitations on local 
borrowing. Th e limit on municipal borrowing is 70 percent of net own revenues. Th e 
ﬁ scal information system, however, does not present proper data on local government 
debt service limits. Since the limit is in place, the debt to net own-source revenue ratios 
were never higher than 15 percent, a level quite low when compared to the allowed limit 
of 70 percent of total budgets. In this respect, therefore, the aggregate local government 
borrowing capacity has high reserves.
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What to Do?
During the 1990s local government management has been developed mostly through 
regulatory actions. Th is brief analysis of the four major service areas and some components 
of ﬁ scal management showed that administrative measures supported decentralization. 
Th is legal framework was necessary for the development of local management. Many 
failed attempts, however, show that this legal-regulatory approach is not in itself suﬃ  cient. 
Several areas of the decentralization process can be characterized as unﬁ nished business 
because the legislative steps did not provide the anticipated results in service delivery or the 
eﬃ  cient operation of local governments. New institutions require several other conditions, 
management skills, and knowledge to reach satisfactory outcomes.
Future actions should focus on the following areas:
 Support and advice to local governments to develop new organizational forms and 
procedures (for example, model contracts, formula-based user charges, and capital 
investment ﬁ nancing schemes)
 Training and development of sector-speciﬁ c and general management technical expertise 
at the local administration and in policymaking both for staﬀ  and for the politicians
 Development of locally available information systems with data relevant to municipal 
operation and management (for example, performance indicators, service standards, 
public ﬁ scal data, and public information on contracts)
 Support to increase the professional level of local governments by independent policy 
institutes, think tanks, professional associations, consulting capacity, and information 
exchange systems among local governments.
The Role of Central Government in Further Decentralization
Most policymakers do not support further decentralization in the local government context. 
In their views, decentralization is simply equal to a transfer of public functions to lower 
levels of government. Obviously, several arguments against such an interpretation arise: 
diﬀ erentiation of local public services, unmanageable allocation of transfers in a fragmented 
urban structure, and the present behavior of local governments geared to seeking central 
grants. Th e national ﬁ scal policy, however, always relied on local governments’ adjustment 
to economic realities, ability to increase the quality and level of services, revenue-raising 
capacity, and development of eﬀ ective forms of service delivery. 
Th e crisis situation—when the basic local government regulatory environment was 
established and experimented with at both levels of governments—is over in many respects. 
First, the economic transformation has reached the level at which private ownership has 
become dominant in the economy. Second, after a long period of economic decline 
economic growth has picked up in the second half of 1990s. Th ird, the tight ﬁ scal policy 
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was successful in signiﬁ cantly reducing the share of general government expenditures. 
Parallel to these changes, however, local governments are faced with new challenges, 
including growing needs and membership in the European Union.
Under these new conditions, decentralization eﬀ orts should be based more on con-
sensus building than on crisis management. Th is responsibility is a new one for the national 
government, which should make local governments capable of realizing all the beneﬁ ts of 
decentralization. National policies should support local adjustment not by simple ﬁ scal 
means only (for example, tightening or reallocation of revenues) but also by other tech-
niques of public administration and public service management. Th e entire public sector 
will beneﬁ t from a consensus-based decentralization.
Such decentralization requires signiﬁ cant changes in national government’s organiza-
tions, operation, and management. A broad interpretation of public administration means 
include: (a) legal and legislative actions, (b) public service management methods, (c) 
ﬁ nances and ﬁ scal management, (d) information and monitoring, and (d) support to raise 
public awareness and publicity. In the main areas of local government functions (see table 
18.1), these public administration means should be developed in diﬀ erent ways.
Elements of Public Administration Means
Municipal solid waste management is a good example to highlight the elements of public 
administration means that are needed in a decentralized system (Péteri 1998). In general, 
environmental protection is well regulated, although some important components of legal 
regulations are still missing. Th is lack causes several problems for local governments: for 
example, waste is not deﬁ ned by law, landﬁ lls’ technical minimums are not detailed, no 
clear regulations on unauthorized landﬁ lls are speciﬁ ed, and legal sanctions on user-charge 
collection are not built into general regulations on minor oﬀ enses.
Public service management can be supported by various national government actions. 
To develop a decentralized control mechanism, the use of ecomanagement and audit 
schemes should be advertised, information and professional expertise are needed for 
environmental planning, and regional planning should be based on market coordination. 
Tendering and contract practices and information on bids should be provided to local 
governments and service organizations.
In the ﬁ eld of ﬁ nances two corrections might indirectly increase the local government’s 
sources allocated to this service: availability of speciﬁ c grants for major stages of large capital 
investments and grants for buying equipment and vehicles. Technical assistance is needed 
for local governments to deﬁ ne general methods for setting user charges and to establish 
typical forms of cooperation among local governments. Supporting competition among 
hazardous waste treatment units to decrease management costs and using obligatory cash 
deposits for contractors are also useful means.
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Th e present information system on communal waste management does not help 
local governments. A limited set of data is available only at the Ministry of Environment. 
No comparative information on ﬁ nances of solid waste services or on tendering and 
contracting is available. Decentralized decision-making can be supported by increasing 
public awareness and publicity on waste problems. Regular professional information 
channels should be developed, and environmental nongovernmental organizations should 
be encouraged to increase their capacity to participate in local decision-making.
Th ese examples show that in a decentralized environment national governments 
must develop new techniques. Th ey are all indirect means to increase local governments’ 
autonomy and capacity to respond to local needs.
Legal Framework with Basic Rules and Service Standards
Organizational forms and models meeting local service delivery needs might be developed 
on a trial-and-error basis, like the “free commune” experiments in the Nordic countries. 
Sometimes national support is also needed (for example, support of the national tax 
administration to introduce value-based local property taxation).
Training, knowledge transfer, and guidance to develop local service management 
capability should be regularly available at an aﬀ ordable price for local governments. 
National government projects and coordinated technical assistance programs must be 
developed for local governments.
Information sharing on service management is greatly needed both for policymaking 
and for local decisions. More detailed information and easier access to data would support 
decentralization of services. Standards, performance levels, cost, and eﬃ  ciency indicators 
help comparison, which is the basis of decision-making in a decentralized environment.
Finally development of negotiating mechanisms is the basis of consensus building 
in decentralized political and public service systems. Organizations representing local 
governments, municipal professionals, or service providers must be involved in the national 
decision-making process. Th ey could protect the needs of the local government sector 
against other lobbying groups. By contrast, well-functioning local government associations 
might help decentralization by keeping the problems within their own circles. Fiscal policy 
coordination can be supported by intergovernmental committees (Shah 1998). 
Summing up, the legal and regulatory steps in the restrictive ﬁ scal environment 
have reached their limits as far as establishing a modern local government system. A 
new interpretation of the decentralization of public administration and public service 
delivery is needed. Indirect support should be provided to local governments to increase 
their institutional capacity and obtain the full advantages of decentralization. Th e national 
government has the main responsibility in creating responsive, eﬃ  cient, and transparent 
local governments.
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19Asset Management in Secondary CitiesZsuzsa Kassó and Piroska Pergerné-Szabó
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Following a quick political decision, municipalities received about a third of total public 
assets, but the asset transfer was gradual and incomplete until the end of the 1990s. Local 
governments, however, became sovereign local political and governing bodies whose 
primary responsibility was to fulﬁ ll public service functions. For a long time before that, 
the fact they were (or not) trustworthy owners, managers, and developers of municipal 
properties were hardly viewed as an issue. Macroeconomic distress, the ﬁ scal squeeze, 
and a poor legal, technical, and organizational framework have prevented most local 
governments from establishing quality property registers and asset management systems. 
Th ese functions were fragmented and randomly distributed among a host of municipal 
agencies, committees, and line divisions. Asset management is still a supplement of the 
main functions rather than a core activity, and that relegation often leads to shortsighted 
political decisions to respond to the challenges inherent when exercising  public functions 
and bridging the resulting legal, organizational, or professional gaps (for example, ad hoc 
asset sale for urgent cash generation).
Th is chapter provides examples from three secondary cities—Nyíregyháza (113,000 
inhabitants), Pécs (161,000 inhabitants), and Budapest District XI (156,000 inhabitants)
—to illustrate the practical application of national and local rules and regulations in 
managing a signiﬁ cant stock of real and ﬁ nancial assets. Th ese three cities, and the books, 
ﬁ les, assets, and organizations reviewed, do not constitute a real statistical sample; by 
and large, they represent typical challenges, practices, shortcomings, and lessons for the 
other 220 cities in Hungary. In spite of signiﬁ cant improvements over the 1990s, severe 
shortcomings remain in recording, classiﬁ cation, accounting, appraisal, and strategic 
management of municipal assets. Th ese shortcomings result in signiﬁ cant losses, unclear 
or sometimes fraudulent transactions, poor asset-liability management, and, ultimately, 
* Th is chapter is based on Kassó 1999a and b and Pergerné-Szabo 1999. 
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suboptimal local development, all of which call for urging further modernization of local 
asset management.
Th e conﬁ dential assessments and proposals in this chapter were prepared for and 
submitted to the local governments of the sample cities and have been partially utilized. 
It seems appropriate to publish here original or slightly modiﬁ ed data and concrete 
assessments, while referring to the sample cities only as city A, city B, and city C, named 
in a random order.
Restructuring and Exercising Property Rights
Th e Act on Local Government (ALG) ordered that state assets, such as real estate, forests, 
water resources, cash and securities, previously managed by the local councils, would 
become the property of the newly constituted municipalities on September 30, 1990. 
Th e 1991 Property Act ordered that public utility assets become the property of the 
municipalities to the extent that enabled them to perform mandatory local tasks. By 1995 
special committees had ﬁ nished adjudicating other claims on assets by municipalities under 
the Property Act. By 1993 all local state residential housing and most local commercial 
property were transferred to municipalities at historic book value and in bad physical 
shape. Th is, in conjunction with the 1993 Law on Housing and Commercial Spaces, led 
to a massive sale of apartments to occupants at ﬁ re-sale prices and also to divestiture of 
some commercial real estate. To avoid the burden of rent arrears, deferred maintenance, and 
refurbishment, many municipalities sold all of their residential property and got out of the 
residential real estate market by 2000.
Th e ALG grants municipal councils full power to exercise property rights, which often 
are passed on to committees, line divisions, and local government bureaus, or to the mayor 
directly. Despite the gradual takeover, the magnitude of the transferred assets overburdened 
the local government organizations because their capacity to manage assets and exercise 
property rights lagged far behind the growing asset portfolio. Th e legislative framework 
that was emerging in parallel with the growing asset portfolio was a tool for a trial-and-
error process rather than a framework for an eﬃ  cient restructuring of property rights.
Asset Classes
Municipal assets are classiﬁ ed by service functions as either core or regular assets, and 
as marketable, limited marketable, or non-marketable (see table 19.1). Core assets are 
key facilities in providing basic municipal services listed in the ALG (see chapter 17), 
and the rest of the assets are regular properties. Th is classiﬁ cation is a redundant and 
perhaps unnecessary rule to assure a minimum level of key public services. First, the ALG 
makes local governments responsible for providing all local services. Second, local 
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governments have exclusive rights to assess the need, quality, and quantity of each local 
service (for example, to maintain a school, to hand it over to a church, or to provide a 
bus that takes the children to the neighboring city could each satisfy local needs). Th ird, 
numerous municipalities lack several core services and assets (for example, sewers or paved 
roads). Th ese local governments, however, cannot by law be made responsible for these 
shortcomings. Moreover because they need to respond to local priorities, they may build 
a non-core utility ﬁ rst (for example, gas pipe) for which the citizens voted. No sanctions 
punish nonexisting or poor quality core services.  
Table 19.1 Asset Classes
Status Core assets Regular assets
Marketable None Base case scenario: they are saleable
Limited marketable Marketable upon local regulation, 
sometimes with exclusive permits of line 
ministries (for example, culture, education, 
environment, transportation)
Buildings with some historical or special 
artistic value (both municipal and private) 
require exclusive transfer permit from the 
line ministry 
Non-marketable Base case scenario: they are nonsaleable None
Source: Kassó 1999a and 1999b.
Flexible Functional Restrictions 
Th e ALG is ﬂ exible in stating that local governments are “responsible for providing” services 
rather than saying that they “must provide services” themselves. Th is regulation enables 
them to provide services through public–private partnerships, subcontractors, budgetary 
entities, independent legal entities, or even foundations. Th is ﬂ exibility contradicts the asset 
classiﬁ cation mentioned above. Th e ALG and the Property Act authorize local governments 
to classify local assets through exclusive ordinance either as marketable, non-marketable, 
or limited marketable assets (see table 19.1). Although non-marketable core assets may 
not be sold, mortgaged, or used beyond providing mandatory public services, the partially 
marketable asset category enables transfer and more ﬂ exible use under certain conditions. 
As a result, assets in similar functions accounted for in one municipality as non-marketable 
might be considered to be partially marketable in another municipality.
Sectoral laws provide additional restrictions on marketability and authorize sectoral 
ministries to review and approve proposals on the sale or restructuring of non-marketable 
or partially marketable assets. Certain buildings with historical or special artistic value and 
sensitive environmental areas have limited marketability either in private or municipal 
hands. Th e function of these types of properties, however, can be changed (for example, in 
an urban renewal project), as long as historical preservation guidelines are observed.
Properties classiﬁ ed as core assets by law must be recorded in the land cadastre. 
Municipalities, however, often do not comply with this registry rule either because of 
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incomplete internal asset ﬁ les or because the regional land registry is incomplete. A city 
council decision can reclassify marketable assets into core assets at any time; the limited 
marketability status of core assets may also be changed with a modiﬁ cation of the munici-
pality’s master plan. Th us the categories of non-marketable and partially marketable assets 
are ﬂ exible. Likewise limited marketability provides ample opportunities for controlled 
restructuring, transfer, or divestiture of assets. Th is ﬂ exibility allows local governments to 
apply good judgment and self-governance in the interest of local economic development. 
Th e fuzzy boundary between marketable assets and core assets with limited marketability 
allows a local government to take its operational budget into account when deciding on 
the future of its real estate assets. Local regulations ought to provide guidance as to when, 
under what conditions, and for what purpose assets can be reclassiﬁ ed.
Other Types of Restrictions
Th e state grant programs set additional restrictions on the marketability of municipal 
assets, such as targeted and addressed grants for wastewater collection and treatment 
systems. In the latter cases, the full amount of the state grant (for example, 60 percent of 
capital cost) must be refunded to the state if the asset is sold within 10 years of completion 
or during construction (see the 1992 Act on Addressed and Targeted Grants). According 
to accounting and tax regulations, municipal projects, such as wastewater, that become 
core assets with limited marketability also fall under value added taxation. In other words, 
municipalities must pay a 25 percent value added tax on their public investment projects 
ultimately funded by state grants. Th e value added tax regulations allow municipalities to 
claim value added tax refunds if the assets are leased out or produce an income stream. If 
these assets are sold, however, the value added tax refund must be repaid to the state. In 
other words, privatization or asset sales induce tax liabilities and grant refund obligations, 
making privatization of physical infrastructure itself rather unattractive.
Assets of core public services were entrusted to municipal enterprises, which sub-
sequently became corporations and independent operators as limited liability or joint-stock 
companies (see chapter17). Because core assets were entrusted and not leased permanently, 
several important court rulings deﬁ ned the application of the term “entrusted assets” in the 
event of bankruptcy. Th e Supreme Court thus decided in 1997 that the core assets were 
placed at the disposal of a commercial utility company, but in the case of liquidation or 
any other change in ownership, the municipality owns the assets themselves. As a result, 
ﬁ rst, the liquidator does not have access to the core assets entrusted to the utility company, 
and they cannot be used to amortize the debt of the utility company. Second, the ultimate 
owner is the municipality, which remains liable for the company’s overdue debts in case of 
reorganization or liquidation. Th us the fate of core assets on loan is still unclear in the case 
of privatization or liquidation, so municipal asset management in many cases meets only 
tactical concerns and leaves many ambiguities and ineﬃ  ciencies unresolved in the long 
run.
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Present Conditions for Asset Management
Municipalities have taken over assets originated in a variety of entities; hence, clear titles 
were few, and inventories and analytic ﬁ les were far from complete or accurate. Th e local 
governments had to identify, catalog, inventory, and appraise assets on takeover. In parallel, 
setting up municipal organizations capable of maintaining and managing these properties 
was of crucial importance. Local governments had to accomplish all of these tasks in a short 
period. Th ese types of background work and property management were entirely new to 
the just-constituted local governments, and they had little expertise and few experienced 
staﬀ  or managers.
Inadequate Organizational Capacity and Fragmented Responsibility
Even in 2000 few local governments recognized that professional asset management 
consists of more than selling oﬀ  residential and commercial real estate and investing the 
proceeds in securities. Moreover, local governments with signiﬁ cant real and ﬁ nancial assets 
need to create units that have a comprehensive approach to quality asset management that 
serves the ultimate public purpose of providing quality services. Th e municipal units often 
focused on public administration in dealing with marketable real estate, property rolls, and 
inventories, but do not treat municipal assets strategically. Furthermore, they do not keep 
an eye on maintenance and various other obligations that come with ownership.
Local government units that cover business and management functions often have 
budgetary and accounting biases and perform essentially bookkeeping roles. Given the 
limitations of the public sector chart of accounts and bookkeeping practices, they have 
no comprehension of cash ﬂ ows, asset value, and the value generated or lost by municipal 
properties. Furthermore, they are unable to detect changes in the real economy that aﬀ ect 
the genuine value of municipal properties.
Local governments created commercial entities to fulﬁ ll asset management functions. 
Since then, evidence has mounted to support the assertion that incentives in a commercial, 
albeit municipally owned, enterprise do not always support the public service goals of the 
municipality.
Special Situation of the Districts of Budapest
Th e 1991 Law on Self-Government of the Capital City Districts regulates the legal status 
of Budapest Municipality, which comprises 23 districts and the Capital City as 24 public 
service districts each led by elected local governments. Th ere is no hierarchy between the 
city and the district governments. Budapest has all the rights and responsibilities typical 
in municipalities and counties. Generalizations that apply to Hungarian municipalities 
regardless of size do not necessarily apply to Budapest or to its constituent districts. 
Although the districts are as large as the largest secondary cities, in many ways they are less 
independent than small villages because of responsibilities and competencies they share 
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with the city government (see chapters 8 and 20). A multitude of property management 
functions are cross-district and are handled by the Capital City Council, by its line 
departments and bureaus, or by the lord mayor.
Th e Capital City administration of Budapest performs the following tasks for the 
entire municipality (that is, virtually on behalf of the 23 districts): 
 Drinking water supply, drainage water management, sewage treatment, gas supply, 
district heating issues beyond district boundaries, and management of the main grid of 
sewers and electric power
 Flood and groundwater control
 Solid waste collection, removal and disposal, including septic hauling and solid waste 
depot management
 Street cleaning
 Public cemeteries
 Maintenance of main roads traversing a district, routes used by public transportation, 
bridges, underpasses, and overpasses owned by the Capital City, as well as district-
owned roads that are used by public transportation
 Parking lot management
 Provision of public and open-air markets
 Green-space management
 Coordination of urban renewal projects and greenﬁ eld investments.
 
Hungarian municipalities except Budapest districts are responsible for all the tasks 
listed above. Furthermore, each municipality is allowed by law to hand over local tasks 
to the respective county, if it lacks local ﬁ nancing or management capacity, but Budapest 
districts only could ask the Capital City to take over some of their responsibilities. In 
addition, the Capital City government maintains public health, social welfare, educational, 
and other facilities that are usually the responsibility of county governments. Given its 
overarching responsibility for infrastructure, Budapest capital government must maintain 
the digital public utility and infrastructure maps as well.
Locally Defi ned Rules for Asset Management
Besides national framework legislation on annual budgets, budgeting, accounting, muni-
cipal assets, and other local government activities, local council resolutions and standard 
operating procedures also provide guidance on property management issues. Soon after 
they had taken over state assets, city B and city C passed local resolutions that contained 
separate provisions for: (a) regulating the management, disposition, and potential privati-
zation of residential and nonresidential real estate; (b) controlling public utilities; and 
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(c) providing general rules, rights, and authorizations to manage and dispose of municipal 
assets. By 2000, ten years into the new local government system, city A still had only a draft 
property decree, and it had no conceptual framework for asset management. 
Asset management rules in city B and city C, just as in most large cities, have sub-
sequently been incorporated into property decrees that: (a) deﬁ ne and categorize local 
assets by functions and marketability, (b) regulate exercising property rights, and (c) 
set up separate procedures for selling marketable and partially marketable assets. Th ese 
property decrees also provide guidelines for managing municipally owned commercial 
enterprises and assign the administrative notary (the chief administrative bureau above 
line departments of the local government) to create and maintain an asset inventory, which 
should be attached to the annual closing budget report of the municipality.
Organizational Framework for Exercising Property Rights
Conceptually, all local government property rights belong to the local councils, which in 
compliance with national regulations may change the disposition of properties and regulate 
their management. Th ese decisions are in some cases delegated to functional committees, 
the line departments, and their bureaus (see ﬁ gure 19.1). Th e professionals working in 
local administration are thus responsible for preparing and executing decisions of the 
city council. But property-related decisions are also often made at several levels, in the 
multitude of municipal institutions and municipal enterprises, without council control or a 
common set of guidelines.
Th e organizational setup of local asset management varies across municipalities, 
but the larger ones typically have a similar multilayered framework of responsibilities 
and organizations in exercising property rights. Th e allocation of competencies between 
committees, line departments, bureaus, and independent agencies shows greater variety. 
Committees and line departments focus on strategy issues and monitoring or control of 
the subordinate entities in many municipalities, and they do perform numerous operational 
asset management functions in other municipalities.
Top-layer Organizations for Local Asset Management
Th ree levels of decision-making govern the local use of assets: the city council, committees, 
and the mayor.
City Council Decisions. Local governments have issued rules and operating procedures that 
govern which type of local decisions require a qualiﬁ ed majority (over 50 percent vote of 
city council) and which require only a simple majority (support of those present at voting). 
Most asset management issues fall into the second category. Qualiﬁ ed majorities are 
required in most cases when passing local decrees, establishing or disbanding institutions, 
joining associations or engaging in joint ventures with other municipalities, establishing a 
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commercial enterprise, modifying the municipal charter, recalling or hiring top management 
personnel, and investing the municipality’s cash or ﬁ nancial assets. Selling assets that have 
limited marketability often requires a qualiﬁ ed majority of the city council voting by name. 
Representatives with personal or family vested interests are disqualiﬁ ed from voting.
Committees—Second Rank Organizations in Local Management. In general terms and in 
most of the 220 cities, councils form a plethora of operational committees that consist 
not only of council members, but also nonvoting members from the community who hold 
special expertise or are appointed for political reasons. Th e committees deal with key issues, 
such as economic development; economics, budgeting, and ﬁ nance; property management; 
city operation; urban planning; culture and education; and health care and social services.
Th e committees on economics, asset management, and budgeting and ﬁ nance are 
particularly important in that they review budget proposals, make suggestions about 
borrowing and bond issues, and appraise investments and ownership shares in commercial 
enterprises. Th ey also make suggestions about privatization, and about what assets may be 
used for commercial or revenue-generating purposes. One committee also manages the 
transfer of operating assets to utilities and supervises overall asset management.
Th e city council can delegate certain operational decisions to the committees 
between the monthly meetings of the council. Such rights include determining short-
term investments for cash surplus. Th e committees, if authorized by the council and the 
operating procedures, can dispose of assets and set rental fees and sales prices, as well as 
evaluate competitive tenders below a certain value limit. Th e committees can place liens 
on private residential property as well in the case of nonpayment of taxes or refurbishment 
assessments.
Mayor—Th ird Rank Asset Manager. Th e role of mayors (and deputy mayors where applicable) 
in asset management is included in the standard operating rules for the municipality and 
the line departments of local government. Th ese rules include conditions and competency 
limits in negotiating and signing contracts, proposing changes in staﬀ  remuneration, 
making recommendations about which staﬀ  of city management or institutions deserve 
promotion or ﬁ nancial rewards. Deputy mayors are assigned duties that include suggesting 
policies for dealing with municipally owned commercial enterprises, city operations, budget 
preparation, social, welfare, and urban development issues.
Line Departments and Bureaus
Th e scope of competencies and responsibilities of cities’ line departments varies. We found 
no single optimal structure or resolution, and even the best practices diﬀ er. In some of our 
sample cities the departments and their bureaus are involved directly in asset management; 
in others asset management is delegated to municipal institutions or enterprises via quasi 
outsourcing; and in still others it is contracted out to independent private entities as paid 
asset managers. Below we summarize the practices of the sample cities. 
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City A. Th e following departments of city A deal with asset and property management 
issues: (a) Department of the Chief Architect, (b) Technical and Construction Department, 
(c) Business Department, and (d) Culture and Sports Department. Th e Department of 
the Chief Architect includes a city planning bureau, a property management bureau, and 
inventory bureau. Th is arrangement is beneﬁ cial since the active management of marketable 
properties takes place in close coordination with city planning and property inventory 
management. Th e Technical and Construction Department handles city operations, 
such as road and park maintenance, and controls service contracts granted to vendors 
performing city services. Th e Business Department prepares the budget, does bookkeeping 
and accounting functions, prepares the annual ﬁ nancial statements, and manages municipal 
institutions. In addition, the Business Department controls cash and bank payments made 
on behalf of all line departments. Th is department also manages the city’s long- and short-
term investment portfolios. Th e Culture and Sports Department keeps track of real estate 
and other properties of these two types of municipal institutions, and also coordinates 
maintenance, upgrades, and reconstruction projects in the schools and other facilities (see 
box 19.1).
Box 19.1 Municipal Property Management Supervision in City A
In 1992 the council of City A set up an independent bureau that is not part of line departments to perform 
several asset management functions in an integrated manner. Th e bureau is responsible for managing 
residential and commercial real estate, including leasing, refurbishment, maintenance, and privatization. 
Th e bureau prepares proposals for the city council to consider, and actively manages nearly 3,000 residential 
properties and 1,200 other facilities. It acts as leasing manager and custodian for 140 buildings with 900 
leased units and manager for 900 co-op apartments with over 3,300 rental units. Th e bureau’s computer 
system accounts for billing, arrears, maintenance, and other data on each property it manages. Th e database 
allows it to analyze cash ﬂ ows and rates of return for each property separately (that is, loss-making units 
are easily identiﬁ ed). Since the bureau is a budgetary agency, the proﬁ t it makes can easily be transferred 
to the municipal budget without any tax implications, and its income statement is included in the city’s 
consolidated ﬁ nancial statements.
City B. Th e various local organizations emerged randomly, so that asset management tasks 
and competencies of committees and line departments led increasingly to overlapping, 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and gaps. Hence, in 1999, city B reorganized its line 
departments to match the structure of the city council committees and, more signiﬁ cantly, 
appointed an asset management commissioner to directly oversee the city’s assets. Despite 
this eﬀ ort to create a professional, transparent, and responsive administrative structure, 
the new system contains several contradictions. For example, the urban development 
department oversees real estate bookkeeping and accounting functions, whereas this should 
be a function of the business department that does the rest of the city’s accounting.
Real estate development and residential housing management functions are allocated to 
one department, although these two services have conﬂ icting goals. Th e city created a new 
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support unit for its public administration professionals, and a group that sets economic and 
municipal development policies. Besides the internal controller’s bureau, a set of liaison 
bureaus maintains ties with nongovernmental organizations, the press, cultural organiza-
tions, city marketing, tourism, and other public relations functions. Commercial enterprises 
owned by the city have to ﬁ le quarterly operational and ﬁ nancial reports, and there is 
a monitoring group. So far, this control system is not extended to the city’s budgetary 
agencies and institutions, though it would be of crucial importance to monitor them too.
City C. Th e standard operating procedures detail functions of departments’ bureaus 
responsible for strategic issues and operational management of the city and most local 
services. Standard operating procedures do not itemize the various budgetary agencies, 
commercial enterprises, nonproﬁ t organizations, and associations the city controls. In the 
course of ISO 9000 certiﬁ cation procedure in 1999, they documented the procedural rules 
applying to each function of line departments and bureaus. Th is certiﬁ cation does not 
extend to the business operations bureau because its numerous ad hoc tasks do not ﬁ t into 
the ISO manuals. Th e city has an economic bureau that prepares and monitors the budget, 
collects information from city institutions, prepares accounting records, does limited 
controlling, and also provides for training of ﬁ nancial staﬀ  members.
Th e assets and business bureau maintains the city’s real estate records, keeps track of 
ownership changes, suggests new uses for properties, assists in the disposition of property, 
and acts as secretariat to the council’s economic committee. Th is bureau maintains the 
property cadastre. Records are in a paper card format, with changes such as liens and 
mortgages inscribed by hand. Th is bureau also manages commercial rental property. In 
theory, all real estate and property ﬁ les should reach this bureau, although quite often other 
departments receive such ﬁ les by mistake.
Th e city development bureau prepares urban planning and historical preservation 
documents, and proposals for the city council to consider. Public procurement tenders, 
construction projects, project ﬁ nance, city planning, the city architect, and so forth, are 
handled in or reside with this bureau. Th e bureau is responsible for the technical planning 
and permitting aﬃ  liated with city projects and privately sponsored projects as well.
Th e city operations bureau assists the development bureau in planning and operations-
related tasks, provides maintenance and refurbishment support to city institutions, and 
does technical inspections. Th e bureau is responsible for street maintenance and cleaning, 
public lighting, transportation, parking, solid and liquid waste removal, as well as roads. Th e 
bureau signs contracts (for example, use of public areas) on behalf of the city. Commercial 
enterprises working for the city are inspected and monitored by this bureau. District 
heating, public markets, public baths, beaches, and other water-related functions belong 
here as well. Th e bureau serves as custodian of city hall. Despite these important roles, this 
bureau has no register of the property-management-related functions it is to oversee. Th ose 
functions are deﬁ ned in the various agencies and enterprises the department supervises.
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Municipal Institutions and Enterprises
Municipalities often establish institutions to provide non–fee-based public services and ful-
ﬁ ll various functions. Th ese tasks are either considered to be part of the municipal divisions 
and accounted as a part of the municipal budget and balance sheet, or they are legally inde-
pendent institutions that have their own budgets and accounting systems, but receive muni-
cipal subsidies, grants, and contracts that show up as annual expenses in the municipal budget.
Municipal Institutions with Independent Budgets. Schools, social welfare organizations, and 
health clinics deliver mandatory public services. Although they have separate budgets, 
these institutions are not fully independent and are sometimes aﬃ  liated with a custodial 
bureau that provides business, accounting, and operational support to several institutions. 
Within their own budgets that depend to a large extent on transfers from the municipality, 
independent institutions are responsible for their current expenditures and property 
maintenance. Renewals and new capital investments are usually carried out by a functional 
unit of the managing bureau, although often they are covered from the funds of the 
institution’s own budget (for example, computerization ﬁ nanced by a state or private grant 
application). Construction and renewals, on completion, are transferred to the books of the 
institution. Changes of service capacity, professional supervision, and many other issues are 
handled by the respective custodial bureaus.
Municipally Owned Independent Legal Entities. Municipalities have the right to establish 
commercial and nonproﬁ t enterprises and to transfer assets to them to perform public 
functions or to generate income. State enterprises (for example, utilities) were commer-
cialized before becoming property of municipalities. Depending on their founding charter, 
municipalities may or may not be able to control these enterprises through their board 
representatives; moreover, they may not act as a majority or sole shareholder (see chapter 
17). All municipally founded enterprises were also commercialized by the end of 1997, 
which in principle made their balance sheets, income statements, ownership structures, and 
property rights transparent (though not necessarily public). Th is action has again in principle 
reduced cross-subsidization. Proﬁ table enterprises could no longer subsidize a multitude of 
loss-making eﬀ orts beyond dividends paid to the owners. Ample room remains, however, 
for capital transfer or for giving more orders to loss-making municipal enterprises.
Most municipalities still do not have a clear idea of the nature of their ownership 
interests in municipal enterprises. No one municipal bureau keeps track of each enterprise, 
its business activity, and whether the municipal interests are being best served. Municipal 
portfolios that contain not only the shares, but also ownership interests in local limited 
enterprises should be monitored, evaluated, appraised, and actively managed. As opposite to 
the latter principles, the use of board and supervisory board memberships, with high salaries, 
is a time-tested tool of local politics. Th e relationship between the asset manager organ 
and the key managers of municipally owned or inﬂ uenced enterprises varies. Th is deter-
mines the extent to which quality services are delivered or dividends are paid to the owner.
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Th e city council, with ultimate responsibility for both ﬁ nances and the level of local 
public services, faces conﬂ icting tasks of acting as a proﬁ t-maximizing owner and public 
servant. Th is duality becomes even more complicated in the case of utilities, where tariﬀ s, 
which were approved by the city council, aﬀ ect its own dividend ﬂ ow, its expenses as a user 
of the services, and the public’s pocketbook simultaneously. Although from an accounting 
and legal perspective municipally owned or controlled enterprises are proﬁ t-maximizing, 
in reality they often behave in a hybrid way, since their owner and main customer exercises 
control and, hence, determines their product and ultimate performance.
Asset Records and Local Wealth
An up-to-date National Land and Real Estate Cadastre is the primary precondition for 
reliable and eﬃ  cient municipal asset management—for households and business entities 
alike. Th e National Cadastre, though varied across geographic reasons, was completed 
only at the very end of 1990s. Th e ways and procedural shortcomings of privatization 
have also led to delays, legal disputes, and severe shortcomings in setting up local property 
registers. Being familiar with the logjams, local governments have repeatedly postponed the 
development of quality asset registers. Th is issue has become one of the major development 
challenges, particularly in the largest 100–200 settlements.
Real Estate Cadastre
Th e Property Act set up the following categories to be distinguished in property registers 
and on titles to the properties: residential and nonresidential property; historical properties; 
buildings for servicing handicapped people; buildings housing utilities or institutions if 
those services are deﬁ ned in laws or decrees as serving public purposes; nature preserves; 
agricultural land; property belonging to utilities; water, public drinking water systems, and 
utilities; and other properties. Decrees deﬁ ne the format and content of municipal property 
registers, although local governments are free to add supplementary data.
Municipalities label their properties using the oﬃ  cial plot numbers issued by the 
County Land Bureau, and the legal descriptions also match the oﬃ  cial terms. Th e property 
registers and inventories often are updated with a big time lag. Th erefore, liens, mortgages, 
and values are recorded only if a bank or other vendor insists on it. Property registers do not 
contain values, and property inventories do not fully match the content and descriptions 
of the respective registers. In all three of the sample cities, matching the land bureau and 
municipal land registers with the value-containing asset inventories is a never-ending task. 
Mismatches and problems are often discovered when executing sales contracts or when 
ﬁ nancial institutions want to register a lien on municipal property. Given diﬃ  culties in 
both the physical content of the registers and the lag in entering values, if any, municipal 
balance sheets rarely reﬂ ect a realistic value of municipal real estate inventories.
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City B developed a digitized base map and, by 1997, added land and real estate cadastre 
modules to its asset management system containing details on ownership, liens, contested 
ownership, and various other rights associated with land and building ownership and use. 
Th is real estate register, however, does not contain information about utilities, because these 
assets (for example, water, sewage, and district heating pipes and equipment) were passed 
on to the various commercial operating enterprises under various lease contracts.
City B’s real property cadastre goes beyond the statutory requirements, capturing 
relevant supplementary information. Th e register contains technical data that allow the 
city to group pieces of land according to their expected income-generating capacity. Land 
and buildings are also classiﬁ ed by potential functions and, if available, by latest market 
value, making it possible to identify income-producing and loss-making properties. Th ese 
categories allow the city to identify loss-making properties that need to be retained because 
they are used to perform mandatory public services.
Th us properties can be classiﬁ ed as core properties with no marketability or limited 
marketability. All other properties can be thus classiﬁ ed as being marketable and available 
for income-generating purposes through privatization, leasing, or concession agreements. 
Th e municipal cadastre includes only properties owned directly by the municipality. Land 
and buildings that are owned by municipal enterprises fall into a separate legal category 
and are recorded only in the enterprises’ balance sheets and analytic ﬁ les. Line departments 
and bureaus are not able to track changes in real estate values, because real property ought 
to be cleared out from the municipal inventory if it is used as in-kind investment by the 
municipality. Th e value of investments should be traced instead, which would require 
municipal enterprises to report changes in their balance sheets.
Asset Inventory
Th e ALG requires that municipalities attach a full inventory of their real and ﬁ nancial 
assets to their annual closing budgets, which are due within six months after closing a 
budgetary year (coincides with the calendar year in Hungary). Many local governments fail 
to attach the full inventory because they do not have the data or they lack a comprehensive 
management system to fully capture the various types of property scattered across 
municipal institutions and bureaus. Beyond the assets actually used by municipal budget 
organizations, the asset inventory would have to detail real estate that has been leased or 
granted to a concessionaire for temporary use. Given that accounting standards do not 
enable local governments to list realistic values for all of their properties, only a reliable 
asset inventory could hint at the scale of a municipality’s property in descriptive terms. 
Changes in ownership would also need to be shown line by line if necessary. Several ﬁ eld 
investigations have shown that substantial outside assistance would be needed to assemble 
a comprehensive and updated inventory at the municipal level.
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City A created a detailed property inventory that it has never matched with the 
respective land bureau records, which, although also substandard, are the only records 
with legal authority. Th e property inventory, when possible, gives estimated values. Because 
accounting rules keep track of property by book value, matching properties in the inventory 
with properties listed by book value on the balance sheet is very diﬃ  cult.
Shortcomings in the Sample Cities’ Asset Records
Our three surveys identiﬁ ed anomalies in the accounting, recordkeeping, and inventory 
methods of each city. Th ese anomalies were partly due to regulatory contradictions and 
partly clear-cut local shortcomings that could be resolved through a concerted reform 
eﬀ ort. Th e three secondary cities showed balance sheets of around Ft 20 billion (US$ 70 
million) each in 1998. In each case, securities, cash, and real estate accounted for most of 
the assets, even though signiﬁ cant portions of real estate assets were recorded at historical 
book value or at zero value.
Challenges in City A
Th e assets of city A in 1998 amounted to Ft 16 billion (US$ 57 million). Invested assets 
amounted to Ft 4.5 billion, of which 60 percent or Ft 2.7 billion were long-term claims on 
the new owners of recently privatized municipal apartments. Although the quality of these 
claims over the long run is doubtful, no provision for risk is made against these assets nor 
are they classiﬁ ed as doubtful in the municipal balance sheet. Real estate holdings (with 
numerous appraisal problems) still amount to nearly two-thirds of the city’s assets. 
Th e ﬁ xed asset increase accounts for 88 to 89 percent of the total capital expenses 
in city A (see table 19.2). Th e diﬀ erence is further highlighted if we consider that assets 
are recorded in the books at net value. Th at is, gross value is reduced by depreciation, 
discards, or rejects, and is increased by the amount of investments incurred in the current 
year. Th e lack of tight relationship of ﬁ xed asset increase and capital expenses is also well 
demonstrated in ﬁ gure 19.2.
Table 19.2 Types of Capital Expenses in City A, 1996–1998 (Ft million)
Year Capital 
expenses
Expenses on non-marketable 
core assets and on assets 
with zero book value
Public 
utility 
investments
Other capital expenses 
resulting in no asset 
increase
Capital expenses not 
resulting in asset increase 
as a  percentage of total 
capital expenses
1996 1,250 59 22 65 12
1997 1,219 64 34 49 12
1998 1,629 43 100 36 11
Source: Szabó 1999.
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Challenges in City B
Assets are extensively recorded at par value, and unrealized change in gains or losses on 
invested assets is not tracked. Over 56 percent of the city’s assets were in the form of 
ﬁ nancial investments, marketable shares, and ownership interests in commercial enterprises. 
Th ese shares and ownership interests are recorded at par or original issue price, completely 
neglecting to incorporate changes in market values. In-kind and property contributions to 
municipally owned enterprises are also recorded at book value. Government decrees require 
that assets that are leased or otherwise signed over temporarily to other legal entities, such 
as concessionaires, must be recorded separately from securities and capital contributions. 
Almost all the latter assets of city B are non-marketable core assets used temporarily by 
utilities.
City B’s balance sheet does not accurately reﬂ ect its true wealth in that signiﬁ cant real 
properties are recorded at zero value. Th e city’s auditor has suggested that all assets listed 
with zero value ought to be appraised and a fair market value entered into the city’s books. 
Unless these steps are taken, the entire balance sheet would not reﬂ ect the true scale of the 
city’s assets and their potential for income or as collateral.
Accounts receivable represent a big challenge for city B (see table 19.3). Another weak 
point of city B’s asset structure is the receivables stemming from the sale of municipally 
owned apartments under 30-year installment payment contracts. Th ese are essentially 
long-term loans by the city to the new owners with a very long and unpredictable payback 
structure. Th e unpaid rental fees and other uncollected debts boost receivables to 5 percent 
of total municipal assets. City B’s fully owned municipal utility enterprises have also 
amassed uncollected, and perhaps non-collectable, receivables, which ultimately need to 
be written oﬀ  by the enterprise and eventually may induce municipal budget expenditures. 
For example, 80 percent of families who rent apartments from the city are in arrears to the 
district heating company.
Table 19.3 Accounts Receivable in City B
Accounts receivable Forint million Percent of total assets
Loan exposure due to the sale of municipal ﬂ ats and 
nonresidential premises installment payments period expire 
mostly by the year of 2028
988 3.6
Stock of overdue receivables taken over from municipal 
enterprises in 1994, so these should have been written oﬀ 
89 0.3
Arrears in rent and other fees (overdue) 76 0.3
Receivables recorded at the business bureau of the local government 262 1.0
Total 1,415 5.2
Source: Kassó 1999.
A critical point is that the large scale of receivables aﬀ ects negatively the liquidity 
of the local government and may have a signiﬁ cant impact on property management. 
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Th e structure of receivables deserves attention as well. Actions should be taken against 
nonpaying tenants—128 notices came into force, but they cannot be executed because 
there is no place to move the tenants.
In addition, a matter of concern is the growing amount of irrevocable debt that has 
emerged in municipal institutions and enterprises. For example, rental contracts mostly 
inherited from the previous regime, which cannot be amended, include water bills as a part 
of the rent, so that public utility debt is due in addition to the rent.
It can be established that: (a) the invested assets are gradually decreasing, (b) the 
proportion of receivables is increasing, (c) the coverage of the assets with own resources is 
continuously deteriorating, and (d) the deteriorating trend in indebtedness and liquidity 
indicators may have a negative eﬀ ect on the city’s future development (see table 19.4).
Table 19.4 Changes in the Financial and Property Position of City B (percent)
Unit 1994 1995 1998
Assets 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Proportion of invested assets 95.8 94.5 87.2
 Proportion of receivables 0.5 1.6 5.8
Resources
 Own resources 95.9 94.8 90.7
 Extent of indebtedness 3.4 4.4 5.2
 Liquidity indicator 3.8 2.1 2.2
Source: Kassó 1999.
Challenges in City C
In 1998 the city’s balance sheet accounted nearly Ft 17 billion (US$ 60 million) in assets. 
Nearly half of these (Ft 7.6 billion) were real assets (mostly real estate and other physical 
assets) and Ft 6.3 billion were ﬁ nancial assets. In 1998, as in the previous case, City C was 
faced, with Ft 1.2 billion in outstanding claims on the owners of the privatized (formerly) 
municipal apartments with nearly 30 years’ maturity. City C keeps separate records of 
properties that are permanently transferred to utility operating companies, because these 
assets are accounted for in the municipal balance sheet. Capital revenues amounted to 
Ft 850 million in 1998, which represented only 6.4 percent of total revenues. Over the period 
under review, capital revenues were continuously decreasing, while capital expenditures 
were increasing signiﬁ cantly relative to total expenditures (see table 19.4). Th is picture, 
however, is misleading, because sizable revenues generated from the sale of nonresidential 
real estate—about Ft 97 and Ft 107 million in 1997 and 1998, respectively—were mis-
takenly recorded as current operational revenues instead of capital revenues. 
City C has about 50 institutions with separate budgets and balance sheets under its 
control, and each institution performs public service functions (for example, education, 
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health, social welfare). In reality, the system has 150 legal entities, most of which do not 
have separate accounting systems, but are serviced by one of the 50 independent institutions 
that handle management, payroll, accounting, purchasing, and other services.
More important, city C is majority or controlling owner of 22 commercial and nonproﬁ t 
enterprises and foundations and has ownership stakes in 33 other enterprises. Th is group of 
55 entities held a municipal portfolio valued at Ft 6.4 billion (US$ 23 million) accounted in 
the municipal closing balance sheet of FY1998. Th ese entities either provide public services 
(such as zoo, district heating, cemetery, water, public markets, community television, 
and city services) or supplement public services (such as health foundation, education 
foundation, scholarships, public aid, and so forth) or serve in economic development (such 
as real estate development, industrial park, innovation center, small business incubator, 
and cable TV), or even are intended to generate income (such as highway construction 
and portfolio management). Even this extensive list omitted several signiﬁ cant enterprises 
owned or controlled by the city, and in many cases gave an incorrect (low) valuation for the 
shares. If the annual ﬁ lings of these commercial enterprises, together with dividend data, 
were shown in more detail, then a more realistic valuation could be used instead of the par 
value or the original investment made in these ﬁ rms. Neither the Property and Business 
Bureau nor the City Management Bureau had reliable data on the extent of municipal 
investment in these enterprises or the form of the investment (that is, cash, real estate, or 
another form of in-kind contribution).
Table 19.5 Capital Revenues per Expenditures in City C (percent)
Year Capital revenues in total revenues Capital expenditures in total expenditures
1995 9.3 9.4
1996 8.6 8.8
1997 7.9 13.0
1998 6.4 12.2
Source: Kassó 1999.
Th is municipality still holds signiﬁ cant real estate assets that have zero book value. 
When maintenance and other capital improvements were carried out, the municipal balance 
sheet did not reﬂ ect any changes in the value of these assets, because the funds expended by 
the municipality were accounted as current expenditures. Th e local government interpreted 
this accounting practice in such a manner that the zero book value reﬂ ects the assets’ special 
functions; hence, capital improvements do not have to be accounted as asset increases in the 
municipal balance sheet.
Th e Finance Ministry, referring to European Union standards, has recently indicated 
in an opinion that core assets must have positive values on the balance sheet, even those 
that are currently recorded as zero value because they are non-marketable core assets. 
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Replacement cost, or depreciated cost based on technical parameters, could serve as a basis 
of appraising the value of these assets.
As a result, our study included, among other things, a proposal for city A to reconsider 
its present accounting policy, because about 12 percent of upgrade and capital improvement 
expenses were omitted from the line of invested assets of the city’s balance sheet between 
1996 and 1998. Th is omission resulted in an artiﬁ cially accounted capital loss when no such 
loss took place at all.
Figure 19.2 Relationship between Capital Expenses and the Change of Fixed Asset Value, 
1996–1998 
Source: Kassó 1999a.
Relationship between Capital Expenses and the Value of Fixed Assets in City A
Capital expenses, in principle, increase the value of ﬁ xed assets. In practice, however, certain 
types of capital expenses are not reﬂ ected in the ﬁ nancial reports of most Hungarian 
municipalities, so they do not result in an increase of ﬁ xed assets. In the case of city A, these 
assets included capital expenses on improvement and replacement of non-marketable core 
assets and on assets with zero book value. According to the interpretation of accounting 
standards by the municipality, improvements to assets with zero book value are not taken 
into account as an increment to the asset value. Public utility investments also are not 
reﬂ ected in the balance sheet of the municipality. Th ese assets, after the completion of 
investments, are transferred to the operating public utility companies. As a result, these 
assets are not present in the municipal balance sheet. Other capital expenses that do 
not result in the growth of municipal ﬁ xed assets are expenses of life-annuity contracts, 
evacuation of buildings to be reorganized, or expenses of the cancellation of forced 
residential rental.
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Recommendations
Th e central government must take urgent steps to enhance accounting standards and 
bookkeeping rules applied to budgetary agencies and their operating environment, preferably 
in a manner to get them closer to the rules and practices of commercial entities. Capital and 
current budgets should be clearly distinguished and their interrelations regulated. Detailed 
national rules need to be introduced for preparing consolidated municipal balance sheets 
that reﬂ ect the requirements applied to commercial holding companies.
Municipal property registers and inventories should be scrutinized and standardized 
to reﬂ ect the true value of holdings. Market value, replacement cost, or some type of 
depreciated value should be used to supplement historical book value. Assets listed with 
zero value should be immediately revalued. A clear set of data entry rules should guarantee 
that entries are made at each appropriate level and agency. Inventories maintained at 
various levels in diﬀ erent entities should have a transparent and transferable structure. 
Local governments should set up a consolidated register to record all assets (including 
buildings, plots, and equipment) whether in the hand of the municipality or its institutions. 
Th is register also should include the assets owned by the municipality but operated by 
other, usually oﬀ -budget, entities. Th e assets are recorded by local government functions 
and services based on the classiﬁ cation recommended by the International Monetary Fund 
for the public sector (see table 19.6). In this case, the classiﬁ cation only indicates functions 
that are relevant at the local level.
Table 19.6 Classiﬁ cation of Assets According to the UN-IMF Classiﬁ cation of 
Functions of Government (COFOG)
Identifi cation code Relevant public services at the local level
01. General public services
01.1.1 Legislative and executive bodies, foreign aﬀ airs
01.1.2 Budgetary and ﬁ nancial aﬀ airs
02. Defense
02.1.2 Civil defense
03. Public order and safety
03.1.1 Police
03.1.2 Fire safety
04. Education
04.1 Preprimary, primary education
04.2.1 Secondary education–general
04.2.2 Secondary education–vocational
04.3 Higher education
04.4 Other education
04.5 Other supplementary services
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Identifi cation code Relevant public services at the local level
05. Health
05.1.1 Hospitals–general
05.1.2 Hospitals–specialized
05.1.3 Maternity hospitals and homes
05.1.4 Sanatorium, convalescent home
05.2.1 Adult and child family doctor services
05.2.2 Specialist clinics
05.2.3 General and special dental services
06. Social security and welfare
06.5 Family and child protection services
06.7.1 Services for habitation
06.7.2 Other social supports
07. Recreation, cultural and religious services
07.1 Recreation and sport activities
07.2 Cultural services
07.3.1 Communication
07.3.2 Publishing activities
08. Housing, urban, and community services
08.1.1 Housing
08.1.2 Village/urban development
08.2 Water service provision
08.3 Public lighting
08.5 Other village/urban development services
09. Environmental services
09.1 Solid waste collection, management
09.2 Sewage treatment
09.3 Environmental protection
09.4 Protection of nature
11. Economic aﬀ airs and services
11.1 Fuel and energy
11.2 Agriculture, forestry, ﬁ shing, and hunting
11.4.1 Road transport and public transportation
11.4.2 Air transport and transportation
11.6.2 Hotels, restaurants, and tourism
11.6.3 Multipurpose projects
12. Others
12.1 Transactions to ﬁ nance budget deﬁ cits
12.3 Other
Source: Kassó 1999a.
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For each function, the register (box 19.2) keeps records of the assets, their book value, 
types, whether they are core assets or non-core assets, and whether they are marketable, 
non-marketable, or restrictedly marketable. It also indicates other legal regulations beyond 
the ALG that may restrict the use and management of the asset. Th e register gives details 
on the form of operation and the legal entity responsible for managing and keeping records 
of the asset. It also indicates the self-ﬁ nancing sources (if any) that are raised through 
managing the asset (for example, entry fees or rents). Th e methods and legal regulations 
that apply at the valuation of the asset are also presented in the register.
Box 19.2  Items of the Register
 Name of local public service
 Description of public service
 Book value of the asset
 Typical assets within this public service group
 Type of assets according to the ALG (marketable, partially marketable core, non-core)
 Entity which records asset value (mayor’s oﬃ  ce, institutions, and so forth)
 Form of operating the asset
 Self-ﬁ nancing
 Valuation of asset
 Compulsory statistics, reports on asset
 Legal regulation/requirements on the management of the asset
Source: Kassó 1999a. 
Local governments should introduce clear rules and mandates for various managing 
units. A municipality’s chart of accounts should reﬂ ect where each asset is located and 
which agency, department, or outside entity is responsible for reporting on and maintaining 
and maximizing the usefulness of the asset.
Th e annual municipal ﬁ nancial statements should be supplemented with, among other 
things, an annex that lists major changes in asset value and composition in the reported 
ﬁ scal year.
A complete revaluation of all municipal assets should be carried out using replacement 
cost, depreciated value, or perhaps market value as terms of comparison. Th is way, annual 
depreciation, though not ﬁ nanced, could show up as a notional expense item, and the 
balance sheet shows capital loss if the proper maintenance and upgrades are not a part of 
the operational budgets.
Residential and nonresidential real estate, including rental properties, should be 
classiﬁ ed along the lines of social needs and commercial viability. Th e expenses and 
revenues accruing to rental properties, if otherwise consolidated in the municipal budget, 
should be shown separately, to allow for a clear understanding of where interventions (such 
as subsidies, privatization, and investment) are needed.
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Conclusions
Experiences of the sample cities summarized in this chapter highlight the key characteristics 
of the legislative and regulatory framework and the mainstream practices of municipal asset 
management. Asset management is still primarily treated as a bookkeeping and tactical 
task rather than a core and strategic function of local governments. Th e local shortcomings 
are caused by: (a) the national accounting, ﬁ nancial, and budgetary rules and regulations; 
(b) lack of local coordination in and capacity for strategic and operational management 
of municipal assets; (c) incomplete and outdated asset registers and inventories; and (d) 
conﬂ icting interpretation of legal rules.
Th e value, scope, and extent of real estate and other assets owned by municipalities and 
their aﬃ  liates are not reﬂ ected fully and accurately in the variety of statutory and voluntary 
registers and balance sheets. Municipalities that own the biggest asset portfolio in a vast 
majority of settlements do not have a full grasp of what properties they own, because asset 
ﬁ les are maintained at several levels by many organizations, and inventories and cadastre 
reﬂ ect neither market value nor replacement cost.
Municipalities acting as owners of commercial enterprises do not fully capture the 
operational results and increases in ﬁ rm value on their own balance sheets nor can they fully 
monitor the extent to which public purposes are being met.
Non-collectable receivables are gradually accumulating at various levels within a 
municipal structure. Th ese contingent write-oﬀ s do not appear on a consolidated municipal 
balance sheet unless the charge-taking unit passes the loss up as a request for a subsidy. 
Ownership stakes are not reevaluated to reﬂ ect accumulated gains and losses on municipal 
investments.
A comprehensive reform of the municipal accounting system to shift from cash- to 
accrual-basis bookkeeping and record maintenance requirements is indispensable. Accurate 
and publicly discussed ﬁ nancial statements would be a key ﬁ rst step toward rationalizing 
governing bodies and institutions of local governments and in making their interaction 
with the capital market more attractive.
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20Emergence of Strategic Planning in the 1990s: The Case of BudapestKatalin Pallai



In the early 1990s cities around the world started to elaborate strategic plans for urban 
development by integrating diﬀ erent sectoral and functional policies. Such a strategy depends 
on broader political and legal circumstances. Th e newly established local governments in 
the transition countries were also faced with the challenges of strategic planning, although 
in the context of very diﬀ erent planning traditions and unstable economic circumstances. 
On the one hand, they had to shift their focus from the communist supply-side system 
toward a demand-side strategic approach based on new perceptions about the public 
sector’s role and public policies. On the other hand, the establishment of local self-
governments introduced a new and relatively independent layer of policy formulation in 
the context of the monolithic and top-down decision-making traditions. Th ese traditions 
required clariﬁ cation and reallocation of competencies and functions and the introduction 
of new coordination methods.
Th is chapter summarizes the evolution of the general urban policies, development 
concepts, and strategies in Budapest during the 1990s. Although development concepts 
have long been prepared, this chapter shows that the local government had to go through 
a reform process before real and viable strategies could be elaborated and complex strategic 
plans developed. General planning and management capacities in Budapest became 
conducive to strategic planning by the end of 1990s, a time during which the merits of 
the new strategies became apparent. Th e distinction of the so-called supply-and-demand 
approach, widely used for studying infrastructure policies, proved to be a useful tool for 
analyzing the evolution of the urban development planning in Budapest.
* Th is chapter is based on Pallai 2000a.
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The Developmental Context
A well-designed strategy for Budapest ought to correspond to its present and historic position. 
Th e underlying factors are the city’s weight and importance in the present economy, but 
also its pretransition heritage and the “supply driven” development before 1990. 
Budapest at First Glance
Budapest is an internationally recognized metropolis with huge development potential. 
Its strength is due to its geopolitical position in Europe as well as to its economic and 
political weight within the country. It lays at one of the major intersections in the network 
of existing and planned trans-European transportation corridors. Th e city has 1.8 million 
inhabitants, with an agglomeration of about 2.5 million inhabitants, and provides a 
consumer market of at least 5 million persons. More than 90 percent of the insurance, 
banking, and telecommunication sectors and 60 percent of research and development 
capacities of Hungary are located in Budapest (see table 20.1). Th e city produces more than 
one-third of the gross domestic product (GDP).
Th e concentration of strategic functions and the high quality of human resources 
explain how in the last few years, Budapest has acquired 60 percent of the foreign 
direct investment channeled to the country and become the most favored target of such 
investment in central Europe.
Table 20.1 Major Indicators of Budapest 
Indicator Hungary Budapest Budapest as a 
percentage of 
Hungary
Size (square kilometer) 93,000 525 0.5
Population (million) 10 1.9 19.0
GDP in 1997, Ft billion (US$ billion) 8,541 (46) 2,950 (16) 35.0
GDP per capita in 1997, Ft thousand (US$) 841 (4,504) 1,552 (8,315) 185.0
Average wage 1998 Ft, (US$) 70,450 (328.5) 89,402 (416.9) 127.0
Investments by businesses in 1996 (Ft billion) 1057 333 31.5
Foreign direct investment 
(US$ billion, cumulative 2000)
23 13.5 60.0
Source: National and Budapest Statistical Yearbooks 1999.
Supply-side Versus Demand-driven Development Strategies
Socialist planning focused on supply-driven investments, technically ﬁ xed solutions, and 
quantitative results. Th is “predict and provide” method spilled over from production to 
C H A P T E R  2 0    E M E R G E N C E  O F  S T R AT E G I C  P L A N N I N G
407
infrastructure and urban development. Th e dominance of central plans and distorted 
demand information caused by symbolic prices created not only uncoordinated sectoral 
policies, ineﬃ  cient structures, severe shortage in service delivery, but also high eﬀ ective 
costs covered eventually by taxpayers. Th e lack of local autonomy degraded local planning 
to an administrative task with a profound hidden function of lobbying for central subsidies 
and, consequently, turned plans into a wish list of interventions. Th e contemporary urban 
planners who took the lead locally were mostly architects and engineers who focused on 
projects rather than processes.
During the 1990s the policy environment moved progressively in a positive direction. 
Th e transition to a market economy, strengthening of the private sector, cost-based user 
charges, liberalization, and privatization necessitated new types of control mechanisms 
and a new political culture based less on decision-making power and more on interest 
reconciliation. Th e focus of policies has shifted from regulation and intervention toward 
the mediation of impacts and interests based on the understanding of the micro-dynamics 
(see Table 20.2).
In parallel, the perception of the role of the public sector changed from sole provider 
of services to facilitator in creating a supportive environment. Th e establishment and 
empowerment of local governments created the opportunity to exploit the advantages 
of local information and initiatives and to package and translate these initiatives into 
comprehensive local policies. Th is new framework is more supportive of local management 
and elaboration or adjustment of plans according to local needs.
One of the biggest challenges within the new public policy environment has been the 
shift from state intervention techniques to more liberal, better coordinated, and cooperative 
strategic planning in public entities. Th e unrealistic dreams of old urban planners had to 
be replaced by an active strategic urban management approach. Instead of listing possible 
interventions, plans now must concentrate the limited public resources on actions that 
generate further development and private investment and transform the development of 
the city into a public–private partnership program.
Table 20.2 Characteristics of Supply and Demand-side Policies in Urban Management
Supply-side approach to urban development FIS Demand-side management of urban development DSM
Dominance of central planning
Local planning for lobbying for central subsidies
Local planning, local-level aggregation 
of policies based on local information, initiatives, 
and accountability
Focused on supply-side investment 
and network extension
Focused on mediation in responding to local needs 
and for increased system eﬃ  ciency
General macro-approach Micromanagement based on understanding 
of micro-dynamics and ﬂ exibility of procedures
Impact based on public investment 
and regulative logic
Pricing and incentives as inﬂ uence on users
Top-down approach and enforcement Coordination of interest and mobilization
Source: Adapted from Guy and Marvin 1996.
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
408
Th e Pre-transition Heritage of Budapest
Buda and Pest have been famous cities on the map of Europe since the Middle Ages. 
Although their fame faded during the Turkish occupation, a process of slow revival 
followed. During the 19th century, especially after a historical compromise with the 
Habsburg Monarchy in 1867 and the uniﬁ cation of Buda and Pest with the neighboring 
settlements in 1873, an incredibly dynamic growth period started. During the course of a 
few decades, Budapest developed into a huge industrial metropolis with prospering trades 
and pulsing international traﬃ  c. In this period a beautiful eclectic-style city emerged, and 
a sizable peripheral belt developed for industries and service functions. Furthermore, outer 
agglomeration settlements clustered around Budapest and started to grow quickly in the 
backyard of the big city. Now, these all have been consolidated into one big city comprising 
ﬁ ve historic inner city districts and a belt of 18 residential and mixed residential-service-
industrial districts.
At the very end of the 19th century and during the following decades, the construction 
of the Danube bridges enhanced the development of Buda, the western part of the city. 
Elegant villas were built on the hills of Buda, while industries and larger apartment houses 
settled in south Buda. On the Pest side, the garden city of Zugló grew eastward ﬁ rst.
During the last decades of the socialist regime, the construction of large streets, 
commuter trains, and a metro line to the north launched fast urban growth along these 
transportation corridors. As a result, the former industrial belt rapidly shrank in the north 
of the city, but a gray transitional zone survived in the southeast of Budapest. By 1990 
Budapest included, as a result of its natural position and its development potential, three 
challenging sections: the inner city, including the historic eclectic-style core; the northern 
development zone; and the transitional zone, with industries and brownﬁ elds, and the 
potential to merge functionally into the inner city (ﬁ gure 20.1).
Figure 20.1 Historical Development of Budapest
Source: Budapest Municipality.
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Concepts and Strategies during the 1990s
Right after the ﬁ rst local elections, the new leadership started to elaborate an urban 
policy concept (UPC91). Th e goal was to review and reconsider the needs and possible 
development interventions in the city under the new conditions. Half a year of intensive 
work resulted in a summary of issues that could initiate public and professional dialogue on 
the major urban policy issues at the start of the transition.
Th e Initial Challenges and Responses
UPC91 identiﬁ ed three troublesome development elements of the socialist heritage: (a) an 
over-centralized road system with low capacity and high ratio of through traﬃ  c, (b) serious 
decay of the historic core city, and (c) insuﬃ  cient public services in big outer city areas.
Under the socialist regime, the severe shortage in privately owned vehicles was coupled 
with a fairly good coverage by public transport. Even in the 1980s, the vast majority of 
residents used public transport. As a result, an underdeveloped and strongly centralized road 
network could temporarily satisfy traﬃ  c needs. Th e traﬃ  c has since become burdensome 
for the city because of noise, pollution, and time wasted in transit.
Th e challenge of the historic core city was that this zone, with the country’s best 
tourist and business potential, desperately needed rehabilitation. On the one hand, the 
core city suﬀ ered because of the lack of public funds for maintenance and refurbishment 
of apartment houses, most of which were cheap public rentals. Th e legal impediments and 
the lack of a real estate market, on the other hand, prevented mobilization of private funds 
into this territory.
Th e challenge of the outer area was rooted in uncoordinated and asymmetric 
development in the previous decades. Housing development previously was focused on the 
outer areas of the city without the parallel development of public services onsite; hence, 
these outer cities were not self-standing zones but functioned as satellite towns.
As a simple answer to these conditions and urban conﬂ icts, three priorities for urban 
development could easily be deﬁ ned in 1991: (a) ease the increasing traﬃ  c problem, (b) 
start a building and street rehabilitation program in the inner city, and (c) develop public 
services and improve connections for outer districts.
UPC91 and the ensuing dialogue provided a framework for deﬁ ning the most urgent 
large-scale development tasks. Th ese eﬀ orts led to the ﬁ rst mega-project of Budapest—
development of the Hungaria ring road in conjunction with a new Danube bridge. Th e 
Hungaria ring road supplements the two historic rings of the core city. It is currently the 
longest and outermost continuous ring street on the Pest side. It serves several functions: 
(a) it is a bypass for an immense volume of through traﬃ  c, which thus protects the inner 
city; (b) it provides better connections between the inner city and the outer districts; and 
(c) it provides for excellent connection and improves the development potential for a large 
part of the gray transition zone.
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While the city government invested in construction of the Hungaria ring road, the 
central government started to construct a beltway around the city called the M0 highway 
(ﬁ gure 20.2). Th e construction of a beltway was also well justiﬁ ed. First, when fully 
constructed, it provided a fast and easy way for both the heavy and the passenger through 
traﬃ  c between the seven major highways approaching Budapest from nearly all cardinal 
points. Second, the M0 could eﬀ ectively and entirely keep all through traﬃ  c out of the 
expanding inner city. Th ird, the M0 not only supplements but also reinforces the Hungaria 
ring road development, since the latter, no longer burdened with through traﬃ  c, could serve 
to readjust city traﬃ  c. Th e M0 highway is not only a primary tool for bypass traﬃ  c, but it 
has inspired the dynamic development of a gigantic new logistic zone at the southern edge 
of the city. For instance, a dozen shopping malls, several truck terminals, and tens of logistic 
bases have grown as greenﬁ eld investments. Th is logistic zone has gradually become the 
fourth strategic zone of Budapest (ﬁ gure 20.2).
Figure 20.2 Challenges and Development in the 1990s
Source: Budapest Municipality.
Parallel to the formation of the logistic zone, the construction of the Hungaria ring 
road has created development zones and partly counterbalanced the M0’s unfavorable city 
deconcentration eﬀ ect by pulling back some investments closer to the inner city (table 
20.3). Private investments have fairly reinforced the Hungaria ring road development 
program (table 20.4). By 2000, for instance, as real estate became a strategic market 
segment in Budapest, half a dozen of shopping centers opened, and dozens of modern 
oﬃ  ce buildings and new hotels were built at the Hungaria ring road and along the radial 
avenues that connect the inner city and the ring road.
C H A P T E R  2 0    E M E R G E N C E  O F  S T R AT E G I C  P L A N N I N G
411
Table 20.3 Capital Investments in Budapest as a Percentage of the Municipal Budget,
1990–2000
Investment 1990–1999 2000
Transportation 30–40 41.5
Other infrastructure 15–20 27.8
Rehabilitation fund Ft 2 billion per year Ft 3 billion per year
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Table 20.4 Private Sector Investments, Budapest, 1990–1999
Investment 1990–1999 Under construction
Oﬃ  ces (square meters) 277,500 280,000
New retail space (square meters) 340,000 378,000
New hotels (rooms) 1,200 2,000
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1999.
Th e Hungaria ring road has proven to be a well-selected development intervention, 
because its construction alone could increase the potential of the surrounding area so that 
dynamic development could start there. Because the Hungaria ring road is beyond the 
border of the inner city, it stretches signiﬁ cantly farther beyond the limits of the densely 
used inner area. Th is ring alone, however, has not yet been able to create an impetus large 
enough to restructure the southeastern industrial brownﬁ eld toward the outer area.
Th e inner city rehabilitation was much less successful in the early 1990s. To rehabilitate 
and upgrade the inner city, parking regulations had to be instituted and bypass routes 
started to improve the quality of the physical environment. Th e ﬁ rst building rehabilitation 
programs were only partially successful because of serious legal and ownership impediments 
and the economic depression in the middle of the decade. Th e extensive and fast divestiture 
of the rental apartment buildings (around 300,000 units were sold by 1995) and legislative 
changes have laid the basis for rehabilitation of the inner city driven by the private sector. 
Th e private investors adjusted fast and well, so the inner city of Budapest has absorbed the 
largest private hotel and oﬃ  ce building development among the central and east European 
capitals.
Th e outer city development program turned out to be the third element of the overall 
development strategy both in terms of timing and emphasis. It was crucial to improve 
accessibility by creating better connections among the radial avenues through the gradual 
construction of new sections of the Hungaria ring road. Th is third strategic element of 
the city development has proceeded at a much more moderate pace, and the ﬁ rst results 
occurred only by the end of 1990s. Th e improvement in public services was driven by 
the local governments of the respective districts, which started their own development 
programs in coordination with the municipal council of Budapest.
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Halfway to a Realistic Plan: Th e Mid-1990s
Although the municipal government of Budapest was overburdened with important 
operational, ﬁ nancial, and management issues, two strategic concepts were elaborated 
by 1994. Th e ﬁ rst laid down a strategy concept for the administrative restructuring and 
management reform of service delivery (UPC94), and the second was an urban development 
concept (UDC94). UPC94 was realistic in attempting to foresee the maneuvering in the 
ﬁ scal, ﬁ nancial, and political arena and delineating the next reform steps. Based on three 
years of experience and the transition process, the future of the local government system 
was far more predictable in 1993–94 than in 1991. It was possible to adjust administrative 
structures to tasks and capabilities, and the strategic concept document attempted to deﬁ ne 
the scale of present and proposed activities in accord with forecast revenues. Th e 1994 local 
elections reconﬁ rmed the previous leadership, and this program became the basis of the 
coalition agreement between the two largest parties in the new local assembly and also 
served as the work plan of the local government for the next period.
UDC94, however, was almost entirely neglected for two reasons. First, the program of 
the new local government was understandably focused on administrative and management 
reform, which was further reinforced by the ﬁ scal squeeze. Second, the urban development 
concept presented the vision of an idealized future state of the city, but not ideas as to 
how to achieve this vision. Th e wishes for an end-state concept implied huge development 
interventions, but failed to set clear priorities. Th is method was still a supply-side approach, 
useless in a system where the local government policy had to optimize locally available 
resources.
Modern Strategic Planning on Track
In 1996, after a short ﬁ nancial crisis caused by huge delays in receiving transfers from the 
central government, a new ﬁ nancial strategy was approved. Th is strategy started with a 
drastic reorganization of the municipality’s ﬁ nancial management and a thorough reform 
of service delivery. As a consequence, the budget began to improve in parallel with the 
increasing predictability and creditworthiness of local ﬁ nances, a change that made possible 
the operation of public services and the ﬁ nancing of public investments on a sustainable 
basis. Th ese provided good ground for sound strategic-planning practice.
Urban Development Concept, 1998
Th e elaboration of a new urban development concept started in 1997. By that time Budapest 
had experience with ongoing city development under market conditions. Th e eﬀ ects of the 
reorganization of traﬃ  c patterns, privatization of housing and infrastructure services, the 
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strengthening real estate market, and the eﬀ ectiveness of interventions could be analyzed. 
As a result, the identiﬁ cation of problems and possible solutions became more focused.
A new urban development concept was developed in 1997–98 (UDC98). Th e 
expert team analyzed the diﬀ erent urban areas based on their prevailing problems and 
developmental stages, and distinguished four strategic zones: (a) the inner city, (b) the 
transition zone, (c) the northern twin cities, and (d) the southern logistic zone (see ﬁ gure 
20.3). UDC98 listed the most important local government actions for upgrading each zone. 
At the same time, a ﬁ nancial prognosis was prepared. Th e ﬁ rst comparison of the rough cost 
estimate of the necessary actions and projected ﬁ nancial resources clearly showed that more 
focus and priorities needed to be established under UDC98. As a consequence, the concept 
could be viewed only as a ﬁ rst iterative phase of strategic planning. Still, when the concept 
was published, professional and public review did not criticize the lack of focus. On the 
contrary, its generality and all-embracing nature was highly appreciated and ultimately led 
to widespread public acceptance.
Figure 20.3 Strategic Zones in 1998
Source: Budapest Municipality.
From Concept to Strategic Plan, 1999–2000
Th e second phase of the new urban development concept started in 1999 (UDC99) and 
focused on the delineation of a viable strategy in line with needs and capabilities. Th e new 
strategy aimed at developing a competitive and sustainable urban structure involving: (a) 
construction of a fourth ring road and two Danube bridges to merge most of the transitional 
zone into the inner city and use huge land reserves, (b) continuation of the rehabilitation of 
public spaces and buildings, and (c) improvement of the outer areas.
Th e concept identiﬁ ed the low-density transitional zone, especially its southeastern 
part, as the biggest obstacle in the development of an eﬃ  cient urban structure for Budapest. 
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Th e key argument was that this economically depressed area, which is badly decaying and 
underused, increases the length of routes and travel needs and separates the inner and outer 
parts of the city. Hence, the construction of one more outer ring road, the Körvasúti Körút, 
with two new bridges in the north and south became a key long-term public investment 
project.
In addition, this concept aimed at upgrading the transitional zone into a “Park City” 
ring area (ﬁ gure 20.4). Planners assumed that completion of the fourth ring road would 
result in better access to a huge territorial reserve and, they hoped, would attract sizable 
investments. Th e development strategy envisages the creation of new centers, public spaces, 
and intermodal nodes in the zone, as well as a few major ﬂ agship projects. Underlying the 
concept is the idea that this concentrated development in the transitional zone beyond 
the exploitation of local land reserves, can take over some functions from the inner city, 
facilitating improvement of the quality of both the inner city and the outer districts.
A development strategy that focuses on the transitional zone as a long-term objective 
considers the development process to be a huge public–private partnership undertaking. 
Th e public sphere must take a leading role in upgrading the area by construction of the 
ring road and some centers as focal points and give access to a huge territorial reserve 
in a strategically good position. Th e dark areas on the map show the territories that can 
be redeveloped for housing, green, and mixed functions (see ﬁ gure 20.4). Most of this 
land reserve is in private hands, so the infrastructure plan is targeted to encourage private 
investment in the process. If the infrastructure improvements and regulation bring the zone 
into the position of a good investment target, the redevelopment of these areas can clearly 
be accomplished by the market or in public–private partnerships.
Figure 20.4 Strategies in 1999–2000
Source: Budapest Municipality.
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Besides the new Park City project, continuity in earlier strategies for upgrading and 
rehabilitating the inner city remained a key part of the long-term urban development. 
Rehabilitation and the consequent improvement of the quality of life in the inner city 
is the primary precondition for Budapest to obtain and strengthen the role it hopes to 
fulﬁ ll as a regional business, ﬁ nancial, communication, and cultural center in central 
Europe. Likewise, a refurbished inner city could keep or attract the middle- and upper-
class population to live in this zone. Targeting the physical, functional, and environmental 
improvement of the inner city is based on three elements:
 Constructing a new metro line (in my view, this construction is the optimal vehicle to 
facilitate the increase of urban density without increasing  noise and pollution)
 Undertaking comprehensive street and public transportation rehabilitation and an 
integrated traﬃ  c system to ﬁ lter the in-city traﬃ  c through the development of 
adequate parking places in tandem with proper parking fee policies within and outside 
of the inner city
 Launching a further development and rehabilitation process by focusing local govern-
ment interventions on public spaces.
On the outskirts of Budapest, the goals are to:
 Establish new infrastructure connections
 Initiate large-scale public–private partnership actions for developing several mixed 
residential-business sections in this zone
 Revitalize or establish new local urban centers.
 
Local centers are the key developmental factors, not only to improve the local supply 
of public services and quality of life but also to decrease travel needs to the inner city of 
Budapest and simultaneously ease the inner city traﬃ  c by creating so-called “local inner 
cities.”
Budapest’s Strategic Plan for the New Millennium
At the end of 2000 Budapest did not have an urban development strategic plan, although 
the city came very close to it. Th e urban development strategy elaborated in 1999–2000 
focuses on the transitional zone of the capital for long-term development to ensure that 
reserve land can be exploited. Th is eﬀ ort is a mega-project that aims to be the engine of 
the whole urban development process. Th is urban development concept considered to 
be a draft development plan was adopted in 2001. After the oﬃ  cial acceptance of the 
concept, the challenge for the local government will be to adjust policy tools, resources, and 
management instruments to facilitate the targeted processes. To achieve this goal, it will 
be critically important to amend pricing policies, introduce value-based property taxation, 
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and reconsider regulations and incentives. Th e draft plan comprises three groups of strategic 
development targets and actions (see table 20.5). 
A complete and full-ﬂ edged strategic urban planning process is not yet achieved. 
Th is learning-by-doing strategic planning process is gradually proceeding, however, and 
comprises more and more complex and outreaching ideas, absorbs new elements based on 
previous results, and is adjusted to changing conditions. Th e draft strategic development 
plan gives the hope that in the coming years the necessary implementation tools will also 
be elaborated and the strategic plan will be completed in a timely manner. 
Table 20.5 Budapest Urban Development Strategy for the New Millennium
Goals Targets and actions
Access to territorial 
reserves
Körvasúti Körút: construct the fourth ring road, including two Danube bridges 
Access isolated territories
Develop intermodal hubs
Extend development zones along the Danube 
Relieve inner areas
Inner city development Filter traﬃ  c, develop parking, and set regulations
Rehabilitate buildings and public spaces
Construct of a new metro line
Improvement of 
outer areas
Construct an external ring road to complete the M0 beltway
Develop transversal connections from the Buda hills
Develop public–private partnership programs in the southern outer districts of Pest
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Lessons Learned
Looking through Budapest’s urban development concepts of the 1990s, one can clearly 
see that the policies and development concepts aimed at creating new strategies and 
contained key strategic elements. Th e urban policy elaborated in UPC91 was a necessary 
and courageous ﬁ rst attempt to stabilize the city.
Th e 1994 management reform concept sought to organize and harmonize system-
atically the ﬁ nancial and management aspects of sectoral policies. Th e 1994 urban 
development concept, however, could only give a vision of how the city would look in the 
future. An ideal end-state was sketched, but no policy goals or programs were articulated, so 
these concepts cannot be considered to be a strategy by any standards of policymaking.
Th e ﬁ rst real development strategy was the ﬁ nancial and management reform that 
could be fully elaborated and implemented only under the pressure of an approaching 
crisis in 1996. Th is historic momentum made reaching a consensus in bearing the political 
costs of serious restrictive measures politically possible. Th is new ﬁ nancial strategy and its 
implementation resulted in a comprehensive reform of the internal functioning of the local 
government by the end of the 1990s.
C H A P T E R  2 0    E M E R G E N C E  O F  S T R AT E G I C  P L A N N I N G
417
Th e 1998 urban development concept UDC98 was conceptually diﬀ erent from 
its predecessors. It focused on the sections of the city that had the most development 
problems, listed possible programs, and speciﬁ ed needed development interventions in 
the four strategic zones. Th is concept was still full of problem statements and supply-side 
actions, and these naturally reactive policies did not cover key issues of ﬁ nancing and 
decision-making capabilities of the city government.
It happened only in 1999 that the previous approach of “what should be done in the 
diﬀ erent areas?” shifted toward the more strategic question of “how can the development 
and investment process be best inﬂ uenced or strategically guided with the limited resources 
available?” Clearly under the conditions of market economy, the primary goal should be to 
inﬂ uence demand patterns, which could be achieved only by coordinated active strategic 
policies.
Th e crucial and symbolic point in this process was the shift of focus to the transitional 
belt. Discussions on the relative importance of each strategic action pushed the objective of 
construction of a new ring road to the top of the priority list. Th e conceptual change was 
that the evaluation was no longer the mere supply-side argument (for example, need for 
new traﬃ  c connections). Th e importance of the project in the new reasoning was twofold. 
On the one hand, the plan upgraded the low-density area in the transitional zone by giving 
access to badly underused areas and attracting investment. On the other hand, the plan had 
an objective to improve development possibilities of the whole city through the indirect 
eﬀ ect of a more eﬃ  cient urban density structure. Th is approach qualiﬁ es as demand-side 
management, because the role of the local government was to modify urban demand 
patterns by bringing areas of the city into the position of an investment target.
Th e 1998 technique weighed and prioritized possible interventions by the importance 
and urgency of the problem to be solved. In 1999–2000 a strategy was used in which 
interventions were prioritized by the strength and range of their eﬀ ect. Th e ﬁ rst approach 
remains in the domain of passive, supply-side thinking, lists “the reactions to problems,” 
and “achieves as much as possible.” Th e second approach is a more active, demand-side one, 
in which eﬀ ectiveness is targeted by interventions at optimal points to reorganize demand 
patterns and initiate a further development process. Th e fact that importance was given to 
the Park City program symbolizes the shift from concept to strategy.
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To understand the operation and impact of land use regulations, realizing the context in 
which they are implemented is critical. For example, in one country, discretion in land 
regulation may be primarily a tool for screening out inadequate development proposals, 
whereas in another, the overriding policy may be to approve all projects regardless of rules. 
Realizing that land use regulation may stimulate as well as deter development is also 
essential. Without the order that land use regulations and subdivision requirements may 
bring, development may take undesirable forms that discourage other development in 
adjacent and neighboring areas. Absence of regulation or great ﬂ uidity in regulations may 
subject development proposals to unacceptable risks concerning potential neighboring 
uses.
Factors that may be used to evaluate the eﬀ ectiveness of land use regulations in 
promoting development include: (a) the existence of an overall planning scheme designed 
to foster beneﬁ cial development; (b) the likelihood that permits may be obtained for 
reasonable plans; (c) the time required to obtain permits; (d) the cost of obtaining permits, 
including impact and subdivision fees and dedication requirements; (e) protection from 
physical and regulatory takings; and (f ) an adequate and secure process for transfers of 
property ownership.
Th e purpose of this chapter is to describe Hungarian land use regulations and to 
comment on their impact on development. In addition, the chapter contains a limited 
discussion about land management and sales by municipalities, and the impacts of land 
registration (titling procedures) on development. Th e enforcement of regulations is 
hampered by the lack of an overall development strategy and coherent planning schemes. 
So far, urban planning has been largely a technical process, without due consideration 
of its economic side, as a result of which current land use practices have unduly favored 
developers.
* Th is chapter is based on Baar and Locsmándi 1999. 
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Land Use Regulation before Transition
Th e forms of land use regulation that developed during the pre-socialist and socialist eras 
are central to the current schemes of regulation. From the end of the 19th century, land use 
was regulated by detailed oﬃ  cial street and zoning maps. In addition, land subdivisions 
were regulated. Th e creation of a “City Beautiful” was an objective of the early measures.
Expropriation of land for public purposes (eminent domain powers) has been 
authorized since 1881, provided that full compensation is paid, but compensation costs 
were seen as high because public authorities had to pay fully for a portion of a parcel taken, 
even if the resulting public improvements would increase the value of the parcel’s remaining 
portion still privately owned.
Th e 1937 Act on Land Regulation
A major change on land regulation was adopted in 1937, when the government authorized 
the expropriation of up to one-third of a parcel for roads without compensation. Th e 
underlying rationale was that increases in value associated with the improvements on the 
land that was taken would oﬀ set losses in value resulting from partial expropriation.
Also, the regrouping of land was authorized. Th is step was important because much of 
the land was divided into narrow strips that were unsuitable for residential development. 
When regrouping occurred, aﬀ ected landowners were obliged to compensate each other 
according to the gains and losses in their land values.
In the 1937 act, the government adopted a two-tier framework for urban planning 
consisting of: (a) a comprehensive “general” plan (ART) drafted by municipalities, 
but which required the approval of the Ministries of Interior and Industry, and (b) 
“detailed” plans (RRT), which were also adopted by municipalities, but were not under 
ministerial control. Th e detailed plans were publicly created subdivision plans. Based on 
the German practice, urban land was divided into building and nonbuilding sections. 
Subdivision into plots of less than 2,900 square meters was prohibited in the nonbuilding 
sections of cities.
Land Regulation in the Socialist Era
Although the legal framework of land use regulation remained nearly the same during the 
socialist era, the realities of planning were radically altered. Th e state became the major 
developer. Although adoption of plans was the responsibility of municipal councils, the 
drafting of plans was strongly controlled by the Ministry of Planning and Construction, 
and ﬁ nancing of local developments came from central sources in accord with national 
priorities and the objectives of the various ministries (primarily industrial development and 
construction of multifamily housing).
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Most of the planning and building law was governed by national statutes, including 
the 1964 National Planning and Building Act and the National Building Code. Th e code 
set forth zoning classiﬁ cations that could be adopted only with the national rules for those 
classiﬁ cations as to density, height, setback, and so forth. For example, a medium-density 
residential zone could be deﬁ ned in only a single way. Th e list of possible classiﬁ cations, 
however, provided a great deal of variety.
Th e building code contained virtually no rules governing the details of uses within 
nonresidential zones (for example, density, lot coverage, height, or setbacks). Th is approach 
was consistent with the fact that until 1989, nonresidential construction was almost solely 
a state activity, which the state had no interest in regulating. Moreover, central areas of cities, 
where the housing stock had been nationalized, were not subject to detailed regulations.
Th e national law included guidelines governing the percentages of land that had to be 
devoted to particular uses. Th e National Planning Board formulated speciﬁ c requirements 
for residential buildings covering parking, open spaces, spaces for shops and other services, 
preschools, and so forth. Another set of national standards formulated by the Ministry of 
Urban Planning and Building contained guidelines to be followed by local planners, which 
were stricter than the National Planning Board requirements.
Development took place typically on urban fringes or in central areas that had low-rise 
development. In the case of urban fringe development, authorities could avoid costly re-
housing requirements that would have been necessary for central city demolition and redeve-
lopment. Although local councils had the legal authority to adopt or reject zoning plans, 
sometimes their discretion was limited by party pressure. At times, localities were forced to 
accept plans that were unpopular. In the 1980s the planning process became more sensitive 
to public opinion, and the party played less of a role, while public debate over development 
issues increased (sometimes including televised statements by project opponents).
Although most development was directed and ﬁ nanced by the state, by the 1970s 
private development became a major source of housing. In rural–urban fringes, growing 
demand for individual houses led to the subdivision of agricultural lands.
Because state developers focused on multifamily housing, they had very little concern 
about the regulation of single-family housing. Land subdivision requirements were reduced 
to a minimal level in single-family areas, covering only basic infrastructure, setback, and 
lot size. In areas of private development, no master plans were adopted, and subdivisions 
commonly lacked any type of amenities or open spaces. Responsibilities for infrastructure 
costs were not clearly set forth; over time increasing portions were paid by residents.
In the central city and areas of multifamily development, the detailed plan concept 
(RRT) played a key role. Detailed plans diﬀ ered from zoning plans of the type adopted in 
the United States and Britain. Th ey were virtually architectural (building envelope) plans 
in the sense that they set forth the physical outline of allowable structures, including their 
size, location on a plot, and height. Th e RRT approach posed many problems. Detailed 
RRTs for some areas were not coordinated with overall zoning plans. Often RRTs that 
were developed in response to particular development proposals remained in place even if 
the proposal was not implemented. Sometimes RRTs that required substantial alterations 
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of existing patterns strangled intermediate development, pending the institution of broader 
redevelopment. In other cases, the RRTs were not taken seriously by state developers 
because they could easily be modiﬁ ed in response to changes in their proposals.
During this era the state paid no compensation for bans on construction even if they 
were permanent, and the concept of “regulatory” taking did not exist. One aspect of public 
power, however, was seriously limited by the repeal of the public power to reallocate plots 
without the unanimous consent of the eﬀ ected landholders. Th is change aﬀ ected matters 
such as street development.
Although the expropriation laws remained substantially unchanged, signiﬁ cant 
modiﬁ cations took place in expropriation practices. In the early socialist era compensation 
was nominal. Later in this era citizens who could aﬀ ord legal representation obtained 
substantial compensation. Th roughout this period the right of the state to take property in 
a particular case could not be contested, and lower court decisions overruling administrative 
bodies regarding the amount of compensation could not be appealed. By contrast, the 
state avoided undertaking projects that would incur the opposition of wealthier groups, 
especially in single-family areas.
Land Use Policy after 1990
In the late 1980s, especially after the transition, analysts understood that the system of 
planning regulation had to be modiﬁ ed. Work on a new act was started in 1990. Th e main 
problem was that the preexisting RRTs were still in eﬀ ect, although their concept of a 
detailed physical plan for each plot within a speciﬁ ed area no longer made sense within 
a framework of privately generated development. Th e result was that most development 
proposals required oﬃ  cial modiﬁ cations of the RRT for the project area, as well as approval 
of the actual project.
In the event a proposed project did not conform with the applicable zoning provisions 
of the ART, an RRT had to be created and then amended to conform with the new RRT. 
From the goal-oriented perspective of a city, the RRT and ART stood on an equal plane.
RRT: Serving or Guiding Individual Plans?
In formulating proposals for a market-oriented planning system, planners debated whether 
planning regulations should continue to require: (a) the traditional type of RRT plans, (b) 
broad zoning classiﬁ cations leaving substantial discretion to developers as long as they 
complied with the regulations, or (c) a permit review, as well as zoning classiﬁ cations, so 
that the details of a proposed development could be reviewed. Consistent with the overall 
thrust toward decentralization, planners debated how much planning control should be 
delegated to local authorities.
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Pursuant to the 1997 Act on the Formation and Protection of the Built Environment, 
cities must be divided into building areas, where over 10 percent lot coverage is permitted, 
and nonbuilding areas, where lot coverage is limited to 5 percent. Under the act, all areas of 
a city must be covered by a general plan (structural plan) and a zoning ordinance.
Detailed plans (regulatory plans), which are comparable to the old RRTs, must 
cover areas subject to urban renewal or extension of the built-up area. Changes from the 
previous systems are that some development rights must be permitted in all areas, and that 
regulatory plans must take into account overall zoning.
In practice, cities, which suﬀ ered from serious cash shortages and were anxious to get 
development, worked out ad hoc responses within the existing legal framework. Generally, 
they adopted whatever changes in the general plan and RRT were necessary to legalize 
approval of proposed developments, with little or no consideration of the relationship 
between a particular proposal and an overall planning scheme.
Typically, localities contracted with or employed planners speciﬁ cally to draft plan 
amendments so that developers’ needs could be met without the resistance of a chief 
architect interested in preserving preexisting concepts or following the directions of 
political authorities.
Commonly, the developer has been required to pay for plan modiﬁ cation in response 
to a proposal. Some cities made a concentrated eﬀ ort to review their RRTs and repeal 
those that did not make sense. Other cities adopted a uniﬁ ed city zoning ordinance and 
coordinated scheme of RRTs. Many cities consolidated reviews of a number of land use 
plan modiﬁ cations to speed up such processes.
Negotiations with developers to obtain planning advantage became very common, 
especially when public lands were sold. Under the direction of planning commissions 
and city councils, dedication conditions have become common. Some jurisdictions have 
introduced variance procedures, even though the Ministry of Agriculture, which now has 
jurisdiction over planning matters, believes that such variance procedures violate the Act on 
the Formation and Protection of the Built Environment.
In the view of the ministry the standard local practice of planning amendment through 
negotiation in response to individual applications was undermining the concepts of urban 
planning. In its view cities were modifying their land use regulations to approve permit 
applications regardless of whether they ﬁ t within an overall land use concept. When 
applications did not ﬁ t within the existing plan, the plan, rather than the proposal, was 
judged to be at fault.
One of the objectives of the authors of the national legislation was to make amending 
zoning plans pursuant to developer requests more diﬃ  cult. Th e number of required special 
purpose reviews for regulatory plans and approvals for permit applications was increased 
to 27. Local planners responded, however, by requesting letters of interest from eﬀ ected 
agencies at the outset of a proposal. Typically, many do not respond, and the process is not 
much more burdensome than before. Key informants commented that local plans suﬀ er 
from the lack of an overall development strategy.
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Takings and Compensation Standards
Under national legislation adopted in 1990, oﬃ  cially recorded and notiﬁ ed bans on 
construction were limited to three years (Decision of the Constitutional Court 1991). After 
that, yearly compensation equal to 5 percent of the value of the property was required. Th e 
concept of using bans was limited to situations involving hazards or instances where a ban 
was required to implement a plan.
Bans that were not recorded and oﬃ  cially notiﬁ ed were not subject to compensation 
requirements. Out of fear that limitations on development rights would trigger compens-
ation requirements, many cities reduced the areas covered by such limitations. Th is period 
was also marked by the commencement of discussions of even more substantial expansion 
of regulatory taking concepts. Moreover, citizens obtained the right to challenge taking 
actions as well as the amounts of compensation.
Regional Planning Considerations
In 1995 the government mandated that regional economic and infrastructure planning 
issues must be considered in local plans. Th e scope of this regional control has not yet been 
deﬁ ned, although clearly, it governs infrastructure, road networks, and natural conservation 
areas.
From a ﬁ scal point of view, control over national development subsidies has been 
shifting from the national government to county and regional development agencies, and 
the special agencies for the Budapest metropolitan area and the Lake Balaton region (see 
chapters 4 and 7). Whether these councils will consider physical as well as economic plan 
issues is not known.
The Current Organization of Planning Control 
and Building Permits
Th e basic structure of the planning and permit system has not changed substantially from 
the pretransition system. Th e components of the planning framework are: (a) the structural 
plan (preparatory land use plan), (b) local planning and building regulations (zoning and 
building code), and (c) the regulatory plan.
Th e local planning and building regulations must cover the whole city with zoning 
districts. Th e regulatory plan (continuation of the RRT concept) is not required for the 
whole city and can be limited to single blocks. What interactions will occur between the 
new zoning plans and the old RRTs is uncertain, as is how development will be aﬀ ected by 
the new requirement for adoption of citywide zoning plans. Th e administrative bodies of 
the planning process are: (a) the local council and its committees, (b) the building authority, 
and (c) public agencies (national, regional, and local).
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Th e local council has control over the structural plan, regulatory plan (former ART 
and RRT), and the local building code. Th e building authority has control over individual 
permit applications. Other public agencies are involved in the planning and permit 
processes. Th e local council and its committees have a great deal of discretion, but the role 
of building authorities is largely administrative.
Th e local authorities must submit their structural and regulatory plans for review and 
comment by the Ministry of Agriculture, which operates in planning matters through 
its agents, the Regional Chief Architects and their consultative boards or juries, and 27 
public agencies (see box 21.1). Th e local authorities do not have to abide by the agencies’ 
comments concerning plans and regulations; however, they must provide a justiﬁ cation for 
not complying. If a city does not adopt the recommendations of the public agencies, those 
authorities can still block approval of an individual project, which must comply with all of 
its prerequisites.
Box 21.1 Agencies Th at Review Permit Applications
 Aviation Directorate 
  Chief Inspectorate of Technical Security 
  Chief Inspectorate of Traﬃ  c 
  Civil Defense Headquarters 
  County Agriculture Oﬃ  ce (agrarian land consolidation) 
  County Labor Center 
  County Land Oﬃ  ces and Inspectorates of Environmental Protection (protection of agrarian land) 
  County Oﬃ  ce of Plant and Soil Protection 
  County Regional Development Councils 
  Defense Ministry 
  Department of Frontier Guards 
  Directorate of Nature Conservation and National Parks 
  Fire Department 
  Hungarian Geological Service 
  Hungarian Oﬃ  ce of Mining 
  Inspectorate of Environmental Protection 
  Inspectorate of Forests 
  Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Regional Development and Building Oﬃ  ce or 
Regional Chief Architect 
  Ministry of Interior 
  Museum Authorities 
  National Chief Directorate of Water Management 
  National Oﬃ  ce of Nuclear Energy
  National Oﬃ  ce of Protection of Monuments 
  National Police 
  National Public Health Agency 
  Telecommunications Inspector 
  Th e Air Force
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If an applicant’s building plan conforms to the regulatory plan and local regulations, 
the applicant will apply directly to the building authority; however, an application will 
be made to the council if a modiﬁ cation of the regulatory plan is required. Th e building 
authority determines whether a development application conforms to the regulatory plan 
and local and national building codes. A modiﬁ cation of the regulatory plan usually is 
required because the old ARTs and RRTs are still in force and, typically, are inappropriate 
for the new applications (furthermore, their adoption did not involve the required review 
by the special purpose authorities).
In addition, individual permit applications must be reviewed by the 27 public 
agencies that govern matters such as utility services, historical preservation, parks, mining, 
defense, health services, and so forth. In the past, applicants could address each of the 
authorities directly and obtain their consent. Currently each of these authorities must be 
contacted by the building authority; however, the review by many agencies (for example, 
those representing the military, police, civil defense, nuclear, aviation, museum, mining, 
monuments, and telecommunications) is only perfunctory because the application does not 
raise signiﬁ cant issues within the scope of their jurisdictions. In addition to the agencies, 
neighboring land owners must be notiﬁ ed (see table 21.1).
Table 21.1 Steps in the Formulation of a New or Modiﬁ ed Regulatory Plan
for a Designated Area
Actions/events Time to accomplish
1. Preliminary discussions and negotiations with the developer 0.5 to 1.5 months
2. Preparation and provision of notice to eﬀ ected parties (city, building authorities, 
special purpose authorities) which must indicate if they are interested in the 
plan. Replies must be provided within two weeks.
1 month
3. Selection and contracting with consultant planner and determination 
of how cost will be allocated (unless an in-house planner is used)
1 to 1.5 months
4. Preparation of consultant’s report or an in-house planner’s report. 
Length of preparation depends on complexity, whether in-house planner used, 
and whether council planning committee objects to draft plan.
(City support may speed up the process.)
3 to 9 months
5. Oﬃ  cial review of the plan by the interested authorities 
(time limit is mandatory)
1.5 months
6. Resolution of disagreements among interested authorities 
(if needed) (time limit is mandatory)
1 month
7. Publication of plan (time limit is mandatory) 1 month
8. Presentation of plan to chief architects or county or ministerial jury 
(for major project)
1 month
9. Review and adoption or rejection 1 month
Rejection is rare at the ﬁ nal stage.
Total 12 to 15 months
Additional time for building permit (agencies have 30 days respond) 60-day ceiling
Source: Locsmándi 1999.
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Denial of a building permit application may be appealed to the County Administrative 
Oﬃ  ce, but its scope of review is limited to consideration of legal errors. Appeals of decisions 
by the oﬃ  ce are subject to review by the Constitutional Court.
Based on our experiences in consulting with localities on development issues and the 
opinions of key interviewees, we believe that planning regulations do not act as a signiﬁ cant 
deterrent to development.
Land Registration and the Development Process
Hungary has been upgrading its land registration process during the past few decades. From 
1973 through 1981 a new real estate registration (cadastre) was ﬁ nished. Property sheets for 
each parcel contain physical information, owner-related data, and data on property rights 
(mortgages, servitudes, and so forth.).
Th e land registration and titling system for all of Hungary is administered by the 
Department of Lands and Mapping in the Ministry of Agriculture. Th e department 
oversees 19 county land oﬃ  ces and 116 district land oﬃ  ces that together have a staﬀ  of 
about 4,300 persons. 
Since the transition, land registration and titling requirements have been substantial 
as result of the privatization of apartments, distribution of properties pursuant to 
compensation, and distribution of cooperatively owned land. With major assistance from 
the European Union, the land registration process is being computerized.
Th e reports we received indicated that the lag between a transfer of ownership and the 
time when the title is registered is generally 18 months to two years. Local oﬃ  ces may give 
priority to transfers involving real estate mortgages. Presently, notations of the existence 
of new transactions are made on existing land records, so that all related transactions can 
be traced. Prospective purchasers, with the aid of attorneys, rely on their own title searches 
to ensure the adequacy of title. Title insurance is not available. Interviewees indicated that 
the land transfer process was not being delayed by the length of time required to register 
a new title.
Public Ownership of Urban Land
In 1990 a substantial portion of state-owned property, which included commercial 
property, vacant land, and residential land, was turned over to municipalities. Th e bulk 
of the property consisted of residential ﬂ ats. In 1992 the government adopted legislation 
requiring that localities develop an inventory of all public assets, including land, by 1994.
From the outset, municipalities, most of which have been in a desperate ﬁ nancial 
condition, have developed strategies to obtain revenues from their properties. Th ese 
strategies have included various combinations of sales and rentals. Social considerations 
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
428
have governed the strategies for residential rental properties, so rents and sale prices to 
residents have been maintained at nominal levels. Typically, cities have found that resi-
dential sales even at nominal prices are beneﬁ cial because they relieve them of maintenance 
costs, which exceed the rental income generated by the properties. Municipal strategies 
in regard to nonresidential properties have varied greatly in sophistication. In some cases, 
desperate conditions have led cities to sell or rent on unfavorable terms (see chapter 19). 
No data are available on the quantity of municipally owned land before 1994. Data 
compiled pursuant to the inventory legislation provide information on the number of 
publicly owned parcels of diﬀ erent types and the proportion of parcels that are non-
marketable or semi-marketable (for example, streets, parks, water reservoirs, public utilities, 
public buildings, park areas, historic buildings) (see table 21.2).
Th e 3,200 municipalities owned approximately 818,000 pieces of real estate (parcels) 
as of 1997, of which 271,000 were residential ﬂ ats, and 41 percent were “unmarketable” or 
“semi-marketable.” Th e data did not indicate the values of the parcels, however. Th erefore, 
the signiﬁ cance of the publicly owned land cannot be evaluated, but we should note that 
the amount of publicly owned land increased between 1994 and 1997 (CSO 1998). 
Th is increase is a result of various factors, such as the progress of the gradual takeover 
of municipal properties in accordance with the Property Act, improvement in property 
registers both regionally and locally, and the gradual review and cross-checking of 
municipal asset inventories and property registers (see chapters 17 and 19). Th e number of 
state-owned ﬂ ats declined from 365,315 in 1994 to 270,898 in 1997 (see table 21.2). 
A recent analysis of publicly owned land (Péteri 1998) noted that in 1991 local 
governments were direct owners of material assets, the majority of which were real estate. 
By 1995 one-third of municipal ownership had been converted into shareholdings because 
of the privatization of state companies and transfers of municipal assets into indirect 
ownership in the form of municipally owned share companies.
Of the marketable properties that can be used for development, one-third of the total 
estimated value is owned by Budapest and one-fourth by the smaller cities (table 21.3). 
Cities with county status (which contain 20 percent of the population) own only about 8 
percent of the marketable properties.
In these county cities, the average share of marketable property in the estimated total 
value of their property assets is only 14 percent. Th ese cities have been more active in 
disposing of their properties (see table 21.4).
We requested speciﬁ c information on developable land ownership, purchases, and 
sales from six municipalities. Data from the four cities that responded indicated that three 
of them owned less than 1 percent of the developable land and the other city owned 3 
percent.
According to key information, the general strategy of cities is to sell their developable 
land, and the cities consider whether alternate uses of their land capital would be more 
productive. Four of the cities provided information on land values. Th e increases, in absolute 
terms, were less than the oﬀ setting inﬂ ation, which was approximately 80 percent.
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Table 21.2 Real Estate Properties of Hungarian Local Governments, Selected Years
Properties 1994 1997 Change 
1994–1997
Number of units total 734,800 818,465 11.4%
Number of units not assessed (zero value) 603,476 632,929 4.9%
Share of marketable properties (percent) 45.5 47.4 —
Number of buildings 1994 1997 Change 
1994–1997
Dwellings 365,315 270,898 –25.8%
Rooms in buildings of other uses, for example, shops 69,137 72,681 5.1%
Industrial premises 12,176 12,663 4.0%
Retail, service, administrative 9,494 10,758 13.3%
Social services, public health 7,495 8,030 7.1%
Education 12,837 13,964 8.8%
Number of other  properties 1995 1997 Change 
1995–1997
Cultural, sport units 5,582 5,743 2.9%
Swimming pool, bath 310 308 –0.6%
Cemetery 6,389 6,537 2.3%
Publicly owned land (hectares) 1995 1997 Change 
1995–1997
Unbuilt land 175,481 190,860 8.8%
Open spaces (parks) 15,787 20,199 27.9%
Characteristics of properties 1995 1997 Change 
1995–1997
Total number of real estate properties 806,210 818,465 1.5%
 Non-marketable (percent) 40.5 41.2 —
 Limited marketable (percent) 11.5 11.4 —
 Marketable (percent) 48.0 47.4 —
Number of assessed (gross value indicated) 140,754 133,636 –5.1%
 Non-marketable (percent) 20.9 23.4 —
 Limited marketable (percent) 24.2 25.5 —
 Marketable (percent) 54.8 51.5 —
Number of not assessed (zero value) 626,978 632,929  0.9%
 Non-marketable (percent) 45.8 48.0 —
 Limited marketable (percent) 8.8 8.5 —
 Marketable (percent) 44.5 43.5 —
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce 1997 data.
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0 Table 21.3 Publicly Owned Real Estate by Type of Jurisdiction, 1997 (percentages)
Population in jurisdiction Share of 
total population
Assets as a percentage 
of country total
Marketable as a percentage 
of country
Unbuilt land as a 
percentage of country
Marketable land as a percentage 
of municipality total
Under 499 3.1 2.6 1.8 2.3 17.3 
500–999 5.9 6.7 17.4 17.1 66.1 
1,000–1,999 11.3 15.8 2.1 4.8 3.5 
2,000–4,999 18.2 21.7 4.5 25.0 5.5 
5,000–9,999 11.3 4.7 12.0 11.0 66.5 
10,000–19,999 12.5 7.4 8.0 7.5 28.2 
20,000–49,999 13.4 7.7 8.1 7.2 27.3 
50,000–199,999 4.0 16.4 9.1 5.5 14.6 
More than 200,000 2.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 43.4 
Budapest, countya 18.2 29.9 36.6 19.5 57.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 26.1 
Budapest 18.2 13.4 34.2 19.3 66.9 
Counties — 3.3 2.4 0.1 19.4 
Cities with county rank 20.2 15.8 8.4 4.8 13.9 
Other cities 24.2 17.5 24.7 19.9 37.0 
Villages 37.3 50.0 30.2 55.8 15.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  26.1 
Note:  a. Population data of Budapest, the rest of the line Budapest and Pest county data.
Source: Péteri 1998.
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Table 21.4 Publicly Owned Developable Land and Amount Sold for Development 
in Five Cities, 1992 and 1997
City Adminsitrative
area
1992
(hectares)
Oﬃ  cial 
built-up area
1992
(hectares)
Public land 
in 1992
(hectares)
Public land 
sold
1992–1997
(hectares)
Land bought
by the city
1992–1997
(hectares)
Land remained
public
1992–1997
(percentage 
of 1992)
Eger 10,473 1,473 170 16 1 —
Kecskemét 32,136 3,200 155b 31 4 81
Püspökladány 18,695 928 8.5 7.8 0  8
Szentes 32,323 1,684 32 18c 18 c 100 c
Szombathely 9,752 2,932 345a n.a. n.a. n.a
Notes: a. In 1997 no data are available for land sold, or information about many private transactions.
  b. Rough data because development land is not registered separately.
  c. Between 1992 and 1996.
Source: Locsmándi 1999.
Conclusion
Current land use practices are highly favorable to developers. Th e following are our key 
observations and conclusions:
 When cities desire a project, they are committed to amending the applicable land use 
regulations so that the project can be approved.
 Th e actual permit process does not involve substantial costs.
 Th e time needed to obtain a permit is not excessive by modern standards.
 Although a large number of agency approvals is required (27), in practice the process 
has not led to major costs or delays.
 
Moreover, the common lack of a comprehensive, coherent planning scheme could 
hamper overall development in the long run. In reaction to these concerns, national 
support is growing to make modifying plans in response to individual applications more 
diﬃ  cult and to introduce tighter subdivision controls on the urban fringes. Cities without 
overall development plans may be less economical to operate, less attractive to long-run 
development, and less attractive to live in. Up to this time, urban planning has been largely 
a technical process, without due consideration of economic matters. 
Th e national government is taking substantial steps to provide security from regulatory 
expropriation. Compensation is now required for unlimited moratoriums. In fact, the 
requirement that compensation be paid for any reduction in value caused by changes in 
the law goes far beyond the requirements of any industrialized country and, if seriously 
enforced, could have a negative eﬀ ect on planning.
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As indicated, the weaknesses in the land registration process have not had a signiﬁ cant 
impact on land transfers.
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
Autonomy in ﬁ nancial management is a critical condition of an eﬃ  cient decentralized 
local government system. Hungary’s intergovernmental ﬁ nance system initially provided ex 
ante transfers for all kinds of organizations, for example, units of ministries, municipalities, 
and local budgetary organizations. Dozens of municipal budgetary organizations used 
their own budget without coordination. Th ey had separate budget, ﬁ nancial management, 
procurement, and ﬁ nancial reserves. Moreover, looking for supplementary earnings, 
they invested temporary cash surpluses, yet sometimes failed to comply with their tax 
obligations. Th e Hungarian State Treasury (HST) was established in 1996 after the French 
model. It provides banking services for central budgetary institutions through a treasury 
single account, manages the internal debt of the central budget, and provides net (tax 
deducted) ﬁ nancing in central transfers.
Municipalities started to establish local treasuries in 1997, partly as a response to the 
ﬁ scal squeeze and partly in imitation of the HST. Municipal ﬁ nance managers quickly 
became aware not only of their lost interest earning potential, but also the rationality of the 
treasury system. Commercial banks were partners in establishing local treasuries, because 
of lost opportunities as a result of the HST system. Two basic municipal treasury models 
have emerged. Th e “soft model” is a consolidated cash management plan that reﬁ nances 
local budgetary organizations managed by the municipal ﬁ nance department. Th e “hard 
model” is an independent treasury organization that takes over the planning, ﬁ nancial 
management, procurement, and monitoring functions from the budgetary organizations.
Th is chapter addresses the most important issues of innovative cash management. 
First, we review the key challenges such as size of the municipality, costs and beneﬁ ts 
of introducing a local treasury, techniques to ensure autonomy of service institutions, 
incentives for joining the treasury, and relationships between treasury and ﬁ scal planning. 
Second, in two short case studies, we summarize experiences when local treasuries were 
introduced in Tokaj and Szeged, a small town and a large city.
* Th is chapter is based on Barati and Péteri 1998. 
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The Conceptual Framework of Cash Management
Modern cash management provides sound liquidity from smaller cash reserves while 
it ensures eﬃ  ciency, transparency, and legality of ﬁ nancial management in both the 
private and public sector. Th e ﬂ ows of municipal revenues and expenditures ﬂ uctuate 
over the ﬁ nancial year. Timely and coordinated collection of revenues, expenditures, or 
disbursements result in real savings and temporary cash surpluses that can be used or 
invested to generate extra earnings. Taxes, fees, and user charges should be collected in a 
timely and eﬃ  cient way. Uncollected revenues can be regarded simply as interest-free loans 
from the local government. Likewise, money expended before the legally binding deadline 
sacriﬁ ces potential interest earnings, and late payment may invoke a penalty.
Financial investments are conceptually assessed by earnings, risk, and liquidity. Local 
governments, by law, keep their reserves in bank deposits and state securities, so liquidity 
is the primary condition for ﬁ nancial investments. For liquidity purposes, cash forecasts 
should cover all the ﬁ nancial activities of various government entities under the same 
budget. Th e municipal treasury concept has been developed primarily for improving the 
overall liquidity of local budgets.
International Models of Treasury
Various treasury models try to solve the two competing goals of public ﬁ nances: (a) 
autonomy and adjustment of appropriations to spending agencies’ needs, and (b) uniﬁ ed 
information, strict planning rules, and budgetary discipline to stop overspending. Two 
major treasury models are used in developed countries: one is based on the Anglo-Saxon 
traditions; the other is a combination of the Roman and Napoleonic concepts of the state 
(description of the international models is based on ADETEF 1998 and RKK 1994). 
In the United Kingdom spending ministries enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Th ey 
are responsible for their ﬁ nancial decisions and also subject to strong parliamentary control, 
but other organizations (for example, the National Audit Oﬃ  ce) provide a counterbalance 
to their autonomy. Th e Treasury is not involved in the detailed control of spending; 
however, it designates the banks at which ministries can open accounts and has the power 
to release money from the consolidated fund. Th e Treasury thus plays more of a strategic 
role and presses the spending departments to improve their eﬃ  ciency, including the cash 
management. Local governments are not integrated into this system.
In Germany parallel organizations, Kasse and Zahlstelle, operate as independent 
ﬁ nancial institutions and can respond to the needs of spending units of central and local 
governments. Th ese cashier institutions have developed their information and accounting 
functions, although they work within a strict hierarchy under the professional control of the 
Ministry of Finance. Th e system is therefore decentralized, but the eﬃ  ciency requirement is 
strong and keeps control of local units’ operations.
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Th e French Treasury is the most centralized among the diﬀ erent state administration 
management models. A Treasury Single Account at the National Bank of France comprises 
the entire ﬁ nancial stock of the public sector. Because no real money is transferred within 
the treasury, the liquidity is increased and the system is more transparent. Th e Treasury also 
performs banking functions, for example, placing money on the market, issuing securities, 
functioning as a saving bank, providing insurance, collecting deposits, and maintaining 
accounts. Th ese ﬁ nancial services create operational revenues and increase the Treasury’s 
liquidity. Th e Treasury also manages, records, and pays oﬀ  the state debt, and ensures the 
solvency of the central budget. In 1996 it had about 4,000 units all over the country and 
employed more than 56,000 employees.
Th e core of the French ﬁ nancial supervisory system is the Ministry of Finance, 
which actually combines two ministries: (a) the ministry responsible for the economy and 
ﬁ nances, and (b) the secretariat of state responsible for the central budget. Th e Ministry 
of Finance consists of several directorates; the former treasury is part of the Directorate 
of Public Accounts, which is subordinated to the minister responsible for the central 
budget. Th e accounts of each central budget institution are allocated here, and several other 
functions are concentrated at the Treasury: management of public money, auditing, control 
of compliance with laws and regulations, and eﬃ  ciency. Th e Treasury is responsible for 
ﬁ nancing all state expenditures, including salaries.
Local governments are allowed to keep their accounts exclusively at the Treasury. Th e 
36,000 local governments get services from the Treasury: keeping their accounts, advisory 
activity on ﬁ nancing options and capital investment ﬁ nancing, and solving local budgetary 
and municipal legislative problems.
Th e control and audit of ﬁ nancial activities are ensured through managers at diﬀ erent 
levels of the public administration (in ministries, at local governments, and at institutions) 
who authorize payments, up to the allowed ceiling for their appropriations. In parallel, 
a hierarchy of public accountants belongs to the treasury. In every ministry and also in 
geographic regions, a public accountant’s approval is necessary for any disbursement. 
Th is accountant also controls the ﬁ nancial-economic apparatus, gives advice during the 
preparation of the central budget, and checks whether payments are appropriated and 
funds are available; otherwise any transfer should be refused.
Th e public accountant has personal ﬁ nancial responsibility for his or her work in the 
system, so in the case of uncollected taxes, for example, the accountant must demonstrate 
that he or she has recourse to all measures to collect taxes. Unapproved payments must be 
refused, because the public accountant will be liable for illegal transactions.
Why Cash Management Became Important
In the mid-1990s Hungary’s public sector went through a signiﬁ cant transformation 
when the amount of public expenditures decreased greatly. Eﬃ  cient deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing was 
contingent upon proper debt management and eﬀ ective cash management at the national 
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level. Th e central budget, as the largest borrowing agent, is responsible for a well-designed 
borrowing program with favorable interest and maturity structure. Th is responsibility 
required a ﬂ exible and accountable administration and proper control by the Parliament 
or other elected bodies. Th ese considerations led to the establishment of the HST in 
1996. In line with debt management objectives, the cash used in the budget must be 
minimized. From the central budget’s point of view, extrabudgetary funds, central budget 
institutions, and transfers to local governments are the major spending units that created 
a fragmented system. To decrease the funds to ﬁ nance the gap between available revenues 
and appropriated expenditures, cash management should be centralized. As a result, the 
short-term ﬁ nancing plans of the central budget will be more accurate and the loans 
required to ﬁ nance the deﬁ cit will be smaller (László 1994). 
Th e HST
Th e organizational reform of the public sector included, among other things: (a) the 
separation of the central budget and the central bank functions, and (b) the separation of 
the central debt management and the cash management from the central budget functions. 
By the mid-1990s the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for the central budget, 
realized that the ex ante ﬁ nancing of fragmented public spending units caused uncontrolled 
spending, expensive ﬁ scal transactions, and vague ﬁ scal planning. Th e primary goals of the 
HST and the new cash and liquidity management framework were: (a) to control the 
cash management of spending institutions, (b) to minimize the need for borrowing by 
the national budget for liquidity purposes, and (c) to improve the planning capacity in the 
public sector (see box 22.1).
Box 22.1 Historic Roots
Historically, ﬁ nancial management in the public sector was centralized. In the 19th century, when the 
modern banking services and public sector ﬁ nances were established, an integrated system of ﬁ nancial 
management was developed. It was based on the balance between the Ministry of Finance, the Post Savings 
Bank, and the National Bank. Th e regional units of the Ministry of Finance, in charge of controlling any 
public spending, were transferred to the Post Savings Bank. Th e cash, which was available at the Post 
Savings Bank, had to be invested at the National Bank. 
Early organizational forms of consolidated local cash management were established during the mid-
1980s. Business and technical service support organizations were created at that time to rationalize the 
operation of local budgetary organizations.
Th e idea of a national treasury system emerged in the early 1990s, but the HST was not 
established until a government decree was issued on July 4, 1995. By the end of 1995, an 
amendment to the Act on General Government Finances, along with new government and 
ministerial decrees, served as legal bases for the HST. After a half year of quick preparation, 
the HST started to operate with a few key elements, and in the subsequent years, it was 
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gradually developed after the French model. Th e following are the HST’s main elements 
(Th uma, Polackova, and Ferreira 1998) in mandatory banking services for central budgetary 
organizations and extrabudgetary funds:
 Th e Treasury single account, where all transactions for the members of the treasury 
system are accounted and payments are made only for entities outside the treasury 
circles
 Current and capital expenditures of the member organizations ﬁ nanced through 
reimbursements (that is, no advances paid for the spending units)
 A net ﬁ nancing scheme for intergovernmental transfers (for example, local governments 
receive only a net amount of grants, shared revenues, and social security dues)
 Th e State Debt Management Center.
 
Th e operation of the HST is quite simple for members. Each client has a ledger, 
where all transactions are accounted. Budgetary institutions keep their right to allocate 
appropriations according to prevailing ﬁ scal rules and regulations. All revenues under the 
HST are deposited in the Treasury single account, so institutions have little need for cash, 
and the HST has new investment options. Th e interest gained through these transactions 
is shared between the HST and the member organizations. HST also supplies interest-free 
credit for Treasury members when they need short-term cash (sometimes with limits, for 
example, up to Ft 60 billion for health and pension funds). 
During the ﬁ rst period the HST ran approximately 3,200 separate accounts of 
1,800 budgetary units. Later on, other public entities became members of the Treasury 
(for example, the National Academy of Sciences, regional development councils, and the 
Health Insurance Fund with special status). All these functions were implemented with a 
staﬀ  of 370 employees at headquarters and an additional 460 staﬀ  at the regional branches. 
Th e latter were taken over from the Hungarian National Bank and from the National 
Development Institute, which ceased to exist after the HST started to operate.
Th e primary beneﬁ t of establishing the HST was an immediate improvement in the 
balance of the national budget. Th e amount of money required by the central budgetary 
organizations decreased, and as a result, an additional Ft 50 billion cash was made available 
at the Treasury single account (a 50 percent increase relative to the previous balance). Th is 
boon in turn resulted in Ft 10 billion in interest earnings by the Treasury. 
Th e introduction of net ﬁ nancing intergovernmental transfers also reduced by 45 
percent (Ft 187 billion) the amount of money needed to ﬁ nance municipalities, and that 
savings also generated signiﬁ cant interest earnings at HST. Because the advance ﬁ nancing 
was changed, the idle money available to local governments decreased, which obviously 
resulted in losses in interest earnings of municipalities and gave rise to local treasuries.
Th e integrated system of state debt management also improved the eﬃ  ciency of the 
ﬁ scal system. Th e HST issues all the treasury bonds and manages the market for these 
bonds. HST made government action in this area better planned and more precise. Th is 
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eﬃ  ciency helped in restructuring the government securities market and changed ﬁ nancing 
from short- to longer term instruments.
Th e most important consequence of the establishment of the HST was the improve-
ment in the quality of ﬁ scal information for both the expenditures and revenues of the 
central budget. Th e accounting is still the responsibility of the spending institutions, but the 
transaction codes introduced by the HST improved the discipline of spending units. HST 
also has plans to improve the entire budget cycle by combining its analyzing, monitoring, 
and implementation functions.
Th e immeasurable beneﬁ t of the partial integration of local governments into the HST 
is that the Treasury has now direct information on local ﬁ nances. Financial transactions 
between the subsystems of the general government budget became more transparent 
for both the national and the local governments. Based on section 17, subsection (5) of 
the 1992 Act on Public Finance, the Treasury provides information to the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Finance on capital investments supported by central grants. 
Th e Treasury remits the grants jointly with the money provided by the local governments 
or extrabudgetary funds.
Th e Concept of Municipal Treasuries
Th e ﬁ scal squeeze and the positive experiences with the HST encouraged local governments 
to rationalize each component of local ﬁ nances and ﬁ nancial management, including reform 
actions that were ultimately directed to the cash management area. Th e permanent pressure 
on local budgets encouraged them to raise own-source revenues. Financial investments 
were good opportunities for raising own-source revenues, especially in large cities that 
have a signiﬁ cant stock of ﬁ nancial assets. Th e relatively high inﬂ ation rates (the peak was 
38 percent) also pushed local governments toward savings and high-yield investments. 
To keep the real value of municipal reserves and idle cash, local governments made bank 
deposits and purchased Treasury bills. Th ese opportunities also motivated the development 
of local cash management methods.
Th e development of cash management techniques had a signiﬁ cant impact on the other 
components of ﬁ nancial management. Th ese eﬀ orts mutually reinforced each other and 
cash management apparently integrated into the ﬁ nancial management (see ﬁ gure 22.1). To 
have adequate information on the appropriations, actual spending, and potential revenues, 
accurate ﬁ scal information is needed. Th is information depends on proper administration 
of disbursements and revenue ﬂ ows. Revenue and expenditure administration should be in 
harmony with local ﬁ scal planning and performance measurement techniques, otherwise no 
comprehensive information would be available on municipal budgets. Fiscal planning and 
performance evaluation are critical conditions for local decisions regarding the ﬁ nancing 
of services and collection of revenues. Local government audits form a critical part of the 
overall framework for municipal decisions.
C H A P T E R  2 2    M U N I C I PA L  T R E A S U R Y
439
Figure 22.1 Th e Stages in Development of Local Financial Management
Source: Authors.
Similar changes had been launched by Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development countries since the late 1970s. Th e primary motivation was to improve 
ﬁ nancial management through better planning methods and decentralization of executive 
decisions (PUMA 1987, 1990). Lessons from the private sector were also learned by 
introducing modern ﬁ scal planning techniques. Program- and performance-based 
budgeting systems served not only ﬁ scal planning purposes, but also eﬃ  cient use of the 
appropriations. If the allocations were clearly assigned to the responsible spending units 
who had more sophisticated professional knowledge and more information, then the 
budgets would be used more eﬃ  ciently than under a centralized system.
After the ﬁ rst full year of net ﬁ nancing, municipalities were more frequently seeking 
local opportunities to launch Treasury-type cash management. Th ey recognized that the ex 
post ﬁ nancing, savings, and other potential beneﬁ ts in consolidated ﬁ nancial management 
can also be achieved at the local level. Municipalities are essentially in the same situation 
as the central budget. Th e municipal budget must cover the cash needs of local budgetary 
service providers, but it should avoid both arrears and unjustiﬁ ed overspending. Th ese 
goals could be achieved by ensuring the availability of current funds at the municipal level 
without curbing the institutions’ professional and decision-making autonomy or their 
incentives to generate own revenues.
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For a period of almost two years reformers did not decide whether the HST would 
incorporate local budgets or not. Th e HST was not prepared for absorbing the local 
governments’ accounts. Absorbing would have required a signiﬁ cantly larger apparatus and 
capacity to work with 16,733 local institutions, more than 3,000 of whom are autonomously 
managed. Further development of HST was not supported, but these considerations 
inﬂ uenced local governments.
In the present legal environment, integration of local governments in the Treasury is 
not possible. Paragraph (3), section 1 of the 1990 Act on Local Government states that 
the local government can autonomously regulate and freely administer local public matters 
under its competency. Paragraph (1), section 17 of government decree number 211 in 1996 
(XII.23) states that the representative body of the local government can choose its bank 
without any restrictions.
Municipal Treasury Solutions and Models
In the course of executing the budget, a local government must fulﬁ ll numerous mandatory 
and optional tasks. It must settle the cash ﬂ ow required for carrying out local tasks and 
provide for the related accounting and ﬁ nancial reporting services. In addition, it must 
ensure that budget appropriations are not exceeded and that its budgetary institutions 
follow the approved budget plan. It must apply an eﬀ ective ﬁ nancial service organization 
and good ﬁ nancial management methods, since the environment forces it to save money 
and increase revenues.
For these purposes, municipalities created local treasuries, which fall in one of two 
categories. Th e “soft” version is an in-house treasury, a unit of the ﬁ nance department that 
fulﬁ lls cash management and regulatory tasks related to local budgetary organizations and 
manages the relationship between the local budget and the municipality’s bank. Th e “hard” 
version is an independent treasury organization that takes over budget planning, ﬁ nancial 
management, and procurement functions from the local budgetary service organizations 
and exercises monitoring and control over their operations.
Treasury management is only a tool, regardless of which version the municipality 
introduces. One can assume that in establishing the simpler version—in the future after 
favorable experiences—municipalities can gradually introduce local treasuries that perform 
more complex and diverse tasks. Th is transition, however, is likely to require a longer period, 
because the establishment of an independent treasury organization requires signiﬁ cant 
transformation in the entire local decision-making and management system. (Th e Center 
for Civic and Municipal Innovation gathered examples on municipal treasury initiatives in 
1996.)
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In-house Treasury
Th e “soft” treasury has a simple organizational structure and does not require major 
municipal investments. Th e core feature of the in-house treasury is that the ﬁ nancing system 
and the supporting bank software ensure that local government’s surplus liquid assets can 
always be invested or can replace liquidity loans rather than being kept in municipal oﬃ  ces. 
Th ese short-term deposits provide the municipality with interest revenues. Th e earlier 
common situation of a municipality having to borrow while some of its institutions had 
liquid assets does not exist any more.
Th e foundation of this local treasury model is a computer program and a bank 
terminal, used by local government staﬀ  who understand ﬁ nances. Th e terminal continues 
to operate as a unit in the municipal ﬁ nancial department, and the jobs of staﬀ  who deal 
with municipal treasury need not change because their initial responsibilities remain the 
same. Th e only change is that the manually operated ﬁ nancing is assisted by an eﬀ ective 
computerized system.
By monitoring the local budgetary appropriations, this in-house treasury eﬀ ectively 
ensures the required ﬁ nancing. Municipal transfers are not paid into the institutions’ bank 
accounts on a regular monthly basis in advance, but only when the municipality has invoices 
to be paid. Having been fully informed about the bank account, the municipal treasury has 
exact information on the own revenues of the institutions, so a smaller municipal fund 
transfer to the institution’s account is needed.
Consolidating liquid assets at the municipal level also reduces the need for cash and 
makes secure, continuous, and economical cash management possible. Th e software monitors 
the account balances, earnings on deposits, amount of deposits, the size of funds that can 
be placed, and the maturity structure. At the same time, it provides the municipality’s 
ﬁ nancial managers with an exact report on expenditures and revenue appropriations, the 
unused items, and the necessary reallocation of the budget. Income will be generated in the 
municipality’s budget by using the surplus liquid assets. Th is ﬁ nancial information, received 
in a uniform and consistent manner, also makes local decision-making (budget planning, 
reporting) easier and more sound.
Th e treasury computer program—depending on the local bank—also provides 
the following option: if, within a possible maturity period of a short-term deposit, the 
municipality needs funds for a short period of time, the bank could automatically provide a 
loan backed by the deposit. For instance instead of losing a three-month interest earnings 
on a Ft 200,000 deposit, a Ft 100,000 loan for a week costs the municipality much less. 
Independent Treasury
Th e independent treasury is entrusted with management of actual costs, procurement, 
bookkeeping, accounting, and analyzing, and it makes budget estimates not related to 
professional staﬀ . It also plays control and monitoring roles. Professional and ﬁ nancial 
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management tasks of service organizations can be separated (government decree number 
156 of 1995). When an autonomous budgetary organization, for example, a school, agrees 
to hand over its planning and other ﬁ nancial management tasks to another budgetary 
unit, it still retains its institutional and professional independence. Financial management 
and logistic tasks, however, should be separated from professional operations and service-
providing functions.
Th is naturally impairs the institutions’ ﬁ nancial autonomy, but makes possible a more 
eﬀ ective and transparent measuring of the institution’s professional activities. Th e treasury 
actively participates in the preparation of institutional budgets and performs ﬁ nancial 
management. Creating a municipal treasury that has a wide range of ﬁ nancial management 
tasks must be regulated in a municipal decree, because a decree is the only way to impose 
ﬁ nancial management over independent budgetary institutions.
Because the independent treasury provides ex post ﬁ nancing and checks available funds, 
it becomes increasingly involved in the professional details of the institution’s operation. 
Th e municipal treasury, having detailed information on the expenses of numerous similar 
institutions, also strives to improve the ﬁ nancial and management eﬃ  ciency of their 
decisions. One possibility is to coordinate the purchase orders of various institutions and 
achieve a lower price through joint procurement. Naturally, joint purchase also has costs, 
but the savings achieved and the regulated transparent procedure create greater advantages 
for the municipal ﬁ nance management.
Th e available ﬁ nancial information also allows the evaluation of the institutions’ 
performance. By comparing the service performance indicators and the expenditures, the 
institution’s expenses can also be compared. Th e cost eﬃ  ciency and the reasons for the 
diﬀ erences can be analyzed based on the detailed ﬁ nancial information.
When municipalities introduced municipal treasuries, they deliberately made budget 
rationalization and modernization important aspects. In several municipalities the screening 
exercise, that is, the eﬀ ort to ﬁ nd reserves and losses, led to the creation of municipal 
treasuries. A part of this rationalization procedure is the renewal of budgetary planning and 
introduction of zero-based budgeting. On the one hand, the municipal treasury makes an 
exact assessment of the institutional activities and cost requirements possible. On the other 
hand, it helps to control the ﬁ nancial operations of budgetary organizations by building on 
performance indicators.
Operational Issues of the Two Treasury Models
Th e two treasury models each have their own merits and drawbacks. Th e soft model looks 
more suitable for small municipalities.  Th e more sophisticated, hard model would provide 
better results in medium and large municipalities. Beyond this ﬁ rst-glance consideration, 
however, several other issues should be considered before introducing a real treasury model 
in a municipality.
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Size and Type of the Municipality
Th e ﬁ rst question is whether the size of the municipality is too small to make creating a 
treasury worthwhile. Th e experiences of both the system organizers and the users show that 
a treasury can operate in any municipality no matter how small it is. Two preconditions 
must be met for creating an in-house treasury: the municipality must have a computerized 
accounting system and, based on it, the municipality must establish an online connection 
with a bank.
Beyond the basic conditions, the size of the municipality and the number of budgetary 
organizations do matter. Th us, only about 3 to 5 percent of municipalities are not suitable 
for municipal treasuries. Even the smallest ones, however, could introduce the fundamental 
principles of treasury operation. Th e smallest operating independent treasury exists in 
Tokaj, a city of 5,000. In the case of smaller communities—based on the opinion of 
developers—the treasury is recommended if a municipality has at least 7 to 10 municipal 
service institutions that have autonomous ﬁ nancial management.
Th e decision to introduce an in-house treasury model must be based on the savings 
that can be achieved through jointly managing the institutions’ accounts, developing a 
uniform account system (simplifying accounting), controlling the institutions’ ﬁ nancial 
management, adequately timing expenditures, and measuring the volume of the incremental 
interest earnings.
Th e treasury functions not only in municipalities (small and big cities, for example, 
Tokaj, Balatonfüred, Békéscsaba, Pécs), but also in counties. Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 
county is planning a “good deal for everyone” treasury. New treasuries are under preparation 
in Bács-Kiskun and Csongrád counties, based on the initiatives of the County Treasury 
and Information Service Oﬃ  ces. Two Budapest districts are also organizing municipal 
treasuries. In sum, Hungary’s experiences suggest that municipal treasuries can be 
organized in various sizes and levels of subnational governments.
Financial Advantages and Disadvantages
Naturally, the introduction of a treasury requires expenditures. For an in-house treasury 
the typical costs emerge from purchasing or renting an adequate computer system for a 
line department of the local government. If the municipality rents the computer from the 
bank, rental fees and software costs are involved, although software development is also in 
the bank’s interest. Th e salaries of the in-house treasury employees could remain the same. 
Regarding the beneﬁ ts, generally interest revenues gained from deposits in the soft treasury 
reach 1–2 percent of the municipal budget excluding long-term loans.
Creating an independent treasury entails the one-time cost of the economic and legal 
transformation of the entire institutional system, including reallocation of employees, 
assignments, assets, and real estate.
First experiences of the municipalities that introduced independent treasuries suggest 
that within a short period their operational budget deﬁ cit declined by 10–15 percent. 
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In addition, their entire planning mechanism transformed: they are now funding only 
programs and not institutions; they introduced service quality conditions by functions; 
and they are immediately informed if the institutional budget is exceeded. Th rough joint 
procurement the nominal value of material costs as compared to the previous year dropped 
by 20 percent; they have no debts and their liquidity has become predictable.
A very important advantage in both treasury cases is that the municipal ﬁ nances 
have become more transparent. In the case of independent treasury, planning is based on 
actual data. Using this data, treasuries are able to concentrate more institutional tasks and 
calculate ﬁ nancing more easily. Th e indirect social advantage is the improved quality of 
community services.
Ensuring Institutional Independence
Controlling the assumption of obligations and limiting the regrouping possibilities in 
everyday ﬁ nancial management also entails reducing economic independence of municipal 
budgetary institutions. Investment of the institutions’ temporary liquid assets provides the 
municipality with interest earnings as well as some opportunity costs. Th is proﬁ t is the very 
reason why the joint interest of institutional professional managers and municipal ﬁ nancial 
management must be created. Nevertheless, the institutions often did not deposit smaller 
amounts of money, or if they did, they did so under worse conditions than the in-house 
treasury unit. 
Th e independent treasury does not entail this kind of challenge, because it does 
not leave liquid assets, other than own revenues, at budgetary institutions. Th e transfer 
of ﬁ nancial management functions to the independent treasury does not mean that the 
budgetary organization’s professional independence is curbed or its power impaired. 
Municipalities introducing the treasury as a separate institution have treasury-operating 
procedures in which professional autonomy is guaranteed. We must emphasize that in 
this case, local regulation is done within the framework of the municipal budget planning 
reform, of which the treasury regulation is only one of numerous elements.
Incentives
In the case of the in-house treasury, regulations on using own revenues for the institution 
ﬁ nancing must be developed in a manner that maintains incentives for raising own revenues. 
To increase institutional revenues, interest earned on reserves by the municipal treasury 
must be returned to the institutions without restrictions on how they will be used. 
Th e introduction of an independent treasury can reward institutions for performing 
professional duties (for example, funding schools) in a more eﬃ  cient manner and increasing 
their revenues. Th e treasury measures and evaluates eﬃ  ciency and, based on that evaluation, 
increases the institutions’ incentives by improving both its professional and ﬁ nancial assets 
in line with strict legal regulations.
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Because of its eﬀ ects on local and budgetary planning, an independent treasury 
also entails changes in the operation of the elected bodies. As with any organizational 
restructuring, the introduction of an in-house treasury also interferes with the vested 
interests of the current system. Within the organization, aside from the ﬁ nancial 
department, the management of other line departments must also be motivated for 
change. Th e mayor or the councilors initiating the independent treasury must convince 
the decision-makers and those aﬀ ected of the beneﬁ ts of treasury. Th is persuasive eﬀ ort 
also requires that the municipality is given guarantees (in a local decree or in the treasury 
regulations) to preserve institutional autonomy and interests.
Financing Schedule
In the in-house treasury model, the current budget determined for an institution is 
disbursed in equal monthly installments. A thirteenth installment, which is not used in 
a timely way at most of the municipal institutions, is also a factor. In addition, spending 
of the budget in an institution is determined by its tasks, seasonal diﬀ erences, and varying 
public utility billing periods, so the municipal treasury must coordinate the diﬀ erent cash 
in- and out-ﬂ ows to reduce the overall cash ﬂ ow.
A critical condition is that institutions with autonomous economic management 
must prepare a ﬁ nancing schedule agreed upon with the municipal ﬁ nance department. 
Th is schedule must state that the institution should take into account the annual budget 
estimates, comply with regulations, and should specify the amount of transfer funds the 
municipality wants to use. 
Th e municipality can also take action in the interest of scheduled spending. For 
example, most institutions having a relationship with several public utility service 
providers, so negotiating an optimal invoicing schedule with each of them is advisable. Th e 
institutions’ capital expenditures also occur on a diﬀ erent schedule and, therefore, are not a 
part of the institution’s regular operating budget.
Th e independent treasury ﬁ nances the institutions according to their actual 
performances under the zero-based budget principle. It simultaneously manages orders, 
fulﬁ llment, and payment turnover, and it carries out strategic acquisitions. Th is treasury 
audits all accounting and ﬁ nancial directions of performed tasks; provides data for the 
sectional supervision; manages accounting; carries out treasury functions, including cash 
supply, deposits, short-, medium-, and long-term loans; and assures balanced asset and 
liability management. Th rough modern monitoring and controlling data, it assists the work 
of the municipal council and its committees.
Relationship with Fiscal Planning
Linking the well-functioning ﬁ nancial information system with cost standards also has an 
eﬀ ect on ﬁ scal planning because it draws attention to the diﬀ erences across institutions in 
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quality and unit cost of services. Transforming the local ﬁ scal planning process means that 
the professional and ﬁ nancial aspects can be compared even at the elementary decision-
making stage. Th is bottom-up budgeting system, built on a set of performance indicators, 
requires signiﬁ cant changes in the traditional planning practices and decision-making 
procedures. Budget planners need to know exactly what services are provided and, using 
this knowledge, need to analyze the fulﬁ llment of local functions and strategic goals.
Th is planning function can be implemented through the zero-based budgeting of the 
entire municipal budget, an approach that oﬀ ers options and decision-making alternatives 
in each step of ﬁ scal planning. Th us one can clearly see where the line item budgeting system 
caused extra expenses in the municipal budget. Th e program-based budgeting—adjusted to 
the provided services—enables the real tasks of the service institutions to determine the 
bases of planning if the funds are available.
Case Studies of Local Treasuries
In this section we brieﬂ y summarize the circumstances and policy considerations that 
resulted in a hard and a soft municipal treasury in two secondary cities.  
Th e Independent Municipal Treasury in Tokaj
Th e establishment of the ﬁ rst independent (hard) municipal treasury was motivated by 
economic pressure and not by public demand. Had it been a question of public will, it 
would have never been established in Tokaj, one of the country’s smallest cities (5,000 
inhabitants).
Economic and Financial Crisis in 1994
Th e newly elected local government in 1994 had to establish a new ﬁ nancial management, 
because the costs of the city’s service institutions far exceeded the revenues, and they were 
not managed in a strictly economical and rational manner. Th e antiquated infrastructure, 
deteriorated trade, slumping tourism, and growing unemployment put the city management 
in a very diﬃ  cult position.
Given these existing conditions, it became imperative that the most crucial improve-
ments begin, although only modest ﬁ nancial resources were available. Key infrastructure, 
education, and health care investments received the highest priority. Th ese functions were 
unavoidable for stimulating the private economy and retaining the residents. Once a bypass 
highway around the city was completed, the reconstruction of the historical city center and 
the renovation and expansion of public utilities started.
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Th e severe ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties soon became apparent and many believed that the 
pace of investments was the cause of the problems. Contrary to these opinions, the local 
government believed that the high operational costs and low performance were the primary 
reasons for the problems, because the developments were ﬁ nanced by state grants not from 
local resources.
It was also well known that the increase in normative transfers appropriated to ﬁ nance 
current expenditures of the institutions were signiﬁ cantly lower than the rate of inﬂ ation 
during the “seven lean years.”  Th ese trends caused ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties not only in Tokaj. 
Of course, the problems had to be remedied where they had occurred, and those aﬄ  icted 
could not be appeased by the knowledge that the situation was no more promising 
elsewhere.
National and Local Crisis in 1995
Th e local budgetary crisis became more severe in 1995, when serious liquidity problems 
emerged. Following the approval of central government austerity measures in March 1995, 
everyone had to realize that an end had come to that carefree period when the national 
government provided guarantees for the ﬁ nancial management of local governments.
Moreover, towns could no longer hope that the central government would provide 
additional funds to ﬁ nance local operations. Th e programs of political parties vying for 
power revealed that all parties from right to left agreed that central revenues had to be 
reduced, local revenues had to be increased, and local governments had to act independently 
to resolve the transition to a more eﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial management.
Consequently, only two solutions were possible for the city leadership: either to ignore 
the impending disaster or to face the gathering storm and develop a plan to ward oﬀ  
catastrophe. Th e former approach would certainly be less demanding, but the latter would 
require politicians to show great endurance and professional judgment and to remain 
steadfast and patient even when subjected to slander.
Tokaj city chose this harder path, although admitting that such wide-ranging local 
stabilization programs were not introduced on a whim, but rather were forced on them 
by necessity. Necessity would have its way, particularly when the municipal ﬁ nancial 
management would be in a crisis situation.
Actions for Recovery
Th e city’s draft budget 1996—prepared in November 1995—gave the city council a 
warning signal that bankruptcy was a possibility because of the magnitude of the planned 
deﬁ cit. Clearly without a tough decision to break the previous institutional ﬁ nancing 
system, which was characterized by the inherited subsidization line-item approach, no 
resolution would be forthcoming.
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Although the intention to reform was clear, many felt that the situation could be 
improved without the radical transformation of the institutional structure and without 
aﬀ ecting the number of public employees and civil servants. In Tokaj’s budgetary plan for 
the 1996 ﬁ scal year, Ft 767 million revenues were planned, and the deﬁ cit amounted to 
Ft 89 million. Th is deﬁ cit, in excess of 10 percent, caused a grave liquidity situation that 
seriously threatened the operation of the institutions.
Th e need to ﬁ nd a solution became unavoidable. Th e local government was most 
concerned with the apparent problems in operational deﬁ cit, because without proper 
treatment, that deﬁ cit would continue to grow and deepen the crisis. For this reason, 
a comprehensive operational audit was unavoidable at the line departments and at the 
institutions of the local government. Following a long debate, the viewpoint prevailed that 
external experts had to be hired to participate in the audit and in resolving the crisis.
A Budapest-based consulting company was commissioned to perform a review, which 
would include the evaluation of institutional operations from professional and employment 
perspectives and, based on this examination, to elaborate procedures for cost reduction and 
the attainment of the new zero-based budget.
Th e examination procedure began with the formulation of a complicated set of 
questionnaires for each institution, crammed with control questions designed to ﬁ lter out 
false data. Th is self-assessment method was highly successful because it dispelled suspicions 
that the leadership sought to force their own opinions on the institutions.
While the completion and analysis of questionnaires continued, arrangements were 
made with the help of the consultant to avoid bankruptcy. Th ese steps had become all the 
more urgent because institutional contracting debts reached Ft 16 million by the end of 
January 1996 (within one month). With this, the deﬁ cit projected in the budget plan would 
swell to Ft 104 million (nearly 20 percent of the budget).
Preventing Bankruptcy
To prevent municipal bankruptcy, Tokaj introduced serious security measures. Th e debts of 
each individual institution were identiﬁ ed and recorded by the ﬁ nancial department of the 
local government and were included in the budget of the institution. Th e institutions were 
required to sign collection contracts with public utility operators. Th e mayor prohibited 
institutions from using wire transfers to settle ﬁ nancial obligations, so the institutions 
could make payments only using cash that was derived from their own revenues.
Th ese measures prevented the further growth of liabilities from contractors and 
suppliers. Th e mayor reached agreements with each individual contractor, within which he 
assumed responsibility for paying oﬀ  overdue liabilities in monthly installments, without 
paying high or punitive interest rates.
With these agreements and with the help of the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County 
Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce’s ﬁ nancing prognosis, the local government 
prepared a liquidity plan and a task-performance concept recommended by the consultant 
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and approved by the lead bank of the municipality. Moreover, based on the ﬁ rst results, the 
bank approved a two-year rescheduling of a Ft 8 million gas loan. Th e immediate danger 
of bankruptcy was averted, and the leadership had a window of opportunity to evaluate the 
audit report and to develop a new institutional structure.
Municipal overstaﬃ  ng was enormous; of Tokaj’s 5,000 citizens, 580 were employed 
as public servants—a huge percentage of the population. Th e number of janitor staﬀ 
(doormen, cleaning crew, kitchen workers, laundry-room workers, and courtyard main-
tenance workers) in health care institutions amounted to more than 52 percent of the 
staﬀ . At the same time, the qualiﬁ cations of the professional staﬀ  were extremely low. Th e 
permanent payroll positions were not ﬁ lled in schools, so the proportion of overtime lessons 
was as much as 50 percent of the base lesson plan in some cases. Cooperation between the 
institutions in repair and maintenance was totally lacking, so despite the large maintenance 
staﬀ , contractors were hired for larger tasks. Th e experts did not recommend reducing the 
tasks and functions in the city, but rather changing the wasteful structure. Based on the 
surveys, the employment had to be adjusted to tasks in strict compliance with the relevant 
laws. Th ey also recommended the strict appliance of the Act on Public Procurement. 
Consolidation of the Institutions and Setting Up the Municipal Treasury
Based on the experts’ recommendations, ﬁ ve municipal institutions were created from the 
previous eleven. Th ree elementary schools were consolidated, the formerly independent 
boarding school was integrated with two high schools, and four health care and social 
institutions were merged into one. Furthermore, an independent municipal treasury was 
created, and although each service institution lost its economic independence, it retained 
its professional independence.
Th e city council made these tough and crucial local decisions with qualiﬁ ed majority 
votes. Of the 12 representatives, 8 voted for, 3 voted against, and 1 abstained. Th e new 
system was instituted on July 15, 1996. Th e approved organizational structure has continued 
to ensure the task performance customary in the city. By using public procurement the 
municipal treasury signiﬁ cantly reduced the number of purchase orders; it also consolidated 
the janitor employees into one maintenance service organization.
New managers or leaders were appointed to head up the restructured municipal 
institutions through competitive bidding procedures. Th e treasury manager received a one-
year contract after which this position was ﬁ lled through competing applications, and the 
same manager was rehired.
Lessons and Achievements
During the reorganization process, 73 employees (15 percent) left the system. Th e remain-
ing janitor employees were employed only part-time each week or only in summer. Th e 
management staﬀ  was signiﬁ cantly reduced, and work performance became much more 
eﬃ  cient.
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Naturally, the reorganization process was not entirely without tension; those negatively 
aﬀ ected continuously fed citizens with false information, which was neutralized with a 
carefully thought-out and executed public relations strategy. Th us Tokaj avoided a scandal 
and restructured its operation.
A new budget had to be developed for the modiﬁ ed, new structure. Th ey needed a 
system that was transparent for everyone, could be controlled, precluded lobbying, and 
assured fair distribution of funds. Th e zero-based budgeting was an extremely suitable 
instrument. It replaced the line-item approach and thus the errors and unjustiﬁ ed beneﬁ ts 
accumulated through the former budgets. Each year this plan begins with zero budgets 
of the institutions and ﬁ nances only actually incurred costs, while taking into account the 
price changes and wage policy consequences. Th is method requires the local government 
to determine which services are provided free of charge and which are ﬁ nanced with fees 
or charges.
By creating the municipal treasury, ﬁ nancial transactions were almost fully removed 
from the departments of the local government, and only the planning functions and small 
cash payments remained there. Th e municipal treasury’s primary task has been to provide 
ﬁ nancial services to institutions that retained partial autonomy and partially independent 
ﬁ nancial management.
Aside from the single municipal account at HST, only the municipal treasury has an 
independent bank account. Th e partially independent professional institutions have only a 
petty-cash fund for smaller payments, provided, controlled, and regulated by the municipal 
treasury. Tremendous results were achieved in liquidity, with the establishment of a single 
bank account. Handling and paying invoices and accounting the transactions are the 
treasury’s responsibility. Th ese tasks also apply to profession-related invoices ordered and 
countersigned by the head of the professional institution.
Th e treasury carries out joint procurement of goods and raw materials, determines the 
time of delivery and volume, as well as designates the delivery sites based on the location of 
direct need. Th us the local government does not have to create a central warehouse.
In practice, the treasury has revealed numerous savings possibilities that were not 
apparent at the time of establishment. Structural changes, staﬀ  rationalization, the 
zero-based budgeting system, and the creation of the treasury made Tokaj’s ﬁ nancial 
management sound and more balanced. Despite all the initial diﬃ  culties, the city’s budget 
deﬁ cit reduced signiﬁ cantly (to Ft 34 million in 1997), which could have been lower if the 
compulsory salary increases of civil servants had been fully ﬁ nanced by the state.
Th at the local government could switch from institution to task ﬁ nancing is deﬁ nitely 
a new and fortunate reality. As a result, the institutions deal only with task performance 
and their leaders are not burdened with ﬁ nancial management. Th e optimal number of civil 
servants was determined by the consultant and the local government based on professional 
surveys, thus during staﬀ  reduction the eﬀ ects of across-the-board cuts did not arise. With 
the introduction of zero-based budgeting, the funds are disbursed based on fairness and 
performance. Th is change resulted in reducing the chances of conﬂ icts with organizations 
seeking to protect their interests.
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Th rough the successful changes in Tokaj, the psychological burden caused by the 
constant lack of funds and bleak outlook was terminated. Today, the liquidity is excellent, 
and the city has regained the conﬁ dence of both the contractors and residents.
Introduction of a Treasury-type Financial Management in Szeged
As of January 1, 1997, the General Assembly of the Municipality of Szeged adopted a 
funding system (soft treasury) that does not violate the service institutions’ professional and 
ﬁ nancial management autonomy and yet ensures the solvency of the municipal budget.
Th e local budgetary institutions no longer receive monthly municipal transfers in 
advance, but only at the time when the actual payments occur. Th is action made funda-
mental changes in the institutions’ ﬁ nancing practices. Small daily expenses are primarily 
ﬁ nanced by the institutions’ current revenues. Transfers may be disbursed from the 
municipal budgetary account only if the expense exceeds the institution’s own revenues, 
so the daily account balances show a zero or minimal positive balance. If a balance on the 
institutions’ accounts remains, this amount is not withheld but rather used to cover the 
expenses of the following period.
Each month, the municipal budgetary institutions are eligible for one-thirteenth 
of their annual budget appropriations to cover their expenses. Institutions performing 
seasonal activities—for example, ﬁ nancing open-air theater or park maintenance within the 
approved annual budget—ﬁ nance their activities by an independently determined schedule. 
Because of the January settlement of bonuses paid as a 13th month salary, the institutions 
are granted two-thirteenths of their budgeted annual transfer. Grants exceeding the 
proportional payments are subject of the decision of the Financial Committee of the Local 
Government.
Th e payment orders of the budgeted monthly transfers of the service institutions, 
prepared by the economic bureau, are sent to the local government’s bank. Based on the 
payment orders, the bank will disburse cash if the institution does not have suﬃ  cient 
revenues. Th e bank monitors compliance with the approved budget projections, and 
payments are made only within the given limit by automatic transfer from the city budget 
account to the institution’s account.
Following the last day of the month, the bank prepares and submits to the city’s 
economic department a summary statement on the use of the institutions’ budget envelope. 
Th e bank automatically increases the institutional current budget envelope with the 
unused amount left from the previous month. In other words, the institution could use the 
previously unused funds at any time.
Changing institutional ﬁ nancing also entails modifying the agreement with the lead 
bank, so in addition to the previously used current account, a roll-over (sweep) account 
is opened, too. Funds that can be saved for a minimum period of seven business days 
are deposited in the rollover account. Based on a standing order, the bank automatically 
transfers the daily balance of the current account—with the exception of state subsidies 
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and shared tax revenues—to the rollover account. With this, in addition to the long-term 
ﬁ xed deposits, the municipality’s revenues are continuously held in accounts bearing higher 
interest rates.
For approving regularity in cash ﬂ ow, agreements were concluded with the largest 
public utility providers (for example, electricity, gas, telephone, water and sewage, district 
heating, and the post oﬃ  ce). After the ﬁ xed state grants have been transferred at the end 
of the month, the utility bills are paid on a set date, so both the spot collection orders and 
advance payments ceased.
Th e content of contracts regarding capital investments and renovations were also 
regulated. Deadlines were set for paying the liabilities at a minimum of 15 days after the 
contract has been signed or invoice has been received.
Having the institutions accept the idea of introducing treasury-type ﬁ nancial 
management was the most diﬃ  cult aspect, because the directors believed this new form 
of ﬁ nancing would limit the use of their own income resources. Th ey believed that they 
had no interest in raising revenues, so the municipal budget decree was supplemented with 
a section on institutional incentives. According to this section, the general assembly will 
acknowledge the institution’s cash surplus as an item as a supplement to the liquid assets 
obtained aside from the previous year’s business revenue and state grants.
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Th e Act on Local Government in 1990 created a clear legal basis for democratic and fully 
autonomous local management. At the same time it became a local task to fulﬁ ll assigned 
responsibilities by exploiting local opportunities. Municipalities faced a key challenge of 
transforming the ﬁ nancial and administrative systems inherited from the socialist local 
councils into an eﬃ  cient, prudent, and accountable management system adapted to an 
autonomous local government.
Budapest, as the biggest city, the strongest economic region (see chapter 20), and 
the most professional local government, plays a unique role in Hungary’s municipal 
development. Th e positive experiences of the Budapest ﬁ nancial management reform have 
been used by secondary cities and could become a model for the largest cities in neighboring 
transition economies.
Th is chapter discusses the ﬁ nancial management reform of Budapest accomplished 
during the 1990s. Th is reform has been a gradual process. Reform steps had to be introduced 
and matched with inherited and new obligations to maintain the balance in fast-changing 
circumstances. After the overview of the tools and procedures of the reform process, I also 
summarize the cornerstones of the city’s current ﬁ nancial strategy.
Financial Management in Transition
Th e ﬁ rst elected government of Budapest clearly knew that political independence, ﬁ scal 
stability, and sound municipal ﬁ nances reinforce each other and provide the basis for real 
sovereignty. It also was understood early that ﬁ nancial autonomy required increased own 
revenues; stability and sustainable ﬁ nancing required clearly deﬁ ned tasks, competencies, 
and responsibilities; and planning, decision-making, and management processes had to be 
restructured to ﬁ t the responsibilities and exploit the opportunities of the autonomy.
* Th is chapter is based on Pallai 2000b. 
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Objectives and Tasks of the Financial Management Reform
Th e ﬁ nancial reforms had two strategic objectives: (a) to obtain a sustainable balanced 
budget to secure city operations and service delivery, and (b) to enhance creditworthiness 
to enable optimal and equitable ﬁ nancing of city development. To achieve these objectives, 
municipal functions and services had to be rationalized and user charges adjusted. Also, 
a task ﬁ nancing scheme and a multiyear planning and forecasting system had to be 
introduced, and borrowing and privatization had to be integrated into the management 
and ﬁ nancing strategy. Th ese were carried out in parallel with the ﬁ scal squeeze and steadily 
reduced intergovernmental transfers between 1990 and 2000. Budapest has a two-tier 
system of management, ﬁ nance, and delivery of services. Th ese tasks are divided between 
local governments of the 23 districts and the municipal government (see chapter 8). I focus 
on the issues at the municipal level.
For sustainability of the operation, the key transition challenges were to reconsider 
municipal functions and to rationalize and reorganize service delivery. With limited 
resources available, the city had to concentrate on what functions could be reinforced and 
what eliminated from the inherited group of tasks. Decisions on tasks had to be made 
in conformity with the conceptually desirable role of local government and predictable 
ﬁ nancial constraints. Th is rationalization consisted of change in the scale of services and 
functions, and privatization or concession arrangements for service delivery.
Th e long-term security of service delivery also necessitated: (a) an increase in own 
revenues to strengthen ﬁ nancial independence, and (b) establishment of a sustainable 
balanced budget through ﬁ nancial forecasting and multiyear planning. “Balanced budget” 
in this sense means one that prevents deﬁ cit and generates an operational surplus for 
renovations and new investments (for future security). A 20 percent surplus of operating 
revenues over operating expenditures was targeted to have a secure capital budget for 
capital expenses even after privatization revenues dried up.
Th e forecasting and planning system was crucial in creating a sound ﬁ nancial 
management and improving transparency and accountability. Th e sustainable task structure, 
the sustainable balanced budget, and the reorganization of ﬁ nancial management enhanced 
creditworthiness and allowed a shift to an active borrowing policy to facilitate future project 
ﬁ nancing.
Th e Process of the Financial Reform
We begin by summarizing how the reform was achieved in Budapest. A clear and con-
sistent strategy and readiness for implementation were the driving forces of the changes in 
Budapest. At the same time, success required adequate timing and coalition building (see 
table 23.1). Th e vision and adaptability together could enable the municipality to achieve 
gradual reform in changing and often unfriendly circumstances.
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Table 23.1 Th e Reform of Financial Management in Budapest, 1990–1998 and Beyond
1990–1994 1994–1998 1998 and beyond
Situation
 Fiscal pressure
 Fiscal uncertainty
 Biased relationship with 
 central government
 Macroeconomic problems
 Improving ﬁ scal certainty
 Improving relationship with 
 central government
 Starting economic growth
 Public ﬁ nance reform
 “Fend for yourself ”
Policy goals
 Maintenance of ﬁ nancial 
 balance and operational capacity
 Strategy for balanced budget 
 and liquidity management
 Sustainable ﬁ nancial 
 management and balance
Reform goals
 Renewal of decision processes 
 and procedures
 Strengthening ﬁ scal independence
 Implementing of medium-term 
 planning
 Strategic development plan 
 Reform the institutional 
 structure and operation 
New tools
 New decision procedure 
 for new projects
 A formula-based model 
 for shared funds elaborated 
 Increase of own revenues (tax, 
 user charge, and privatization)
 Forecasting model
 Four-year planning of capital 
 budget
 Reform of operation elaborated 
 and started
 Rationalization of 
 operation
 Task ﬁ nancing of operation
 Seven-year forecasting and 
 planning
 Active borrowing policy
Results
 Coexistence of old and new 
 elements of ﬁ nancial management:
 Fight for regaining central revenues
 A formula-based model 
 for shared funds 
 A “base ﬁ nancing” of institutions
 New decision procedure
 Operation surplus increase
 Better ﬁ scal balance until the end 
 of term
 Enhancing creditworthiness
 Bond issuance 
 System of sustainable 
 ﬁ nancial balance
 Flexible optimal project 
 ﬁ nancing
 Sound base for strategic 
 planning
Source: Pallai 2000.
Increased service revenues and lower expenditures were necessary to achieve a 
sustainable ﬁ scal balance. In addition, various policies had to be integrated into a broader 
framework of urban management to increase competitiveness, improve quality of life, and 
secure long-term revenue ﬂ ows for local public services (see chapters 10, 14, 20, and 22). 
Th e chronology focuses on the strategically important steps and features listed by 
election periods (see table 23.1). Th e reform process can be best followed by the changing 
goals. In the three periods discussed, the municipality had three diﬀ erent targets. Th e ﬁ rst 
election term (1990–1994) targeted the ﬁ rst simple steps in reforming and consolidating 
local functions. Th e second election term (1994–1998) focused on the elaboration and 
initiation of major ﬁ nancial management reforms. By the end of the second election term 
and in the ﬁ rst years of the third one, a sustainable balance was achieved and a robust 
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economic growth started. Th e third government period and future development will be 
guided by an increasingly complex strategic development plans (see chapter 20). 
Progress in the 1990–1994 Period
Th e start of the new local government system was very promising in 1990. First, 
municipalities received 100 percent of the personal income tax, some other central transfers, 
and virtually all local public assets to fulﬁ ll the wide range of tasks assigned to them.
One major weakness of the Hungarian system, however, could be seen in the early 
years. Th e intergovernmental ﬁ nance rules and budget envelope were (and are) determined 
by the annual national budget; hence, central transfers could be signiﬁ cantly modiﬁ ed from 
one year to the other, but own-revenue capacity could be built up only slowly by the local 
governments. Th is weakness caused growing ﬁ scal uncertainty. A profound tendency of the 
1990s was that the central government passed on more and more service responsibilities 
while cutting transfers to local governments to decrease overall public expenditures and 
ease the pressure on the central budget. Th ese processes together caused considerable ﬁ scal 
pressure on localities.
During the ﬁ rst election term (1990–1994), the ﬁ scal pressure was so high that the 
leadership of Budapest made great eﬀ orts to maintain its ﬁ nancial balance and operating 
capacity, and struggled to regain at least part of the resources withdrawn by the central 
government (see box 23.1). At the same time, elaboration of a strategy to reform ﬁ scal 
and operational management started. As a result, new elements were introduced into the 
system, which for the time-being coexisted with the surviving old elements and practices.
Financing operating tasks remained within the framework of the traditional base-line 
ﬁ nancing system, because a new task ﬁ nancing system was premature. Capital budgets 
were accepted only for a given year and projects could be approved at any time of the 
year, as in the old system. From 1993 on, as a ﬁ rst step toward stricter budget constraints, 
the consequences of new projects on the capital budget for following years were also 
calculated and adjusted to total ﬁ nancing projections. Th e decision rules were also made a 
bit more transparent and accountable. Th ese ﬁ rst improvements of ﬁ nancial planning were 
eﬀ ective on the capital side of the budget, but could not adequately handle the operational 
consequences.
Box  23.1 Electoral Cycles Matter
In Budapest the situation was further aggravated by the fact that, in the ﬁ rst and third electoral periods, 
the city leadership belonged to the opposition parties of the Parliament. Th is split caused various tensions 
between the city and the central government. Beyond general ﬁ scal restrictions in intergovernmental 
transfers, Budapest was not preferred in central investment grants in two electoral periods. As a result 
central government transfers in the Budapest budget dropped from 71 percent of the total revenues in 
1990 to 57 percent in 1994 and to 27 percent in 2000. Because own revenues could not increase enough 
to counterbalance the missing transfers, the real value of total revenues decreased, while local tasks 
increased.
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Progress in the 1994–1998 Period
During the second election period (1994–1998), there was good and bad news for 
Budapest. Th e country faced serious macroeconomic stress, but intergovernmental relations 
improved and became more predictable, which signiﬁ cantly helped the enactment of 
reforms in Budapest. Th e strategy changed from survival to development. Important 
reform steps became eﬀ ective, and the goals to obtain a balanced budget and introduce 
liquidity management became achievable.
Analysts knew from the beginning that the central government had serious ﬁ scal 
problems and that Budapest had a structural deﬁ cit as well (Ebel and Simon 1995). In this 
situation the key element of the city’s strategy was to increase own revenues and target real 
ﬁ scal autonomy by increasing local taxes, charges, and capital revenues instead of a fruitless 
ﬁ ght for regaining the earlier central transfers.
Firm reform steps became plausible and unavoidable in 1995 when a large amount (Ft 
8.5 billion) of central grant funding was pending for months. Th is short instability helped 
the city’s ﬁ nancial leadership gain broad political acceptance for the ﬁ rst privatization, 
dynamic revenue raising, and introduction of a seriously restrictive expenditure policy 
foreseen in the new ﬁ nancial strategy.
Local taxes increased from Ft 9.9 billion to Ft 29.4 billion from 1995 to 1998, and 
other own revenues increased dynamically (see ﬁ gure 23.1). Th e privatization breakthrough 
was the sale of shareholding in three major public utility companies that in itself provided 
for US$ 300 million municipal revenues. Further increase of own revenues was a crucial 
element of the institutional and ﬁ scal restructuring strategy adopted in 1996.
Figure 23.1 Municipal Revenues, 1991–1998 (Ft billion in 1998 prices)
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Th e cornerstones of the new ﬁ nancial strategy had to be deﬁ ned by an analysis of 
tasks and resources. A seven-year ﬁ nancing projection model was developed for Budapest 
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with the assistance of the French Credit Local International Council, which allowed a 
multiyear plan to be established. In 1997 the municipality introduced a seven-year revenue 
forecasting and a four-year planning scheme (in 1999 a seven-year planning of capital 
budgets was implemented).
Th e Credit Local model, besides helping establish multiyear planning, highlighted 
the need for structural changes. Projections of any set of plausible hypotheses in the 
model proved that, without important changes in service delivery, the structural deﬁ cit 
could not be eliminated except by an increase of own revenues and a decrease of operating 
expenditures (see ﬁ gure 23.2).
Figure 23.2 Municipal expenditures, 1991–1998 (Ft billion in 1998 prices)
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Th e ﬁ nancial projection model seemed to be a simple tool, but it became a decisive 
element in the political process. It helped many politicians who previously opposed ﬁ nancial 
reforms to capture the notion of the structural deﬁ cit. Hence, the model encouraged the 
emergence of common support for reform and willingness to accept its political costs.
Th e local government had to face the fact that the increase in current revenues and 
revenues from asset divestiture had serious limits. Under such circumstances, maintaining 
the operating expenses in real terms would result in a shortage of investment resources, and 
eventually even ﬁ nancing these operations would become impossible.
Th e strategy to decrease operating expenditures had three pillars: (a) developing 
concepts for each service sector to deﬁ ne core functions while setting up a strategy to get 
rid of superﬂ uous functions whose expenses could not be covered in the long term, (b) 
reducing unit operating costs by introducing a task ﬁ nancing system, and (c) rationalizing 
the service institutions ﬁ nanced from asset revenues through a rationalization fund.
0
50
100
150
200
250
1992
300
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 19981991
Current expenses
Total expenses
Capital expenses
C H A P T E R  2 3    F I N A N C I A L  M A N A G E M E N T  R E F O R M
461
Because of this decrease the municipality could change the expenditure side of its 
budget considerably. In 1998 operating expenditures decreased from 85 percent to 47 
percent and capital expenditures increased from 13 percent to 24 percent. Th e rest of the 
budget (that is, the remaining 29 percent in 1998) was earmarked for debt service, ﬁ nancial 
investments, and reserves.
Targets and Progress in 1998 and Beyond
It was clear at the beginning of the ﬁ nancial reform that these major changes would 
require several years. Th e capital budgeting reform was easy and complete, but only the ﬁ rst 
introductory steps were taken toward the operating budget reform. In the third election 
term, the shift to task ﬁ nancing of operations was targeted. In 1999 and 2000, besides the 
traditional operating budget, so-called shadow budgets based on the new task ﬁ nancing 
scheme were also prepared, to be ready for exclusive use after necessary reﬁ nements. Th e 
extended budget reform aimed to establish a predictable and transparent ﬁ scal planning 
system, to build creditworthiness, to create incentives for eﬃ  ciency, and to discourage 
institutional slacking.
Enhanced creditworthiness was a precondition to the shift to an active borrowing 
policy, to enter the capital market as a fully autonomous entity, and to be able to build a 
loan portfolio in which ﬁ nancing risk is dispersed. To adopt an active borrowing policy, the 
municipality had to increase its ﬁ nancial reserves to be equivalent to at least one year’s debt 
service obligations. After positive experiences with European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development transport 
loans, the municipality issued debt for German Mark 150 million on the international 
bond market.
Financing infrastructure investments partly from borrowing ensured that the amount 
of annual investment outlays remained roughly equal. Had this practice not been pursued 
by the city, investments would have been implemented with delays, on the one hand, and 
great ﬂ uctuations would have characterized development activities, on the other.
Th e strategy of prudent ﬁ nancial management became a key objective of this period. 
Every autumn, when the concept for the next year’s budget is prepared, a seven-year 
forecasting model is updated. Based on the ﬁ nancial forecast and analysis, the targeted 
annual proportions of the operating and capital budgets are set. Th e operating surplus is a 
crucial element of budgeting. Each year planners make an eﬀ ort to obtain or approach a 
20 percent surplus, even if current expenditures ought to be decreased for the sake of long-
term sustainability. Th e most heated debates among the members of the local government 
are often around this issue from November, when the concept for the budget is accepted, 
until March, when the budget of the actual year is approved.
In the yearly budget debate, the ﬁ nancial management ﬁ ghts for the operating surplus 
(that is, to peg operating expenditures to operating revenues). Th is approach resists the 
short-term political temptation to avoid cutting expenses and increasing own revenues 
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to enable continuing capital investments and strategic development. For the advocates of 
the operational needs concept, the operational surplus is a big target, because a 20 percent 
surplus seems to be an arbitrary number for the arguments to improve services instead. 
Until 2000 the ﬁ nancial leadership proved to be strong enough to accept the short-term 
political costs of restrictions, and after serious conﬂ icts in the leading coalition, the proposed 
ﬁ nancial strategy was kept. Th us, the operating and capital expenditure items deﬁ ned on 
the basis of the pre-set proportions of the budget, the multiyear planning of capital budgets, 
and ﬁ nancial reserves for active borrowing policy are maintained.
Th e key reform achievement is that even after two years of serious decrease in 
intergovernmental transfers, the budget ﬁ gures of the municipality demonstrate ﬁ nancial 
health and balance in 2000 (see table 23.2). Debt service is fairly low and the proportions of 
expenditures are good: 47 percent operating expenses and 42 percent capital expenditures. 
Table 23.2 Major Budget Figures, 2000
Revenues Ft 
billion
% Expenditures Ft 
billion
%
Central transfers 75.2 27.3 Operating expenses 125.4 45.5
 For operations 69.2 25.1 Investments, transfer of funds 61.8 22.4
 Capital 6.0 2.2 Cost of refurbishment 9.0 3.3
Own revenues in the reporting year 112.9 40.9 Debt service 2.4 0.9
 Current revenues 88.4 32.0 Government securities bought 36.0 13.1
 Accumulation and capital-type revenues 24.5 8.8  Maturity within one year 18.5 6.7
 Maturing over one year 17.5 6.3
Residual funds 0.1 0.1 Speciﬁ ed reserves 39.0 14.2
Redemption of government securities 
purchased in preceding years
68.5 24.8  For operations 2 .4 0.8
 Maturity within one year 43.4 15.7  For accumulations 36.2 13.1
 Maturing over one year (municipality) 25.1 9.1  For refurbishment 0.5 0.2
Loans 18.8 6.8  For local minority governments 0.0 0.0
General reserve 1.7 0.6
Grand total of revenues and loans 275.5 100.0 Total expenses 275.5 100.0
Note:  Diﬀ erences in totals one caused by rounding.
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Tools and Procedures in Financial Reform
Th is section summarizes the key instruments and procedures applied in the 10-year reform 
program in Budapest, namely, the Rationalization Fund, the task ﬁ nancing procedure, the 
major privatization actions, the new borrowing policy, and the change in user charges.
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Rationalization Fund
Th e Rationalization Fund was set up in the 1997 municipal budget to facilitate the 
institutional restructuring process by providing resources for one-time investments aimed 
at cost saving and increased eﬃ  ciency in local budgetary institutions. Th e underlying 
considerations were that: (a) an institution often did not have resources for a large one-time 
investment or for compensation needed to realize continuous cost savings later, and (b) 
because of information asymmetry the management of the institutions had to be motivated 
to explore and disclose possibilities for reducing operating expenditures and cooperating 
with the ﬁ nancial department in the cost-saving process.
All local budgetary institutions can bid for resources from the Rationalization Fund 
by submitting calculations on cost savings achievable by a rationalization investment. 
Th e calculations are not revised, but the annual cost savings presented are automatically 
deducted from the operational budget envelope of the institution. Th is rule encourages 
accountable decisions. Th e ﬁ nancial department sets the ﬁ nancial conditions, the rules, and 
the amount of resources to ﬁ ll up the fund each year. Th e sectoral departments of the local 
government make the actual decisions on the bids, keeping the given ﬁ nancial framework 
and using their professional standards.
Th is fund, on the one hand, avoids long debates on small refurbishing and rationalizing 
interventions with relatively small amounts. On the other hand, it has broken the old 
routine of lobbying for capital investments without considerations of operational cost 
consequences. Th e directors of institutions now must take responsibility for cost savings. 
Th e fund secures positive steps toward more eﬃ  cient institutions and optimally allocates 
decision-making roles. Th e needs assessment is made by the institution, the ﬁ nancial 
conditions are deﬁ ned by the ﬁ nancial leadership, and professional priorities are set and 
decisions are made by sector departments and professional committees. Th e merit of the 
fund has gained wide acceptance and resulted in increasing resources.
Task Financing
Th e base-line ﬁ nancing method in budgetary institutions was a heritage in Hungary and in 
Budapest alike. Th is method means, ﬁ rst, that the institution rather than the delivered task 
is ﬁ nanced. Second, the actual expenditures of the base year are the basis of the budget plan 
of the following year, and line items are increased or decreased in accordance with various 
benchmarks, such as inﬂ ation or overall change in resources, or are changed without any 
normative arguments. Th is old and simple method can result in serious disparities across 
institutions because it gives no information about the ﬁ nancing level of each activity, 
eﬃ  ciency, and possible cost reductions or obstacles to reducing costs without risking service 
delivery.
To reduce municipal operating expenditures as targeted in the ﬁ nancial strategy, 
reformers had to introduce a more eﬀ ective and transparent system of ﬁ nancing service 
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delivery. Resources had to be scaled to tasks rather than ﬁ nancial positions gained over 
years. Hence, the most complicated systemic change was the shift to zero-based task 
ﬁ nancing in the whole ﬁ nancial management reform.
Th e task-ﬁ nancing program started in 1997, when a comprehensive assessment of 
budgetary institutions and task performance was prepared. Th e primary items of every 
account were recorded at least throughout one year to measure the attainment of material 
expenditures. On the basis of these data, the legal framework of a normative task ﬁ nancing 
was prepared and normatives were set. Soon after, the preparation of a zero-based budget 
proposal started, linked to benchmarks and task normatives. In the ﬁ rst phase new labor 
and material expenditure plans were calculated for each institution.
Planners realized at the beginning that an all-embracing change to zero-based 
budgeting required at least three to four years. In the ﬁ rst, experimental years (1998–2000), 
so-called shadow budgets were prepared beside the traditional type budgets, which 
remained in use. On the basis of an assessment of the results of the two budgeting schemes, 
the benchmarks and the normatives of the zero-based budget would be reﬁ ned before 
shifting the system to the exclusive use of the task-ﬁ nancing scheme. 
After the system’s introduction, the municipality annually updates the normatives and 
benchmarks if necessary and sets ﬁ nancing (current transfer) conditions accordingly. Th e 
receiving institution, however, then has freedom in the actual use of resources received (that 
is, reallocation of funds between tasks performed).
Privatization
Th e basic principles of privatization are service security and the involvement of professional 
investors with adequate ﬁ nancial strength and operating experiences. Th e privatization 
concept considered a very large circle of companies, set guidelines and procedures, but left 
room for exclusive decisions (Municipality of Budapest 1994). By 1996 all of the service 
enterprises were transformed into commercial companies to prepare them for privatization. 
Of the 15 public utility companies, eight essentially were natural monopolies, and seven 
worked in a competitive market prior to the privatization. Four companies retained their 
natural monopoly after privatization. Th e privatization decisions and other regulations will 
determine the market position of the other companies.
Privatization of the Th ree Big Utility Companies
Th e most important transactions in Budapest have been the privatization of the Gas Supply 
Company, the Waterworks, and Wastewater Works. Th e privatization of the three major 
utility companies has three common features. First, each of them was tendered in a two-
round open international competitive bidding process. Second, the municipality retained its 
majority ownership stake in each company. Th ird, privatization involved the companies’ core 
assets (physical network and structures) to maintain the unity of the assets and operation. 
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An exception will be the new sewage treatment facilities, which will remain in 100 percent 
municipal ownership because they were ﬁ nanced from earmarked state grants (see chapters 
4 and 7). Th e privatized company, on the basis of a lease or an operation agreement, will also 
operate these new components of the municipal infrastructure (see table 23.3).
Table 23.3 Privatization of Utilities
Parameter Gasworks Waterworks Wastewater works
Conditions to be fulﬁ lled Operation and 
maintenance
Operation and 
maintenance, 
plus reconstruction
Operation, maintenance, 
reconstruction, 
and development 
Market position Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly
User charge set by Central government Municipality Municipality
User charge formula None Cash-ﬂ ow basis Cash-ﬂ ow basis
Subsidy None None Development subsidies
Privatization method 50% in preference 
shares plus dominant 
management rights
27% of voting shares, 
dominant management 
rights, and responsibility 
of operation
25% of priority shares, 
dominant management 
rights, and responsibility 
of operation
Privatization revenue Ft 13.5 billion (1995)
Ft 4.3 billion (1997)
Combined US$ 142 
million 
Ft 16.5 billion (1997) 
US$ 88 million
Ft 16.9 billion (1997) 
US$ 90 million
Period of contract Indeﬁ nite 25 years 25 years
Investors’ beneﬁ t Dividend Management fee Dividend priority
Local government beneﬁ t Dividend Cost savings Dividend earnings
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Besides similarities, the diﬀ erences between the utility companies justiﬁ ed the 
application of diﬀ erent privatization models. Th e Gas Company was essentially in good 
condition at the time of privatization, so investors were called to submit two bids each, one 
for majority and one for minority ownership. Th e decision by which a minority shareholding 
was sold with majority management rights was essentially political. A professional investor 
(VeW Ruhrgas consortium) was awarded the contract, which assured the enhancement 
of the company’s eﬃ  ciency. Privatization, nonetheless, should be regarded as a ﬁ nancial 
investment, but the market price of the shares sold depends on the gas price. Because the 
gas price is regulated by the central government, the Budapest local government could not 
oﬀ er a rate-of-return guarantee to the investor. Th e investor receives dividends only if this 
company is proﬁ table under these conditions.
Although divestiture to a minority municipal ownership is still not on the agenda, it 
is in principle an alternative. For this reason, the local government changed the statute 
of the company prior to privatization and created a so-called “golden share.” Th e latter 
will be retained even if virtually all the shares are sold, because the golden share assures 
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key ownership rights (for example, vote against closure, spin-oﬀ , merger, change in the 
company’s core activities or capital).
Th e waterworks had a current and a forecasted future deﬁ cit at the time of its privatiza-
tion. Th erefore, the investor was not interested in acquiring a majority ownership stake, but 
sought another way of earning its proﬁ t. Th e investor (Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and RWE-
Acqua GmbH consortium) acquired 27 percent of voting shares and a 25-year concession 
to be the operator of the company under a management fee agreement. Th e investor was 
able to obtain its proﬁ t from 75 percent of the cost saved. Cost savings are calculated on the 
basis of the 1996 costs according to a formula set in the contract.
Privatization of the wastewater works likewise did not ensure adequate return on the 
shares acquired. Th is company was proﬁ table enough to enable reinvestment for needed 
development. Th erefore, the proﬁ t on investor’s return on equity was projected to remain 
very low for years. As a result, the investor (CGE/Berliner Wasserbetriebe) received a 
priority dividend right. Th is means that all proﬁ ts up to 18 percent of the face value of the 
shares purchased must be paid exclusively to the investor, and additional dividends, if any, 
can be made only above this amount in proportion to the share ownership.
Th e Privatization Beneﬁ ts for the Municipality
In the privatization contracts of the utility companies, the municipality remained responsible 
for control, monitoring, and regulation of service delivery in accordance with the Act on 
Local Government. Th e city also retained its ownership rights. Ownership rights are 
exercised through delegated members on the board of directors, on the supervisory boards, 
and at the companies’ general assembly.
Between 1995 and 1997 privatization revenues amounted to nearly US$ 320 million, 
which represented on average 7 to 20 percent of municipal annual revenues. Since 1990 the 
municipality has used amortization and capital revenues strictly for capital expenditures. 
Although privatization revenues constitute one-time resources, their availability was a 
cardinal element of infrastructure development. Th ey played a crucial role in Budapest, 
because central transfers were seriously decreasing in a period when the fast reconstruction 
of the degraded and underdeveloped infrastructure was a major strategic task of the city.
Because the municipality is not only the owner and user but also the price authority, a 
trade-oﬀ  occurred between the one-time revenue from the share price and the water and 
wastewater charge eﬃ  ciency. Th e long-term price policy received higher priority than the 
revenue goal in Budapest. Besides these considerations, the distinction between the share 
ownership and the management rights sought to enhance eﬃ  ciency. Th e strategic investors 
received proportionately higher management rights than their share ownership, because a 
rational private-like management was assumed to increase operational eﬃ  ciency.
In both cases, a complicated cash-ﬂ ow-type price formula was introduced to secure 
incentives for short- and long-term investments alike. Looking at the past three to four 
years of the Budapest privatization, we can see that although the gas and wastewater 
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privatization have been rather successful, calculation and contractual problems are causing 
continuing conﬂ icts between the ownership partners of the waterworks.
In Budapest the joint sale of assets and management rights to strategic investors was 
not only a revenue source for the local government, but also meant a strong commitment 
for the restructuring of the entities and creation of market conforming eﬃ  cient companies. 
In transition, especially, the symbolic content of these changes has also particular 
importance.
Borrowing Policy
Because the infrastructure investments could not be exclusively ﬁ nanced from capital 
revenues and operating surplus, external resources have also been used since the early 
1990s. For timely ﬁ nancing of long-term development projects, the local government 
aimed at establishing a loan portfolio in which ﬁ nancing risk could be spread.
Th e local government borrowing strategy has been based on conservative assessment 
of resources, selection of quality partners, the use of negative pledge, and creation of a 
continuously optimized and versatile loan portfolio. Th e one-time capital revenues were 
used to upgrade assets and enhance operations, leading to improved budget ﬁ gures and 
creditworthiness, and gradually to improvement in the borrowing position. Th is transition 
ﬁ rst enabled a shift from domestic to international markets, and then from money to bond 
and equity markets. 
Until 1996 the municipality borrowed from two sources: domestic bank loans and local 
currency denominated loans from the international ﬁ nancing institutions. In 1996–1997 
the city was able to enter the international money market because it had a small debt 
portfolio and a relatively large investment portfolio, at a time when investments required 
sound ﬁ nancing, privatization progress was good, and foreign conﬁ dence in the country 
was increasing.
Th e decision for the ﬁ rst bond issue was in the Eurobond market, targeting personal 
investors. Because the city could not get a higher rating than the country, and the Euro-
bond issuance of the Hungarian National Bank had only a slightly lower interest rate than 
the city was projected to obtain, a decision was made to issue a bond without rating (see 
box 23.2).
In 1996 the municipality conducted a two-round tender to select the lead manager of 
a bond issuance, which was postponed because of the change of taxation rules. Following 
the amendment of the tax rules in 1998, the decision was made to launch the bond issue. 
Meanwhile, the rating of Hungary had improved from the speculative to the investment 
category (Moody’s Baa2), and the city’s ﬁ nancial status had also strengthened. In the 
absence of a rating, the local government compiled an Information Memorandum, and the 
issuance took place in Frankfurt with the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank as lead manager 
in July 1998.
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Box  23.2 Terms of the Budapest Municipal General Obligation Bond 1998
Issuer: Municipality of Budapest
Amount: German Mark 150 million
Type: Fixed rate
Maturity: Five years
Amortization: None, bullet payment
Interest rate: 4.75 percent
Issue price: 101.55 percent 
Status: Direct, unconditional
Security: Unsecured
Rating: None
Negative pledge: Yes
Purpose: General funding
Use of proceeds: Infrastructure development
Performance: Punctual
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
Th e trading price of the bond was 99.35 percent and its oﬀ er price 101.55 percent. Th e 
interest rate of the bond was 4.75 percent ﬁ xed rate, which represented a 57 basis point risk 
premium over the yield of the reference German government bond. On LIBOR, a 35 basis 
point premium was obtained. A bond issuance of the Hungarian National Bank obtained a 
33 basis point risk premium over LIBOR in February 1998, so the market assessed the risk 
of the municipal bond very similar to the country risk. Institutional investors subscribed 80 
percent and personal investors 20 percent of the bond, mainly on the German and Austrian 
money market.
User Charges
During the socialist period, a clear supply-side planning approach, with its all-consequent 
weaknesses in developing utilities, resulted in ineﬃ  cient networks, huge subsidies, and 
ﬁ nancial losses. Utility charges remained still symbolic in the early 1990s. Th e gradual 
increase of charges modiﬁ ed consumption patterns, enabled nearly full cost recovery, and 
furnished the conditions for improving service delivery. Th is change made separating the 
service delivery and social assistance functions of the municipality possible.
For instance, the inherited symbolic charge for waste containers was replaced by a 
volumetric charge for household waste in Budapest in 1996. Th e inﬂ exibility of this charge 
scheme was strongly criticized in the few months following its introduction. Later, as 
the users got familiar with the new system, some 20 percent of containers were returned, 
and both the collected volume and charges reached a balanced level in the course of one 
year. Th e major fear before the introduction was that illegal dumping would increase, but 
similarly to other countries’ experiences, no evidence to this eﬀ ect was found. Since 1997, 
because of the charging policy, only the development expenses of waste management were 
debited from the budget of the municipality.
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In the ﬁ eld of water services, the socialist heritage was a relatively well-developed, but 
with a poorly maintained network of both water supply (with 97.5 percent coverage) and 
sewage collection network (with 90.2 percent coverage). Th e rate of wastewater treatment, 
however, was very low (25 percent in 1999). At the same time, as a result of symbolic prices, 
water consumption well surpassed western European standards.
Th e gradual increase of user charges decreased consumption to 140 liters per day 
per household, about the European Union average, and allowed nearly full cost recovery. 
Charges became a tool to improve eﬃ  ciency and conformity with the market and made 
privatization possible. In the wastewater system, some investment subsidy is still needed. 
Th e wastewater ﬁ gures, however, cannot be used as comparative data, because they contain 
only the costs of the existing 28 percent capacity in full treatment.
Th e pricing system has further changed with the privatization. Water charges now 
consist of two parts: a connection fee and a use charge that covers an access fee and a water 
price, both calculated on a volumetric basis. Th e volumetric charge is based on average 
accounted costs determined by a cash-ﬂ ow–based formula that is set in the privatization 
contract. Before the privatization, the charge was decided yearly by the municipal assembly 
on the basis of direct accounting cost estimates prepared by the companies.
Th ough the pricing is based on an average cost rather than marginal cost type charge, 
it still aﬀ ected users’ behavior (ﬁ gure 23.3.) Th e present system provides for adequate 
information about the demand, which helps in introducing further rationalization steps 
in service delivery. Th e city plan for wastewater treatment capacity development was 1.5 
million cubic meters in 1993; it was cut back to 600,000 cubic meters per year in 1999, and 
the process of adjustment of plans to demand continues. Th is adjustment provides huge 
savings on development costs for wastewater services and operating costs both on water 
and wastewater services.
Figure 23.3 Changes in Charges and Amount of Water and Wastewater, 
1990–1998 
Source: Budapest Municipality data.
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Conclusions
Th e case of Budapest clearly demonstrates that a successful reform requires not only 
a clear and consistent vision, but also adequate external and internal conditions for 
implementation. Th e strong strategy and adequate timing of the introduction of the reform 
elements are equally important. A decisive issue is to recognize when the system is mature 
enough for the implementation of more sophisticated tools, and to see whether the political 
arena is suitable for building a supportive coalition for the reforms.
Th e stability and transparency of the ﬁ nancial management made the local government 
a reliable partner for banks, investors, and other private partners. Th e ﬁ nancial management 
reform of Budapest has been used as a model in other Hungarian municipalities. It is widely 
cited and used as a best-practice case in training of municipal staﬀ  in transition countries.
Th e recent recentralizing ﬁ scal strategy of the central government that endangers the 
emerging prudent local ﬁ nancial management also inﬂ uences the development agenda in 
Budapest. One of the most important achievements of the Hungarian transition, the exis-
tence of a multilayer public sector with strong and independent local governments, is 
jeopardized for the sake of a power concentration that historically has been proven ineﬀ ective.
For the time-being, the ﬁ nancial system of Budapest could keep its balance with 
further reduction of operational expenses. Most local governments, however, must seriously 
restrict their development programs to prevent ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties. Still, the situation calls 
for the reconsideration of the entire system of intergovernmental transfers (see chapters 2, 
6, and 9). Th e overall amount of transfers to the municipal sector that was subject of annual 
changes over the 1990s ought to be pegged to macroeconomic indicators (for example, 
gross domestic product or the national budget) to maintain present achievements and 
support further local improvements. “To date the Hungarian transition has been not only 
gradual and systematic, but also bold and creative. Th ere is no doubt that this will continue” 
(Ebel, Várfalvi, and Varga 1998: 444). 
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Th e typical municipal budget inherited from the central planning era was a list of line-item 
revenues and expenditures prepared for accounting rather than for real decision-making 
purposes, and it was traditionally not shared with the local citizens. Th e local government 
of Szentes—a mid-sized city with a population of 33,000—introduced a new slogan in 
1997: “Anyone who needs information about the city can obtain it from the budget.” Th e 
residents and council members of Szentes can look at the budget and know much more 
about how the city works today than they could in 1996. Th e process of achieving this 
objective was diﬃ  cult. Th e local government ﬁ nance oﬃ  cers and department heads had 
to enhance their skills to improve budgeting and ﬁ nancial management. Th e increased 
workload and the need to keep staﬀ  motivated were more than they had anticipated, but 
the results—faster and more informed decision-making and a smoother budget approval 
process—are extremely rewarding.
Th is chapter analyzes the successes and diﬃ  culties experienced by Szentes oﬃ  cials as 
they reformed the budget. Th e process and the lessons learned could be valuable for other 
cities motivated to bring about budget reform.
Departure from the Traditional Budgeting
Before 1997 the Szentes budget was traditional and included no information beyond what 
was required by central regulations. Th e main document consisted of a proposal for the 
next year’s budget, as well as a municipal decree on adopting and implementing the budget 
proposal.
* Th is chapter is based on Stone and Tönkö 1999. 
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Th e narrative part of the decree set forth the rules of the central budget law that regu-
lated local governments, instituted the impact of central regulations on municipal ﬁ nancial 
management, and set up local measures accordingly. For example, the 1996 document stated 
that funds from the central budget had decreased, which necessitated raising more local 
funds and implementing some austerity measures. Th e primary objective was to generate 
suﬃ  cient funds to cover operating expenditures without borrowing. Th e 1996 budget also 
outlined the measures to be taken during the year to achieve that objective.
Th e traditional document was essentially a line-item budget, which had no details 
on service accomplishments and program results and did not facilitate objective decision-
making in the city council. Nor did it explain to residents the local government’s policies 
or use of revenues.
Need for Changes
Th e city had been struggling with very high expenditures for years, and neither the depart-
ments nor the institutions of the local government knew the exact amount of expenditures 
or savings on speciﬁ c services. A decrease in ﬁ nancial revenues had led to an increasing 
need for a more transparent budget document.
Leaders of the ﬁ nancial department felt that a completely restructured budget 
document was required to make informed decisions about discontinuing or decreasing 
municipal activities without aﬀ ecting service levels. Th e new document would need to 
provide information on any duplicate services and related expenditures, so that decisions 
could be made based on data rather than subjective policies.
Initiating Program Budgeting
Th e U.S. Agency for International Development program provided technical assistance, 
including training and resource materials in program budgeting and ﬁ nancial management 
(see box 24.1). Th e Szentes municipality committed the staﬀ  time necessary to undertake 
the reforms and identiﬁ ed the priority area in which to initiate program budgeting. For the 
1997 budget, city oﬃ  cials targeted communal services as a relatively small but suitable sector 
for experimental program budgeting. Two subprograms were identiﬁ ed: (a) park and green 
area maintenance, and (b) public area sanitation. Th e heads of the ﬁ nance department and 
of communal services attended the training seminars. Th e latter stated that after attending 
the ﬁ rst day of the two-day seminar, he did not want to continue. As a person whose job was 
technical, he did not see the need to understand ﬁ nancial matters. Th e training, however, 
revealed that even though the budget was a ﬁ nancial document, its preparation involved 
technical elements and his participation and training were crucial to reform. Moreover, he 
began to see that a program budget could be a powerful tool to acquaint the committee 
members and the public with his sector and help them recognize its value.
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Box 24.1 Program Budget Training Series
In July 1996 Szentes began to participate in a three-year program initiated by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development in Hungary (1996–1999) titled “Modernizing Financial Management for 
Hungarian Local Governments.”  Th e program is comprised of six one- or two-day training seminars 
following the local governments annual budget cycle ( January–December), with training in developing 
a program budget along with other ﬁ nancial management skills, such as forecasting techniques, ﬁ scal 
indicators, revenue alternatives, performance measurement, and capital budgeting. Th e training material 
also covers other categories, such as citizen participation in governance, the budget process and calendar, 
implementing and monitoring the budget, and budgeting and accounting.
Program Budgeting
A program budget focuses on the expected results of services performed by the government 
rather than on what a municipality buys (for example, human services or commodities). 
Goals and objectives are stated for each service category and subcategory in speciﬁ c 
quantiﬁ able terms. Th e program budget identiﬁ es what activity is proposed, what eﬀ ect it 
will have on the public, and the estimated costs of the resources needed to accomplish the 
objectives for each program.
A program budget cannot be initiated without suﬃ  cient political support and guidance 
from the mayor, the ﬁ nance director, and budget committee of the local government. In 
Szentes, the champions of program budgeting were the mayor and the head of the ﬁ nance 
department. Th ey initiated the reform process as follows:
 Council members were ﬁ rst informed about the proposed budget reform in the 
required semiannual report in June 1996. Th ey requested a work plan prior to adopting 
program budgeting.
 Th e needed reform in the park maintenance and green area program was outlined, 
and a work plan was developed. Th e 1996 work plan for the 1997 budget was quite 
preliminary and remained a theoretical rather than practical tool. In retrospect, it 
served more as a draft for the 1997 work plan, which was strictly followed.
 Internal meetings were held among council members and the budget and line 
department staﬀ s to inform everyone about the reform and concepts of program 
budgeting.
 Th e local council decided to adopt program budgeting in the communal sector in the 
August 1996 session.
 
By the time the budget concept was discussed in February 1997, each council member 
understood the changes that had been made in the structure and content of the budget, and 
practically all of them supported those changes.
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After adopting the 1997 budget, the city decided to expand the program budget 
to include the entire social sector (see box 24.2). Th e ﬁ nance department submitted a 
detailed work plan to the city council in May 1997, and it was unanimously supported and 
approved. Th e work plan speciﬁ ed the following actions:
 A complete review of the social sector by the August session of the council, so decisions 
regarding restructuring (if necessary) and changing the sector could be implemented in 
time for the 1998 budget
 A description of the phases of budget reform, including the various steps, deadlines, 
and names of persons responsible for speciﬁ c tasks.
Box 24.2 Development of the Program Budget in Szentes
1997
Program budget for communal sector (two subprograms)
1998
Program budget for the entire communal sector (three subprograms)
Program budget for the entire social sector (three subprograms)
1999
Program budget for all sectors, all programs
 Communal sector
 Social sector
 Education sector
 Other sectors (culture, library, sport, tourism)
Separate operating and capital budgets
Th e concept approved in November 1997 listed all the social sector subprograms to 
be included in the 1998 program budget. Th e city also decided to add bridge and road 
maintenance as another subprogram of communal services to the 1998 program budget.
Th e social sector includes 23 mandatory activities speciﬁ ed by central regulation. 
Szentes grouped them into three subprograms of social activities: (a) subsidized by the 
central government, (b) subsidized directly to the service provider, and (c) providing 
personal care directly to the citizens.
In addition to the main budget, a separate budget and volume of indicators document 
was also developed for all city institutions. Th is document consisted of two sections: (a) 
tables with ﬁ scal and performance indicators from 1995 through 1998, and (b) tables 
with all line items of revenues and expenditures from 1996 through 1998. Input, output, 
and eﬃ  ciency performance indicators were included, but no outcome indicators were 
calculated.
For 1999 the city developed a program budget for all its sectors: communal, social, 
education, and other activities. Th e education sector includes ﬁ ve kindergartens, six primary 
schools, six secondary schools, one dormitory for the primary school, and one dormitory 
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for the secondary school. Th e “other” sector comprises administration and management, ﬁ re 
protection, public culture, sport, tourism, and civil defense. In addition, a separate capital 
and operating budget was prepared.
Budget Reform in Szentes
Th e process of budget reform takes several years. Szentes started program budgeting in one 
sector in 1997 and has slowly expanded to additional sectors. Th e actual process of budget 
reform involves: (a) evaluation of community needs, (b) organization of the budget process, 
and (c) decision-making. Th ese require an in-depth analysis of each sector in a joint and 
sustained eﬀ ort by the ﬁ nancial department and all the institutions involved.
Evaluation of Community Needs
Th e communal and social sectors that have completed a program budget ﬁ rst undertook 
a detailed SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis. Th e 
SWOT analysis, which was speciﬁ ed under phase two of the Szentes work plan, led to 
the development of program alternatives, detailed knowledge of current service levels, 
identiﬁ cation of future needs, and options on how to achieve them.
 Th e budget is a reﬂ ection of how citizens’ money is being spent; therefore, it should 
involve greater public participation. Th is participation promotes citizen understanding of 
local government and vice versa, builds relationships and trust, and ultimately leads to 
better and longer lasting decisions. Th e head of the Szentes ﬁ nance department said that 
the weakest point in the budgeting process is the lack of the public’s direct involvement in 
articulating its needs and demands to the government. Th e city is aware of this shortcoming 
and has tried to increase direct contact with the citizens. In 1999 the city conducted its 
ﬁ rst citywide multiservice household survey and prepared a questionnaire to investigate the 
need and opinion of parents regarding kindergartens.
Currently, information about community demands and needs is obtained indirectly 
from city council members, who learn about the needs or complaints of the citizens at a 
public forum or when they receive citizens in their oﬃ  ces. Th e city council member then 
informs the appropriate government agency and tries to help solve the problem in a fairly 
informal way or formally states the citizens’ concerns at a city council meeting. Th e staﬀ  of 
the municipal unit concerned must then respond to the complaint and state if the problem 
can be solved or ﬁ nanced from the current budget. Since 1994, the mayor has had “open 
day” once a month to hear the grievances and complaints of residents. Th e head of the 
ﬁ nance department also has monthly meetings with institution heads who give progress 
reports on their current work and future plans.
Public complaints and demands are identiﬁ ed in two ways: (a) at public forums and 
city council forums and during oﬃ  ce hours, or (b) from letters addressed to and processed 
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by the ﬁ nance department. Th e department estimates a cost associated with addressing each 
of the problems and includes them in the budget policy document under the title “Public 
Demands.” If people want to inﬂ uence budget decisions on important issues (usually major 
investments), they can participate at the local government’s discussion of the budget.
Organization of the Budget Process
To organize the budget process and make the budget document more friendly for citizens, 
the head of the ﬁ nance department prepared a form for the 1997 budget that had to 
be completed by each institution. Th e form requested information about revenues and 
expenditures, number of staﬀ , and salary scales. Detailed work plans were also prepared by 
the sector developing a program budget.
Th e additional data requirements for a program budget necessitate greater cooperation 
between the ﬁ nancial department and the sectors. According to the head of the ﬁ nance 
department, stressing to all department heads that a program budget will allow better 
articulation of their needs and make clear the consequences of their inadequate funding to 
the city council and citizens is important.
Th e budget process can be made smoother by: (a) preparing a budget calendar and 
a work plan, (b) improving cooperation among departments, and (c) adhering strictly to 
realistic deadlines.
Th e social sector is relatively large and has more staﬀ  than others. Cooperation between 
the social policy group and the ﬁ nance department has been more diﬃ  cult because the 
former is overburdened. For example, the head of the ﬁ nance department had to develop 
independently a list of demographic and other indicators for the social sector to measure 
eﬃ  ciency and eﬀ ectiveness. Th e head of the social policy group later created a short list 
of the indicators. During the process of preparing the budget, both of them realized their 
interdependence and need for cooperation. Th eir work together was successful not only 
because they eventually achieved the program budget, but also because their attitudes 
and way of thinking changed. Th e strategic goals for the 1997 work plan were formulated 
jointly by the ﬁ nance department and the head of the social policy group.
Th e heads of diﬀ erent social institutions were involved in developing the subprograms. 
Institution heads also played a major role in collecting such data as the number of clients 
of various services, mapping the current situation, evaluating collected information, and 
prioritizing the diﬀ erent services.
Dialogue between the heads of the communal and social sectors was limited. Th ey both 
stated that their sectors were so diﬀ erent that discussions on program budgeting techniques 
were unnecessary. Because the communal sector was the pilot group for program budgeting, 
however, lessons learned could have made program budgeting in the social sector easier (for 
example, obtaining additional information from the staﬀ  and motivating them; developing 
indicators, charts, and graphs).
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Decision-making
As a result of the budgetary reform, the decision-making process has undergone changes in 
considering alternatives to achieve a particular goal. Being a small sector, communal services 
did not oﬀ er many opportunities. In the 1997 budget, two alternatives were proposed to 
achieve each subprogram’s goal. For park maintenance and green area management, the 
alternatives were to increase the grass area under city maintenance by 10 or 20 percent. For 
the public sanitation subprogram, the alternatives proposed to increase the surface area of 
the roads to be cleaned by two diﬀ erent percentages.
Th e sector analysis and detailed information generated in the budget reform process 
also beneﬁ ted decision-making in the subprograms. Planners decided to expand the area of 
park maintenance and to create a ﬁ ve-year plan for park maintenance, beginning with 1997 
(this was eventually approved by the city council). Th e same was done for public sanitation, 
and a detailed list of regularly cleaned streets was prepared and reported in the budget for 
the ﬁ rst time. Th us, citizens interested in the functioning of government became better 
informed, and now they complain if streets are not cleaned on time.
Because bridge and road maintenance was also included as a program budget in the 
1998 city budget, planners prepared a detailed list of work to be done in square meters 
(for example, maintenance and repair of potholes, curbs, unpaved streets, pavements, and 
bridges). Th ey also speciﬁ ed the amount of money to be allocated to each of these areas. 
According to the head of the communal sector, other cities, such as Eger and Gödöllö, 
maintain similar detailed information for this sector. In 1997, however, the other cities were 
not aware that this information is used and can be crucial in program budgeting.
Th e welfare sector includes several highly diverse services. Central regulations are 
numerous, so the municipality’s ﬂ exibility is limited. Despite these constraints, three 
alternatives for improving the welfare provision system were suggested after sector analysis 
was completed in August 1997.
All the committee members interviewed for this report stated that decision-making in 
both communal and welfare services were based on a clearer understanding of the program. 
Th e impact of restructuring the sector and any changes in resource allocation on service 
delivery was clearer after 1997.
The Budget Document
Th e transfer of more central government functions and responsibilities has challenged 
local governments to maximize resources and improve managerial productivity and 
accountability. Information on local government policies, operations, programs, and 
expenditures is demanded by policymakers and citizens—and by the investment and 
business communities. In this environment, a community’s budget document can serve as a 
policy statement, ﬁ nancial plan, operations guide, and communications tool.
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Th e Budget as a Policy Statement
Th e budget can be considered to be a single policy document that articulates the govern-
ment’s ﬁ scal and program policies and explains their rationale. Because budget decisions 
and estimates are based on certain assumptions, these assumptions should also be disclosed 
in the budget. Th e budget should guide the activities of people who are budgeting. All local 
governments face practically the same constraint of ﬁ nancial resources that are insuﬃ  cient 
to satisfy competing needs of the community. Managers must, therefore, identify the 
current and future community environment; deﬁ ne needs; establish goals, priorities, and 
strategies to meet the needs; and wisely allocate limited resources.
Th e policy overview of the budget usually includes the following items:
 A transmittal letter—Although not essential, the transmittal letter may summarize key 
budget decisions, serve as an extensive budget message with goals and priorities, and 
provide a description of ﬁ scal and program strategies to address pressing issues and 
help the local government fulﬁ ll its mission.
 A time perspective—Long-term goals and short-term objectives are stated and 
clariﬁ ed by past trends, current events, emerging issues, and future directions.
 Organization along major themes—Successful policy overviews are constructed around 
major themes that are action-oriented statements and guide budget development 
for the upcoming year (for example, “Make the City a Great Place to Live and Do 
Business”).
 Illustration with graphs and graphics.
 
Szentes’ 1997 budget included several new elements, but substantial progress began 
only with the 1998 budget. Box 24.3 shows elements of the 1997 and 1998 budgets 
satisfying these criteria.
Box 24.3 Th e Szentes Budget as a Policy Statement
1997
 SWOT analysis for each subsector (two subprograms).  Th is analysis identiﬁ ed each sector’s current 
 status and future direction.
 Use of graphs and ﬁ gures to explain the working of some institutions.
1998
 Letter from the mayor stating the budget reform rationale and city’s priorities.
 SWOT analysis for each sector (entire communal and social sectors) that identiﬁ ed their current 
 status and future directions.
 Summary of working of the government—past and future—with graphs and tables.
 Increased use of ﬁ gures and graphs throughout the document.
Th e city’s major policy objective is to maintain its level of services (despite decreasing 
central government transfers and subsidies) and to develop the city as a venue for sport and 
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tourism. Even though these action-oriented statements guided the development of the city 
budget, these policies were not formally stated in the budget document. One must keep in 
mind, however, that the budget reﬂ ects government policies not only for the beneﬁ t of the 
citizens of the community, but also for other cities and possible investors. Th us, the city’s 
major missions should be stated up front in the budget.
Th e Budget as a Financial Plan
Th e ﬁ nancial section of the budget should present summaries of revenues, expenditures, 
debt, and capital spending. In addition, it should have a consolidated summary of all the 
ﬁ nancing sources and uses, including revenues, transfers, debt proceeds, expenditures, as 
well as opening and closing balances.
Local budgets have traditionally served as ﬁ nancial documents, with a summary 
and detailed tables (see box 24.4). Th e 1997 and 1998 Szentes program budgets had the 
following additional ﬁ nancial information:
 Consolidated ﬁ nancial summaries of revenues and expenditures, as well as a summary 
of expenditures by institutions
 Description of major revenue sources and discussion of signiﬁ cant revenue trends and 
underlying assumptions for revenue estimates
 Expenditure data and analysis by activities, which together give a better picture of the 
current working of the government because they show the amount of money received 
and spent in each sector
 List of major capital projects and their costs for the budget year, plus the estimated 
impact of capital projects on current and future operating budgets, all of which 
highlight ﬁ nancing needs and help prioritize activities
 Financial statements that have three or more years of information for trend analysis, 
which facilitates more accurate projections for future budgets
 Balance statement of expenditures and revenues
 Outstanding debts.
Box 24.4 Th e Budget as a Financial Plan
Th e budget should provide a comprehensive perspective of the government’s ﬁ nancial condition over a set 
period.  To develop a rough framework of ﬁ nancial constraints that will be faced in the budget year, the 
following issues should be examined and analyzed:
 Current revenue performance and preliminary estimates of revenues for the budget year
 Current expenses versus the budget and the prospects for surplus carryover into the budget year
 Trends in inﬂ ation and local economic conditions
 Prospects for new taxes and fees or changes in current tax and rates 
 Major cost items that will fall due in the budget year.
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Th e Budget as an Operations Guide
Th e budget should guide department managers, measure the departments’ productivity, and 
outline operational and spending plans for agencies and programs. Each program should 
have detailed information on the agency’s mission, staﬃ  ng level, performance objectives 
and indicators, expenditure level, and ﬁ nancing sources, if possible. Th e budget operating 
detail (usually the longest part of the budget document) includes department or program 
goal statements, performance objectives and measurements, ﬁ nancial data, and staﬃ  ng and 
organizational structure.
With the start of program budgeting in 1997, program goals were identiﬁ ed for both 
subprograms in the communal sector. Th e local government also prepared detailed revenue 
and expenditure tables for all municipal institutions, which provided brief a description 
of each institution’s professional activities via major indicators and set goals for these 
institutions. Using a program budget for the social sector in 1998, the city developed goals 
for each social institution. Th e three institutions provided 23 services, which were grouped 
into three subprograms. No program objectives were stated in the budget.
Regarding staﬃ  ng and organizational structure, the 1997 and 1998 budgets included 
ﬂ ow charts showing the structure of the city council, institutions, and mayor’s oﬃ  ce. Both 
budgets also contained staﬃ  ng summaries by institutions.
Th e Budget as a Communication Tool
Th e budget can be a powerful communications tool that brings valuable information to 
citizens, businesspersons, potential investors, central government oﬃ  cials, and others. In 
addition to providing information to the local community, the budget should highlight the 
following elements:
 Major factors that inﬂ uence the budget from one budget period to another
 Th e community proﬁ le, including statistics and the organization of the local govern-
ment
 Organizational and ﬁ nancial structure of diﬀ erent municipal departments and agencies
 Th e fund structure and budget classiﬁ cation used to categorize resources and spending.
 
Because the budget is a vehicle for communicating budget decisions in an accurate and 
clear manner, the document should be formatted and printed in a way that will enhance 
its merit and that the lay reader understands. Th e budget should include reader guides (for 
example, “How to Read the Budget”), budgets in brief, and graphs or other visuals that will 
eﬀ ectively communicate policies and priorities.
A new element in the Szentes 1997 budget document was a table of contents followed 
by an introduction to the city, which brieﬂ y described its demography, economic situation, 
infrastructure, major economic units, and investment opportunities. Other new elements 
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were charts presenting the structure of the city council, the list of municipal service 
institutions, the structure of the local government oﬃ  ce, and a list of major municipal 
responsibilities. Th e document also provided an overall analysis of the communal sector: 
strengths and weaknesses, legal background, local information, description of the 1996 
conditions, identiﬁ cation of tasks for 1997, and crucial issues that needed to be addressed 
to improve municipal services.
Th e local press and radio publicized the budget reform several times. Th e local 
government wants to maintain a day-to-day contact with the media, because it is an 
eﬀ ective way to keep the public informed. In 1997 the newsletter of the Ministry of 
Interior and the national magazine Autonomia covered the topic of program budgeting and 
budget reform in general, and Szentes was cited as a best-practice example. Since then, the 
local media (newspaper and radio) in Szentes have increased their coverage and directed 
questions regarding budget reform to the head of the ﬁ nance department.
In the 1998 budget, in addition to including all these elements, the city expanded 
the section on general information about the community and also discussed internal and 
external factors aﬀ ecting the budget. Improvements in the budget layout, however, could 
make the budget even more eﬀ ective. For example, all information pertaining to a sector 
could be consolidated and presented in one section, with a separate section for each sector.
Impediments to Change
Despite its tremendous achievements in budget reform, Szentes faced several constraints 
to the reform process, such as time, resistance, lack of human capital, and technical 
shortcomings.
Time is the main constraint mentioned by the staﬀ  involved in the budgeting process. 
Th e reform process entails an enormous amount of extra work, often done after regular 
working hours. Because the process requires the cooperation of several units and agencies, 
all staﬀ  members must work overtime.
Resistance to change is another key impediment. According to the head of the ﬁ nance 
department, the budgeting reform process slowed down for two major reasons. First, some 
institution heads tended not to understand immediately the purpose and beneﬁ ts of reform 
(the institutions’ ﬁ nancial managers were better partners). Second, some persons res-
ponsible for a given sector within the oﬃ  ce of the local government did not do what was 
expected of them. Th e institution heads were unable to manage the budgetary reform 
because they lacked an overview of the process. Th is blindspot often made them reject 
the idea of reform. Th e mayor and the head of the ﬁ nance department spent a lot of time 
persuading the staﬀ  that the budget reform was useful and worth the increased workload.
Lack of adequate staﬀ  can be a problem even when they have the necessary skills and 
knowledge. Th ey need training to improve their expertise in putting together a program 
budget, which again requires time. According to the mayor, developing the right attitude 
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in the staﬀ  was important to keep them motivated despite the time shortage. In some 
departments, increasing the number of staﬀ  to cope with the increased workload was also 
necessary.
Technical shortcomings were also serious. Another impediment to the reform was 
the inadequate technical equipment and ﬁ nancial constraints on purchasing (for example, 
insuﬃ  cient computers, color printers, software, and ﬁ ling equipment).
Overcoming technical diﬃ  culties would allow the staﬀ  to focus on the necessary 
analytical and policy changes. Certain ineﬃ  ciencies, such as duplication of eﬀ orts 
because of inevitable parallel compliance with laws (old budget standards) and with the 
requirements of a reformed budget, could be addressed more easily by removing technical 
obstacles. Once all city government oﬃ  ces are computerized, the staﬀ  could easily prepare 
the two budgets.
Conclusions
Because local government responsibilities are deﬁ ned and categorized by sectors (as are 
institutions and departments of the local government), the best way to introduce program 
budgeting is to take a sectoral approach. Th e city of Szentes has created a structure of 
programs and subprograms centered usually on mandatory responsibilities by sectors. 
Th is method is a useful one, especially in the ﬁ rst years of creating a program budget 
when obtaining a clear picture of how these sectors function is crucial. Th e city, however, 
should later strive to create budgets that concentrate on solving problems, that is, program 
objectives should not merely meet responsibilities but also solve major problems. To ﬁ nd 
out what these major problems are, each city must go through the various stages of reﬁ ning 
its budget.
How does the budget process in Szentes diﬀ er from the traditional budgeting process? 
After three years of budget reform in Szentes, the following improvements have been made 
in its budgeting process:
 Th e ﬁ nance department is more careful about timing and starts to look at priority areas 
as early as April instead of November.
 A work plan is developed and strictly followed.
 Key individuals responsible for the various activities are identiﬁ ed early and held 
accountable if they do not deliver results in time.
 Th e city collects actual data for measuring its performance.
 Informing those involved in the budget reform has become an ongoing process.
Szentes shows a long-term commitment to budget reform. Each year, the city has 
added more sectors to the program budget, and in 1999 it had a program budget for all 
sectors. After that, the city focuses on reﬁ ning its budget.
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Th e committee members recognize the tremendous work and eﬀ ort by the ﬁ nance 
department and appreciate the new budget. All the interviewed members stated their 
willingness to support the budget reform and create a conducive and cooperative 
environment for future work. Several obstacles to change have arisen, but the local 
government states that it is motivated and committed enough to continue with the reform 
process.
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25Managing Household Arrears in Utility Services:Social Policy Challenges and Responses
Katalin Tausz



Th e system transition made the introduction of cost-recovery prices for local public services 
both possible and necessary. Serious price increases have taken place in many countries 
in eastern Europe. Although some eﬀ ects were positive, these changes contributed to the 
deterioration of the household budgets of most low-income families. Either as a natural or 
an adverse reaction, this deterioration has resulted in hundred of thousands of unpaid utility 
bills, producing a growing amount of overdue receivables and losses in service companies.
Household arrears have reached alarming magnitudes in Hungary. Th e problems 
have greatly aﬀ ected local governments, which have fallen into a situation of having been 
owners, customers, and regulators of most local service providers, and also the politically 
responsible protectors of the citizens’ interests. Following the principles of cost price and 
restrained supplier subsidization, many municipalities started to analyze the underlying 
factors, categories, and possible treatments of household arrears in the mid-1990s. Th ey 
also turned toward targeted preventive measures and means testing for welfare subsidies to 
support primarily families that would otherwise be unable to pay service charges.
 Th is chapter addresses three issues: (a) the reasons that have led to household 
arrears, (b) the major actors in resolution and preventing arrears, and (c) the role of social 
policy in managing household arrears. Th is chapter summarizes the ﬁ ndings of surveys 
carried out in Budapest in 1998 by the Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce, and social policy lessons 
learned during a successful experimental program supported by the British Know How 
Fund in Nyíregyháza. Th e program aimed at ﬁ nding resolutions and treatments for 
household arrears in this large secondary city in northeast Hungary.
* Th is chapter is based on Tausz 2000.
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Household Arrears and Underlying Factors in Hungary
Analysts recognize three main categories of household arrears: overdue charge and fee 
obligations to utility service providers, overdue rental fees, and arrears in housing loan 
installments. Household arrears are, nationwide, the highest in district heating, and 
housing loan installment arrears are the second highest. Arrears in electricity and natural 
gas services are much less signiﬁ cant because utilities can legally and simply switch oﬀ  
services in case of overdue payment obligation.
Th e Ministry of Finance estimated the amount of household arrears to utility companies 
at about Ft 4.8 billion in 1998, and the Ministry of Welfare estimated them at Ft 10 billion 
for the same year. According to these ministries, some form of utility arrears occurred in 
800,000–900,000 households, and 40–50 percent of them had been accumulating for more 
than six months (Kristóf 1999). Installment payments on 652,000 housing loans were in 
arrears; with a combined amount of Ft 21 billion in 1998 (utility and installment arrears 
together were equivalent to US$ 150 million). During that year, the Hungarian Savings 
Bank, the major provider of housing loans, started legal actions to collect arrears in 38,000 
cases (Nagy and Tausz 1999). By international comparison, household arrears to utilities 
are proportionately not high, but are more worrisome in the light of the average family 
income in Hungary. 
Causes and Underlying Factors of Household Arrears
During the shift to a market economy, Hungary faced several diﬃ  culties that negatively 
aﬀ ected households. From the perspective of household arrears to utility companies, the 
following problems are the most signiﬁ cant:
 Change in the price-setting system and elimination of subsidies
 Privatization of utility companies
 Increase in the preferential interest rate of outstanding housing loans from 3 to 12 
percent in 1990
 Privatization of the housing stock and fall in the number of social housing
 Decrease of real income, increase in unemployment, and increase of poverty and 
income inequalities.
Unjustiﬁ ed Growth
Th e quality of the housing stock signiﬁ cantly improved in the last decades. In 1960, 74.6 
percent of dwellings were supplied with electricity, 22.7 percent with piped water, and 13.7 
percent with piped gas. By 1997, 100 percent of dwellings had electricity, 84.4 percent had 
piped water, and 41.2 percent had piped gas.
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At the same time, households began to use durable goods and electronic devices 
extensively, which signiﬁ cantly increased use of electricity. In 1970 average per capita 
electric energy consumption was 53.9 kilowatt hours, and monthly gas consumption was 
78.4 cubic meters. By 1997 electricity consumption increased to 179 kilowatt hours and 
monthly gas consumption to 125 cubic meters. Th ese positive developments were ﬁ nanced, 
however, from growing external and internal indebtedness of the central budget, while the 
country ran into an economic crisis and a steep inﬂ ation spiral.
Households in Expenditure Trap and Poverty
As a result of the price adjustment, the economic crisis, and the subsequent stability 
measures, household revenues did not grow in step with the multiplying expenditure needs, 
and the rise of household expenditures exceeded the high inﬂ ation rate (see table 25.1). Th e 
gap widened between housing costs and household incomes, so that the housing costs 
grew signiﬁ cantly as a share of household expenditures. Th ese reasons undoubtedly under-
lie the growing household arrears. Diﬀ erences in arrears by income groups, by ﬁ nancing pos-
sibilities, by household means, and by motivations to cover these expenses are substantial.
Table 25.1 Consumer Price Indices in Percentage of the Preceding Years, 1993–1998 (percent)
Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
1998 per 1992
Electric energy 111.0 109.0 160.9 132.2 133.0 121.9 417.2
Piped gas 109.8 103.4 150.7 135.2 133.1 119.8 368.8
District heating 121.3 112.4 129.7 123.6 129.2 116.5 329.0
Coal 105.1 108.4 121.9 128.9 115.9 113.6 235.7
Firewood 120.3 118.0 124.7 120.0 109.8 104.6 244.0
Heating oil 115.8 122.5 236.0 187.2 120.2 109.9 827.9
Bottled gas 111.0 121.0 139.6 137.9 136.3 118.1 416.2
Household energy, total 112.4 111.7 150.0 132.5 129.9 117.9 382.2
Consumer price index 122.5 118.8 128.2 123.6 118.3 114.3 311.8
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce data.
Today food and energy represent the most signiﬁ cant items in the household budget 
(see table 25.2). Th e Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce found that the cost of food increased from 32 
to 40 percent, and housing costs from 10 to 18 percent of average household expenses from 
1989 to 1997 (CSO 1998a: 103). As a result of income disparities, housing costs represent 
16 percent of the expenditures of rich families, 20 percent for lower income families, and 
more than 40 percent for the poorest people who receive some social assistance. 
In 1998 the Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce conducted a survey to determine the living 
conditions of families who receive some form of social assistance. Th ese data prove that 
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the housing conditions of families who have household arrears are worse than for other 
families. More of these families live in ﬂ ats with district heating or in damp, dark, and 
unhealthy dwellings and neighborhoods. Only one-third of those in arrears are active 
earners and one-third live on unemployment beneﬁ ts or social assistance. Many of these 
people receive a disability pension (CSO 1998b: 112).
Of the households represented in this survey, 17 percent had been unable to pay one 
or more bills, 47 percent had one type of debt due, and 53 percent had two or more types 
of debt due. Th e 66 percent of households with debt due were in cities, 28 percent in rural 
settlements, and 6 percent in Budapest. Almost one-ﬁ fth of the families with children 
receiving social assistance cited some form of debts to the utility companies.
One-quarter of families with household arrears who live on social assistance have been 
sanctioned. Electricity was switched oﬀ  in 45 percent of the cases and gas in 17 percent, at 
least temporarily. Movable properties were foreclosed for 17 percent of the cases, and 12 
percent of these the dwellings were put up for auction,
Social disparities by regions are also very sizable. Th e poorer eastern parts of the 
country and the urban areas with large living quarters of housing estates are hardest hit by 
social problems. In the eastern part of Hungary, the accumulated arrears are four times as 
much as the country average (Alliance of Social Professionals 1998). 
Table 25.2 Consumer Price Index by Main Expenditure Categories, 1991–1998
Year Food Household energy Total a
1991 121.9 181.0 135.0
1992 145.6 277.4 166.1
1993 188.1 311.8 203.4
1994 232.1 348.3 241.6
1995 304.3 522.5 309.7
1996 356.9 692.3 382.8
1997 419.4 899.3 452.9
1998 479.8 1,060.3 517.7
Notes: a. Th e total is a combined index of consumer price index of food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, 
 clothing, consumer durable goods, household energy, heating, other articles, fuel, and services.
   1990 = 100.0 percent.
Source: Central Statistics Oﬃ  ce data.
Arrears in Nyíregyháza 
Nyíregyháza is among the cities that have suﬀ ered the most from the so-called trans-
formation recession. High unemployment and poverty levels resulted in serious household 
arrears despite regular central and local subsidies. In 1998 a working group was formed, 
including experts of the local government, utility companies, and consultants hired by the 
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Know How Fund, to ﬁ nd a sustainable resolution for the overdue receivables, the vast 
majority of them accumulated (over 180 days) household arrears (see table 25.3).
One-ﬁ fth of households in Nyíregyháza had some kind of overdue obligations to 
public service providers. Arrears were especially high (73 percent) for families who live in 
public dwellings. Th is situation occurred in 1997 despite the fact that 42 percent of citizens 
eligible for social assistance received a special beneﬁ t to cover the deﬁ cit in housing expenses 
and despite the city spending on average 5 percent of its budget on welfare subsidies.
Th e increase of arrears threatens more and more the housing security of families, the 
proﬁ table functioning of the utility companies, and the social peace of communities. Th us, 
from the aspect of social policy, overdue obligations to utility companies now appear as 
the problem of over-indebted people, and consequently as the problem of social assistance, 
poverty, and impoverishment (Győri 1995). 
Table 25.3 Household Arrears in Nyíregyháza, 1997
Service companies Arrears
(Ft million)
Overdue receivables, 
percentage of total 
sales
Arrears over 180 
days, percentage of 
total arrears
Household arrears, 
percentage of total 
arrears
District heating 237.3 13 72 90
Water 56.0 4 40 88
Social housing management 81.3 16 77 92
Solid waste management 21.0 4 36 53
Source: Local government of Nyíregyháza data.
The Actors in the Arena of Household Arrears
Four major groups of actors could and ought to inﬂ uence the change of household arrears: 
the central government, local governments, service providers, and households. While 
developing the means of handling the problem, reformers must get acquainted with 
and assess the diverse interests of these actors. Only by understanding these groups will 
reformers ﬁ nd ways to make compromises and devise long-term solutions.
Th e central government is interested, on the one hand, in reducing political tensions 
due to the sharp social contractions and, on the other hand, in satisfying the sense of justice 
of deserving taxpayers. Th e central government is also responsible for the defense of central 
resources; thus, it is interested in transferring the problem to the local level.
Th e interests of the local governments are complex. Since 1990, in the new political 
and economic regime, the system of governance has been based on the principles of 
decentralization and subsidiarity. Th us, local governments have direct responsibility for 
municipal utility services (water, district heating, and solid waste management) and for 
public housing. Because municipalities provide various welfare services to citizens, they are 
indirectly responsible for managing a wide range of social problems.
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As a consequence of the transformation of the command economy to a market system, 
utility service companies were privatized and price subsidies were withdrawn. In several 
cases, municipalities became totally or partly the owners of the local service providers. Th is 
process resulted in a schizophrenic situation: the local government as owner has a role in 
setting cost-based prices, and it is also responsible for providing basic utility services and 
for the well-being of the inhabitants. Th e local government as owner is interested in proﬁ t 
maximization, which in several cases aﬀ ects the household budgets and forces the same 
local government to provide social transfers to poor families.
Moreover, local governments are politically divided: they must keep the political and 
social equilibrium between the interests of the beneﬁ ciaries of social transfers and the 
general taxpayers of the municipality.
Th e service companies and the banks are, ﬁ rst of all, interested in avoiding the accu-
mulation of existing arrears and in their reduction, but not at any price. Th eir motivations 
depend on the cost of collecting overdue receivables. Th e utility service companies have 
diﬀ erent options to force households to pay and to sanction them—the electricity service 
can be switched oﬀ  or the water supply can be reduced to a minimal daily service allowed 
by law—but in most places utilities have no way to suspend the district heating service. 
Moreover, the companies work in a given political and social framework, so their collection 
actions inﬂ uence the image of the whole company.
Th e basic interest of households is to use the services and to save their housing 
security. Diﬀ erent types of households, naturally, have diverse interest structures. Some 
of them, when calculating costs and beneﬁ ts, are ready to give up some elements of their 
consumption to pay utility bills, but others do not make sacriﬁ ces to avoid arrears.
Addressing Household Arrears in the 1990s
Th e actions to resolve the problems of accumulated household arrears have been based on 
the principle that all the players involved must make some ﬁ nancial contribution to the 
resolution.
Nationwide Measures
Th e central government launched several programs to handle the problem of household 
arrears. In 1992 the Ministry of Welfare set up a Crisis Management Oﬃ  ce to assist cities 
facing extreme diﬃ  culties. In 1993 the newly enacted Act on Social Administration and 
Assistance introduced a housing beneﬁ t, a new form of social assistance, as a proactive 
instrument to protect the living conditions of poor families. In 1997, to counterbalance the 
increase in energy prices, the central government proposed to set up an Energy Foundation 
based on joint ﬁ nancial resources of the utility service companies and the government.
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A government resolution passed in 1998 aimed to provide a more eﬀ ective way to 
reduce the burdens of over-indebted families. Th e national grant schemes developed to 
reduce household arrears required supplementary local government decrees to facilitate the 
management of arrears and provide a signiﬁ cant local ﬁ nancial matching contribution. Th e 
legislation supported a decentralized solution of the problem. To receive central and local 
government ﬁ nancial support, families had to contribute 30 percent toward the resolution 
of their arrears.
Th e local governments had to formulate their own resolutions on the eligibility 
criteria for the housing beneﬁ t. Although the law initiated a proactive measure and did 
not prescribe exclusion, several local governments excluded households with arrears from 
the group of beneﬁ ciaries. In Nyíregyháza, for example, one-ﬁ fth of the city’s annual 
welfare payments are used for the housing beneﬁ t. Th e only persons eligible for the beneﬁ t 
are those that have no debt due to utility companies or have made an agreement on the 
installments to repay their arrears.
Nonproﬁ t organizations were set up in several places. Th e Héra Foundation was 
organized in 1991 on the recommendation of specialists participating in a special 
committee working on the energy concept of the government. Th is nationwide foundation, 
ﬁ nanced by donations from energy suppliers and other companies, local governments, and 
private persons, assists families with cash and in-kind beneﬁ ts (for example, energy-saving 
bulbs) and provides consultation services. Several local governments have also created 
foundations to provide grants to the service areas, which are local functions that have the 
highest arrears: water, district heating, and public housing.
Actions in Nyíregyháza
Utility companies made several attempts to increase their eﬃ  ciency. In Nyíregyháza 
the water company implemented layoﬀ s and energy rationing programs, but the sewage 
treatment plant works at one-third of its capacity because of the drop in water consumption. 
Th e district heating company could solve its problems only with a major reconstruction. 
It operates at 30 percent below capacity because large institutional customers changed 
their heating systems to individual ones. Th e solid waste company uses cross-ﬁ nancing 
techniques, because it operates some proﬁ table activities as well. Rents have not changed 
since 1994, which partly explains the ﬁ nancing problems of the public housing management 
company.
In Nyíregyháza the service organizations also made eﬀ orts to increase customers’ 
control over their level of consumption. Most of the utility services (water, gas, and 
electricity) can be measured now. Th e district heating consumption is the only one that 
cannot be measured and is regulated individually by users. Th e technology in housing 
estates does not allow individual measurement, which leads to signiﬁ cant losses and causes 
arrears. Th e district heating company, together with the local government, launched a 
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program to install meters in apartments in the framework of a national environmental 
program. Th e company, however, was able to install the meters for only 10 percent of its 
customers by the end of 1999.
Th e local government has the legal authority to set user charges. Th is conclusion is based 
on the information collected from the service organizations. No predetermined formulas 
are available for calculating service prices. Th e service organizations are responsible for the 
collection process. Diﬀ erent practices were developed for reading the meters, for billing, for 
routine collection, and for collection of accumulated arrears.
Th e four service organizations have diﬀ erent practices and do not have a joint database 
on nonpayers. Recent changes in incentive payments proved that when fee collection was 
contracted out, the collection ratio became much higher. In other cases the companies 
prefer collection by their own employees, because they can oﬀ er new schemes or simply 
check the service.
Th rough a public foundation of Nyíregyháza (RES Foundation), the two major service 
companies and their customers can cooperate with the city. Using this ﬁ nancial channel, 
funds of the private service companies can be transferred to public purposes. Th e customers 
(represented by the association of large families) are also involved in the allocation of the 
housing grant.
Among the eligibility criteria for the grants, the key component is that the applicant 
household should pay, within two years and in one sum, two-thirds of the accumulated 
arrears. Th e companies also contribute, and they beneﬁ t from this system because the grant 
is directly paid to them. Th e amount they had transferred to the foundation determines the 
grant they might receive, so cross-ﬁ nancing among the service providers does not occur. 
Th e service organizations monitor the eligibility of the applicant households and prepare 
the resolution contracts with the customers. Th e companies follow their own procedures in 
means testing and evaluating households’ ﬁ nancial status.
Out of the 10,000 households in arrears, nearly 2,000 cases were successfully resolved 
with the technical and ﬁ nancial assistance of the RES Foundation from its establishment 
in 1996 through 1999 (see ﬁ gure 25.1).
Figure 25.1 Number of Arrears Worked Out by the RES Foundation in Nyíregyháza, 1996–1999
Source: RES Foundation data.
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 Th e foundation as an organizational form has several advantages. First, it provides a 
proper framework for cooperation among the interested parties: the local government, the 
service companies, and the customers. As an outcome of the coordination, plans to increase 
tariﬀ s are directly evaluated in tandem with the social policy consequences of the decision, 
so the foundation also works as a consulting forum for combining local ﬁ nancial and 
welfare policy objectives. Th e foundation also supports implementation by coordinating 
various channels of social assistance.
Categories of Households by Positions and Strategies
Over-indebted households and those facing ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties apply diﬀ erent survival 
strategies. On the basis of these strategies and their situation, the households that have 
debts due can be grouped into diﬀ erent categories. When creating preventive and active 
measures in resolving and reducing household arrears, reformers should take some 
characteristics into consideration: the length of the period of nonpayment, the debt due, 
the type of nonpaid services regarding the penalty for nonpayment, and the role of lack of 
solvency in willingness to pay. 
Duration of Nonpayment
Nonpayers are of two types: occasional and recurrent. Recurrent nonpayers are also of 
two types: those who have moderate accumulated arrears and those who have large 
accumulated arrears. Th ese three groups each require diﬀ erent treatment. Th e ﬁ rst two 
categories are good candidates to improve their payment discipline through a sophisticated 
fee collection and punishment system. Th e third category, recurrent nonpayers who have 
large accumulated arrears, requires more complex treatment and joint action by the central 
and local governments and suppliers, including targeted welfare subsidies.
 Occasional nonpayers have small arrears for a short period because of ﬂ uctuating 
income or for some unforeseen reasons.
 Households that have recurrent moderate debts due cannot be considered chronic 
nonpayers, although they are unable to pay three or four times a year or are put oﬀ  
from regular paying.
 Households that have large accumulated debt due have not been paying for a longer 
period of time (10 or more collection periods) and have accumulated signiﬁ cant 
arrears.
 
Generally families facing ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties rank their obligations. Th ey reduce 
consumption and are willing to pay ﬁ rst for those services that can be switched oﬀ  easily (for 
example, electricity and piped gas). Electricity consumption declined in Nyíregyháza when 
customers realized that exclusion was technically simple. Water services can be reduced, but 
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no exclusion is allowed because of public health regulations. Water consumption decreased 
very signiﬁ cantly, however, in response to price increases and punishments. Terminating the 
district heating service is almost impossible, because the present in-house networks do not 
allow individual closure.
Since 1993 the nonpayment of rental fees might lead to eviction. Likewise, the arrears 
in installments on loans may result in the foreclosure sale of the dwelling. Th e risk is 
enormous, living itself is at stake, and because debt collection practices are diﬀ erent and 
changing, assessing the consequences is diﬃ  cult.
Th e results of a research project carried out in the second half of the 1980s proved that 
income poverty is only one of the key reasons for falling into arrears. Th e lack of a well-
functioning household and the lack of stability of the household economy also contribute 
to the process.
Households in Poverty
Some households and persons face serious, often inherited, long-term poverty because of 
factors that reinforce each other and may lead to multigenerational poverty. Th ese factors 
are related to family composition, education, and lifestyle or living conditions. Family 
composition might be one of the following:
 One-person “households” of people who live without a family, such as those who grew 
up in state homes for children and have no skills to run a household; single people from 
households disintegrated as a consequence of divorce
 Constant, long-term poor families that have lived in deep poverty for generations, 
and who have little educational background and uncertain labor market participation; 
families who have disabled members or members with long-term illness
 Sliding, unstable intermediate families whose income depends on moderately paid, 
often temporary or seasonal jobs or who are temporarily unemployed; families with 
sickness or family crisis 
 Rootless people who may live without a household, with uncertain housing and family 
conditions, and without a permanent source of income, frequently suﬀ ering from some 
form of addiction
 Unskilled workers who receive a small ﬁ xed salary, who are living on wage labor or 
pension, and who are generally good at managing, but whose real income has decreased 
and they are no longer able to survive on it 
 Entrepreneurial workers who once lived on wage labor, but who were forced to become 
small entrepreneurs with ﬂ uctuating incomes and without savings
 Welfare workers who got or bought subsidized dwellings but who became unable 
to cover the rent and utility fees because, for example, they lost their jobs or prices 
increased (Győri and Gábor 1990a and 1990b).
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Th e diﬀ erentiation of these groups is of key importance, because the problems of each 
are managed diﬀ erently. Sporadic experiences and researchers’ ﬁ ndings show that the group 
that would be able to pay, but simply does not want to pay, utility charges is relatively small 
compared to the poverty groups listed above.
Alternatives and Dilemmas in Managing Household Arrears
Th e actors in managing household arrears have diﬀ erent, sometimes contradictory, interests. 
Th e local government as the key actor can avoid participation in solving the problems or 
fortify contradictory interests. It also may motivate the actors, however, to cooperate and 
smooth conﬂ ict. In the latter case, the local government may try to ﬁ nd a balance between 
conﬂ icting interests. For instance, the service companies are mainly interested in getting the 
fees, but not by all means from the consumers. Th e local government or a foundation may 
assume part of the arrears. Sharing the burden of overdue debts between the consumers, 
the utility companies, and the local government is always a better solution than letting the 
families lose their housing and then providing them with very expensive social housing 
services.
Preventive or Corrective Measures
As a consequence of these roles, a decision must be made about whether: (a) to use com-
pelling measures to collect arrears, or (b) to support the families. Pressure and punishment 
may, in the short run, result in paying, but they will not solve the problems of those families 
who have no resources to mobilize.
In addition, the local government must choose between preventive and corrective 
measures. If the local government chooses prevention, it must concentrate its eﬀ orts to 
help, ﬁ rst, households that have short-term arrears to one or two service companies, and 
second, households that are able, with extreme diﬃ  culty, to pay for the time-being, but that 
would be pushed into the group of nonpayers by further price increases. If, in the short 
run, the local government would like to decrease outstanding arrears, it must deal with the 
largest, long-term arrears.
Th e target group of the preventive measures is endangered lower-middle-class 
families. Corrective means, by contrast, would support the poorest part of the population. 
Th e lessons from large cities indicate that slow accumulation of arrears might lead to an 
unmanageable crisis situation, so social policy actions should also focus on households that 
have short-term debt due to one service company.
How to Cover the Expenses of the Interventions
Expenses can be covered in several diﬀ erent ways. Nyíregyháza organized a foundation 
that shares the costs among the local government (from taxpayers’ money), the service 
companies (from the fees paid by good consumers), and the households in arrears.
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Th e amount of support to be provided to nonpaying consumers must be carefully cal-
culated. Th e supported consumers must contribute ﬁ nancially to the resolution, often with 
a predetermined amount. Th e 1998 central government resolution stipulates a one-third 
consumer contribution, but a reasonable alternative would be to consider the actual potential 
of the household. Th is method would slow down the rhythm of debt repayment, but would 
broaden the base or number of households realistically involved in the collection of arrears.
Households must receive a detailed description of the preconditions and eligibility 
criteria for support. Th e support must be used to decrease overdue debt. Th erefore, the 
money is transferred not to the consumer, but directly to the service provider or is credited 
to the consumer’s account.
Several local governments use various eligibility criteria, such as the so-called recognized 
size of dwelling, the minimum or maximum amount of arrears, and the cost of housing.
As a precondition of support, the consumer may be required enter into a contract with 
the service provider to pay the arrears in installments. A useful precondition to motivate the 
long-term overdue debtors would be for them to use debt management counseling services.
Setting excluding preconditions is a risky and nonequitable solution, because exclusions 
generally aﬀ ect the poorest households (for example, excluding from the debt resolution 
those who have no permanent job).
Present and Future Challenges
Th is section summarizes the challenges in the arena of household arrears, namely how to 
set service prices; how to assess needs and eligibility; how to deﬁ ne appropriate support; 
how to set up a program for resolution of household arrears; how to join their eﬀ orts; and 
what are the key factors beyond social policy.
Price Setting 
Price setting is a crucial component in developing a preventive social policy at the local 
level, and local governments can have a strong inﬂ uence on the procedure. Th e assessment 
and review of company ﬁ nances, and the evaluation of the eﬃ  ciency of operation and 
management practices in a monopoly situation require expertise in municipal administration. 
Such expertise is not always available, even in large cities, so new forms of cooperation 
should be established between local governments and the service companies.
To increase the inﬂ uence of local social policy, price negotiations and price-setting 
procedures should be improved. Th e criteria of welfare policy should be enforced from the 
very beginning of the process. Th e factors included in planning the price increase should be 
agreed on and preferably ﬁ xed by a formula. In this way the framework of the negotiations 
is given, and coming to an agreement on the actual scale of changes of various factors 
incorporated in the formula will be easier.
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Need Assessment and Eligibility
A conscious welfare-service strategy must be based on need assessment, which should 
be made by collecting: (a) data on the families in arrears and on the basic characteristics 
of their overdue debt, and (b) opinions from citizens and from some public and civic 
organizations (for example, social service providers, nongovernmental organizations, labor 
market centers, and minority self-governments). A key impediment to need assessment 
and means testing is that the law on protecting private information prohibits merging 
diﬀ erent databases. Hence, information about the real estate, indebtedness, arrears, and 
personal ﬁ nancial condition of a family cannot be compared. Th is shortcoming is bypassed 
in Nyíregyháza with an information sheet that households applying for debt resolution 
must ﬁ ll out. Th is solution is not perfect, but it is a relatively workable one.
Monitoring and regularly evaluating the eﬀ ectiveness and eﬃ  ciency of the system of 
managing overdue debt is necessary (for example, whether it prevents the rise of new arrears 
and reaches the target group). Evaluation methods should be developed in the planning phase.
A communication system is a key part of the resolution program. Citizens must be pro-
vided with information on public services, consumers’ rights, and eligibility criteria for resolu-
tion of the arrears. Th e ﬂ ow of information between the institutions and sectors also must
be organized. Cooperative planning processes can prevent or solve many tensions and conﬂ icts.
Appropriate Support
Support of the diﬀ erent types of overdue debtors necessitates special measures. Th e 
standard of living rather than the way of life of a family could be the basis for assessing 
the real household situation. In the case of consumers who have one or two overdue bills, a 
notice can be enough to pay. It is a good time to correct administrative mistakes. For people 
who have temporary ﬁ nancing problems because of an unexpected crisis situation, one-oﬀ  
and urgent support payments might be given to prevent the accumulation of arrears.
Paying installments or delayed repayment may be eﬀ ective if some family members 
have the opportunity to get back to the labor market (because they have the necessary 
training and skills), making it likely that their incomes will increase in the near future. Here, 
active social policy measures can be eﬀ ective.
Labor market and debt management counseling services may give additional help to 
families that are unable to increase household income on their own. Th ese families have to 
be provided with income support for the long run and may be motivated to move into a 
low-cost dwelling.
In the case of long-term nonpayers who have given up hope, social workers can play 
an important role.
Inevitably the last two groups will have hardly any chance to solve the problem by their 
own eﬀ orts. Either the service providers need to write oﬀ  their arrears or some of the actors 
(local government, service provider, or a foundation) must assume part of it.
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
498
Th ose consumers who are able to pay but simply do not want to pay may face 
compelling measures. Th is problem resides primarily with the service providers.
Program for Resolution of Household Arrears
Th e reasons for getting into arrears, the behavior of diﬀ erent types of households in arrears, 
and the interests of the actors raise very complex issues. Hence, we advise constructing 
a system and an implementation program for resolution of household arrears with very 
diﬀ erent measures. Th is system would be an action strategy that is: (a) planned for the long 
run, (b) systematized, and (c) based on the combined resources of all actors. Th is system 
requires data and information collection, resource calculation, and decisions on the political 
as well as the professional dilemmas.
Adaptation of a model consisting of connected modules of preventive and corrective 
components proved to be eﬀ ective in Budapest. In this model, households are eligible 
for compensating support to prevent the development of arrears on a normative basis, 
the decision on discharging debt is discretionary, and selection is based on a complex 
assessment of a household’s standard of living and income.
Th e most important advantage of normative solutions for households in need is that 
the conditions are measurable and guarantee legal security. Decision-makers may also 
beneﬁ t from the relatively simple administrative procedure and reduction of expenses that 
would be incurred by means testing.
Selection based on the discretionary principle cannot be measured by the consumer 
because doing so results in consumers who are in need being unable to protect themselves. 
Th ese procedures are generally based on long, expensive assessment processes at the end of 
which the real situation of the client may not be revealed.
In a programmatic structure, the most important elements of the model must be built 
into one system (for example, the type of beneﬁ t, the beneﬁ t to discharge overdue debt, and 
the housing beneﬁ t).
Joint Eﬀ orts
To work out a complex support system and action strategy, the representatives of the 
actors (local government, service companies, banks, and consumers) must, ﬁ rst of all, be 
invited to a conference table. Joint eﬀ orts will lead to better solutions both in welfare policy 
and in methods of managing arrears at the service organizations. Joint eﬀ ort requires an 
established forum of permanent cooperation to balance the equity and eﬃ  ciency aspects of 
the overdue debt problem. All the interested parties, in equal position, should be involved 
in this process. Th is cooperation is the only way to establish a long-term, stable solution 
for managing social and service company eﬃ  ciency problems at the same time. A joint 
decision-making procedure is more complicated in cases in which a number of local 
governments own one service company.
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Coordination of the actors’ interests is absolutely essential to construct a complex, 
adaptive, and stable supportive, regulatory, and organizational system. All the actors must 
realize that people running into arrears is not an exception. Any method of managing 
arrears must take into account that a market economy will always have households that run 
into arrears in the long run. Over-indebtedness endangers their basic living conditions, and 
they will not be able to solve the problem using only their own eﬀ orts. A stable local and 
nationwide social policy system, adjusted to the circumstances of a market economy, must 
be in place to promote troubled families.
In Nyíregyháza, in addition to the RES Foundation, a Household Debt Management 
Counseling Service Association was set up in 2000 within a nongovernmental organization 
using ﬁ nancial support from the local self-government and some service companies. 
Th e counseling service treats more complicated cases than the RES Foundation. Th e 
nongovernmental organization has been able to arrange some form of solution for nearly 
500 households (debts were rescheduled, arrears are repaid in installments, and so forth), 
and resolved about Ft 40 million overdue debts by end of 2000 (see ﬁ gure 25.2).
Figure 25.2 Adjusted Arrears by Services in Nyíregyháza, December 1999–2000 
Source: Household Debt Management Counseling Service Civic Organization data.
Beyond Social Policy
Solving the problem of arrears, however, is impossible with only social policy measures. 
Economic processes directly inﬂ uencing the living conditions of the households (the gap 
between the increase of incomes and the energy prices, and so forth) need other economic-
type interventions.
Th e social assistance system in itself cannot solve the problem either. Between 1993 
and 1997 the number of people provided with a housing beneﬁ t in cash grew from 35,000 
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to 206,000, while the number that received the beneﬁ t in kind increased from 19,000 to 
95,000 (CSO 1998c: 104). At the same time, the number of households in arrears grew.
Th e only way to achieve fundamental changes would be extension of education, 
improvement of labor market participation, and increase in incomes. Because the fact that 
one has to pay for services is a basic social norm, nonpayment can be labeled as deviant 
behavior. Th us overdue debt may legitimate social exclusion.
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26Financing and Regulating District HeatingKenneth K. Baar



In Hungary 16 percent of the residences are served by district heating. Provision and use 
of this type of heating present special problems because its cost is substantial relative to 
household incomes and because ﬁ xed charges, which constitute about half of total charges, 
are set on a collective rather than an individual basis. Th erefore, residents who have district 
heating cannot control the cost the way that residents with other types of heating do.
Th e emphasis of this chapter is on the institutional, ﬁ nancing, investment, and 
regulatory strategies related to the provision of district heating. Th ese strategies can be 
addressed through legal and institutional reforms and by moderate ﬁ nancial expenditures. 
Signiﬁ cant issues include: (a) the shift to charges for district heating based on building 
consumption, which is required by the 1998 Act on District Heating; (b) the introduction 
of cost allocators and charges based on individual unit consumption, which has been done 
voluntarily in thousands of ﬂ ats; (c) the role of the national government in supporting 
district heating provision, cogeneration, and pricing of electricity from cogeneration 
sources; (d) municipal concession agreements for district heating company operation; and 
(e) information needs and availability.
District Heating in Central and Eastern Europe
Th e basic technical and economic problems of district heating in central and eastern Europe 
have been widely discussed and are well known and understood (EGI 1995; Martinot 
1997; WB 1999). A summary of how district heating has operated over the last 30 years 
follows. Central plants provide energy for heat and hot water for buildings through pipes. 
Commonly losses are great, because utilities produce an excess capacity, especially when 
* Th is chapter is based on Baar 2000. 
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energy is required only for hot water supply. In residential buildings the district heating 
systems serve radiators (typically three per ﬂ at), which do not have valves. Th e piping is 
arranged vertically, rather than in a single link for each ﬂ at, so measuring the consumption 
of a ﬂ at with a meter is impossible. Traditionally, heat charges have been based on the 
number of cubic meters in each ﬂ at, and hot water charges have been based on the average 
consumption per cubic meter in the city. To bring each ﬂ at up to the required temperature, 
many are overheated, and in buildings that do not have bypass pipes between ﬂ ats, the only 
way to reduce the heat is to open a window.
District heating systems were constructed for new multifamily housing in urban 
centers during an era when energy was very cheap, substantial state subsidies were provided, 
and consumption was viewed as social rather than individual. District heating was often 
a byproduct of the huge energy center of the state enterprises, without clear rules for 
cost allocation. Th e emphasis was on production of as many housing units (and heating 
systems) as possible as cheaply as possible. As a result, heat consumption of district-heated 
households is far higher in central and eastern Europe than in western Europe. For 
example, per capita heat consumption is 45 percent higher in Hungary than in Finland or 
Sweden (EGI 1995). 
Since the transition, the ensuing shift to market pricing of heat, and the increasing 
withdrawal of state subsidies, the costs and energy wastes associated with district heating 
have become a major issue. Commonly, district heating costs now consume a large 
share of household income. As a result, district heating has been the target of numerous 
pilot projects designed to increase eﬃ  ciency and reduce costs. Th e concept has been to 
demonstrate the beneﬁ ts of eﬃ  ciency measures in terms of rates of return that would be 
attractive even without subsidies and that would thus induce others to follow their lead. 
Th e World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and various 
bilateral assistance programs have funded such projects. Numerous private investors also 
have entered the energy eﬃ  ciency market in this area.
On the supply side, utilities have taken various measures to make plants and heat 
distribution systems more eﬃ  cient. Many analysts believe that cogeneration has major 
potential to bring about signiﬁ cant cost reduction, so cogeneration eﬀ orts are widespread, 
but they still constitute only a small portion of total production. To varying degrees, cities 
have identiﬁ ed the portions of their supply systems where improvements would be most 
beneﬁ cial and are economically feasible. On the demand side, one standard project has been 
to install valves and cost allocators that measure the consumption of individual radiators 
and to introduce fees based on the consumption levels of each ﬂ at. Some consumers have 
also taken simple energy-saving measures, such as weather stripping around doors and 
windows.
Th e implementation of improvements and cost reduction measures in district heating 
faces various economic, structural, and institutional problems. Th e costs of capital are so 
high that even relatively high rates of return by market standards are inadequate relative to 
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amortized costs. And district heating companies have a virtual monopoly because the cost 
of installing alternative heat sources is prohibitive.
Although analysts have seen district heating as a major problem in central and eastern 
Europe, in western Europe major eﬀ orts in recent years have expanded the scope of district 
heating in conjunction with cogeneration. Cogeneration can produce cost-eﬃ  cient heat, 
but the beneﬁ ts may not be passed through to heat suppliers. It also reduces pollution levels 
associated with energy production. In line with this approach, the European Union has 
taken a position in support of a combined heat and power program and favors dismantling 
barriers to its development (EU COM 1997). Cogeneration suppliers, however, have 
commonly faced discriminatory conditions for access to electricity grids.
District Heating in Hungary
Th e provision of district heating in Hungary is undergoing signiﬁ cant transitions. With the 
withdrawal of national subsidies and the introduction of cost pricing, pressure is great to 
increase the eﬃ  ciency of district heating on both the production (primary) and consumption 
(secondary) sides. Th e 1998 Act on District Heating required extensive measures including 
separate charges for each building (but not each ﬂ at) based on consumption after 2003. 
Furthermore, the measurement and allocation of charges for individual ﬂ ats based on 
consumption is spreading.
In Hungary, 103 municipalities have district heating systems. Th e breakdown is as 
follows:
 District heating serves 647,000 dwelling units (16 percent of the total stock) through-
out Hungary.
 Seventy-one percent of the units served are concentrated in 10 cities. 
 Budapest has 241,000 ﬂ ats that are served by district heating. 
 Th e nine secondary cities have a combined total of 15,000 to 32,000 units that are 
served by district heating. 
 Approximately half of all units in cities with a population over 100,000 (other than 
Budapest) are served by district heating.
 Less than 2,000 dwelling units in each of 61 cities (40 of whom serve less than 1,000 
units) are served by district heating (a combined total of 48,901 ﬂ ats).
 
Nearly all of the district-heated ﬂ ats are in multifamily dwellings, most of which are 
in housing estates constructed during the socialist era. During the 1990s the change in 
the number of ﬂ ats served by district heating or in their overall consumption has not been 
signiﬁ cant. Meanwhile, the district heating consumption by industrial users has dropped 
(see table 26.1).
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Table 26.1 National Heat Consumption by Users 1990 and 1997 (tetra-joule per year)
Users 1990 1997
Industrial 42,761 25,490
Residential 21,981 25,996
Residential hot water 12,777 8,986
Institutional heating and hot water 4,248 4,874
National total 81,767 65,346
Source: District Heating Providers’ Yearbook 1998. 
Before the transition district heating companies were owned by the state, and a central 
authority set the prices in accordance with the 1990 Price Act. Charges for households were 
based on their size in square meters rather than on consumption levels. In the early 1990s 
municipalities became the owners of their district heating distribution systems, but the 
power sources were privatized. Th e right to set heating prices was transferred to the cities.
Th e district heating charges of the major cities are based on a combination of ﬁ xed 
rates per cubic meter and either: (a) district-wide consumption charges that are prorated 
by the per square meter, (b) individual building charges based on their consumption (see 
table 26.2), or (c) both. Comparisons are limited by the diﬀ erent criteria that are used to set 
fees. Interviewees frequently indicated that district heating fees vary substantially among 
cities and noted that the fees in Szigetvár are double those in Győr. As table 26.2 indicates, 
however, the dispersion of fees among most cities is much smaller.
A signiﬁ cant percentage of interviewees indicated that the price-setting process is 
largely political and that city councils feel pressure to keep rates low. Some thought a 
return to the system of national price setting in accordance with the Price Act would 
enable district heating companies to charge rates that would cover their operating costs 
and provide capital for needed improvements. Others felt that their city assembly already 
set prices in a reasonable manner, enabling the company to recover cost increases. Some saw 
little justice in setting diﬀ erent prices for each municipality, because local district heating 
costs were the result of past national development decisions rather than the will of the 
residents. Interviewees repeatedly noted that cities were in the diﬃ  cult position of having 
to represent the competing interests of consumers and district heating companies at the 
same time.
Operating Costs of District Heating Companies
Th e costs of district heating provision are mainly for energy. Interviewees indicated that 
energy costs were approximately 60–70 percent of total revenues (see table 26.3). In most 
cities, the prices are adequate to cover operating costs and some amortization, but are not 
adequate to ﬁ nance substantial improvements. A notable exception is Miskolc, which has 
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Table 26.2 Residential District Heating Charges, March 19, 1999  (Ft per air-cubic-meter per year)
Settlement Number of district 
heated fl ats
Heat/consumption fee Base fee
Pre-calculated 
average charge
Ft/am3/year
Consumer hot water
Ft/am3
Metered
Ft/GJ
Heating
Ft/am3/year
Consumer hot water
Ft/am3/year
Total
Ft/am3/year
Szigetvár 832 n.a. 180.00 1,338 232.00 67.00 299.00
Kaposvár 6,868 n.a. n.a. 1,026 223.68 47.28 270.96
Nagykőrös 534 228.40 214.50 1,042 213.36 57.60 270.96
Keszthely 1,128 222.80 249.70 1,021 219.00 49.20 268.20
Cegléd 1,605 232.14 191.20 910 181.44 81.00 262.44
Kiskunfélegyháza 1,494 205.32 170.40 947 175.20 83.00 258.20
Esztergom 1,346 n.a. n.a. 716 209.40 45.00 254.40
Székesfehérvár 19,694 186.30 247.10 963 200.52 51.60 252.12
Dorog 2,100 177.48 139.90 676 208.20 41.16 249.36
Nyíregyháza 15,564 176.54 228.95 780 219.27 29.17 248.44
Miskolc 32,765 249.86 244.87 882 218.51 27.80 246.31
Szekszárd 5,595 n.a. n.a. 979 172.00 69.00 241.00
Gödöllő 1,982 n.a. n.a. 1,020 n.a. n.a. 238.00
Mosonmagyaróvár 3,554 209.00 172.00 823 192.00 45.00 237.00
Ajka 7,005 156.60 160.00 576 201.60 32.40 234.00
Érd 1,044 259.00 183.12 1,039 183.00 48.80 231.80
Sárvár 1,457 n.a. n.a. 1,106 177.96 53.76 231.72
Százhalombatta 4,037 208.80 211.00 765 176.40 51.60 228.00
Sátoraljaújhely 1,073 n.a. 262.00 990 214.88 10.12 225.00
Szolnok 8,681 192.72 149.70 966 191.04 32.16 223.20
Salgótarján 3,843 n.a. 250.00 960 222.00 n.a. 222.00
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Settlement Number of district 
heated fl ats
Heat/consumption fee Base fee
Pre-calculated 
average charge
Ft/am3/year
Consumer hot water
Ft/am3
Metered
Ft/GJ
Heating
Ft/am3/year
Consumer hot water
Ft/am3/year
Total
Ft/am3/year
Debrecen 30,977 201.60 207.30 924 188.04 32.40 220.44
Hajdúnánás 652 213.12 208.50 877 199.54 20.90 220.44
Szigetszentmiklós 1,020 n.a. n.a. 895 154.20 65.40 219.60
Tiszaújváros 5,552 n.a. n.a. 767 n.a. n.a. 219.60
Budaörs 2,357 198.00 178.80 959 179.52 39.72 219.40
Dunaújváros 1,455 189.00 154.20 847 122.41 96.05 218.46
Dunakeszi 2,560 226.00 217.00 937 150.00 66.00 216.00
Komló 4,915 216.00 210.00 890 216.00 n.a. 216.00
Budapest 241,022 479.76 225.60 1,036 190.68 24.72 215.40
Kecskemét 11,072 219.96 208.00 947 174.48 38.76 213.24
Veszprém 8,425 220.78 234.80 1,043 159.54 53.61 213.15
Tata 1,820 319.29 308.97 1,278 197.23 15.65 212.88
Dombóvár 1,898 218.40 300.00 910 208.65 n.a. 208.65
Celldömölk 459 n.a. 212.68 1,016 162.00 45.57 207.57
Ózd 5,550 221.60 243.80 820 162.00 40.00 202.00
Sopron 6,077 n.a. n.a. 825 183.48 18.48 201.96
Mátészalka 1,705 199.80 231.00 1,080 172.20 29.10 201.30
Szentendre 1,516 244.00 223.00 916 148.00 51.00 199.00
Tatabánya 21,380 160.20 144.00 694 152.52 45.36 197.88
Vác 2,739 284.00 172.00 902 143.00 52.00 197.00
Table 26.2 Residential District Heating Charges, March 19, 1999  (Ft per air-cubic-meter per year)
(continued)
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Settlement Number of district 
heated fl ats
Heat/consumption fee Base fee
Pre-calculated 
average charge
Ft/am3/year
Consumer hot water
Ft/am3
Metered
Ft/GJ
Heating
Ft/am3/year
Consumer hot water
Ft/am3/year
Total
Ft/am3/year
Siófok 1,133 n.a. 214.00 1,074 n.a. n.a. 195.50
Eger 4,744 n.a. n.a. 988 148.32 46.80 195.12
Kisvárda 1,248 197.00 158.00 1,353 143.00 36.00 179.00
Nagyatád 240 292.52 99.11 NA. 178.98 NA. 178.98
Nyergesújfalu 866 276.00 305.00 1,153 132.00 36.00 168.00
Mohács 2,015 n.a. 207.90 792 n.a. n.a. 166.80
Szombathely 11,300 n.a. n.a. 842 127.08 34.56 161.64
Győr 21,865 n.a. 148.40 742 121.00 29.00 150.00
Oroszlány 4,216 n.a. n.a. 1,301 43.20 12.00 55.20
Hódmezővásárhely 2,717 344.00 370.00 1,676 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Pécs 30,393 423.00 427.80 1,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Szeged 27,355 382.00 328.00 1,654 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note:  am3 size of apartment measured in air cubic meter. GJ Giga joules. 
Source: Hungarian Professional Association of District Heating Providers data.
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been operating with substantial negative cash ﬂ ows since 1992, even with a municipal 
subsidy equaling 10 percent of revenues.
Table 26.3 District Heating Companies’ Operating Cost Ratios, Selected Cities 
(percent)
Cost Budapest Salgótarján Tiszaújváros Debrecen Miskolc Szombathely
Energy 68 50 77 74 58 70
Other materials 7 8 3 1 7 5
Personnel 10 15 12 13 11 12
Depreciation 9 11 5 4 5 10
Other costs 6 15 3 8 20 3
Note:  Variations in ratios are partly attributable to diﬀ ering classiﬁ cations of expenses.
Source: Interviews with district heating company representatives, 1999.
District Heating Costs Compared with Household Incomes, 
National Expenditures, and Revenues
At the end of the socialist era, district heating costs were low for households, because 
energy was still relatively cheap and the national government subsidized the cost. In 1990 
the national subsidy was Ft 9.2 billion, which covered over half of the cost of district 
heating. Th is amount constituted 0.4 percent of gross domestic product and 0.8 percent of 
government expenditures in that year. In the early 1990s these subsidies were withdrawn 
and fuel costs started to increase.
Currently, the national expenditure on district heating by households is in the range 
of Ft 50 billion (US$ 210 million) per year. Overall turnover in the district heating sector 
was about US$ 330 million in 1997 (Euroheat 1998). A subsidy covering half of current 
household costs for district heating would roughly equal about 0.25 percent of gross 
domestic product and 0.5 percent of government expenditures.
Although the cost of district heating is low relative to gross domestic product, it is 
high relative to the incomes of the households served. In 1998 typical annual estimated 
household costs for district heating and hot water averaged Ft 70,000, an amount exceeding 
10 percent of median household income and over 20 percent of the income of households 
on pension. (In winter months, the costs may exceed 40 percent of household income for 
low-income households.) Furthermore, because these are only averages, for a signiﬁ cant 
proportion of lower income households, the burdens are unbearable.
Available data indicate that the average incomes of households with district heating 
are not lower than the national averages (table 26.4). Th is situation may change, however, 
because the distribution of housing is becoming increasingly market based and higher 
income households are starting to leave the housing estates.
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Table 26.4 Average Annual Heat and Hot Water Costs for District-heated Flats, 1998
(Ft per year) 
City Metered charges City Metered charges
Szigetvár 92,775 Eger 64,965
Tata 78,580 Szigetszentmiklós 64,762
Nagykőrös 77,509 Mosonmagyaróvár 64,392
Kaposvár 76,893 Nyíregyháza 64,315
Kisvárda 76,793 Hajdúnánás 64,185
Keszthely 76,320 Komló 64,073
Sárvár 74,558 Dombóvár 63,829
Kiskunfélegyháza 72,091 Budaörs 63,199
Érd 71,990 Miskolc 62,807
Székesfehérvár 71,868 Dunaújváros 62,757
Gödöllő 71,604 Szentendre 62,728
Cegléd 71,251 Esztergom 62,673
Szekszárd 70,949 Vác 61,913
Budapest 69,611 Százhalombatta 60,917
Veszprém 69,570 Dorog 60,438
Mátészalka 69,359 Tiszaújváros 59,834
Sátoraljaújhely 69,165 Sopron 59,509
Siófok 68,328 Ózd 59,446
Szolnok 67,993 Oroszlány 57,706
Celldömölk 67,761 Szombathely 54,723
Salgótarján 67,596 Ajka 54,468
Nyergesújfalu 67,575 Tatabánya 54,026
Debrecen 65,995 Mohács 53,510
Kecskemét 65,887 Győr 49,267
Dunakeszi 65,883
Note:  Heating costs are estimated to constitute 75 percent of the total (1998). 
Source: Hungarian Professional Association of District Heating Providers data.
National Subsidies
District heating industry representatives and citizens continually comment on the lack of 
national subsidies for these programs. Household expenditures for district heating exceed 
those for water and sewer, but subsidies are far greater for water and sewer. Th is diﬀ erence 
may result from the extensive European Union standards for water and sewer provision, 
compared to absence of standards for heat provision.
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Table 26.5 Average Annual Household Expenditures, 1997 (Forint)
Expense Household expenditures
Water 3,551
Sewer 1,272
Electricity 10,965
Piped gas 9,309
District heating 5,063
Firewood 2,818
Coal 2,023
Bottled gas 1,951
Note:  Expenditures include all households whether they use the service or not. 
Source: CSO 1997: 37.
Subsidies for developing district heating systems in the range of a few billion forints 
per year are available. Under one program, the government uses Ft 2 billion to cover one-
half of the interest cost of commercial loans, but it does not guarantee the loan. Th e loans 
are administered by one bank selected on a competitive basis by the interest rates it oﬀ ers. 
Th e maximum loan per demand-side project is Ft 30 million and per supply-side project is 
Ft 150 million. One interviewee noted that this subsidy provided funds that were adequate 
only for a feasibility study. To put these amounts in perspective, typically several billion 
forints are required to renovate one district heating plant.
Some interviewees suggested that a national fund should be created to guarantee 
loans to district heating companies and private companies for district heating projects. A 
second program, introduced in 1999 (government resolution 1025 of 1999), authorized Ft 
150 million in grants and an Ft 50 million subsidy that covers 50 percent of the interest 
payments up to Ft 1 billion in loans to companies that provide energy savings systems 
within district-heated ﬂ ats. In some interviews, district heating companies seemed to be 
pinning their hopes on national assistance, although they indicated that they were not 
optimistic about it.
Household Arrears as Internal Subsidies
Under the current system the district heating company and the users who pay regularly 
cover arrears. Because of the arrangement of the piping in district heating systems, 
switching oﬀ  an individual household for nonpayment is not feasible. Instead, a district 
heating company must resort to the courts to place a lien on the ﬂ at of the nonpaying 
households. (Th is remedy is not useful in the case of municipally owned ﬂ ats.)
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As a practical matter, district heating companies have been compelled to provide heat 
to households that have not paid. In this sense, they have been compelled to perform a 
social function in providing a basic utility.
Household arrears are commonly seen as a substantial cost for district heating 
companies. A major portion of arrears was incurred just after the withdrawal of state 
subsidies. In most cities the rate of arrears has been low, and accumulated arrears are high, 
although they have been decreasing in some cities in recent years. Accumulated arrears 
were typically about 10 percent, but have reached as high as 40 percent of annual utilities’ 
revenue (see table 26.6).
Table 26.6 Arrears in District Heating Payments, Selected Cities, 1998
City Annual arrears 
(percentage of fi rms’ revenue)
Accumulated arrears 
(percentage of annual gross income) 
Budapest 7–10 n.a.
Dunakeszi 3 10
Eger n.a. 25
Kaposvár 3 10
Miskolc 0.5 10
Nyíregyháza n.a. 40
Szeged n.a. 16
Székesfehérvár n.a. 10
Szombathely 1 10
Tiszaújváros 2 8
Source: Interviews with district heating company representatives.
A survey prepared for one city found that the rate of arrears was not a function of 
income. Instead, in the opinion of the district heating company representative, it was a 
function of households’ conﬁ dence that they would not suﬀ er adverse consequences as a 
result of failing to pay their bills. Miskolc and other cities reported that the rate of arrears 
was particularly high in municipally owned ﬂ ats. (Usually, only a small percentage of ﬂ ats 
are municipally owned.)
The Shift to Consumption-based Pricing
Th is section summarizes the various demand-side measures towards consumption-based 
pricing: metering consumption by buildings; insulation and installing cost allocators in 
ﬂ ats; and pilot energy-saving projects.
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Charges Based on Consumption for Each Building
Th e 1998 Act on District Heating required billing of each building according to its 
consumption after 2003. Most district-heated buildings have their own heat-exchange 
centers, and for them the cost of complying with the metering requirement is not 
substantial. For cases in which several buildings are served by one heat exchange, the cost 
of creating separate exchanges for each building is in the range of Ft 500,000 per ﬂ at. Th e 
installation of the necessary equipment cost Ft 6–7 billion in Budapest and Ft 1 billion in 
Miskolc, according to interviewees in those cities.
At this point, cities are permitting individual buildings to decide whether their 
charges will be based on consumption. Buildings that elect to have their billing based on 
consumption are no longer part of the set that is used to compute the average consumption 
level for the per cubic meter charges in the balance of the district-heated ﬂ ats. Typically, the 
most eﬃ  cient buildings elect to have their charges based on consumption. Consequently, 
the costs for the remaining buildings increase.
Billing each building according to its actual consumption level may conform to some 
notions of economic justice. Consumption levels can also be viewed as “non-elective,” in 
the sense that citizens did not choose their residences. Instead, they had to take whatever 
was allocated to them.
Heating costs can vary by over 100 percent among buildings depending on the 
quality of their construction. Systematic data on heat consumption by building types in 
Székesfehérvár revealed that 49 percent of all ﬂ ats had consumption levels (as measured by 
building consumption) within 10 percent of the median. About 80 percent of all ﬂ ats had 
consumption levels within 20 percent of the median, but diﬀ erences in consumption levels 
among building types amounted to 50 percent or more (see ﬁ gure 26.1).
Diﬀ erences in actual district heating charges for buildings also depend on what portion 
of the district heating charge is ﬁ xed and what portion is based on actual consumption. 
Generally, about half of district heating company revenues derived from ﬁ xed charges and 
the other half from consumption charges. 
Generally, interviewees indicated that condominium organizations were not taking 
collective measures to reduce heating costs in response to the introduction of charges 
based on consumption. In Szombathely, where buildings have been metered since 1993, 
buildings have elected widely diﬀ ering heat settings, ranging from 17 to 25 degrees Celsius, 
but usually they were not undertaking other steps, such as installing simple insulation 
measures. Several interviewees indicated that each reduction of one degree in temperature 
reduces heating costs by 6 percent (above certain temperatures, each degree increase in 
temperatures increases the required energy substantially).
In Szeged, where all heat charges have been based on consumption since the mid-
1990s, without any ﬁ xed charges, buildings that have approximately 6,000 units have 
elected to have cost allocators installed without the aid of subsidies. (Over 85 percent of 
all buildings have been metered since 1997.) Th e complete reliance on actual consumption 
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in setting fees was seen as central to the widespread unsubsidized installation of cost 
allocators. Other interviewees commented that basing the entire district heating fee on 
consumption levels would be unreasonable, because ﬁ xed costs inevitably amount to a 
substantial portion of costs.
Figure 26.1 Divergence from the Average 206.06 Mega-joule per Air-cubic-meter 
Heat Consumption by Types of District-heated Buildings in Székesfehérvár, 
1998–1999 Heating Seasons (percentage)
Source: Székesfehérvár district heating supplier data.
One interviewee believed that the implementation of metering by building for all 
buildings would create a political scandal. Others viewed the legislative requirement for 
charges by buildings as a useless half-step because individual eﬀ orts to conserve would 
occur only when charges are based on individual ﬂ at consumption.
Although the provision of equipment allowing buildings to regulate heat consumption 
was generally considered part of the policy, some interviewees indicated that this step 
was not a legal requirement. One district heating company indicated that even though 
heat consumption could be measured for each building, it still could not be controlled by 
buildings (see ﬁ gure 26.2).
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Although the weight of empirical information on communal actions has limits, 
building systematic databases of the impacts of the type of construction, temperature 
adjustments, and simple insulation on heat costs would be useful.
Figure 26.2 Distribution of Heat Consumption Level among District-heated Building, 
1999 (mega-joule per air-cubic-meter)
Source: Székesfehérvár district heating supplier data.
Cost Allocators and Basic Insulation Measures
Cost allocators enable analysts to determine the proportion of consumption by radiator 
relative to total consumption in a building. Metering by building, individual valves, and cost 
allocation according to consumption have been seen as prerequisites to economic operation 
of district heating. Without them, individual households have neither the incentive nor the 
opportunity to conserve costs and energy. For example, the 1999 national energy policy 
states that a basic condition for the competitive operation of the district heating market is 
that consumers should be able to regulate and meter their heat consumption. To support 
this purpose the state should play an important role (NEP 1999). 
Unlike water, gas, or electricity consumption, however, heat consumption is not totally 
individualized because the ﬂ ats are also heated externally by the heat from the neighboring 
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ﬂ ats. Individual heat consumption, hence, is largely dependent on the position of a unit in 
a building (interior, outside corner wall, and the heat level selected by the neighboring ﬂ at). 
Some ﬂ ats can meet most or all of their heating needs from the neighboring units. In East 
Germany, to combat tenants getting a free ride oﬀ  the heat of other units, valves cannot be 
set below a certain level. 
One partial remedy for unreasonable divisions of heating charges is a combination 
of ﬁ xed charges and consumption charges. A common, but far from universal, practice 
has been to use correction factors in computing the consumption for each ﬂ at within a 
building. Th e leading installers of cost allocators suggested correction tables. Some inter-
viewees believed that it made no sense to bill according to the consumption for each unit if 
correction factors had to be used.
A common view is that the cost allocators can be manipulated, but representatives of 
district heating companies usually disagreed with this view. One of them indicated that 
only one case of manipulation had occurred over several years.
Others questioned whether cost allocators led to decreases in costs or whether the 
cost reductions that appeared in pilot studies were the outcome of associated insulation 
measures. In Slovakia legislation requiring the introduction of cost allocators was repealed 
on the grounds that they were not cost eﬀ ective (ECB Interview 1999). 
In Hungary interviewees consistently suggested that the installation of cost allocators 
and simple insulation measures usually reduced consumption by about 15–30 percent. Th e 
cost of such measures has been in the range of Ft 40,000 per ﬂ at, and the annual savings 
typically are about Ft 10,000 per ﬂ at. Interviewees in cities where cost allocators were 
introduced without accompanying insulation measures gave similar estimates of resulting 
consumption reductions. Unfortunately, these impressions about the impacts of allocators 
were not supported by systematic research. Th e research that exists consists of data for one 
year comparing the heat costs in buildings with and without cost allocators, rather before 
and after the installation of cost allocators. Diﬀ erences between buildings with and without 
cost allocators may partially reﬂ ect the fact that more eﬃ  cient buildings elect cost allocators 
rather than reductions in consumption following their installation.
Commonly, projects for the installation of valves and cost allocators have been funded 
by a combination of central government grants, municipal grants, interest-free loans, 
and loans with conventional terms. Another source for funding such projects has been 
an increase in the ﬁ xed charges (a temporary surcharge) for all ﬂ ats within a jurisdiction. 
In a signiﬁ cant proportion of the cities with such subsidies, less than half of the available 
subsidies have been used.
In Nyíregyháza, where 16,000 units are served by district heating, subsidies have been 
provided for cost allocators and basic insulation measures in 3,900 ﬂ ats. Project funding 
consists of a combination of a grant, a zero-interest ﬁ ve-year loan from the national 
environmental fund, and 4 percent of the fees for all households served by the district 
heating system. Th e average savings has been Ft 10,000 per year out of an average annual 
heating cost of Ft 73,000 per ﬂ at.
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In Eger, where substantial subsidies are provided for installation, 40 percent of 
households have installed cost allocators. A substantial portion of the available subsidies 
has not been used, however.
In Dunaújváros a public campaign was undertaken to install cost allocators. By the end 
of 1999, 70 buildings with 3,500 ﬂ ats elected to participate in the program out of 19,391 
district-heated ﬂ ats in the city. Each participating ﬂ at must pay a one-time fee of Ft 800 
per radiator. Th e balance of the cost of the program is ﬁ nanced from an increase in monthly 
charges of Ft 100 per radiator.
In Szeged buildings have been metered for the past few years, and the fees are based 
solely on consumption. Approximately 6,000 out of 27,000 district-heated households have 
installed allocators without public subsidies. District heating staﬀ  has not published data 
that compare the district heating costs for the buildings with and without cost allocators. 
Based on its review of bills, however, staﬀ  indicated that consumption levels in buildings 
with cost allocators were 15–20 percent lower than for other buildings and for prior years. 
Th orough examination of the expense information for Szeged would be particularly 
valuable for measuring the impacts of cost allocators, independent of insulation measures.
Table 26.7 Portion of Units with Cost Allocators, Selected Cities
City District-heated fl ats
(number)
Flats with cost allocator
(percent)
Cities with over 10,000 district–heated ﬂ ats
Budapest 240,837 Minimal
Debrecen 30,909 8
Dunaújváros 22,180 18
Kecskemét 11,078 15
Miskolc 32,125 3
Nyíregyháza 15,948 25
Szeged 27,534 22
Székesfehérvár 19,654 4
Szombathely 11,022 23
Other cities
Eger 4,752 35
Kaposvár 6,874 30
Source: Interviews with district heating company representatives.
In lieu of encouraging cost allocators, Kaposvár has subsidized central regulatory 
systems for each building, which allow residents to regulate the temperature of water ﬂ ow 
into each building. Th e city pays a portion of the cost of these systems, about Ft 500,000 per 
building. Residents pay for the accompanying installation of valves, which costs about Ft 
50,000 per ﬂ at. District heating company interviewees indicated that these systems, which 
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are now in about 60 buildings, are as eﬀ ective as cost allocators in reducing consumption. 
In considering the Kaposvár experiences, one must note that, typically, about 15 ﬂ ats are 
served by the regulatory systems, which may make communal action more feasible than in 
the large panel buildings that are typical in other cities. 
Decision-making by Buildings
In the case of building cooperatives, a majority is needed to make decisions and 
investments. Otherwise, the introduction of cost allocators requires the unanimous consent 
of the residents of a building. As a practical matter, usually introducing a cost allocation 
system is impossible without physically entering each ﬂ at, which requires the consent of 
the occupant.
Pilot Projects—Other Energy-saving Strategies in Buildings
Pilot projects, which involve extensive insulation measures (for example, insulation of 
external walls) as well as regular measures in conjunction with the installation of valves and 
cost allocators, have been common and have achieved healthy rates of return. Usually, these 
programs have been funded by international donors, national, or municipal subsidies. Th e 
costs for such projects have typically ranged from Ft 400,000 to Ft 800,000 per ﬂ at. Th e 
problem with these projects is that they cannot be replicated without subsidies.
Supply-side Measures
Th is section addresses the combined heat and power generation, the most powerful 
technical measure at the supply side, but other technical solutions are beyond the scope of 
this chapter.
Cogeneration—Combined Heat and Power
Cogeneration is widely seen as a strategy for signiﬁ cantly reducing district heating costs. 
Currently, the share of cogeneration in district heating is 24.9 percent (Euroheat 1998). 
Cogeneration potential of each city depends on the particular characteristics of the local 
situation in regard to energy costs, availability and price of alternate sources, the particular 
type of power plant, and facilities of the district heating company.
Interviewees repeatedly indicated, however, that national energy policy lacks a uniﬁ ed 
approach between district heating and other energy issues. In particular, Hungarian 
regulations regarding electricity pricing are unfavorable to cogeneration. Electricity 
purchasers are not required to pay a capacity fee to cogeneration sources. In contrast, some 
other nations have more favorable prices for electricity provided through cogeneration.
PART 2   SECTION 2   LOCAL MANAGEMENT: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
520
Current statements of energy policy require more favorable treatment for cogenerated 
electricity on the basis that such policies are in the national interest, but they have not been 
implemented with speciﬁ c regulations.
Miscellaneous Supply-side Measures
Description and analysis of the various types of measures designed to make heating supply 
more eﬃ  cient are beyond the scope of this chapter. Th ey vary among cities depending on 
the characteristics of their particular district heating system.
Several interviewees indicated that cities were seriously hampered by a lack of energy 
expertise and suggested that they each be required to hire an energy expert. Th e lack of 
expertise was especially serious in smaller cities.
Privatization of District Heating Provision
Because of a lack of available national and municipal ﬁ nancing for district heating com-
panies, the introduction of private capital is taking on increasing importance.
Concession Agreements
At least 10 cities have entered into concession agreements for the operation of their district 
heating company, including Dunaújváros, Kiskunfélegyháza, Nagykőrös, Sárbogárd, 
Szeged, and Szolnok. Such agreements may be politically attractive to local governments, 
because they may shift political responsibility for a service that cannot be provided in a 
manner that will make the users content.
Th ese agreements typically have terms in the range of 20 years and require that the 
private company install designated improvements (Illés 1999). Because the contracts are 
kept secret, we had diﬃ  culty obtaining speciﬁ c information about them. According to 
information from interviews, price adjustments in the contracts are based on a weighted-
cost index. (One report notes that the cost index used in one contract tied increases to 
actual wage costs and over-weighted the wage factor, thus subjecting the price-setting 
mechanism to manipulation. Typically, when price indexes are used, the coeﬃ  cients are 
tied to external measures rather than actual company costs.)
Investments for cost allocators are covered by increases in fees. Interviewees repeatedly 
stated that the contracts require only minimal investments by the concessionaire company 
and, therefore, did not accomplish any objectives that could not be performed by the 
existing district heating company. Several interviewees noted that concession contracts 
violate the Act on District Heating, because they set prices without complying with the 
requirement that the local government shall request the opinion of consumer protection 
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agencies and consumer representation groups prior to determining prices (Act on District 
Heating 1998).
Concession agreements may or may not bring about beneﬁ ts to district-heated 
households. Contractors may be selected on a competitive basis. Once the contractor is 
selected, however, competition is terminated for the length of the contract, which may lock 
consumers into a particular pricing structure regardless of what supply-side innovations 
and cost-saving potential may emerge.
Diﬃ  culties with concessions are compounded by the inexpert and secretive processes 
associated with such arrangements. As a matter of practice, neither the expert reports not 
the concession contracts are available to the public. (For further discussion on public access 
to public contracts see chapter 15.) 
National Oversight over Concession Contracts and Prices of District Heating
In Poland, under the National Energy Law, the Energy Regulatory Authority (Urzad 
Regulacji Energtyki) awards local concessions for district heating services and sets their 
tariﬀ s. Under the national law, the tariﬀ s should ensure: “Coverage of justiﬁ ed costs 
of energy enterprises’ operation in the ﬁ eld of production, transformation, storage, 
transmission, distribution or trade of fuels and energy and costs of development and 
environmental protection; and protection of interest of consumers from unjustiﬁ ed price 
increases.”
Th e law also directs that pricing include incentives for cogeneration, and “Tariﬀ s for... 
heat... may include costs of co-ﬁ nancing by energy enterprises of projects and services 
which purpose is to reduce energy and fuel consumption by customers and which provide 
an economically justiﬁ ed alternative for avoidance of development of new sources of energy 
or grid” (Energy Law, 10 April 1997, section 45).
Lease Agreements
Lease agreements are an alternative to concession contracts. Leases generally have a term 
of seven and a half years for a ﬁ xed monthly fee, under which private companies agree 
to install speciﬁ ed improvements. At the end of the term, the improvements become the 
property of the residents and the district heating company. As in the case of concession 
contracts, cities keep lease agreements secret. For a lease agreement entered into by one 
city, a substantial investment was required and the price level was ﬁ xed throughout the life 
of the contract. Of course, without knowledge of the actual price, evaluating the adequacy 
of such contracts is impossible.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Overall resolution of the fundamental ineﬃ  ciencies and costs associated with the provision 
of district heating may not be economically feasible, but institutional issues, some of 
which may be addressed without substantial funds, should be reviewed. Th ese include the 
following:
 Data on the impacts of individual charges for buildings, the use of cost allocators, simple 
insulation measures, and related issues should be systematically collected and analyzed 
by independent third parties and made available to the public. Because information on 
district heating charges is computerized, the cost of such research should not be high.
 Th e potential economic and environmental beneﬁ ts of central government subsidies 
for district heating should be compared with returns obtained through other types of 
infrastructure subsidies, such as water and sewer.
 Public review of the basic documents related to concession contracts and adequate 
expert representation should be a precondition to any transfer of the operation of 
District heating programs through long-term agreements. Possibly, a national agency 
should be given the role of reviewing and commenting on proposed concession 
contracts that exceed a minimum time period.
 Review of the impact of energy rules and electricity pricing policies on district heating 
should be undertaken.
 Pilot projects and deep subsidies should be evaluated and the focus should shift to 
projects that are more eﬀ ective and ﬁ nancially feasible to replicate.
 A review should be undertaken of the legal policy of requiring unanimous or near 
unanimous consent for the installation of cost allocation devices in buildings. 
Although the introduction of cost allocators may reduce average costs, at the same 
time they increase the costs for some units. Requiring unanimous consent serves 
the interest of the minority at the expense of the majority. In western democracies, 
universal compliance with and participation in energy-saving measures is generally 
required without unanimous consent.
 Often, reports by public agencies are considered secret and are provided to individuals 
on the condition that they not be circulated or quoted. Information availability should 
be increased. Independent public expertise is a valuable tool in bringing about eﬀ ective 
and useful reforms.
 Th e present focus in central government subsidies and local eﬀ orts on the installation of 
cost allocators should be carefully evaluated and compared with the potential beneﬁ ts 
from basic insulation measures, supply-side improvements, and technical assistance for 
local governments in supervising and pricing district heating.
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In developing and transition economies, the combined eﬀ ect of decentralization and 
urbanization has increased demand on local governments to provide and ﬁ nance public 
services. Against this background, tight ﬁ scal policies have constrained budgetary transfers 
from central to local governments. Competing claims for scarce budgetary resources 
have caused large funding gaps for local infrastructure investments. Local governments 
will need private capital if they are to bring services to minimum standards that support 
growing urban demand.
Local capability to shoulder the expanded responsibilities and, in particular, mobilize 
the required resources, is contingent on the existence of an adequate regulatory and ﬁ scal 
framework for decentralization, which requires three key conditions:
 Responsibilities for service delivery should be clearly assigned among government tiers.
 Capacity for own-source revenue generation (local taxes and user charges) should be 
enhanced.
 Net ﬂ ows (tax sharing and transfers) from central to local governments should be and 
made rational and predictable.
 
Th e ability to access credit markets is a function of creditworthiness, which is assessed 
by prospective creditors on the following bases: (a) overall quality and eﬃ  ciency of local 
asset management; (b) institutional vehicles and operational mechanisms for local service 
delivery, which might involve entities distinct from existing political divisions; (c) selection 
criteria for local public investments, especially the beneﬁ ts these investments would yield at 
the local level; (d) pricing policies that contribute to the sustainability of service provision; 
and (e) laws and regulations regarding such credit-related issues as local asset pledge, 
bankruptcy, and default remedies.
* Th is chapter is based on El Daher 2000. 
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Th is chapter addresses issues of development of sound municipal credit market and 
the possible role of specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries in ﬁ nancing local infrastructure 
investment, a particular need in Hungary and in central and eastern Europe.
Conditions for the Development of Sound Municipal Credit 
Markets in Transition Economies
Local governments in developing countries face challenges when they attempt to access 
to private savings. Th eir local ﬁ nancial and institutional capacity is often constrained, and 
local infrastructure investments are sometimes associated with ineﬃ  cient implementation, 
unattractive returns, and high credit risk—hardly an inducement for investors seeking 
competitive risk-adjusted returns and lenders wary of poor credit. Th e development of 
domestic municipal bond markets should thus go hand in hand with improvements in the 
municipal revenue base and in the institutional framework within which municipal services 
are delivered. Th e development of eﬀ ective mechanisms to diversify and transfer risks is also 
important, but ﬁ rst the broad macroeconomic framework should foster domestic savings 
and the eﬃ  cient allocation of credit.
Macroeconomic Issues
Municipal credit markets develop as a subset of domestic capital markets, which beyond 
the conﬁ nes of municipal governments, require rational macroeconomic, ﬁ scal, and 
monetary policies. Like other ﬁ xed income instruments, municipal issues will remain 
attractive to bondholders only when inﬂ ation is kept in check. Moreover, as a result of 
political constraints, local government borrowings in developing countries may actually 
become part of the overall public debt. Th is involvement makes it crucial for countries 
seeking to expand local borrowing operations to ensure that the consolidated public debt 
remains consistent with macroeconomic policy objectives and ﬁ scal targets (see chapters 6 
and 7). Departure from these principles might have destabilizing eﬀ ects at the macro level. 
Genuine municipal bond markets imply that municipal issues should entail no sovereign 
support or guarantee that might create contingent liabilities at the sovereign level. As a 
result, they would be priced at market-determined rates usually at a spread above central 
government securities.
Institutional and Regulatory Issues
Th e development of municipal credit markets also requires that local governments have 
sound institutions, predictable ﬁ scal relations with the central government, and an eﬃ  cient 
organizational setting for service delivery. Th is set of requirements implies transparent 
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city budgets, credible accounting systems, independent audits, a sound competitive 
environment with rational pricing policies, and performance criteria that can be monitored 
for monopoly services. Private provision of infrastructure services and concession arrange-
ments, many of them already proven, must be encouraged and developed (see chapter 
15). Public utility companies should be autonomous and have a secure recurrent income 
through reliable services to consumers. To play their role eﬀ ectively, capital markets must 
rely on well-functioning banking institutions with reliable payment systems and custodial 
services.
Municipal credit markets also require adequate legal and regulatory frameworks 
covering supervision and disclosure as well as debt issuance, settlement, and repayment. 
Regulations allowing municipal bankruptcy would be needed in the event of default (see 
chapter 30). Strains on municipal ﬁ nances, which might be evident in periods of economic 
downturn, are likely to be combined with declining central government transfers and 
mounting taxpayer resistance to higher levies. Creditors’ rights and the seniority of their 
claims on municipal assets should thus be well speciﬁ ed because these claims (even on 
dedicated revenues and taxes) would likely be weighted against the eﬀ ects of disrupting 
the provision of critical public services and actually subordinating such other municipal 
liabilities as employees pension claims.
Credit Issues
Credit risk accounts for a critical component of investment risk, because returns and 
initial capital could be lost as a result of issuer’s default. Credit quality thus becomes a 
determinant parameter as far as market acceptance and pricing of debt are concerned. 
Countries with developed ﬁ nancial markets rely fairly strongly on credit ratings, which 
provide independent opinions to investors as to the creditworthiness of debt issuers (World 
Bank 1999). Moreover, developing countries can use ﬁ nancial and legal structures that 
enhance the credit quality of municipal debt—guarantees, insurance, securitization, and 
derivative products—and improve investors’ acceptance of debt issues. In countries that 
have sound banking systems, issuing municipal debt might be possible if the debt is backed, 
for instance, by bank letters of credit, so that all or part of investors’ exposure is transferred 
away from issuing municipalities to more creditworthy commercial banks.
Pricing Local Government Debt
In countries that have market-determined interest rates, the central government securities, 
which are deemed to be free from credit risk because they carry the full faith and credit 
of sovereign governments when they issue debt in their national currency, provide the 
reference yield curve, or benchmark, for pricing other debt obligations including corporate 
and municipal issues across the maturity spectrum.
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Some developing countries conform to a diﬀ erent pattern in which administered 
interest rate structures make the ready identiﬁ cation of a benchmark diﬃ  cult. In China, 
for instance, where the bond market is under partial government control, non-sovereign 
debt issues must comply with the state credit plan. Coupon rates on corporate bonds and 
rates on commercial bank deposits may not be higher than those on government securities 
of comparable maturities. Eﬃ  cient credit markets require that the level and structure of 
rates reﬂ ect economic conditions in which: (a) short-end, base rates (for example, the 
U.S. federal funds rate) are set by monetary authorities in the context of monetary policy 
objectives, and (b) long-term rates reﬂ ect inﬂ ation expectations as expressed by the market 
(that is, investors in the primary or secondary markets).
Debt by non-sovereign, including municipal, borrowers can then be priced at a spread 
above the reference risk-free yield curve. Spreads reﬂ ect issuers’ parameters in terms of 
creditworthiness, liquidity, and size. When the government market cannot provide a 
benchmark because of the absence of market-determined interest rate structures or because 
of the absence of securities in speciﬁ c maturity ranges (such as India where no government 
debt issues were beyond a 10-year maturity) eﬀ orts have to be made to develop synthetic 
benchmarks, or proxy yield curves.
Country Experiences with Specialized Local Government 
Financial Intermediaries
Mobilizing foreign equity to fund infrastructure investments in developing countries has 
become common, although it is selective in terms of countries and sectors and is often ﬂ ow-
ing in enclave investments. A strong challenge for local governments is to raise debt ﬁ nance 
in the domestic as well as the Eurobond markets. Some countries, especially the larger ones, 
have relatively developed credit markets where local governments can mobilize debt. Other 
countries have established specialized intermediaries for local government ﬁ nance.
Many developing countries have established municipal development banks as a 
channel for municipal credit. Some have received pools of loans from government sources. 
Others have sought to serve as a bridge to private credit markets in borrowing on domestic 
or foreign markets (although mostly with central government guarantees) and on-lending 
to local governments, directly or through domestic banks. 
Industrialized countries have also established specialized ﬁ nancial institutions to foster 
local economic development. Examples include local government ﬁ nancial intermediaries 
in Belgium, Finland, France, Spain, and Sweden; municipal ﬁ nance corporations in Canada 
(mostly provincial agencies operating at the provincial level); and municipal bond banks 
in the United States (state-owned intermediaries operating at the state level). A state 
revolving fund is an example of bond bank that has an element of public support and in 
which lending is mostly accomplished in leveraging central and state capital grants through 
bond issuance.
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Among European intermediaries specialized in municipal ﬁ nance, no clearly deﬁ ned 
pattern of ownership emerges. Some are privately owned (France and Spain) and others 
are publicly owned (Belgium and Netherlands). Th e public sector can be present at the 
central or local government levels or both. Th us, Finland’s Municipal Finance Plc. is owned 
by the association of local governments. It is involved in debt pooling for speciﬁ c and 
identiﬁ able projects, as is the case for U.S. bond banks. Th e Swedish local government 
funding agency Kommuninvest is owned by the association of local governments but is 
privately managed.
Th e central and local governments jointly own Holland’s Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten; 
its loans are subject to the joint and several liability of the cooperative of local government 
borrowers and shareholders. Spain’s Banco de Credito Local is privately owned by Argentaria 
and Dexia, a world leader in ﬁ nancial intermediation to local governments, with equity 
participation in a number of European funds. Dexia is the holding structure for Credit Com-
munal de Belgique and Credit Local de France. Credit Communal de Belgique is a local
government-owned cooperative; Credit Local de France, originally government-owned, 
has been privatized. Credit Local de France’s resources are raised through bond issues, where-
as deposits represent the main resources of Credit Communal de Belgique, which is a major 
depository institution, unlike most specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries for local governments.
In several countries the World Bank has supported local governments through 
municipal development funds (MDFs). A comprehensive assessment of World Bank 
experience in MDF operations has yet to be conducted, but a number of reviews address 
speciﬁ c aspects of MDF operations (Davey 1988; Peterson 1997). Th e reviews suggest that 
the investment components have been largely successful, met physical targets, added to the 
capacity of municipal infrastructure, and helped local governments build a credit record. 
Th e institutional development components, focused on local administration and technical 
capacity building, seem to have had limited success.
In terms of resource mobilization beyond oﬃ  cial multilateral or bilateral sources, 
achievements have, with few exceptions, generally fallen short of goals. Th e reviews suggest 
that, despite some successes, MDFs have been to some extent alternative vehicles for central 
transfers to local governments, often associated with government subsidies or guarantees, 
directed or ineﬃ  cient allocation of credit, and sometimes political patronage.
Future MDF operations should aim at encouraging transition to market-based muni-
cipal credit systems, including self-sustaining ﬁ nancial intermediaries for local government 
investments. To this end, reformers must deﬁ ne the requisite policy conditions for local 
government borrowing and the steps by which existing MDFs could be transformed into 
market-based operations. Th ese issues are debated in a number of developing countries.  
Evolving Role of Specialized Local Government Financial Intermediaries
Th e role, operating strategy, and ﬁ nancial structure of specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries 
for local governments can evolve through diﬀ erent stages by focusing successively on: 
P A R T  2    S E C T I O N  3    D E V E L O P I N G  A  C O M P E T I T I V E  S U B N AT I O N A L  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M
532
(a) funding streams of local government investments, (b) assisting in local institutional 
development and helping build a local credit culture and record, and (c) mobilizing private 
long-term resources for local infrastructure projects.
First Stage
MDFs would act as a conduit of budgetary and other resources to local governments along 
speciﬁ c criteria applicable to loans or grants. Th e comparison of the two scenarios, with and 
without MDF, shows that, in rationalizing the ad hoc, arbitrary, and sometimes politically 
guided process of resource transfers from central to local governments, the criteria-based 
MDF funding, which relies on strong technical capabilities, can strengthen local capacity, 
improve the selection of investment priorities, and markedly enhance the quality of local 
project ﬁ nance.
Second Stage
Specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries would further develop their capacity in local project 
ﬁ nance. Local governments that draw on the intermediary’s resources must service their 
loans out of the economic beneﬁ ts directly or indirectly generated by the investments 
funded by such loans. Th is procedure would help rationalize borrowing practices at the local 
level and improve the quality of local investment programs. At this stage, the specialized 
ﬁ nancial intermediary’s resources could consist of budgetary as well as bi- and multilateral 
oﬃ  cial funding. Th e intermediary’s institutional objectives would be, among other things, 
to help local governments strengthen creditworthiness by enforcing improved budgeting, 
auditing, and disclosure standards. Th is improved status would provide prospective lenders 
with credible and transparent information and establish a reliable credit track for future 
borrowings.
Th ird Stage
Within a maturing ﬁ nancial sector, specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries would provide the 
pooling mechanism through which local governments could mobilize additional private 
ﬁ nancial resources for their investment programs. Market-based ﬁ nancial intermediaries for 
local government entities would operate along commercial principles and issue long-term 
debt that has no government guarantee for on-lending mainly to viable, revenue-generating 
infrastructure investments. Part of the lending may also be directed to investments in public 
goods (such as street paving, lighting, and security) if lenders can establish, and shoulder, 
the risk that local borrowing entities generate. Th e range of borrowers would be expanded 
beyond local governments to cover utility corporations serving local constituencies. Th ese 
corporate entities would be eligible borrowers whether they are public, private, or operating 
under concession arrangements.
C H A P T E R  2 7    C R E D I T  M A R K E T S  A N D  S P E C I A L Z E D  I N T E R M E D I A R I E S
533
Objectives and Features of Market-based 
Local Government Financial Intermediaries
Market-based ﬁ nancial intermediaries for local governments are institutions able to raise 
long-term resources on private credit markets and operate in a ﬁ nancially sustainable 
manner. Th ey support local government operations through a range of ﬁ nancial 
instruments and products adapted to local needs. Market-based local government ﬁ nancial 
intermediaries (MLGFIs) may operate in primary or secondary credit markets. Th ey involve 
pool-ﬁ nancing arrangements for local infrastructure investments and provide smaller local 
government borrowers the possibility to access long-term debt markets. Lending would be 
accomplished mostly in leveraging the intermediary’s equity funds through bond issuance. 
Nonlending products, including fee-based ﬁ nancial advisory services, may also be oﬀ ered to 
local governments, mainly the larger ones. Th e intermediary’s portfolio, diversiﬁ ed among a 
large number of local government borrowers, would provide a good security and strengthen 
the credit quality of its debt issues.
In an open and competitive ﬁ nancial system, the comparative advantage of MLGFIs 
among other ﬁ nancial institutions would rest mainly in their knowledge of the local 
government sector. Th e speciﬁ c focus on local government business allows specialized 
intermediaries to build a competitive edge over other lending institutions that have a 
broader client base and act as a preferred lender for local governments. To achieve ﬁ nancial 
viability, MLGFIs need a regulatory environment conducive to enhancing local government 
creditworthiness. Th ey must engage in eﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial transactions within a business 
framework that is well deﬁ ned in terms of: (a) strategic and institutional objectives; (b) 
eligibility criteria and operational features, including speciﬁ c guidelines for portfolio 
diversiﬁ cation among sectors and borrowers; (c) a range of lending and nonlending products 
(such as loans, equity participation, guarantees, underwriting, and advisory services); (d) 
ﬁ nancial policies related to funding, lending, and capital adequacy; (e) product pricing for 
balance as well as oﬀ -balance sheet transactions; and (f ) market, credit, and currency risk 
management policies. When relevant, the steps needed to transform existing intermediaries 
into sustainable market-based operations would have to be considered.
Market-based Local Government Financial 
Intermediaries and Municipal Bond Markets
MLGFIs and municipal bond markets are not mutually exclusive approaches to local 
government access to credit. Th ey play complementary roles and serve diﬀ erent, albeit 
overlapping, market segments in meeting local government demand for long-term 
credit. Th is dual source provides local governments with diﬀ erent options to fund capital 
investments. Th erefore, the establishment of MLGFIs is no alternative to building 
eﬃ  cient municipal bond markets able to meet part of the credit demand of the larger local 
governments, which in aggregate might be signiﬁ cant. Th e availability of such alternative 
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sources of funding may somewhat reduce the claims by the larger local governments on 
scarce budgetary resources. Th ese reductions might in turn release additional ﬁ scal space 
for smaller local governments that are not able to access private credit. Moreover, domestic 
bond markets would be a source of long-term funding for MLGFIs and thus, indirectly, 
local governments.
Local governments diﬀ er markedly in terms of resource base and economic size. 
Th ese diﬀ erences bear on funding strategies and choices of ﬁ nancial instruments for 
capital investments. Th us, although larger, better endowed local governments that have 
good ﬁ nancial records may be able to tap the domestic municipal bond markets—and 
the international markets, in the case of a selected few local governments—smaller 
local governments often need to rely on the pooling capabilities of ﬁ nancial institutions 
to mobilize long-term credit. (Some small local governments may not be able to access 
credit in any form.) Moreover, in deciding whether to borrow from a specialized ﬁ nancial 
institution or to issue debt obligations on the bond market, local governments need to 
assess and compare the cash-ﬂ ow implications of both alternatives. Indeed, whereas credit 
lines from ﬁ nancial institutions allow a draw-down of funds in accordance with borrower 
expenditure requirements, bond issues would result in relatively large, lump-sum cash 
in-ﬂ ows. For local governments usually unacquainted with good liquidity management 
practices, loans from ﬁ nancial institutions allow for more manageable cash proﬁ les and a 
better control of the cost-of-carry.
Role of Market-based Financial Intermediaries 
in Local Government Access to Credit
MLGFIs mobilize long-term institutional savings for local infrastructure ﬁ nance by pooling 
the credit demand of local government borrowers. By acting as a bridge between local 
government demand for and capital market supply of debt securities, the intermediaries 
ﬁ ll a void where little potential for direct local government access to credit exists. Indeed, 
when institutional investors are in no position to assess individual local government 
risk, they may be willing to assume a diversiﬁ ed local government exposure through the 
ﬁ nancial intermediary. As such, the capital markets remain, indirectly through the ﬁ nancial 
intermediary, the ultimate funding source for local infrastructure investments.
In leveraging their equity funds through debt issuance, the intermediaries can deepen 
and expand the market-based funding pool for local governments and contribute to the 
upstream development of domestic long-term credit markets. Regardless of intermediation-
speciﬁ c issues, the development of domestic credit markets requires regulations and 
guidelines on, among other things, disclosure, credit rating, and benchmarks for pricing 
local government debt securities.
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MLGFIs must develop appropriate policies and mechanisms for lending to viable, 
revenue-generating investments (project ﬁ nance), as well as to priority public good 
investments (public ﬁ nance) that enhance the ﬁ scal revenues of local government 
borrowers and generate the tax resources needed for debt service. As their expertise grows, 
ﬁ nancial intermediaries, who are the repository of knowledge, data, and indicators on local 
government operations and ﬁ nance, could expand the range of their activities by oﬀ ering 
additional products to local governments. Lending products could include, for instance, 
short-term credit to improve cash-ﬂ ow proﬁ les as well as seasonal expenditure and revenue 
mismatches. Nonlending, fee-based services could include advisory and technical assistance 
to local governments, as well as underwriting of local government securities, especially in 
the case of private placements requiring no retail infrastructure.
Market-based Local Government Financial Intermediaries 
and Management of Risks
Like all ﬁ nancial institutions seeking to maintain ﬁ nancial viability (and achieve growth 
and proﬁ tability), MLGFIs must eﬀ ectively manage the main risks inherent in their lending 
business. Foremost among these are the market, credit, and foreign exchange risks. Speciﬁ c 
issues (strengths as well as weaknesses) associated with the ﬁ nancing of local governments 
need to be duly factored in the intermediary’s risk management policies. On the one hand, 
local governments, unlike corporate borrowers, are subject to constraints and regulations 
likely to hinder their debt service capacity, including inﬂ exible staﬃ  ng structure and costs, 
obligation to maintain minimum levels and standards of services even during economic 
downturns, and special jurisdiction that may shield them from creditor claims. On the 
other hand, local government borrowers that have taxing authority may increase revenues 
to meet debt service obligations in calling, within limits, on additional sales, business or 
property taxes.
Interest Rate and Oﬀ -balance Sheet Risks
MLGFIs, which are in the business of funding long-dated assets through long-term loans, 
need matching long-term resources that they raise on capital markets. Because they are 
not depository institutions, MLGFIs are unlikely to engage in maturity transformation 
in any signiﬁ cant way. Nonetheless, maturity mismatches may arise between the ﬁ nancial 
intermediary’s resources and applications. Any resulting interest rate or duration risk 
would need to be adequately managed. Moreover, MLGFIs need to develop the capability 
of managing their contingent liabilities (such as oﬀ -balance sheet exposure, including 
guarantees and other capital-sensitive nonlending products). In particular, the pricing of 
such transactions should reﬂ ect the cost of capital tied up in them.
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Credit Risk
Th e ability of a MLGFI to mobilize long-term debt on private markets is conditional on its 
creditworthiness. In turn, creditworthiness is a function of the credit quality of assets (that is, 
the portfolio of local government loans). For MLGFIs, the built-in portfolio diversiﬁ cation 
resulting from the variety of subsectors and borrowers translates into improved portfolio 
quality. Such a diversiﬁ ed asset base: (a) provides good security to creditors because it 
strengthens the credit quality of debt issued by the intermediary, and (b) allows the use 
of credit enhancement structures that require a diversiﬁ ed, expanded pool of debt. Th us, a 
MLGFI can use guarantees and derivatives that eﬀ ectively increase market acceptance or 
lower the cost of debt issues. Securitization of the intermediary’s loan portfolio can further 
strengthen the credit quality of its debt obligations.
Foreign Exchange Risk
MLGFIs may have diﬃ  culty hedging any foreign currency exposure that is not passed on to 
borrowers. Yet, local governments that generate no foreign currency resources (tax and fee 
income mostly accrue in local currency) may not be able, in the absence of eﬃ  cient currency 
swap markets, to bear such foreign exchange risk. Hence fostering the development of 
domestic markets as a source of long-term, local currency ﬁ nance is of crucial importance. 
Should the national authorities decide, when foreign currency is involved, to assume the 
foreign exchange risk on the grounds that they control monetary policies and foreign 
exchange reserves and would therefore be prepared better to hedge and manage the risk, 
the intermediary or the ultimate beneﬁ ciaries would have to levy a duly priced fee to cover 
government’s exposure.
Ownership of Local Government Financial Intermediaries 
and Elements of Public Support
Ownership structure is an issue often raised in connection with MLGFIs. Although 
private ownership would be the preferred option, public or joint private–public ownership 
can also be considered as long as the MLGFI has no monopoly in local government ﬁ nance 
and operates under the same rules and regulations as other private ﬁ nancial institutions 
involved in the local government sector. In the case of public ownership (where public 
equity funds are leveraged in private credit markets), any guarantee that either the central 
or local government may provide to back the intermediary’s debt issues should be duly 
priced and structured to reduce the likelihood of its being called on, and thus alleviate the 
incidence on the guarantor. Budgetary transfers and grants, if any, from central to local 
governments may be handled by the intermediary for a fee on a managed, oﬀ -balance sheet 
basis. For example, the government may channel through the MLGFI clearly targeted and 
transparent grants for projects involving more exacting national environment standards and 
for which externalities are demonstrated.
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Specialized Financial Intermediaries for Local Governments: A Useful Tool
Specialized ﬁ nancial intermediaries for local governments can serve a useful purpose in 
allowing local government access to long-term credit markets through an evolving process. 
In the initial stages, the institutional and operational focus of the intermediary would be 
mainly on the asset side (that is, portfolio quality and the economic sustainability of local 
projects):
 Th e ultimate objective would be to move toward establishing market-based approaches 
involving commercially viable, well-capitalized ﬁ nancial intermediaries that could 
independently mobilize long-term debt on private markets for on-lending to priority 
local investments.
 Th e evolving role of the intermediary would require a parallel development at the 
ﬁ nancial and infrastructure sector levels, including structural and regulatory changes to 
remove barriers to private sector entry into local infrastructure provision and to private 
ﬁ nancial institutions’ participation in local project ﬁ nance.
 Although private ownership of MLGFIs is preferable, public or joint private–public 
ownership can be considered as long as no restrictions or penalties are placed on other 
private ﬁ nancial institutions involved in the local government sector.
 MLGFIs and municipal bond markets play complementary roles in meeting local 
demand for term credit. Th ey oﬀ er alternative options by ﬁ nancing local governments, 
the needs and capabilities of which vary in line with their economic size and resource 
base. Municipal bond markets may be more suited for the larger, better endowed 
borrowers. Yet, when local governments lack the scale for direct market access, MLGFIs 
can ﬁ ll the void by pooling credit demand and mobilizing long-term resources on local 
government’s behalf.
Credit Rating
Local governments planning to tap the credit markets may want to obtain a credit rating 
by a recognized rating agency. A rating entails a credit agency review that would measure 
a local government’s ability to service debt in light of available taxes and other resources, 
and assess its record in honoring ﬁ nancial commitments, especially under adverse 
circumstances. Relevant areas of focus would be the economic and social characteristics 
of the constituency, and the structure of the government debt and ﬁ nancial operations 
(including sources of revenues, spending requirements, and unencumbered cash available). 
Improving the credit standing of municipal issuers requires that municipal tax bases be 
expanded and tax rates rationalized, and that local investments, including infrastructure, 
be screened to select those that have large payoﬀ s in helping cities develop services, expand 
business, and increase employment.
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As a general rule, no issuer will receive a rating higher than the sovereign rating of 
the jurisdiction in which the issuer is located—the so-called “sovereign risk ceiling.” Th is 
rating reﬂ ects the risk that depreciation in the value of the local currency or imposition 
of foreign exchange controls might restrict the ability of subsovereign issuers to honor 
their debt service obligations. Under certain circumstances, securitization through oﬀ shore 
receivables, for instance, may provide the basis for a credit rating that may be above that of 
the sovereign.
By providing independent opinions to investors as to the credit quality of debt issuers, 
credit ratings have become important parameters in market acceptance and pricing of debt. 
Ratings are now viewed as easy-to-use tools for diﬀ erentiating credit quality by individual 
investors and by institutional investors often required to hold instruments of given credit 
categories in their portfolio.
Defi nitions and Features
Credit ratings are public opinions about the creditworthiness of an obligor (that is, a 
debt issuer) with respect to a speciﬁ c ﬁ nancial obligation, a speciﬁ c class of ﬁ nancial 
obligations, or a speciﬁ c ﬁ nancial program, such as commercial paper. Ratings are based on 
the likelihood of default and the capacity and willingness of the obligors with respect to 
timely payment of interest and principal in accordance with the terms of their obligations. 
A rating is not a general-purpose evaluation of an issuer; it may also be predicated on the 
credit enhancement provided by a third party, such as a guarantor, insurer, or lessee.
Credit ratings are analyses based on current information obtained from the obligors 
and other sources that rating agencies consider reliable. Th e agencies are unambiguous in 
their disclaimer that a rating is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold a debt security 
as it performs the isolated function of credit risk evaluation, which is only one element 
of the entire investment decision-making process. Moreover, despite the thorough rating 
process, rating agencies do not conduct an audit of the information supplied by the issuer, 
which forms the basis on which ratings are assigned. Rating agencies have no ﬁ duciary 
responsibility in relation to investors. Th erefore, although ratings are important elements of 
disclosure, they should not be outright substitutes for credible reporting by issuers as far as 
investors are concerned.
Change in Rating of Outstanding Debt
Th e ﬁ nancial condition of a rated entity may change, sometimes rapidly, because of intrinsic 
reasons that alter the price structure of a product line or erode the competitiveness of a 
business concern. A lapse in the risk management and control systems of an obligor may 
cause a rapid change. For example, California’s Orange County, which despite its high-
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quality rating had to ﬁ le for bankruptcy protection in 1994 after sustaining large losses 
in its liquidity portfolio. A macroeconomic downturn or ﬁ nancial shocks (for example, 
ﬁ nancial crises in east Asia) that deﬂ ate asset prices, reduce demand for companies’ output, 
or contract the revenue base of public entities may also cause a rapid change in credit rating.
Credit ratings on outstanding debt obligations may be subject to downgrade or 
upgrade, so a rating agency should consider that material changes in the ﬁ nancial condition 
of an issuing entity do warrant a rating review. Th e issuer’s rating may be put under credit 
watch with positive or negative outlook until such time as a revised rating is assigned. Th e 
timeliness of rating reviews is critical to investors, who view ratings as leading indicators 
of credit quality. In this regard, the speed in which rating agencies recognize, and reﬂ ect 
through credit downgrade, the onset of a ﬁ nancial crisis, for instance, might be viewed by 
investors as a performance indicator of the agencies’ role as an early warning system for the 
ﬁ nancial markets. Rating agencies walk a ﬁ ne line and argue that a precipitous action of 
downgrade, in restricting or increasing the cost of access to credit markets in time of crises, 
can further compound borrowers’ ills.
Ratings as Relative Measures of Creditworthiness
A credit rating provides a relative ranking of issuers’ creditworthiness under similar stress 
conditions. As such, ratings oﬀ er a vehicle for the relative pricing of debt securities when 
yield spreads among debt issues that have diﬀ erent credit ratings reﬂ ect the credit risk 
premium required when investing in the riskier issues. Th e benchmark reference for the 
pricing of corporate and subsovereign debt would normally be set by the debt securities of 
even maturity issued by the sovereign government in the currency of the debt. Th e interest 
spread would compensate for the credit and liquidity risk of the debt issue relative to the 
so-called “risk-free” sovereign debt obligation. (For instance the U.S. Treasury securities set 
the benchmark oﬀ  which all U.S. dollar denominated debt issues would be priced.)
Sovereign Ceilings for Foreign Currency Ratings
Country risk considerations form an integral part of the credit analysis of debt issuers, 
because credit ratings take into account the currency in which a debt obligation is 
denominated. To this end, rating agencies assign sovereign ratings for countries. Th ese 
ratings generally set a ceiling for the foreign currency denominated debt of domestic 
entities, including subsovereign governments. Th e rationale for the sovereign rating ceiling 
is that domestic entities might eventually have to rely on central governments and central 
banks to secure the foreign exchange required for external debt service, but a domestic 
entity could qualify for a foreign currency debt rating higher than the sovereign’s, for 
instance, when debt securitization is backed by export trade receivables or using other 
forms of credit enhancement such as insurance.
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Project-speciﬁ c Ratings
Rating agencies provide credit assessment of project ﬁ nance deals. Project ﬁ nance deals 
would normally be capped by, and not necessarily qualify for, the sovereign rating of the 
country in which the project is located. Regardless of country ceiling however, some 
projects, typically exports with structured ﬁ nancing, may claim a subsovereign rating higher 
than the sovereign’s. Moreover, a project-speciﬁ c rating based on secured or structured debt 
for instance, might be diﬀ erent from, and superior to, the rating of the company issuing 
the project debt.
Short-term Ratings
Credit ratings reﬂ ect the issuers’ ability to meet their debt obligations as they come due 
over the contractual term of the borrowings. In this regard, debt with long-term maturity 
would be assigned a “long-term” rating. Rating agencies assign “short-term” ratings to debt 
obligations that have original maturities of one year or less, such as commercial paper. A 
short-term rating may also be used to indicate the credit standing of an issuer with respect 
to a put feature on a long-term debt obligation (where the put gives investors the right 
to sell back the debt obligation to the issuer at an agreed price within a speciﬁ ed period). 
In this case, a dual rating may be published with the short-term rating relative to the put 
feature and the long-term rating relative to the underlying long-term security.
Credit Quality and Default Rates
Although a credit rating is just a solid assessment of the credit quality and as such just 
one element of a complex investment decision-making process, evidences suggest that 
there are strong correlation between the credit quality and the subsequent defaults. Th is 
section summarizes results of enquiries on coincidences between: default and economic 
environment; default and credit quality; volatility of defaults by credit categories; and the 
risk of unforeseen event.
Default Rates and Economic Environment
Statistical analyses correlate credit quality and default rate on an historical basis. For 
instance, analyses can quantify the occurrences of default xaaa%, xaa%, and xa% over a 
speciﬁ ed holding period for entities that had been rated respectively AAA, AA, and A at 
period-start. Analyses conﬁ rm that xaaa is lower than xaa, which is in turn lower than xa. Yet, 
absolute default probabilities may not be inferred from the credit rating categories, because 
default occurrences xaaa%, xaa%, and xa% are period dependent (with higher concentration 
of defaults in periods of economic depression). For instance, analyses of corporate debt 
defaults during the U.S. Great Depression show that, of all corporate issuers rated by 
Moody’s as of July 1932, almost one in ten defaulted within one year. Of the U.S. municipal 
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debt issues that were rated in 1929 and went into default in 1932, 78 percent had been 
rated AA or better, and 48 percent had been rated AAA. Reﬂ ecting the severity of the 
depression, such default occurrences of highly rated municipal entities over relatively short 
holding periods are unlikely to be matched in other times.
Default Occurrence and Credit Quality
Among the studies correlating default rates and credit-rating categories are Moody’s 
analyses of historical default rates (Moody’s 1987). Th e recent 1997 update of the research 
covers the 77-year period 1920–1996, over which Moody’s had rated the debt of some 
14,000 corporate and sovereign issuers. Recent studies of municipal default rates might be 
less representative than for corporate defaults, because the majority of U.S. subsovereign 
issuers are in the middle-to-high end of the investment grade spectrum, with most recent 
debt issues covered by bond insurance. Claims against municipal bond insurances show 
insigniﬁ cant levels of default. In Moody’s studies, default is deﬁ ned as any missed or delayed 
disbursement of interest and/or principal. Default also includes distressed exchanges where 
bondholders are oﬀ ered packages of securities with diminished ﬁ nancial obligation such as 
preferred stock. 
Th e studies show the inverse relationship between default rates and rating categories, 
with a clear pattern of higher risk of default for the speculative grade-rating categories. For 
instance, over the 27-year segment 1970–1996, average one-year default rates were 0.01 
percent for A-rated issuers, 0.12 percent for Baa-rated issuers, 1.36 percent for Ba-rated 
issuers, and 7.27 percent for B-rated issuers. Over the entire period 1920–1996, one-year 
default rates were 0.08 percent for A-rated issuers, 0.30 percent for Baa-rated issuers, 1.48 
percent for Ba-rated issuers, and 4.47 percent for B-rated issuers.
For defaults over holding periods exceeding one year, the studies also show a signiﬁ cant 
jump in default frequency for progressively lower ratings. Indeed, during the 1920–1996 
period, (cumulative) default rates over a 10-year holding period averaged 8 percent for 
issuers rated Baa, against 18 percent for Ba and 31 percent for B-rated credits. A similar 
pattern of increasing average default rates for lower rated issues also prevails over 5-, 15-, 
and 20-year holding periods.
Volatility of Default Occurrences and Credit Category
Th e studies also show that the volatility of default rates increases with lower credit rating 
(for instance, default rates within one-year for B-rated issues reached 22 percent in 1970, 
with no such default in 1971). Volatility of one-year default rates expressed by the standard 
deviation over the study period 1920–1996 range from 0.1 percent for Aa credits to 0.3 
percent for A credits, 0.4 percent for Baa, 1.7 percent for Ba and 4.5 percent for B. Th e 
lower predictability of default rates also explains the signiﬁ cantly higher risk premium 
required by investors in lower rated issues. (Moody’s 1997) 
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Event Risk
Regardless of credit quality and rating category, defaults may be brought about by special 
events, which Moody’s deﬁ nes as follows: Changes in a borrower’s “prospects of ﬁ nancial 
position that result in a sudden shift in credit quality although its precise timing and 
nature could not have been predicted by the fundamental tools of credit analysis” (Moody’s 
1997: 87). Examples would be mergers or takeovers, divestitures, and ﬁ ling for bankruptcy 
protection as a defense against litigation (for example, the litigation-related bankruptcy 
ﬁ ling of the Aaa-rated Texaco). Although credit evaluation is supposed to factor special 
events into ratings of individual issuers, the full implications in terms of default experience 
of individual companies cannot be predicted in advance. Special events are likely to have 
their greatest impact on default rates of higher rated issuers because these, by deﬁ nition, 
are more resilient to default than lower rated issuers would be under similar exogenous 
economic conditions.
Subsovereign Credit Ratings
Local governments in emerging and developing economies are increasingly seeking ways to 
raise debt on private credit markets to ﬁ nance local investments. As a result, subsovereign 
credit assessment has become an important topic for investors and policymakers. In 
the United States most municipal debt issuers are rated. In emerging and developing 
economies, subsovereign credit evaluation, which is in its early stages, would need to 
respond speciﬁ cally to the concerns of potential domestic and foreign lenders and investors 
as they evaluate credit demand and investment proposals by local governments. To this end, 
the information systems upon which ratings are predicated must be built and improved (see 
also chapter 19). 
Credit-rating systems in which creditors rely on the subsovereign borrower’s capacity 
to repay, not on an explicit or implicit sovereign guarantee, analyze the assignment of 
responsibilities among various levels of government, the structure of local government 
expenditures and revenues (including own source), and the regulatory and institutional 
setting within which local services are delivered. Creditworthiness, as assessed by market 
players, including rating agencies, should reﬂ ect the local resource endowment, soundness 
of the local government ﬁ nance framework, and its capacity to withstand stress and 
issue debt in a way consistent with macroeconomic stability. Th us, credit analyses of 
subsovereign issuers and the assessment of an issuer’s ability to service debt seek to address 
the following:
 Economic and social characteristics of the jurisdiction. Th ese characteristics include local 
resource endowment, the existing stock of productive assets, level and distribution of 
income, level of education, and quality of services.
 Sources and composition of revenues and expenditures. Th ese criteria cover the predictability 
of ﬁ scal relations with, and transfers from, the central government and the local revenue 
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base. Th e latter includes composition of taxes (property, business, development, and 
sales), adequacy of tax rates and tax administration, and existence, diversiﬁ cation, and 
sustainability of other revenues upon which local governments would call to meet debt 
service. Th is evaluation would be matched and assessed against the level, structure, and 
proﬁ le of local expenditures.
 Structure of local government ﬁ nancial operations. Th ese operations include outstanding 
debt and other ﬁ nancial commitments, structure of assets and liabilities, liquidity, and 
unencumbered cash available. Also relevant would be the quality of ﬁ nancial controls 
and the transparency and credibility of budgeting, accounting, and auditing systems. 
Th e issuer’s record in honoring ﬁ nancial commitments, especially under adverse 
circumstances, would also be assessed.
 Regulatory and institutional setting for local service delivery. Th is setting includes the 
capacity and eﬃ  ciency of local government institutions, the quality of local asset 
management, the degree of autonomy of utilities companies, the reliability of services to 
consumers and recurrent income, the competition and pricing policies in the provision 
of local services, the criteria for monitoring performance of monopoly services, and the 
processes for planning and selecting local investments (including infrastructure) that 
help local government expand businesses and increase employment.
 Legal and regulatory environment for local government credit. Th is environment includes 
the framework for debt issuance, settlement, repayment and custody; regulations on 
local government bankruptcy; creditors’ rights; and claims on local assets against other 
liabilities.
 Credit enhancement mechanisms. Th ese mechanisms include the assessment of features 
that strengthen the credit of local government debt issues in providing security col-
lateral through dedicated streams of income and third-party support, such as guarantee, 
insurance and bank letter of credit, and derivative structures.
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Appendix
Credit Rating Rules
Standard & Poor’s 
Long-term Ratings Scale and Defi nitions
Moody’s Long-term Ratings Scale and Defi nitions
AAA 
Debt rated AAA has the highest rating assigned 
by Standard & Poor’s. Capacity to pay interest and 
repay principal is extremely strong.
AA
Debt rated AA has a very strong capacity to pay 
interest and repay principal and diﬀ ers from the 
highest rated issues only in small degree.
A
Debt rated A has a strong capacity to pay interest 
and repay principal although it is somewhat more 
susceptible to the adverse eﬀ ects of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions than debt 
in higher rated categories.
BBB
Debt rated BBB is regarded as having an adequate 
capacity to pay interest and repay principal. Whereas 
it normally exhibits adequate protection parameters, 
adverse economic conditions or changing 
circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened 
capacity to pay interest and repay principal for debt 
in this category than in higher rated categories.
BB, B, CCC, CC
Debt rated BB, B, CCC, or CC is regarded, on 
balance, as predominantly speculative with respect 
to capacity to pay interest and repay principal in 
accordance with the terms of the obligation. 
BB indicates the lowest degree of speculation and 
CC the highest degree of speculation. While such 
debt is likely to have some quality and protective 
characteristics, these are outweighed by large 
uncertainties or major risk exposures to adverse 
conditions.
Aaa
Bonds which are rated Aaa are judged to be of 
the best quality. Th ey carry the smallest degree of 
investment risk and are generally referred to as “gilt 
edge.” Interest payments are protected by a large or 
by an exceptionally stable margin and principal is 
secure. While the various protective elements are 
likely to change, such changes as can be visualized 
are most unlikely to impair the fundamentally 
strong position of such issues.
Aa
Bonds which are rated Aa are judged to be of high 
quality by all standards. Together with the Aaa 
group they comprise what are generally known as 
high-grade bonds. Th ey are rated lower than the best 
bonds because margins of protection may not be as 
large as in Aaa securities or ﬂ uctuation of protective 
elements may be of greater amplitude or there may 
be other elements present which make the 
long-term risks appear somewhat larger than 
in Aaa securities.
A
Bonds which are rated A possess many favorable 
investment attributes and are to be considered as 
upper-medium-grade obligations. Factors giving 
security to principal and interest are considered 
adequate but elements may be present which suggest 
a susceptibility to impairment somewhat 
in the future.
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Standard & Poor’s 
Long-term Ratings Scale and Defi nitions
Moody’s Long-term Ratings Scale and Defi nitions
C
Th e C rating is used to cover a situation where a 
bankruptcy petition has been ﬁ led or similar action 
has been taken, but payments on this obligation are 
being continued.
D
Debt rated D is in default, and payment of interest 
and/or of principal is in arrears.
Plus (+) or Minus (–)
S&P’s ratings from AA to B may be modiﬁ ed by 
the addition of a plus or minus sign to show relative 
standing within the major rating categories.
Baa
Bonds which are rated Baa are considered as 
medium-grade obligations, i.e., they are neither 
highly protected nor poorly secured. Interest 
payments and principal security appear adequate 
for the present but certain protective elements may 
be lacking or may be characteristically unreliable 
over any great length of time. Such bonds lack 
outstanding investment characteristics and, in fact, 
have speculative characteristics as well.
Ba
Bonds which are rated Ba are judged to have 
speculative elements; their future cannot be 
considered as well assured. Often the protection 
of interests and principal payments may be very 
moderate, and thereby not well safeguarded 
during both good and bad times over the future. 
Uncertainty of position characterizes bonds 
in this class.
B
Bonds which are rated B generally lack 
characteristics of the desirable investment. 
Assurance of interest and principal payments or of 
maintenance of other terms of the contract over any 
long period of time may be small.
Caa
Bonds which are rated Caa are of poor standing. 
Such issues may be in default or there may be 
present elements of danger with respect to principal 
or interest.
Ca
Bonds which are rated Ca represent obligations 
which are speculative in a high degree. Such 
issues are often in default or have other marked 
shortcomings.
C
Bonds which are rated C are the lowest rated class 
of bonds and issues so rated can be regarded as 
having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining 
any real investment standing.
Ratings from Aa to B may be further disaggregated 
in numerical sub-categories (1, 2, 3).
Source: World Bank 1999: 6–5.
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Since 1990 local governments in Hungary have made signiﬁ cant investments in water and 
wastewater treatment systems using mostly state funds, mainly targeted and addressed 
grants. Drinking water systems were completed in ﬁ ve years, and now serve all localities 
and 99 percent of Hungary’s population. Regardless of the success in terms of quantity, the 
ﬁ nancial eﬃ  ciency and economies of scale of these developments came under increased 
scrutiny. Many of the ﬁ xed networks for natural gas supply, electric power, and telephones 
were privatized and operated on a regional basis. Th e next challenges are in wastewater 
collection and treatment, solid waste handling, and road construction. All three functions 
are important for European Union membership.
Local governments have proven very innovative in ﬁ nancing infrastructure; at the same 
time, they are far from using ﬁ nancing techniques common in more developed economies. 
Within Hungary’s mixed regulatory system and almost entirely privatized banking 
and ﬁ nancial system, local governments with a broad range of business and economic 
activities provide many examples of creative infrastructure ﬁ nance that are rational in the 
environment in which they operate. Th ese creative solutions on a project-by-project basis, 
however, are often suboptimal at the national level, and reveal the distortions caused by 
uncertainty and the adverse incentives of the investment grant system.
Th is chapter addresses municipal infrastructure ﬁ nance issues based on extensive ﬁ eld 
research and a comprehensive review of several recently completed sewage-treatment and 
collection projects. In addition to identifying the actors, their roles, and prototype models, 
this chapter describes four cases which demonstrate that: (a) the primary criterion for local 
government decisions is to maximize grant funding rather than optimize investments, 
(b) the grant distribution system causes liquidity problems for municipalities during 
construction projects, and (c) expensive and semi-legal bridging tools are used to overcome 
these liquidity gaps.
* Th is chapter is based on Jókay, Kálmán, and Kopányi 1998. 
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Actors Involved in Municipal Infrastructure Projects
Several actors develop and provide utility services, each with diﬀ erent, sometimes 
conﬂ icting, objectives, legislative and economic conditions, and motivations. Th ese 
actors are the local government, the utility operator company, the large users, the prime 
contractors, the ﬁ nancial institutions, and the small customers of utilities.
Th e Local Government
Th e key actor in initiating, planning, funding, constructing, and operating a sewage 
treatment plant and collection system is the municipality or a group of municipalities in a 
loose association managed by a lead municipality. In most cases the municipality directly 
owns the treatment plant and the network because these facilities are by law core assets (see 
chapters 17 and 19); the municipality often also owns the utility operating company. Th e 
municipality and its institutions, such as schools and hospitals, are often major consumers of 
utility services, and the local government is also a regulator and oversight body representing 
the interests of commercial, private, and industrial consumers.
As project manager, the local government supervises technical planning, engineering, 
and construction and obtains funding sources in the form of grants, loans, and equity. 
Setting utility rates is a conﬂ icting and diﬃ  cult municipal function. On the one hand, the 
local government should support cost-based pricing with a modest proﬁ t; on the other hand, 
as a political entity, it often fails to support an economically rational price or an adequate 
price adjustment. As the price regulator, the local government has the right to examine in 
detail the utilities’ operation and cost structure, even if it is not the owner. Th is arrangement 
raises the classic principal-agent dilemma in the sense that the public authority may not 
have technical skills to review and encourage eﬃ  cient utility operation.
Th e Utility Operator
Th e operator could be a department of the local government, an independent municipal 
enterprise, a private enterprise, or a state-owned ﬁ rm. At the onset of the new local 
government system, core and noncore assets were separated. Assets such as machinery, 
vehicles, and buildings were spun oﬀ  into an operator company, and core assets, such as 
land, sewer pipes, and treatment plants were transferred from the state to the books of 
municipalities. Commonly, a pre-arranged lease arrangement was created between the 
municipality and the operator, who pays a negotiated leasing fee, which conceptually 
should be suﬃ  cient to cover the real depreciation and ﬁ nancing cost of the core assets.
Political considerations, however, limit the extent to which the leasing fee covers 
these expenses. Under this arrangement, the value and depreciation of municipal assets 
are indirectly related to user fees (see chapter 15). Very often, the user fee is set on a 
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political basis, and the leasing fee is calculated to enable the operator to cover its capital 
and operational expenses and provide a moderate proﬁ t. As a result, the leasing fee is often 
nominal.
Looking at the whole universe of the integrated utility service system, most assets 
are owned by the municipality, and the undercapitalized operator owns only a relatively 
small portion. One major consequence is that the operator does not have enough physical 
collateral to obtain ﬁ nancing for new investments, necessitating various local government 
guarantees involving real estate and other assets with no relationship to the capital project 
being funded.
Large Users
Large industrial and commercial users of water and sewage services have a vested interest 
in plants that have the capacity to treat their eﬄ  uent adequately. Th ese interests are often 
at odds with those of the population, which does not feel the eﬀ ect of environmental 
degradation directly. Heavy users must comply with discharge standards to obtain or renew 
operational licenses and to avoid ﬁ nes and penalties or a disruption of operations. In project 
planning, when several large users account for a signiﬁ cant portion of the eﬄ  uent and 
pollutants, local government’s best interest is served by involving the large users at all stages 
from planning to capacity engineering, especially to project ﬁ nance preparations.
Prime Contractors
Because of the size and complexity of a utility development, a prime contractor should 
serve as the sole counterpart of the investor and be responsible for completion of the 
project. Th e contractor should also select subcontractors, coordinate their work, and ensure 
their cooperation. Th e prime contractor should be suﬃ  ciently capitalized because its capital 
should provide liquidity and guarantee against unforeseen risks. Th e prime contractor often 
volunteers to cover signiﬁ cant expenses, although some of them occur prior to selection. 
Th e 1995 Act on Public Procurement, however, requires a public competitive tender for 
projects above a certain size; all but 10 percent of water, wastewater, and sanitation projects 
fall into this category.
Th e prime contractor could be a municipal enterprise, but very often it is a private 
company. Th e latter often volunteers to provide three types of bridge ﬁ nancing to the 
investor municipality:
 A loan identiﬁ ed as such in a contract or note. Mortgaged real estate unrelated to the 
project could also be involved.
 A loan against a ﬁ ctional sale contract. To hide contingent liability, the contractor 
purchases a piece of real estate or other property at a low price with a put option and 
sells it back at a more favorable price when the municipality’s liquidity is restored.
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 Accepting delayed payments for services rendered. Th e due amount is paid when the 
municipality obtains funds from another source.
 
A closer look at these arrangements shows that the eﬀ ective real interest rate and the 
total cost of funds in most of these schemes far exceeds those of purely market-based loans 
and other forms of credit, because of the lack of local government creditworthiness, as well 
as lack of expertise in project ﬁ nance and in the analysis of real or eﬀ ective price of such 
oﬀ ers.
Financial Institutions
In the late 1980s, before the transition from socialism, local councils issued 10–15 year notes 
with ﬁ xed 8–10 percent interest rates. In the early 1990s inﬂ ation 30 percent and above 
destroyed the real value of these instruments. Afterward long-term ﬁ xed rate ﬁ nancing 
(such as 20–30 year bonds) was not available; banks tended to lend for three to ﬁ ve years 
at variable interest rates indexed to short-term government bonds. Th e present prudential 
regulation requires banks to set up reserves of 100 percent against municipal loans.
Th e prevalent grant and soft money system creates adverse incentives for project-
based cash ﬂ ow ﬁ nancing. In addition, the general level of uncertainty and perceptions of 
creditworthiness prevent the issuance of classic general obligation debt. Legal regulations—
such as the debt service limit provision of the 1990 Act on Local Government—prevent 
excessive debt. Th e municipal accounting system is cash-based, however, and does not accrue 
or apportion an impending balloon payment as “debt service,” which may cause sudden, 
unpredictable violations of the debt service limit in the year of the balloon payment.
Customers
Th e population is, ﬁ rst, a consumer of infrastructure services and, second, but no 
less important, the taxpayer, voter, and enforcer of popular sovereignty over the local 
government that is the owner, price-setter, and perhaps operator of the same infrastructure. 
In addition, the population pays a gamut of central government taxes, a portion of which 
comes back in the form of capital grants to municipal projects. In a slightly schizophrenic 
situation, the local citizen encourages grant seeking, which is not necessarily in the citizen’s 
favor as a payer of national taxes. Various segments of the population could have multiple 
roles as local business leaders, consumer advocates, and environmentalists.
Customers also play a critical role as ﬁ nanciers through user fees, connection charges, 
and local taxes. User fees are often in the crossﬁ re of local political debates, which could 
result in economically dubious compromises. Th e willingness to pay “unfair” rates is 
thus critical if the population is not educated about the true costs and beneﬁ ts of the 
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infrastructure. In addition to hook-up fees and contributions to utility capital costs, the 
population often forms wastewater associations, signing petitions enabling the associations 
to borrow funds from banks where 70 percent of the interest cost is paid by the state 
directly. Th ese associations essentially signal a form of highly subsidized phantom municipal 
borrowing in which the state bears an additional burden. Th is dubious involvement of the 
citizens in project ﬁ nancing supports the arguments for keeping user charges below full 
cost recovery.
Th e State
Th e state, through various grant and soft loan programs, is essentially the chief ﬁ nancing 
source for local infrastructure projects that reﬂ ect some national priority. Th ese funds 
come in the form of targeted and addressed grants, from special funds (from the Water 
and Environmental Ministries), and regional development sources. Using the principle of 
matching grants, this system means roughly a 50 percent direct state share that in some 
cases, given the lack of coordination and enforcement, could be tuned up to 100 percent or 
more of project costs.
Th e state provides payments only against invoices that have been paid. Th is 
reimbursement scheme causes a major liquidity problem even for projects that are 
overwhelmingly grant funded. Preparation costs are not reimbursed by the state, and, in 
essence, local governments have to pre-ﬁ nance the eventual state grants. Vendors and 
prime contractors, as well as ﬁ nancial institutions, provide up-front money. Th e state as 
rule-maker and creator of the enforcement mechanism motivates grant-seeking and grant-
maximizing behavior removed from economic and environmental rationality.
Four Basic Investment Models
Th e four sewage development cases summarized below do not represent a statistical sample, 
yet they show four common ways of ﬁ nancing local utilities in the 1990s. Our ﬁ ndings 
support the conclusion that beyond the intrinsic economic circumstances, the views, 
perceptions, policy priorities, and political connections of local governments determine 
the technical and ﬁ nancing character of these investment projects. Th e system of state 
investment grants, beyond its primary role in supporting national priorities, often distorts 
the size, ﬁ nancing forms, and eﬃ  ciency of local utility investments (see box 28.1).
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Box 28.1 Four General Financing Models
Th e scale and dimensions of various sources of funding distinguish the four general models of infrastructure 
ﬁ nance, ranging from using almost entirely state funds to using largely own-source funds and private 
capital that is to be repaid from operational revenues. Th e following descriptions show the diﬀ erent role of 
own sources in capital costs.
100 percent or overwhelmingly state-funded projects. No local government project is done without some 
degree of state funds. One extreme would be a complex mix of state funds (for example, targeted grants, 
addressed grants, funds from ministries of environment, water, transportation, and regional development) 
adding up to 100 percent or perhaps more of a project’s cost. Central government funding sources are not 
synchronized, coordinated, or cross-referenced. Starting in 1999, donors are required to coordinate among 
themselves. Targeted and some other infrastructure grants also play an economic equalization role and are 
distributed on an entitlement basis.
Entirely own sources. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a local government could fund a project 
entirely from its own sources such as loans, operational savings, capital contributions, and hook-up charges.  
A popular practice is to characterize as an “own source” all funds that are obtained from sources other 
than the one being applied for at the time. In other words, a grant from the Ministry of Environment 
is considered to be own source when matched against the targeted grant or other state grants. Genuine 
own sources can include asset sales, capital income, operating proﬁ ts from user-fee-based services, as well 
as loans based on future cash ﬂ ow from these sources. Borrowing is seen as a last-resort mechanism, in 
contrast to the pay-as-you-go system of intergeneration equity in practice in more advanced Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. Bond ﬁ nancing, whether general obligation or 
revenue, is still controversial, yet a hopeful future option.
Public–private partnership. Th is model involves several variations. In one case a large commercial 
or industrial user oﬀ ers a soft loan to the project company or to the municipality, in return for quicker 
construction or the use of a technology that is more appropriate to the donor’s needs. Th e large user oﬀ ers 
cash that can be used to complete the project faster than otherwise possible given the 3-year draw-down 
under the traditional targeted grant system. Th e large user avoids environmental penalties and operational 
disruptions, and the municipality enjoys a steady stream of predictable user fees during operations and 
liquidity during construction. Another variation is to involve a concessionaire in a so-called build-operate-
transfer arrangement, where the concessionaire ﬁ nances, builds, owns, then later transfers ownership to 
the municipality in return for a guaranteed rate of return. In a unique central European twist, an inverse 
build-operate-transfer became typical. In this arrangement, a piece of infrastructure is built with public 
funds then sold to a concessionaire or leased to an operating company. Privatization of Hungary’s gas and 
electric utilities represent an inverse build-operate-transfer. 
Vendors ﬁ nance. Vendors could be asked not only to provide liquidity loans, but essentially to ﬁ nance 
the own-source portion of a municipal project by delaying payments over long periods and by actually 
loaning cash or buying services at disproportionate prices from the operating company or project company. 
Th e project’s own sources are provided by the vendor who then recoups the investment through its usual 
proﬁ t margin. Th e vendor essentially extends a loan that would be repaid from the proceeds of a potential 
concession fee oﬀ ered to the municipality in return for the right to operate the facility. Th e infrastructure, 
built with state funds and from explicit and hidden loans from the prime contractor and major services 
and equipment vendors, is ﬁ nanced from anticipated proﬁ ts from user fees and from high markups on 
services rendered.
Project Supported Entirely by State Funds
Th e ﬁ rst typical case is a small village of 1,700 citizens in one of Hungary’s most 
disadvantaged regions that has a high unemployment rate above the national average. Th is 
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village decided to initiate a sewage project with a total three-year cost about 10 times its 
annual budget. Given the village’s small size, any infrastructure project of signiﬁ cance is 
likely to be a multiple of its annual budget. Th is village was motivated by the availability of 
free money and soft money, and by rivalry with neighboring communities of similar size. 
Th e community began planning when it was already pre-treating its wastewater without an 
expensive sewer system.
Th e village had four options: (a) improve the existing wetland and connect the new 
sewage collection network there, (b) build only a network and connect it to a nearby large 
city, (c) connect its new network to a nearby medium-sized city’s treatment plant under 
construction, (d) construct a network and a small treatment plant with a neighboring small 
village.
Expanding and improving the existing wetland and building a collection system was 
the ﬁ rst and the most economical option in terms of capital and operating expenses. Th e 
regulatory authorities did not favor natural or alternative treatment systems, and imposed 
discharge standards that made using the existing system diﬃ  cult. In contrast, European 
Union discharge standards do not apply to settlements with populations of fewer than 
2,000. Zealous environmental regulations prevented the most cost-eﬀ ective form of 
treatment in this case.
Th e second option was to build collection systems and mains, and connect the village 
to a nearby large city’s underused modern treatment plant, which had low capital but higher 
operational expenses. Th is option was rejected because of the cost of moving sewage a large 
distance and doubts about the citizens’ willingness to pay high sewer charges. Th e grant 
system requires an estimate of operational expenses, not coverage of all costs, including 
replacement and capital costs. Hence, municipalities focus on minimizing operational costs 
and do not select the most economical option.
Th e third option was to build the collection system and connect it to the treatment 
plant under construction in a neighboring town of 5,000. Because the village was not part 
of the other town’s original grant application, however, it could not join later because of 
grant regulations. In this case, the grant regulations prevented joint provision of a service 
because, illogically, a grant-supported project underway could not be modiﬁ ed.
Th e fourth option was to construct a new treatment plant jointly with a neighboring 
village. Th is joint eﬀ ort brought the user population to more than 4,000, and the other 
village contributed the presence of an industrial user interested in a plant expansion.
Th e village selected this last alternative, ﬁ nanced a technical plan, and applied for state 
grants in 1998 (ﬁ gure 28.1). Of the Ft one billion total investment cost, the village needed 
to assemble Ft 471 million (Ft 31 million toward the treatment plant and Ft 440 million 
toward the collection system), of which 90 percent was expected to come directly from 
state sources and about 10 percent from hook-up fees from the population. Discussions 
with the local government led us to the conclusion that this preferred alternative was 
selected based on the lowest possible user fees, but we realized that the village had not 
taken certain expenses, such as depreciation, into account and that estimated user fees for 
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approximately 500 households were likely to be much higher than indicated by the village’s 
own projections.
Figure 28.1 Financing Sewage Investment in NT
Source: Municipality of NT data.
Th e investment alternatives were further distorted by an informal rule of cost calculation 
still common in the country. Th e village reasonably expected to make this development 
without any signiﬁ cant cash contribution of the municipality even when it was likely to 
generate a sizable positive cash ﬂ ow. Investment costs were based on “national average unit 
costs” announced initially by the Transport, Water, and Telecommunications Ministry as 
cost ceilings for reviewing the grant applications, but soon became used as national average 
unit costs (see box 28.2). Because this village had favorable soil conditions, its construction 
costs were signiﬁ cantly lower than calculated in the project proposal.
In the end, this project was dropped because of political changes, but it serves to 
demonstrate the major role of political relations between the local and central governments 
and of state funds in selecting project alternatives. A signiﬁ cant feature of this situation is 
the huge diﬀ erence between the sponsoring village’s annual budget and the total or annual 
capital cost of the sewage system being built. In other words, a village with a Ft 80 million 
annual budget was encouraged to be responsible for a Ft 470 million project. We cannot 
be certain that suﬃ  cient technical and ﬁ nancial competence existed to manage the project. 
Moreover, even if the project eventually provided a positive cash ﬂ ow, the small local budget 
would have been insuﬃ  cient to overcome the liquidity management problems over the 
project cycle.
10%
Citizen
10%
Water Fund
10%
Regional development 
resources
20%
Environment Fund
50%
Target grant
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Box 28.2  Th e Centrally Set Unit-cost Ceilings
Th e Ministry of Water, Transportation, and Telecommunications published in the Oﬃ  cial Gazette the 
centrally set unit-costs ceilings for sewage developments in 1996. Th ese costs have been introduced with 
the foresight of providing a basis for comparability and cost eﬀ ectiveness. Th e unit costs are given along 
technical measures in the following format: for pipelines according to size of pipe, for machinery for 
transfer of sewage according to performance measured in cubic meter per day, and in similar ways for other 
equipment to be built into treatment facilities. Some examples are as follows: 
Pipe size 
(millimeter)
Unit cost 
(Ft per meter)
Performance  
(cubic meters per day)
Unit cost
(Ft per cubic meter)
40 3,500 0–100 120,000
110 8,000 101–300 80,000
250 20,500 301–600 65,000
 
Source: Ministry of Water, Transport, and Telecommunication.
According to several expert and local government oﬃ  cials, however, these unit costs are not diversiﬁ ed 
enough to mirror diﬀ erences in geographic, water-base, and other characteristics. Moreover, although 
originally intended as maximum allowable unit costs, these unit costs are used by local governments as 
benchmark numbers orienting budget calculations in grant applications, and are also accepted by grantor 
agencies as such. 
Th us central budget pays large amounts of subsidies for developments in areas in which, because of 
soil quality or other features, such investments can be constructed with unit costs lower than those centrally 
set. Local governments as investors can save signiﬁ cant amounts and use them for other purposes, which 
in practice, because the lack of proper monitoring, might stay unnoticed. In a recent report the State Audit 
Oﬃ  ce dealt with this problem and found that real unit costs of certain technical solutions (e.g., sewage 
network construction) are lower than those published (prime contractors chosen by public procurement 
could make oﬀ ers of 15–30 percent less costs) whereas in other cases (e.g., the transferring machinery) the 
Ministry’s unit costs are underestimating real costs (SAO 1997). 
In our opinion this system needs improvement, because it provides no incentives to ﬁ nd cost-eﬃ  cient 
technical solutions and thus results in overspending of public money.
Investment Pedominantly from Own Sources
Th e next case describes a fortunate county capital of 36,000 residents with a well-managed, 
strategically oriented local government that had a prudent ﬁ nancial record. Th is city had a 
budget of nearly Ft 5 billion and a local economy with low unemployment and a vibrant 
business sector. Annual budgets were based on a long-term strategic plan, and the city had 
signiﬁ cant savings. Th e speciﬁ c project was to refurbish an existing wastewater treatment 
plant and expand its capacity. Upgrades have been planned since 1996, when the existing 
plant proved unable to meet more rigorous standards. Th e initial project did not include 
expansion of the sewage network system.
Th e largest owner of the wastewater work was the local government, with 27 percent 
stake, and 45 other local governments shared the rest of the stake. User fees included a 
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proﬁ t margin of 3–5 percent, suﬃ  cient to cover minor repairs but not development. Th e 
utility company not only operated but also owned the facilities, so it could ﬁ nance capital 
improvements from depreciation allowances. Because of regulation of state grants, the 
upgrade and expansion would result in the local governments taking possession of the new 
facilities directly.
Th is local government, in contrast to the previous example and unlike the general 
approach in Hungary, planned to use an extraordinary proportion of its own funds. Th e 
total project cost was approximately Ft 1.3 billion (see ﬁ gure 28.2). Despite the Poland-
Hungary Assistance the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE) loan and funding from 
the Water and Environment Funds, the city covered 39 percent of total capital costs from 
its own sources, 11 percent from a cheap PHARE loan, 15 percent from a bank loan, and 
the rest from state grants. If we include value added tax (VAT) refunds, then the state 
portion rises to 55 percent (as the second pie chart in ﬁ gure 28.2 shows), still very diﬀ erent 
from a typical majority state ﬁ nance case.
 Sources of repayment for the PHARE and the bank loan are portions of the user 
fee and a rental fee paid by the utility company to the local government. Th e rental fee 
includes depreciation, interest, and capital repayment, so in essence the operating company 
also contributes to repaying the municipal loan. Th is project did not require the usual 
bridge loan, nor did the city need to borrow for liquidity purposes. Th e city had a long-term 
strategic plan and sound environmental reasons to expand capacity. Another lesson learned 
is that despite success in obtaining a cheap PHARE loan, the city had to wait two years for 
the PHARE decision, which delayed the project seriously.
Figure 28.2 Financing of a Sewage Development Primarily 
from Own Resources in City EG
Source: Municipality of EG data.
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Public–Private Partnerships
Partnerships in this context mean both a cooperative and a non-cooperative involvement 
of large commercial and industrial polluters in the ﬁ nancing of wastewater facilities. In 
the cooperative case, the local government and large users jointly planned, discussed, and 
implemented the project that resulted in signiﬁ cant beneﬁ ts for both parties. In the non-
cooperative case, the local government often needed to coerce the polluter into contributing 
to the project. In this case communication did not take place before a municipal decision 
and was certainly not interactive.
Cooperative Involvement of Large Users in City DH
In the cooperative case the project received a relatively small capital grant from the state, 
and the large users essentially ﬁ nanced the project. In this example, a well-located city of 
15,000 inhabitants decided to develop an industrial park on its periphery in 1993. Th e park 
soon created a need for modern sewage treatment because good road access, tax breaks, 
and good infrastructure brought a major multinational ﬁ rm as an anchor tenant. Th e city 
and other potential tenants in the industrial park also needed sewage treatment capacity. 
Th e large user desperately needed it to obtain an operating license on short notice and had 
several options: (a) purchase additional land and build its own treatment plant; (b) wait 
for the city to build a municipal plant; (c) jointly build a plant with the city, agreeing to 
purchase a portion of treatment capacity, essentially becoming a steady source of user fees 
for the operator. An important feature was timeliness, because any delay in plant operations 
because of a missing piece of infrastructure would cause signiﬁ cant losses for the user.
Th e local government had a vested interest in helping the multinational investor solve 
its problem, partly because it was thinking about the municipal sewage program because of 
the favorable grant environment and partly because it knew that infrastructure was needed 
to attract additional tenants to the industrial park. Th e local government involved the 
multinational company from the planning stage forward, and the planned investment was 
only the treatment plant, with the collection system to follow. Th e parties agreed to build 
the plant and completed it in early 1998.
Th e cost of the joint treatment plant was Ft 800 million. Th e local government applied 
for and received a targeted grant of Ft 200 million. Th is proportion was low compared to 
the usual 40–60 percent support for sewage projects. Th e large user, through a series of 
ﬁ nancial transactions, provided the balance of Ft 600 million. Th e municipally owned water 
utility issued a 20-year, non–interest-bearing bond to the large user. Th e local government 
managed the construction and the treatment plant became its property; however, the user 
signed a 20-year contract to use 80 percent of the built capacity of the plant. Both parties 
were aware of the fact that the user fee would have to cover operations, capital, and ﬁ nancial 
expenses. Th us, the user essentially became the prime source of repayment of its own loan to 
the municipality. Th e large user got its plant built in eight months instead of three years.
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Th e Ft 200 million targeted grant from the state could be drawn down only over a 
three-year period. Th e vendor, who wanted the plant ﬁ nished as soon as possible, issued a 
Ft 200 million three-year zero-interest loan to the local government. Th e source of 
repayment was the capital grant drawn down over three years. In 1999 the State Audit Oﬃ  ce 
put a question mark on this economically impressive ﬁ nancing scheme; its view was that 
the state grants should not be used for debt repayment but exclusively for direct ﬁ nancing 
of the investment. Th is decision made the Ft 200 million bridgeloan retrospectively illegal, 
and the municipality had to repay one-third of the state grant that was disbursed after the 
investment was fully completed.
By calculating the net present values, we could compare the three alternatives.
Option one. Th e large user, if it decided to go alone, would have to build a plant costing 
at least 80 percent of the Ft 800 million, or Ft 640 million. Because of the high ﬁ xed cost of 
land (which in the joint project was provided by the municipality), this option would have 
cost about Ft 740 million.
Option two. By relying solely on the local government for construction ﬁ nancing, the 
large user would have paid capacity and hook-up charges of about Ft 200 million. To this, 
one would add user charges over 20 years, which would come out to Ft 198 million in 
net present value. Th ese expenses totaled to Ft 398 million for the large user if the local 
government built the plant on its own. Th e cost of waiting three years for the plant was not 
calculated, yet this added expense was obviously large enough to convince the investor not 
to choose this option.
Option three. Th e user and the local government jointly ﬁ nanced the treatment system, 
and the net present value of the user’s total contribution was less than Ft 600 million. 
Th e large user provided a one-time loan of Ft 800 million to the local government. By 
deducting the present value of the stream of loan repayments from the Ft 800 million, we 
arrived at the net present value of the large user’s contribution. Th e present value of the 
20-year, non–interest-bearing bond is Ft 199 million. Th e three-year bridge loan at zero 
interest equals a present value of Ft 134 million. By deducting Ft 199 million and Ft 134 
million from the Ft 800 million cash loaned to the project, the large user’s contribution 
equals Ft 467 million in net present value term.  In other words, the large user beneﬁ ted 
from cooperation with the local government because it obtained a plant for Ft 467 million 
in present value terms, instead of spending over Ft 700 million on a plant of its own, or 
waiting three years or more for the municipality to ﬁ nish one on its own.
Th e local government enjoyed several advantages from the participation of the large 
user in planning and ﬁ nancing the project. For its own purposes, the local government 
would have built a Ft 200 million sewage treatment plant, which would have called for at 
least Ft 100 million in cash from the local government. In contrast, a much larger plant 
was built without any local government cash outlay, and the plant became the property of 
the municipality.
Th e larger plant has excess capacity that could make the local industrial park more 
attractive to other investors. Based on a Ft 800 million project cost, the local government 
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gained a VAT refund of Ft 160 million within eight months. So this alternative even 
generated a sizable positive cash ﬂ ow for the municipality. Taking into account opportunity 
costs the advantage to the local government of using this option estimated in net present 
value terms was around Ft 260 million. In addition, it was critical that a large user contracted 
to use 80 percent of the plant’s capacity over the next 20 years, and the repayment of the 
debt over the same period is to be covered by user fees. Th e municipality of DH essentially 
issued a virtual revenue bond.
Figure 28.3 Financing Sewage Development in Cooperation with a Large User in City DH
Source: Municipality of DH data.
Non-cooperative Partnership in City G
City G is a medium-sized settlement in a less developed area and is home to several sizable 
food processing companies. Th e municipality has a relatively large budget for its 36,000 
population—Ft 3.5 billion—but only 5 percent comes from local taxes. Th e city has no 
privatization or capital income, and it is a typical grant seeker. Unlike several previous 
examples, the local government did not negotiate with large users prior to the sewage 
development decision in 1997. It happened because they had no regular communications 
with the large users and because the idea of building a new sewage plant emerged from 
the hope of receiving a huge state grant rather than from a thorough assessment of need, 
capacity, and technical properties. Th is approach resulted in a suboptimal solution and an 
endless debate into 2000 about the responsibility of the mismanaged development.
Before this investment, sewage treatment was provided by a wetland-type facility, and 
over 65 percent of the homes were connected to the sewer system. Th e availability of grants 
motivated the city management to develop a plan quickly for a new treatment facility 
(Ft 560 million total budget) and to apply for the grants. As a result, the municipality 
totally ignored the issues of optimal capacity and ﬂ uctuating discharge quality, although 
that would justify a timely and close cooperative eﬀ ort with the largest users.
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Professional opinions were considered only after the development decision. One option 
was to build a small biological plant costing Ft 100 million, without state grants, that would 
not oﬀ er a long-term solution. Th is plant could have provided adequate treatment if one 
of the foreign-owned dairies had been consulted about pretreatment experiences they had 
had abroad in similar situations.
Th e construction cost for the city’s sewage project was calculated on the basis of a 
list of unit costs of sewage treatment development published by the Ministry of Water, 
Transport, and Telecommunications (see box 28.2). Likewise, the city assumed it could 
receive up to 50 percent in targeted grants. Detailed planning began with these parameters 
predetermined—but now involving the large users who accounted for over two-thirds of 
the total sewage load.
Th e remaining key question regarding ﬁ nancing was who would cover 50 percent of 
the capital costs. Of the missing Ft 280 million, Ft 120 million could be recouped through 
VAT refunds, leaving Ft 160 million of own-source funds to identify. Th e city decided to 
obtain these funds from the large users and acted in a confrontational manner. Initially, the 
city decided to set the large users’ hook-up fee to collect exactly Ft 160 million. When the 
large users refused to pay, the city threatened to impose environmental ﬁ nes in the same 
amounts. In the end they agreed on the bond format, “necessary due to lack of trust,” as the 
large users expressed it. Th e city issued a private placement bond to the large users, paying 
no interest, with a 10-year maturity and a face value of Ft 100 million. Th e municipally 
owned operating company borrowed the remaining Ft 60 million backed by mortgages on 
municipal property completely unrelated to this project (ﬁ gure 28.4).
Figure 28.4 Financing Sewage Development in a Non-cooperative Partnership in City G
Source: Municipality of G data.
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provided the only liquidity besides another interest-free loan from the prime contractor, 
who asked for mortgages on municipal property and agreed to buy, then sell back, a piece of 
forest. Repayment of the loans and bonds is expected from user fees, when three-quarters 
of the user fees are to be paid by the users themselves. So the solvency of the treatment 
plant depends on the ability and willingness of the largest users to pay far into the future.
Th is conﬂ ictual case illustrates the need for good communication even in the conceptual 
stage of a planned project to prevent costly capital projects from getting out of control. 
From the large users’ perspective, this process contains several important lessons learned:
 Th e large users need to be involved at the conceptual stage, because they have precise 
data on wastewater parameters, and prospective data on future ﬂ ows. Involving their 
sewage plant specialists would enable precise planning and would keep the project 
appropriately sized.
 In this speciﬁ c case a smaller and less expensive option would have been optimal had 
large users been involved from the outset.
 Treatment facility phasing could have been optimized because, in the large users’ 
opinion, the existing facility could have served for another one to two years while the 
plant expansion was planned and constructed.
 Th e management of the large users expressed a concern that because they had been 
a part of the community for several decades, they expected some cooperation in an 
earlier phase.
 A signiﬁ cant distortion has been that the existing facility could have been optimized 
for one to two years in a transition period, but the “grant-seeking temptation” was too 
large, and the city sought to maximize pitfall funds instead of fully using existing local 
professional capacities.
 Th e technical content of the funded project proposal is not the same as the realized 
project. In other words, “value engineering” is applied in a negative sense, with funded 
features reduced in size and quality, and the funds used for other purposes. In the 
opposite direction, more expensive and more proﬁ t-laden components are added 
during construction, denying eﬃ  ciencies that may have been contained in the original 
plans. Th is approach creates an unnecessary burden on the central budget.
Lessons from the Public–Private Partnership
Th e unit-cost ceilings set by the Ministry of Water, Transport, and Telecommunications 
do not reﬂ ect the geographic and technical diversity of real construction costs. Th e ceilings 
are maximums, and the rational local government “tunes up” project size and cost to obtain 
the maximum amount of cash ﬂ ow, regardless of the availability of lower cost technologies. 
Because capital costs are matched to maximize available funding programs, operational 
expenses and depreciation costs are not optimal, causing sewer charges in some cases to be 
higher than would be otherwise justiﬁ ed.
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From an economic perspective, involving municipal assets, such as real estate (the forest 
in city G) not related to a speciﬁ c service as collateral for loans to municipal infrastructure 
projects is not justiﬁ ed. Th e municipality bears the opportunity cost of mortgaging assets 
better suited for other projects, and these pledges also remove the direct need for the project 
to generate or provide the asset-based or revenue-based security for loan repayment. Th ese 
hidden opportunity costs and guarantees do not show up as operational or capital cost in 
project budgets, distorting project ﬁ nancial projections and decision-making processes. 
Sectoral- and state-level ﬁ nancial and technical regulations, as well as grant programs, 
distort local government project planning away from optimal solutions and appropriate 
technologies.
Th e cooperative model described previously was motivated by the real needs of the 
project sponsor and the largest users, while the suboptimal, confrontational public–private 
partnership was motivated solely by grant maximization. In the cooperative case, the large 
industrial user that accounts for 80 percent of waste ﬂ ow could have built its own plant 
because the need for a municipal treatment plant was not proven. Th e industrial user had 
the state capital grant program pay for 80 percent of a plant’s capacity that did not serve 
predominantly municipal purposes.
Vendor Financing
In 1992, one village and three neighboring communities in central Hungary agreed to 
pursue a grant from a foreign donor to ﬁ nance up to 50 percent of the costs of a preliminary 
operating permit to build a 6,500 cubic meter wastewater reuse system. In 1993 the donor 
awarded a planning grant and the four villages decided to form a Regional Wastewater 
Association to build the system. Th e communities received the preliminary permit in 1993, 
and decided to apply for a targeted grant for 1994. In the meantime, two more communities 
joined the association. Th e association also applied for targeted grants for a sewer system 
in 1994, which was rejected because the association was formed only to build a treatment 
system.
In 1995 the association was awarded a targeted grant for the treatment plant and 
selected general contractor. It also modiﬁ ed its charter to include the collection system 
and applied for a targeted grant that was awarded in 1996. Two additional communities 
joined the association in 1997. Construction on both systems began in 1996. Th e treatment 
system was completed in April 1998 and began operations in May. Th e collection system 
was completed in 1999.
Treatment and Collection System Construction Finance
Th e design, ﬁ nancing, construction, and future operation of this wastewater collection and 
treatment project took place in essence with virtually no cash contribution on the part of 
the eight members of the association. Th is case demonstrates the state of the art in grant 
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maximization and careful cash ﬂ ow management (see ﬁ gures 28.5 and 28.6). Th e project 
needs, missing cash-ﬂ ow and unique legal and tax situations prevalent in the early 1990s 
led to the creation as project manager of a limited liability company owned by the initial 
six community members.
Figure 28.5 Financing Sources of the Treatment Plant
Source: Municipality of DV data.
Figure 28.6 Financing Sources of a Sewage Development
Source: Municipality of DV data.
Th e association, through its lead member, applied for and received the maximum 
allowable targeted grants for the treatment and collection systems. Th e association 
assumed responsibility for coordination of what ultimately became an eight-village project. 
Th e association and its designated chairman, the mayor of the lead municipality, handled 
all regulatory liaison duties such as negotiations with vendors, ﬁ nanciers, regulators, 
contractors, and state authorities
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Th e grant formula changed during the course of the project. At its inception, targeted 
grants for the treatment plant covered up to 50 percent of unit-cost ceilings. By the time 
the association applied, targeted grant support dropped to 40 percent. Regional utility 
associations subsequently received an extra 10 percent support, so for this association, the 
targeted grant amount increased to 60 percent for treatment and 50 percent for collection.
Other grants were applied for and awarded to the association, one from the Water 
Fund and two from the Environmental Fund. Because the association did not have its own 
tax and statistical number at the time of fund disbursement, the grants were paid through 
the bank account of the lead village. Th e village incurred administrative, bank, and other 
expenses that it could not recover from the other members.
In terms of ﬁ nancing the own-source or, more precisely, the non-state-grant component 
of the treatment and collection systems, several types of subsidized and vendor loans were 
involved.
Th e Ft 133 million PHARE loan with zero interest and an initial three-year maturity 
was made to the association, with each community assuming responsibility in proportion to 
the number of hook-ups. In this case, each community is assuming a portion of the liability 
for the one lump sum payment of principal due on maturity, initially at the end of 1998, 
but subsequently rescheduled to 2001. Two vendor loans—one for Ft 199 million from 
the treatment plant general contractor, the other for Ft 300 million from the collection 
system general contractor—covered the balance of own-source funds. Th ese two loans have 
unknown implicit interest rates. Overall, debt of all types accounts for 39 percent of total 
project costs, including cost overruns, and for virtually all of non-grant own sources of 
construction funds.
In addition, a unique ﬁ nancing mechanism, a Ft 711 million subsidized loan, was 
granted to the Community Water Association, which is a temporary ﬁ nancing association 
of citizens to provide a down payment to the investment based on the valid signatures 
of 60 percent of the households of each involved community. Th e Community Water 
Association was used to generate funds for the collection system. Th is unique loan made 
through a commercial bank involved a highly subsidized interest rate, a 10-year maturity, 
and a guarantee of the municipalities in question. Essentially, each member municipality 
collected signatures on a petition, and then received its proportion of the Ft 711 million 
loan.
Sources of Repayment
Th is arrangement is an inverse build-operate-transfer scheme in that the local governments 
obtained funds to build a system that was to become their property, only to seek a 
concessionaire for operating the system since the association members could not come up 
with their own sources of funds. In essence, they lost the usual advantages of build-operate-
transfer during the construction process, but at the same time bore all ﬁ nancial risk of the 
development.
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Th e population will directly repay the Community Water Association loan in a special 
assessment as part of the future sewer charge. Th e PHARE loan is an on–balance-sheet 
item of each community, to be repaid from general revenues or included in a potential 
concession fee. Th e two vendor loans (plus interest) amount to Ft 499 million and will 
be included in an up-front fee to be paid by the winning concessionaire. Th e eventual 
sewer charge is expected to include a capital charge to ﬁ nance the up-front concession fee 
that essentially converts the debt of the eight municipalities into the debt of the selected 
concessionaire operating company.
Lessons Learned from the Vendor Finance Scheme
Th e two vendors have an uncertain source of repayment, since repayment or assumption of 
accumulated debt is a part of ongoing negotiations with potential operator concessionaires. 
Th e association’s cash ﬂ ow problems during construction were signiﬁ cant and illustrative, 
however. Th e association as representative of the eight villages could draw down the various 
forms of state grants only if it could demonstrate cash balance amounting to, on average, 
about 40 percent of the invoice. Th e state agency would pay its share of each invoice if the 
association could show that it had its 40 percent on hand. Several sources of liquidity were 
used.
Th e association’s members, as mentioned, created a project manager company (PMC), 
under the control of the member communities. Th e proceeds of various loans were used to 
provide the 40 percent own share to draw down the state grants. Th us the vendors loaned 
the association an amount that could cover 40 percent of the vendors’ own invoice for 
services, but the association subcontracted management to its PMC, which received loan 
proceeds as payment for services, and then the vendor invoiced the PMC. Th e advantage 
to this method was generating liquidity. Namely, the PMC was entitled to get VAT re-
imbursements for each invoice it paid to the vendor, and use those VAT refund proceeds 
as loans back to the association, which then ordered the next round of services from the 
vendor through the PMC.
Of the Ft 3.4 billion all-inclusive costs, about 20 percent or Ft 680 million in VAT 
was ultimately paid back to the state tax oﬃ  ce. Using the VAT reimbursement method, 
however, the association, through the PMC, used the refunds as temporary liquidity, in 
essence not having to generate 40 percent of the VAT (Ft 272 million) as an own-source 
contribution. Th us, realized interest earnings on this cash ﬂ ow were also used as own-source 
revenues for the project.
During the operational phase, the Regional Wastewater Association will maintain 
ownership and the overall statutory service provision obligation. Th e association and 
its members assume responsibility for repaying the PHARE and Community Water 
Association subsidized loans, with payment streams from general revenues, concession 
fees, and user fees. Th e two large vendor loans amounting to Ft 500 million, or 19 percent 
of the total project cost, including the cost overrun, were a delicate part of negotiations with 
concessionaire operators. A key element of the concession fee was to repay the loans.
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A group of communities can still optimize the grant-driven infrastructure ﬁ nancing 
system without much cash of their own despite a high, 40 percent own-source requirement. 
Nearly 85 percent of the total project cost was provided by soft money in terms of 
subsidized loans and grants. About 15 percent of the total cost came from vendor ﬁ nancing. 
Th e other important lesson is that the excess proﬁ t or capacity included in a system subject 
to such a high level of grants is about 15–20 percent, based on international experience. 
In other words, the hard loan or vendor ﬁ nance portion of this project provided not only 
much needed liquidity, but also a proﬁ t source to be ﬁ nanced through user fees and general 
revenues far into the future.
Th e key problem with this method is not the level of subsidies or subsidized loans, but 
the unit-cost ceiling. Th ese ﬁ gures are taken as givens, regardless of the genuine cost of 
construction. If the entire cost were hard money, or harder money, about a 20 percent cost 
savings could be extracted. We believe that in this case the treatment system cost overrun 
was justiﬁ ed. In the case of the collection system, however, the allowable cost (that is, the 
project cost calculated with the centrally set unit costs) was about 15–20 percent higher 
than the lowest possible cost. In other words, the allowable cost ﬁ gure is not accurate 
enough given competition among various technologies and construction ﬁ rms, and the 
entire price could be biased upward.
Th e soft money nature of the overall sources of revenue for projects such as this 
provides a strong disincentive for value engineering. Capital cost is assumed to be bearable 
by the population far into the future if the concessionaire and the association can set a 
sewer charge that is high enough, and extract up-front payments or reﬁ nancing from the 
potential concessionaire.
Conclusions
Th e above cases support conclusions with respect to: planning and pre-ﬁ nancing, the role of 
own-source revenues; the role of credits; fees and charges paid by the citizens; state grants; 
and the answering why did the grant system also support suboptimal projects.
Planning and Pre-ﬁ nancing
Local governments must demonstrate in their grant applications that own-source funds 
are available, and must pre-fund technical design and engineering (between 1 percent and 
5 percent of total project costs).
Local governments rarely have enough reserves to invest in technical design and 
engineering costs up front; thus, they must decide whom to involve in pre-funding these 
expenses (vendors, prime contractors, large users).
In most cases these actors provide some form of bridge or liquidity loans backed by 
assets and real estate unrelated to the facility being constructed.
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Starting in 1999, targeted grant applications require a technical and economic 
feasibility study. According to 1998 government decree number 104, this study should 
include a description and evaluation of project alternatives, and the technical, operational, 
ﬁ nancial, and economic aspects of the one selected. Th e economic comparison must take 
account of investment costs as well as future yearly operation costs and projections on 
user-fee revenues.
Own Sources
Municipalities deﬁ ne own sources of funds as any source independent of the current source 
being sought in an application, allowing double-counting and total awards sometimes 
exceeding 100 percent of allowable project costs. 
Regulations in force since 1999 deﬁ ne own sources in targeted grant applications as 
those funds speciﬁ cally identiﬁ ed in a city council budget resolution, or as a line item 
of a budgetary agency. A documented loan commitment from a ﬁ nancial institution or 
approved plans for the collection of hook-up fees could also be considered as own-source 
revenue.
Regulations state that funds from the state budget, regional development money, and 
foreign donor funds should not be considered to be own sources.
Th e Role of Credit
Bank loans and bond issues by municipalities, which have had a modest role in municipal 
project ﬁ nancing to date, will become more signiﬁ cant in future projects because of the 
following:
 Budgetary agencies such as municipalities have modest resources available to pre-
ﬁ nance engineering and design and other forms of project preparation.
 European Union requirements for environmental upgrades, as well as mandated cost 
sharing, generate demand for own sources.
 Monies to serve as matching funds for European Union grants are not available from 
the central state budget.
 Inﬂ ation in Hungary declined to 10 percent by 2000, and further decreased afterward. 
Th is drop will make ﬁ xed-rate instruments more feasible and likely in the near future.
 Mandatory and voluntary pension funds and other institutional investors seek ﬁ xed 
income instruments to complement government bond and equities portfolios.
 Municipal budgeting regulations and accounting practices do not allow for capturing 
or recording accrued principal payments and balloon payments on bonds and loans 
outstanding.
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 From an economic perspective, involving municipal assets, such as real estate, not 
related to a speciﬁ c service as collateral for loans to municipal infrastructure projects is 
not justiﬁ ed.
Fees Paid by the Citizens
Th e population participates in ﬁ nancing municipal infrastructure projects by paying one-
time hook-up fees and continuous user fees.
User fees are set on a political basis by city councils, and do not always cover full capital 
costs, such as depreciation, interest, and principal payments, in addition to operations and 
maintenance costs.
State Grants
Local governments undertake projects to maximize state funding in the form of grants 
and subsidized loans. State grants and soft loan programs are uncoordinated, resulting in 
duplication and over-engineered projects. Funding goals and mechanisms among grantors 
are divergent, and funding decisions are rushed given the volume of applications.
Th e overall grant system often creates wrong incentives, for example, requiring an 
estimate of operational expenses but not demonstrating coverage of all costs, including 
replacement and capital. Hence, municipalities do not always select the most economical 
option.
Starting in 1999, project applications are to be submitted to the largest funding agency, 
which is then responsible to evaluate and pass on the materials to other grantors. Th is 
requirement is designed to prevent parallel applications to a variety of funds.
Funding of Suboptimal Projects
Obtaining funding for projects that are over-engineered, inappropriately sized, use the 
wrong technology, and will have technical and ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties during the operational 
phase is still possible.
Th e pressure to submit plans and speciﬁ cations within project funding deadlines 
negates opportunities to research alternative, lower cost solutions, thus favoring prepackaged 
technical solutions that meet grant criteria but do not necessarily oﬀ er the best solution for 
the municipality.
Th e new feasibility study requirement calls for a comparison of prospective operational 
as well as capital cost scenarios, including fee impact analysis as well as a study of the 
population’s ability to pay.
Th e pressure to create regulations that conform to European Union requirements can 
also have unwanted consequences.
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Other Challenges
Normative unit-cost ceilings do not take into account geographical, technological, and cost 
diversity.
Monitoring by the State Audit Oﬃ  ce is ex post and amounts to a compliance audit that 
does not question the rationale behind spending decisions.
Local governments seek VAT refunds on projects that will produce revenues. Th ese 
VAT refund schemes have the eﬀ ect of reducing the actual cash outlay a local government 
needs to pay as an own source.
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29The Prospects for Municipal Revenue BondsMátyás Makay



During the ﬁ rst decade of economic transition, most countries in central and eastern 
Europe made major progress in introducing ﬁ nancial market instruments. Municipal 
ﬁ nances, however, are seriously lagging behind this overall trend. Even in advanced 
economies, municipalities have a negligible presence in the credit market. Although this 
situation might sometimes be because of unfavorable exogenous factors (for example, 
high inﬂ ation, economic depression, or ﬁ scal squeeze), it is also because of the fact that 
municipalities do not have suﬃ  cient capacity to tackle and use advanced debt instruments. 
Despite Hungary’s overall progress during the transition, its municipal debt market has 
remained at an embryonic stage. An increasing number of factors, however, on both the 
supply and demand sides, support a dynamic development of the municipal credit market 
in the near future.
Th is chapter discusses the potential for ﬁ nancing municipal utility projects with 
revenue bonds in Hungary. Th e ﬁ rst section examines the basic concept of revenue bonds. 
Th e next section provides an overview of the regulatory environment for securities issues. 
Finally, the applicability of revenue bonds to the Hungarian capital market is examined.
Municipal Bonds
Traditional subsovereign bonds are securities issued by provincial, special district, and 
municipal governments. Th ey come in a variety of types, with diﬀ erent redemption 
features, and have diﬀ erent characteristics in terms of credit risk and marketability. Most 
of these instruments are issued without sovereign guarantee or without recourse to the 
national government. Municipal bonds are basically of two types: general obligation bonds, 
backed by all kinds of municipal revenues (for example, asset proceeds, taxes, and fees) and 
* Th is chapter is based on Makay 1998. 
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revenue bonds, to be repaid exclusively from the revenue stream of the ﬁ nanced project 
(see chapter 27). 
Municipal Bonds in the 1990s
Municipal bonds issued between 1990 and 2000 are a hybrid type, because several laws 
limit revenue streams and assets available for debt service (see chapter 19). Th e securities 
issued by local governments have been of the general obligation type in that they oﬀ ered 
the full faith and credit guarantee of legally available municipal assets and income streams, 
regardless of potential project revenues. Th ese municipal bonds have been slightly less than 
general obligation in the sense that, although the municipality pledges all of its assets, 
ultimately no covenant calls for increases in local taxes and other fees to the extent required 
making debt service payments.
Genuine project ﬁ nancing is done within the context of separate, oﬀ -budget entities 
or municipal enterprises in which the municipality may have controlling, complete, or 
partial interest and which borrow as corporate entities. If these municipal enterprises issue 
bonds (see chapter 17), they would be straightforward corporate bonds, whose prudential 
requirements, disclosure standards, and so forth, are no diﬀ erent from other commercial 
issues. Th ese potential corporate bonds, however, carry a special risk element because the 
municipal government sets or approves the fees and charges of local public utilities in the 
service area over which it has sovereignty.
Th e local government council and the mayor are allowed to borrow for short-term 
liquidity purposes and to engage in long-term borrowing through bond issues or bank 
loans within certain legal limits. Bond issuance, when the issuer is the municipality per se, 
requires an exclusive decision of the local government. Municipal budgetary agencies do not 
borrow long term on their own. Th e regulatory and legal environment encourages revenue 
bond borrowing by oﬀ -budget agencies and enterprises, rather than by the municipality 
itself (see chapter 28). 
Issuance of project-supported bonds with the municipality proper as the issuer did 
not take place in the 1990s. Municipal involvement with revenue bonds may be greater 
when the municipality acts as a guarantor or provides a user-fee covenant to the bond 
issue or borrowing, which actually takes place on behalf of a separate legal entity (that is, a 
municipal enterprise).
Municipal risk in these types of projects stems from unpredictable pricing policies or 
from inability to enforce user-fee price-setting commitments because of political pressure 
on the city council. If and when the municipality itself is the borrower, cash ﬂ ow alone 
is rarely the only or primary guarantee for loan or bond repayment. Rather, ﬁ nancial 
institutions demand collateral, the liquidation value of which would be in excess of the total 
borrowing in nominal terms. In other words, those bond issues and loans that are placed on 
commercial terms by ﬁ nancial entities are over-insured and underleveraged.
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Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market
Issues of securities are regulated by the 1996 Act on Securities. Th e main authority 
governing capital markets is the State Financial Markets Supervision. As for the issue of 
securities, the law diﬀ erentiates between public issues and private placements for both ﬁ xed 
income and equity-type securities. Because revenue bonds may be issued by municipalities 
themselves, but also (in most cases) by special-purpose (vendor) companies, regulations on 
both municipal and corporate ﬁ xed income issues are reviewed in this section.
According to regulations, municipalities are allowed to arrange public issues and 
private placements (see boxes 29.1 and 29.2). Public issues involve higher costs, more 
intensive administrative eﬀ orts, a more detailed prospectus, and generally more disclosure. 
Furthermore, in the case of a stock exchange listing, a more integrated ﬁ nancial information 
system is necessary to meet the stringent reporting requirements of the Budapest Stock 
Exchange. In the case of private placements, the cost and administrative factors are more 
favorable, though the limited investor base might be a serious shortcoming.
Box 29.1 Regulating Public Oﬀ erings
 Th e issuer must publish a prospectus and make a public announcement of the securities issued.
 Th e issuer must entrust a licensed investment enterprise with the oﬀ ering.
 One full calendar year in operation for the issuer or its legal predecessor is required.
 Stock exchange listing must be initiated within 60 days if the face value of the issued series reaches or 
 exceeds separately or together with the securities, representing the same rights and issued publicly 
 earlier, Ft 200 million.
Th e law also elaborates on all the necessary items to be detailed by the prospectus. Th e prospectus 
and the public announcement require prior approval by the supervision. Th e time limit for approval by the 
supervision is 60 days; the approval fee is Ft 500,000.
Box 29.2   Regulating Private Placements
 A minimum of Ft 5 million par value is required.
 Th e issuer must prepare an information memorandum and the description of the main features of the 
 issue must be submitted to the supervision at least 15 days before the issue. Th e issuer must not, 
 however, publicly announce the issue.
 Th e issuer must entrust a licensed investment enterprise with the oﬀ ering.
In addition, certain regulations govern the maximum outstanding debt for both 
corporate and municipal issuers. Th e maximum level of outstanding public debt for 
enterprises other than banks is the amount of their own capital. If the public debt of an 
enterprise is guaranteed by a bank, however, this regulation is void. Th e level of privately 
placed debt has no maximum limit.
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Th e maximum amount of annual total debt for municipalities is 70 percent of net own 
revenues and includes public and private debt (bank loans, securities, leasing arrangements, 
and guarantees). Own-source revenues are fees, capital income, business income, and local 
taxes that are imposed, set, collected, and spent at the city council’s discretion. No shared 
tax, grant, or transfer payment may qualify as own source according to the Act on Local 
Government that deﬁ nes this debt service limit (see chapter 11). 
In terms of revenue bonds, if the project’s revenues ﬂ ow to the borrowing (bond issuing) 
municipality, then they would be considered own-source revenues available for debt service. 
An example would be concession fees or leasing payments made by an operating company 
in return for the right to use municipally owned assets (see chapter 28). In this case, the 
operating company or concessionaire collects user fees and other revenues, then forwards a 
portion to the municipality to support capital costs, such as depreciation and debt service, or 
a replacement fund. If the municipality collects the user fees directly and pays the operator 
for the service, then the user fees are also an own-source revenue available for debt service.
Alternatively, if a project company is the borrower or bond issuer, then the bond is a 
straightforward corporate bond. Th is bond could have a municipal guarantee and would 
entail legislative risk in the sense that the city council controls user fees, and therefore 
enterprise revenues, directly. Th e municipal guarantee, of course, is subject to the debt 
service limit and the availability of net own-source revenues. An operating enterprise or 
project company subject to legislative-appropriation risk would not likely be able to issue a 
bond without at least a moral, if not a full faith and credit, guarantee from the price-setting 
municipality. As of 2000, no examples of project companies borrowing exclusively against 
cash ﬂ ows with municipal guarantees had occurred.
Th e Issuer’s Political Environment
A municipal bond issue has four unique aspects of due diligence:
 Th e integrity and professionalism of the public servants employed by the issuer, clearly 
deﬁ ned public goals, a track record of successful management of public institutions, 
and commitment to professional and ﬁ scally stringent operations are highly relevant.
 A highly charged, militant, or chronically unstable political situation is a negative sign 
that should deter investors. Th us, when assessing revenue bonds, not only potential 
political conﬂ ict among members of the bond-issuing body but also the relationships 
and conﬂ icts among those who make the appointments to the body are important 
considerations.
 Th e investor should determine whether the issuer must seek prior approval from 
another governmental jurisdiction before user fees or other charges can be levied. 
If so, then the stability of the political relationships between the two units must be 
determined.
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 In addition to the institutional and political concerns, and for revenue bond issuers in 
particular, the technical and managerial abilities of the staﬀ  should be assessed. Issuers 
with a history of high management turnover or project cost overruns, or those who 
have little experience, are usually avoided by conservative investors.
The Fixed Income Market
Th e Hungarian capital market was reborn in the 1980s with the ﬁ rst bond issues, many of 
which were actually municipal issues guaranteed by the state. Th e real revitalization came 
in 1990 when the ﬁ rst Act on Securities and Act on the Stock Exchange came into force. 
Although the capital market has experienced immense development in sophistication and 
depth since then, it still bears several characteristics of a developing market. Th e ﬁ xed 
income market is dominated by government issues. Only a limited number of corporate 
and municipal issues were arranged, mostly in private placement form. Although Treasuries 
are considered as the most liquid investment, corporate and municipal bonds have basically 
no secondary market.
Th e ﬁ rst and most important issuer on the ﬁ xed income market is the government. 
Treasuries are issued in the form of three-month, six-month, and twelve-month Treasury 
bills and Treasury notes with maturities of two, three, ﬁ ve, seven, and ten years. Gross 
government debt was Ft 6,900 billion at the end of 1999, amounting to 60 percent of gross 
domestic product. In 1999, 61 percent of new government debt issued had maturities of 
over one year, 22 percent of new issues had maturities of two to three years, and 10 percent 
of new issues had ﬁ ve or more years’ maturity. Of gross government debt, 14 percent or 
Ft 439 billion was held by foreigners and around 50 percent of new net borrowings had 
maturities of ﬁ ve to ten years in 2000.
Treasuries are issued at regular auctions and subscriptions organized by the State Debt 
Management Agency. Publicly issued Treasuries are listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange 
and are also heavily traded on the over-the-counter market. Liquidity is further enhanced 
by some 20 primary dealers (mainly securities ﬁ rms of large banks) who continuously 
provide bid and ask prices on Reuters. Treasuries, especially on the shorter end, are 
considered the most liquid investments on the Hungarian capital market. Treasury issues 
create benchmarks for all other ﬁ xed income issues. Starting in the late 1990s, Hungary 
has experienced a negative yield curve (see ﬁ gure 29.1) that presents a rather unfavorable 
environment for ﬁ xed income issues with longer maturities.
Domestic corporate bond ﬁ nancing is still very limited, only 1.6 percent of gross 
domestic product. Th e reasons for this situation are numerous and include factors from 
both the demand and supply side.
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Figure 29.1 Forint Yield Curve for Government Securities, April 2000
Source: National Bank of Hungary monthly reports.
Supply- and Demand-side Factors of the Fixed Income Market
Th e ﬁ xed income market depends on some general ﬁ nancial and capital market factors, 
but a number of speciﬁ c factors play a decisive role and largely inﬂ uence the role and 
performance of the municipal sector in the ﬁ xed income market. 
Demand-side Factors
Th e demand-side factors show that the capital market for ﬁ xed income securities is in its 
early stage of development, the depth of the market is limited, and large corporate issuers 
tap foreign currency denominated bond markets.
 Th e large quantity and high yield level of Treasuries are crowding out corporate debt 
securities.
 Most corporate bonds are issued in private placement form. Important segments of 
institutional investors are presently allowed to invest only in public issues (such as 
insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds).
 Rating agencies play a limited role.
Supply-side Factors
Th e supply side factors are not yet favourable.
 For blue-chip companies, bank loans are relatively cheap because of the ﬁ erce bank 
competition in that market niche.
 Because of more advantageous cost, time, and administrative factors, private placements 
are favored to public issues.
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 Th e high yield environment and inverted yield curve created an unfavorable 
environment for long-term issues.
Municipal Demand
Th e municipal sector has a very limited presence on the ﬁ xed income market. Despite the 
continuously shrinking availability of funds and the decreasing share of central government 
funding, the sector has not shown signiﬁ cant demand for borrowing. As privatization 
draws to a close, however, the share of asset sales in municipal budget revenues will drop 
dramatically. Furthermore, because of the sale of income producing municipal assets, 
some revenues may also decrease. Currently, the bulk of ﬁ nancing instruments is provided 
predominantly by banks, except for a few rather small municipal bond issues (up to Ft 
1 billion). Th ese issues are usually bank-guaranteed and placed privately with a limited 
number of institutional investors, mainly insurance companies. So far, these issues added 
nice shades to the general picture, but were of rather limited ﬁ nancial signiﬁ cance.
Because of municipalities’ increasing long-term ﬁ nancing needs, general obligation 
bond ﬁ nancing could very likely become more important, although the economic 
limitations will remain substantial. Considering a Ft 300 million to Ft 1 billion issue (this 
size range is determined on the low end by economies of scale and capped by market depth 
factors), the annual budget of the issuer should be a minimum of Ft 2 billion. Since 30–35 
municipalities belong to this league, the number of municipal general obligations issuers is 
likely to be limited to this number.
Th e situation for revenue bonds is slightly diﬀ erent. Because revenue bonds are project 
driven, the economic limit is set by the ﬁ nancial viability of projects and not by municipal 
budgets. Th e main constraint here is the economy of scale of projects that, in the case of the 
sewer and solid waste projects in particular, have a strong relation to the population served 
by the plants and tend to be large. Th ese factors underline the need for strategic municipal 
coordination in the design and implementation of utility projects.
Investors on the Fixed Income Market
Since the Treasury market is the broadest investment arena, basically all groups of investors 
are quite active there (see ﬁ gure 29.2). Th e fact that an investor group is heavily engaged 
in Treasury investments, however, does not necessarily mean that it can rationally be seen 
as a potential creditor for municipal bonds. Historical experience and economic and legal 
factors suggest that the following types of investors may be interested in municipal bonds: 
banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds.
Th e potential interest and role of other investor groups would need to be assessed in 
light of regulatory constraints and business objectives. Th us, the National Bank of Hungary 
can invest only in Treasuries. Retail investors can take only public issues, and the costs 
and administrative eﬀ orts involved can be justiﬁ ed only when large amounts are involved. 
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Foreign investors do not seem to be ready to take municipal risks; furthermore, they attach 
great signiﬁ cance to liquidity, which is diﬃ  cult to ensure in the case of municipal bonds. 
Enterprises usually invest in Treasuries to manage their liquidity, so their investment 
horizon is short and liquidity is also important for them.
Figure 29.2 Ownership Structure of Outstanding Treasuries, 1999 
Source: State Debt Management Agency data.
Insurance Companies
Foreign-owned companies dominate the insurance market in Hungary, and these entities 
play an important role in the ﬁ xed income market. Th eir market sentiment can be 
characterized by the following considerations:
 Because of the nature of their assets (and future liabilities), insurance companies, 
especially life insurance groups, tend to have the longest available investment horizon.
 Insurance companies are usually highly conservative and have a risk-averse investment 
policy enforced by their multinational parent companies.
 Insurance companies are allowed to purchase both public issues and private 
placements.
 Liquidity is of secondary importance.
Insurance companies constitute the single most important target group for the 
private placement of corporate and municipal bond issues (see ﬁ gure 29.3). Th eir portfolio 
managers have good knowledge and understanding of sophisticated bond structures and 
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their asset portfolio is large enough to take sizable issues. Th e duration of their portfolio is 
relatively long, which creates demand for long maturities; at the same time, liquidity is of 
limited signiﬁ cance. By contrast, they usually have a conservative investment policy, which 
in most cases requires some kind of bank guarantee for nongovernmental issues. Th ey also 
tend to be highly demanding as far as pricing.
Although insurance companies are presently the most important purchasers of 
corporate and municipal bonds, the growth of their assets is moderate, and no signiﬁ cant 
changes can be envisaged in the medium term.
Figure 29.3 Invested Assets of Institutional Investors, 1994–1998 
Source: Boston Consulting 1998.
Investment Funds
Capital under the management of investment funds grew considerably in the last years, 
providing the most dynamic expansion of available assets on the market. Th e investment 
fund market is concentrated, and though it is shifting toward equity funds, the majority 
of the investment is still in ﬁ xed income instruments. Although equity funds have become 
more popular, all fund managers run at least one ﬁ xed income fund. Th eir approach can be 
characterized by the following factors:
 Th eir appetite for longer maturities is governed by their longer term market expecta-
tions.
 Investment funds can invest only in publicly issued securities.
 Th eir investment limits are regulated by law.
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Within the limits provided by law, investment fund companies deﬁ ne their own 
investment policies and strategies. Th ey are ready to take longer maturities and corporate 
and municipal risks if conditions are adequate. A major disadvantage is that presently 
they are allowed to invest only in public issues. Although investment funds have shown 
outstanding real growth, the market still has upside potential for them.
Pension Funds
With a high dependency ratio, high costs, and chronic pension deﬁ cits, Hungary faced 
signiﬁ cant challenges in this ﬁ eld. To shift to a more viable structure, the following three-
pillar system was introduced in 1997: 
 Pillar I—the original state pay-as-you-go system;
 Pillar II—compulsory funded pension savings with private fund management;
 Pillar III—voluntary mutual pension funds.
 
If present trends were to continue, pillars II and III are likely to grow to the largest 
investment group within ﬁ ve years (see ﬁ gure 29.4). Asset management of pension funds is 
outsourced in most cases. In the past, mandating that securities companies manage funds 
was common, and that mandate created serious conﬂ icts of interest. In the medium term, 
asset management companies will likely take over this task. Investment limits of private 
pension funds and voluntary mutual pension funds are regulated by government decrees. 
Presently, private pension funds (pillar II) are allowed to purchase private and public issues, 
but mutual pension funds are restricted to public issues. Th ese regulations seem to be 
inconsistent and will likely change in the future.
Figure 29.4 Projections of Pension Fund Assets, 1997–2002 
Source: Boston Consulting 1998.
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Commercial Banks
Commercial banks do not belong to the traditional circle of institutional investors; 
nevertheless, they may play an important role in the municipal bond market for three 
reasons.
 Because of their exposure and involvement in municipal ﬁ nancing, banks may have 
a better understanding of municipal risks and project risks of municipally owned 
enterprises.
 Banks usually play an important role in securities underwriting.
 Besides being direct investors, banks may contribute to municipal issues by providing 
partial or full guarantees to issuers, making them attractive to more conservative 
investors.
Because commercial banks cannot be considered traditional institutional investors, 
they have short investment horizons and usually require ﬁ rm exit options.
Viable Revenue Bond Options
Some of the most important factors considered by potential investors when deciding on 
ﬁ xed income investments are
 default risk of issuer (credit risk)
 yield (reward for risk)
 maturity and duration (market risk)
 exit (liquidity risk).
 
At ﬁ rst glance, municipal (revenue) bonds may not readily appear to be the most desired 
investments. Revenue bonds are new on the market, and as with all new instruments, 
investors need time to get accustomed to them. Project risks are not easy to evaluate, and 
most investors have not developed the necessary skills and knowledge to do this. Maturities 
of revenue bonds tend to be long because they are determined by the projects rather than 
by the absorbing capacity of the market. Liquidity is likely to be low, because most issues 
are private placements. Nevertheless, a number of structures may, by adding enhancement 
features to the securities, neutralize or mitigate most of these diﬃ  culties.
Th e introduction of this new instrument to the market was made with strategic views 
in mind. In the beginning, the market will probably take only ﬁ re-sure bonds, but it is 
also likely that, as the market advances along the learning curve and as more and more 
comprehensive track record of revenue bond issues will emerge, non–plain-vanilla issues 
will also become marketable. Th e following section of the study will elaborate on structures 
and diﬀ erent enhancement features, which may provide solutions to speciﬁ c problems.
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Enhancement of Credit Risk
Obtaining government guarantees for municipal issues used to be the most common 
credit enhancement feature. A strong tendency exists, however, against central government 
providing either explicit or implicit guarantees to municipal issues as a matter of policy. Th is 
tendency is likely to continue, so with the exception of few special cases, this enhancement 
will no longer be available for issuers.
Bank guarantee is another commonly used instrument. Several bank-guaranteed 
general obligation and revenue bonds are available. Bank guarantees eliminate the issuer’s 
credit risk and are widely accepted by institutional investors. Guarantees can cover both 
principal and interest payments, but they also can take a form of partial guarantees when 
the bank guarantees only the principal but not the coupon payments. Guarantees can also 
be limited in time: in some structures, the guarantee comes into eﬀ ect after a certain period 
(for example, after 10 years). Th is solution is a good one when investors are ready to take the 
issuers’ credit risk within a deﬁ ned period shorter than the maturity of the bonds.
Bank guarantees do not come easy and do not come cheap. Th e most likely guarantors 
are the banks that are already familiar with the project or the municipalities involved when 
the parties already have a solid track record of successful cooperation. Th e fee for a bank 
guarantee usually ranges between 1–3 percent annually depending on the project, the 
structure of guarantee, and the quality of the beneﬁ ciary of the guarantee. Because a better 
quality bond can be sold at lower yields, the guarantee fee and the achievable cost decrease 
and the nonguaranteed issue must always be compared.
Rating of Municipalities
Rating agencies evaluate the probability of default of the issuer and rate ﬁ xed income issues 
accordingly. Although they do not eliminate or transfer risk—and do not substitute for the 
investors’ own ﬁ nancial evaluation—ratings are widely accepted by institutional investors. 
In most cases, institutional investors have limits based on the investment categories of the 
largest rating companies. Although the domestic municipal bond market is too small to 
have issues rated by the large rating companies, the following four points are very important.
 One or more domestic rating agencies exist on the market in 2000 and are ready to rate 
municipal issues. Focus Ltd. has just started operations in Hungary and is determined 
to extend its services to the municipal bond market. Municipal (that is, revenue) bond 
issuers have their bonds rated by these agencies.
 Th e rating process takes time and administrative eﬀ ort, and requires comprehensive and 
reliable data collection and processing. Rating also means an immediate cost factor for 
the issuer, and yet the potential reward of rating (lower coupon) will have eﬀ ect only in 
the future. Th e short-term and strategic beneﬁ ts of rating must be intensively marketed 
toward municipal ﬁ nancial decision-makers by road shows, seminars, workshops, and 
so forth.
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 Laws and regulations on the investment activities of institutional investors start to 
use these ratings as investment criteria. Directly aﬀ ecting institutional investors, this 
factor plays a critical role in the general introduction of a rating culture in Hungary. 
It will also present a very strong and clear reason for issuers to have their issues rated. 
Rating should become one of the investment criteria for investment funds, insurance 
companies, and pension funds.
 Institutional investors develop the culture of rating. Because of the heavy supply of 
high-yield Treasuries, institutional investors have not developed individual project-risk 
evaluating capacities, and developing them will not likely happen in the near future. 
Rating, however, is a well-known concept to them and, most important, to their owner-
companies. Marketing eﬀ orts should be made by the rating companies to present their 
activity on the market and their rating methods for municipal issues.
 
Cash-ﬂ ow Proﬁ les
Th e two basic cash-ﬂ ow proﬁ les of a bond are the bullet and the amortizing structures (see 
box 29.3). In a bullet structure the bond pays interest at certain intervals and the principal 
amount is paid back at maturity. In most cases in which the cash-ﬂ ow structure of the bond 
is bullet repayment, the reasonable assumption is that the project will be able to generate a 
cash ﬂ ow adequate to pay coupons. Making sure that at the end (this end may well be in a 
quarter-century) suﬃ  cient reserves will be available to repay the total principal amount is 
always diﬃ  cult, however.
Amortizing structures eliminate some of this risk by providing a smoother cash ﬂ ow 
for the investor. Th ese bonds also pay regular interest, but at the same time they pay back 
some of the principal. Another newly developed scheme to avoid the risk of the bullet 
repayment is the Zero Coupon Collateral (ZCC) structure. In this case, the issued amount 
covers not only the ﬁ nancing needs of the issuer but also the price of a zero coupon Treasury 
bond (with the same maturity as the issue itself ) whose value at maturity will be equal to 
the principal amount to be paid back. At issue, the zero coupon Treasury is purchased and 
deposited in a segregated account and will be used at maturity for principal repayment (El 
Daher 1997). 
Th e major beneﬁ t of the ZCC structure is that payback of the principal amount is 
guaranteed by a government paper bearing the minimum possible default risk. Th e ZCC 
structure requires stronger cash-ﬂ ow producing capacity from the project, but the real cost 
of the design is the diﬀ erence between the interest paid by the issuer and the (accrued) 
interest of the zero coupon Treasury. Th is promising instrument is not yet applicable, 
since no zero coupon or discount Treasury bills in Hungary have maturity longer than 12 
months.
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Box 29.3 Model Cash-ﬂ ow Proﬁ les of Possible Municipal Bonds
Th e model below presents the cash ﬂ ow (from investors’ point of view) of a bullet issue. Ten percent interest 
is paid every year, and at maturity the capital is paid back.
Cash-ﬂ ow Proﬁ le of a 10-year 10-percent Bullet Issue
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Cash ﬂ ow –100 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 100
Th e next model presents a bond that pays back 20 percent of the capital amount in years 6, 7, 8, 9, 
and 10. Note that, for example, in the eighth year beyond the repaid 20 principal only 6 percent interest is 
paid upon the remaining capital (60).
Cash-ﬂ ow Proﬁ le of a 10-year 10-percent Amortizing Bond 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Cash ﬂ ow –100 10 10 10 10 10 30 28 26 24 22
In the following zero coupon collateral (ZCC) structure the issue amount is 220 from which 100 
goes to project ﬁ nance and 120 goes for buying 10-year zero coupon Treasury note with discount rate of 
8.3 percent. Th e issuer pays 10 percent on the bonds equaling 22 annually. At year 10 the ZCC Treasury 
bill matures at a value of 220 providing full coverage of the principal amount of the issue. Note, however, 
that the project must be able to generate a minimum 22 percent per annum cash ﬂ ow (on the 100 allocated 
for project ﬁ nance).
Cash-ﬂ ow Proﬁ le of a Zero Coupon Collateral (ZCC) Structure
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Project –100 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
ZCC –120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 220
Total –220 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 242
 Source:   Author’s calculations.
Coupon Structures
Bonds pay interest (coupon) during the maturity at predeﬁ ned periods (usually annually or 
semiannually). Th ese coupons can be ﬁ xed rate or ﬂ oating rate. In the case of a ﬁ xed rate 
issue, coupons are predeﬁ ned at the date of the issue and will remain the same for the whole 
life of the securities. In this structure, on the one hand, the issuer runs the risk that, because 
of the decreasing yields on the market, obtaining cheaper ﬁ nance than taken at the time 
of issue would be possible. On the other hand, the issuer is protected against a potential 
increase of yields. Th e investors run signiﬁ cant market risk in buying a ﬁ xed rate bond. If 
the yield level on the market increases, the value of the bonds will decrease. Th e longer the 
maturity (duration) of the bonds, the more signiﬁ cant the change in value (price volatility) 
will be (see chapter 27).
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Maturity relates to the timing of the ﬁ nal cash ﬂ ow only, and the duration includes all 
cash ﬂ ows time-weighted, so that duration carries more information and is more relevant 
than maturity (see ﬁ gure 29.5). Accordingly, taking duration into account, we see (see box 
29.4) that a 20-year bond, for instance, is only 2.2 times riskier than a ﬁ ve-year bond, 
though its maturity is four times longer (El Daher 1997). 
Figure 29.5 Comparison of the Maturity and Duration of a 10-percent Bond
Source: Author’s calculations.
Box 29.4 Th e Duration of a Portfolio Investment 
Percentage distribution of the portfolio Instrument Duration
20 Cash 0
60 1-year Treasury bill 1 year
20 15-year 10-percent revenue bond 8.4 years
100 Th e portfolio 2.28 years
Th e duration of a portfolio of securities is equal to the sum of the market-value-weighted durations of 
its component securities. Accordingly, the average duration of the portfolio is (0.2•0) + (0.6•1) + (0.2•8.4) 
equaling 2.28 years, which may be within the risk tolerance of the investor.
Th e portfolio concept is essential for investors for whom revenue bonds are only a part 
of a diversiﬁ ed basket of investment instruments. Besides factors attributable to market 
expectations (decreasing yield level), some speciﬁ c reasons explain why a ﬂ oating rate can 
be the preferable structure for revenue bonds.
 In the case of project ﬁ nancing, tailoring ﬁ nancing so that its structure reﬂ ects the 
cash-ﬂ ow proﬁ le of the project is prudent.
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 Revenue bonds are usually issued for utility projects where, in most cases, operation 
costs, user charges, and fees are exposed to inﬂ ation.
 Th e level of inﬂ ation in Hungary is still signiﬁ cant.
 
From the investors’ point of view, ﬂ oating rate instruments eliminate market risk to 
a large extent because their coupons are adjusted periodically. Th e coupon structure of a 
ﬂ oating rate security contains a base rate and a premium above the base rate. Th e premium 
on the base rate is designed to compensate for the risks attached to the issue; the higher the 
risk, the higher the premium. Several instruments are usually used as base rates for issues:
 In many cases, individual Treasuries (for example, Treasury bills) are used for the 
base rate. Th is structure ensures that the bond will always pay yields similar to those 
available on the Treasuries market.
 It is also possible to use some index or basket for the base rate (for example, Frankfurt 
or Budapest Stock Exchange indices: DWIX, BUBOR). Th is design oﬀ ers basically 
the same beneﬁ ts, but is much less exposed to an individual security or auction.
 Th e third possibility is to link the coupon to some macroeconomic ﬁ gures, usually the 
consumer price index (CPI). In this structure, the coupon will follow the inﬂ ation 
trend.
Th e coupon structure of a ﬂ oating rate revenue bond must be designed in a way that 
synchronizes the cash-ﬂ ow proﬁ le of the project and the coupon structure of the issue. User 
fees and charges usually follow inﬂ ationary trends, so a CPI-based structure is in many 
cases the ﬁ rst solution to be considered. If changes in the project cash ﬂ ow follow the yield 
environment, then the base also should mirror this phenomenon.
Other Enhancing Structures
Many more enhancing techniques can be used either to make the bond more tailor-made 
to the project or to make it more appealing to investors. Some of them are used on the 
Hungarian market, but others are not yet present. Th e two examples below are tested in the 
domestic market (see boxes 29.5 and 29.6).
A substantial amount of time usually passes between the date of the issue (ﬁ nancing 
need) and the date when the project starts to generate substantial cash ﬂ ow. Th e deferred 
ﬁ rst payment structure mirrors this cash-ﬂ ow proﬁ le, with the ﬁ rst (annual or semiannual) 
coupon payment due after a certain period from the issue date (for example, three years). 
Th e bond is either issued at discount and reaches par at the date of the ﬁ rst coupon payment 
or bears accruing interest. Th e deferred ﬁ rst payment structure is especially advantageous in 
case of ﬁ nancing projects that are in the construction phase, or when cash ﬂ ow starts to be 
generated after a certain period of time.
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Box 29.5 Financing Structure of the ELMKA Highway Development
One of the ELMKA bond’s interesting features is the discounted future payment structure. Th e bond was 
issued at par and capitalized interest (28.5 percent) for three years after which it pays CPI + 4.5 percent on 
the principal (including capitalized interest). Th e bond also features an amortizing structure in which the 
principal amortizes at predeﬁ ned, but not equal, annual rates.
Year Payment year Interest due Principal Interest paid Cash-fl ow 
(interest + principal due)
1995 0 — 100 –— –100
1996 1 28.5 128.5 0 0
1997 2 28.5 165.1 0 0
1998 3 28.5 212.2 0 0
1999 4 CPI + 4.5% 212.2 CPI + 4.5% CPI + 4.5%
2000 5 CPI + 4.5% 212.2 CPI + 4.5% CPI + 4.5%
2001 6 CPI + 4.5% 200.7 CPI + 4.5% 11.4 + CPI + 4.5%
2002 7 CPI + 4.5% 176.1 CPI + 4.5% 24.6 + CPI + 4.5%
2003 8 CPI + 4.5% 149.6 CPI + 4.5% 26.5 + CPI + 4.5%
2004 9 CPI + 4.5% 120.7 CPI + 4.5% 28.9 + CPI + 4.5%
2005 10 CPI + 4.5% 91.1 CPI + 4.5% 29.6 + CPI + 4.5%
2006 11 CPI + 4.5% 55.8 CPI + 4.5% 35.3 + CPI + 4.5%
2007 12 CPI + 4.5% 19.3 CPI + 4.5% 36. 5 + CPI + 4.5%
2008 13 CPI + 4.5% 0 CPI + 4.5% 19.3 + CPI + 4.5%
ELMKA bond principal due, 1995–2008
 Source:   ELMKA Rt. Data.
Some bonds are callable, which means that the issuer can—in line with a process 
deﬁ ned in the prospectus—redeem the bonds before the ﬁ nal maturity date. Th e call may 
take place because of cheaper reﬁ nancing possibilities or because external ﬁ nancing is no 
longer necessary. Because the call is usually not favored by the investor in many cases, the 
issuer must pay a premium in redeeming the bonds. Call options are especially diﬃ  cult to 
50
0
1995
100
200
150
250
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
P A R T  2    S E C T I O N  3    D E V E L O P I N G  A  C O M P E T I T I V E  S U B N AT I O N A L  F I N A N C E  S Y S T E M
588
design in a negative yield curve environment (which exists in Hungary), in which market 
participants expect decreasing trend, and long-term yields are lower than short-term yields. 
Suppose that an investor buys a ﬁ ve-year bond with a yield of 10 percent when a one-year 
Treasury bill is sold at a yield of 8 percent. Because the investor anticipates a falling trend 
and believes that in the ﬁ ve-year period this bond will be earning better yield and the bond 
is called after a year, then the investor has a straight opportunity loss of 200 basis points.
Box 29.6 Municipal Bond the City of Pécs 
Th e ﬁ ve-year Pécs bond has an interesting call feature: the bonds can be called by the issuer every year. 
When the bond is called, however, the issuer pays a premium on the last coupon, and the premium is 
determined so that the total yield of the bond will be same as if the issuer invested in a bond with maturity 
up until the call. For example, if this ﬁ ve-year bond is called after three years, then the last coupon will be 
22.12 percent giving a total return of 18 percent on the bond. Th is yield is about the same as the investor 
would have received if he or she had invested originally in a three-year bond. Percentage yields are shown 
below.
Call premium percent 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Yield
After year 1 20.95 — — — — 20.95
After year 2 16.40 23.09 — — — 19.45
After year 3 16.40 16.40 22.12 — — 18.00
After year 4 16.40 16.40 16.40 20.79 — 17.25
No call  year 5 16.40 16.40 16.40 16.40 16.40 16.40
 Source:  Pécs municipality data.
Policy Implications
Th e introduction of revenue bonds to the Hungarian market needs strategic thinking from 
many market participants. Below we list the key actions to be made at central and local 
government level.
Central Government Level
Th e Central government is responsible for creating a favorable legal, institutional and 
regulatory environment that includes the following measures:
 Further strengthening of the institutional investment sector (pension funds in 
particular) is of critical importance. Individual investors in funds should be provided 
with meaningful tax shelters.
 Favorable taxation of municipal bonds would signiﬁ cantly decrease the cost of capital 
market ﬁ nancing for municipalities and municipal projects.
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 As soon as credible rating agencies start to operate, investment limits of institutional 
investors should be formulated using ratings. Besides having a clear eﬀ ect on institu-
tional investors, this measure would also encourage issuers to have their bonds rated.
 Organizing special capital market seminars and workshops for municipal decision-makers 
and ﬁ nancial oﬃ  cers would be a key tool in strengthening local management capacity.
Municipal Level
Th e major action at municipal level would be to build local capacity for developing and 
advanced ﬁ nancing of large projects.
 Capacities for municipal revenue and debt management, investment programming, 
project ﬁ nancing, and ﬁ nancial policy management must be strengthened.
 Municipal staﬀ  responsible for investment programming and project ﬁ nancing should 
prepare for a decreasing trend of central funding and obtain adequate loan market, 
capital market, and project ﬁ nance knowledge to be able to ﬁ nance the project through 
the market.
 Both utility projects and capital market ﬁ nancing tend to have large economies of scale, 
and that condition underlines the importance of cooperation between municipalities to 
use resources in the most eﬃ  cient way.
 Revenue bonds require revenues that are paid by the community within the boundaries 
of the municipality. Political courage is often required to introduce or increase user fees 
and charges, but this increase is inevitable if projects are planned.
Conclusions
A number of trends present in the municipal ﬁ nancing arena will have strong and 
permanent eﬀ ects on municipalities:
 Decreasing central government contributions to municipal budgets
 One-time asset sales no longer generating large incomes
 Increasing needs for project and infrastructure development.
Th ese factors will dramatically increase the need for stronger ﬁ nancing capacity, as well 
as for new ﬁ nancing techniques, instruments, and tools. New ﬁ nance will, in the ﬁ rst place, 
come from the equity and ﬁ nancial markets. Revenue bonds are capital market instruments 
designed speciﬁ cally for ﬁ nancing municipal utility projects. Projects to be ﬁ nanced by 
revenue bonds must meet strict economic and administrative standards. Th e project must 
be economically viable at the planning stage, and reasonable guarantees should ensure that 
it remains so until the debt is fully repaid at the time of bond maturity.
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Structuring a revenue bond requires considerable qualiﬁ cations in terms of engineering, 
and legal and ﬁ nancial expertise. Revenue bonds are new on the market and, in most cases, 
are rather sophisticated instruments with signiﬁ cantly more risk elements than plain vanilla 
Treasury issues. Project risks are diﬃ  cult to evaluate, and the available track records are less 
than impressive. Th e maturity of revenue bonds tends to be long, because it is determined 
by the projects rather than by the absorption capacity of the market. Also, liquidity is likely 
to be low because most issues are private placements.
Th e investor base for nongovernmental ﬁ xed income issues is still limited, although it 
grew considerably in the second half of 1990s. Most investors have not yet developed the 
necessary skills and knowledge to perform their own evaluation of project risks inherent 
in revenue bonds. Another problem is that a sizable segment of institutional investors can 
purchase only public issues, whereas revenue bonds are most likely to be privately placed.
Considering these factors, one can reasonably argue that the domestic capital market is 
still premature to accommodate classic revenue bonds in signiﬁ cant amounts. A number of 
structures are already available (for example, guarantees, ﬂ oating rate, amortizing schedules, 
and call options) that may, by adding enhancement features to the bonds, decrease some of 
these risks.
Several actions must be taken to facilitate the growth of the market in: (a) introducing 
changes to the legislation (for example, taxation and rating), (b) increasing capital market 
know-how in municipalities by organizing seminars and workshops, and (c) strengthening 
marketing eﬀ orts aimed at market promotion.
Th e introduction of this new instrument to the market must be made with a strategic 
perspective. In the beginning, the market will take only guaranteed bonds, but this situation 
likely will no longer be required as the market advances along the learning curve and a more 
comprehensive track record of revenue bond issues emerges.
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30Municipal Bankruptcy Framework and Debt Management Experiences 1996–2000Charles Jókay, Gábor Szepesi, and György Szmetana



With the advent of the 1990 Act on Local Government, Hungary’s local governments 
became independent entities subject only to the supervision of Parliament, with no 
intermediate layer of government or administration to approve, intervene, or monitor their 
activities. Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce (SAO) monitors and investigates the technical, accounting, 
and reporting aspects of using state funds. Th e SAO issues opinions on the use of state 
funds by local governments, but cannot sanction violations. Th e public administration 
oﬃ  ces issue opinions about the formal legal compliance of local government decisions 
with the Constitution and other laws, but do not comment on the eﬀ ectiveness, content, or 
rationality of local government actions.
Municipalities received virtually all local public assets as part of their responsibility to 
provide and ﬁ nance local services and functions. Th ey are authorized to conduct proﬁ t-
making businesses, to own and manage commercial property and portfolios of securities, 
and to borrow for capital investment projects freely, without approval from or registration 
with a higher level of government. Given virtually unlimited freedom to manage assets and 
to conduct business, local government operational budgets and mandated activities could 
be threatened without proper prudence and experience. As a reaction to the economic 
depression and ﬁ scal squeeze, local governments started to borrow too much, so that by 
the end of 1994 the central government considered methods to rein in irresponsible local 
borrowing and activities. Th is led to approval of the 1996 Act on Municipal Bankruptcy.
Th is chapter summarizes the experiences of municipal debt settlements over 1996–2000. 
Th e ﬁ ndings suggest that, in the Hungarian context, the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy has 
become a key instrument as a framework for court-led settlement of troubled debt and as 
a tool to encourage early preventive measures, including out-of-court settlement between 
municipalities and their creditors
* Th is chapter is based on Jókay, Szepesi, and Szmetana 2000. 
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Arguments for Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation
In the euphoria of the early 1990s, besides budgeting for the 25 basic tasks, municipalities 
began to invest in and borrow funds for proﬁ t-seeking activities, endangering mandatory 
tasks and solvency in many cases. Borrowing exceeded the total budgets of some smaller 
municipalities, and the economic viability of non-mandatory infrastructure was often 
questionable. Given the unfettered freedom of local governments to manage their assets 
and budgets, the central government faced the possibility of having hundreds of cases of 
contingent liabilities and of directly carrying out mandatory local tasks if local governments 
failed (see box 30.1).
Box  30.1 Municipal Borrowing Restrictions in Place, 1990 to March 1995
  No absolute or formula limits municipal borrowing within one budget year or on a multiyear basis.
  Central government shared revenues, transfer payments, normative grants, and infrastructure grants 
cannot be used for loan repayment (implicitly, the central government would not ﬁ nance a local 
government’s debt).
  Th e municipality may borrow for whatever purpose at whatever terms the city council approved in a 
local resolution.
  Th e Act on Local Government states that the central government will not assume responsibility for 
local debt.
Need for Changes in 1995
By 1995 Hungary’s trade, budget, and current accounts deﬁ cit placed such pressure on the 
government that in March it enacted a series of ﬁ scal restrictions known as the “Bokros 
package.” Combining a one-oﬀ  devaluation, a pre-announced crawling peg devaluation, 
and a host of real cutbacks in spending and other restrictions, the situation of indebted 
local governments became more serious. By the end of 1995 several local governments 
lobbied for and received one-time grants from the central government’s general reserves to 
resolve insolvency (government decision number 1092) of municipalities due to their own 
fault. Th ese communities included Bakonszeg, Nágocs, Bátorliget, and Páty, all of which 
eventually underwent a debt adjustment process.
Th e availability of these funds to municipalities in distress threatened to set a bad 
precedent and incur immeasurable contingent liabilities for the central government. Th e 
eventual repayment to the central government of these temporary bridge grants was to be 
addressed in a future debt adjustment law in which the central government would assume 
the role of a creditor. Because the International Monetary Fund and other international 
organizations wanted to make the entire state budget as transparent and unequivocal 
as possible, negating contingent or implicit state liabilities became a policy goal. In this 
climate, the issue of municipal insolvency became unavoidable within the policymaking 
Interior and Finance Ministries.
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Although municipalities receiving these emergency funds were restricted to performing 
a short list of mandatory tasks (see box 30.2), the precedent of central funds being available 
at all posed a real danger for the state budget and gave no incentive to the local level to 
make more reasonable investment decisions.
Box 30.2 Eight Mandatory Tasks
Th e tasks applied to the ﬁ ve communities receiving emergency funds: 
  Primary schools, educational facilities, and where appropriate, facilities for ethnic minorities
  Social welfare
  Education for children undergoing health treatment
  Facilities for physically and mentally handicapped children
  Public lighting
  Public cemeteries
  Operating the mayor’s oﬃ  ce, the town hall, and conducting local and state administration tasks as 
called for by the law
  Operating the local ﬁ re department and ambulance service (where appropriate). 
 
 Annex to 1995 government decision number 1092.
 
 Note that drinking water and sanitation services were exempted temporarily.
Th e availability of these “soft funds” also reduced some of the risks lenders faced and 
encouraged them to continue to lobby for such bailouts in the future.
In 1995 municipalities began to borrow long term to ﬁ nance short-term operating 
deﬁ cits, and other capital borrowing was largely to ﬁ nance investments in non-mandatory 
infrastructure (that is, in activities that were voluntarily assumed, not mandated by the 
state). Th is debt was rolled over year to year, and in 1994–1995, prevailing short-term 
interest rates on Treasury securities were between 25 and 30 percent. Some localities began 
to make late payments (that is, in technical terms defaulted), and creditors and debtors 
began to lobby for wide-scale state bailouts. Representatives of several commercial banks 
explicitly stated that these loans were in essence for the public beneﬁ t and deserved bailouts 
by the state.
Representatives of the ministries responded that loans entail risk since Hungary was 
already a market economy. Th e essential question of maintaining and protecting public 
services while securing the rights of creditors went unanswered. Hungary’s corporate 
bankruptcy law, in force since the late 1980s, was not entirely applicable to borrowers who 
could not be liquidated without the state taking over their duties. Furthermore, each citizen 
has a constitutional right to representation at the local level, so local government cannot be 
liquidated like a commercial code enterprise. Without the political will or ability to keep 
tight control on local government borrowing and business practices by constitutional and 
legislative ﬁ at, the Hungarian government decided to propose a municipal debt adjustment 
law that would be invoked if prudence and other preemptive measures failed.
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Few Policy Options Available
In late 1994 and 1995 the central government had few realistic policy options to control 
municipal borrowing and to protect the overall solvency of the state budget. It could declare 
no responsibility for borrowing by local governments (despite their inclusion in the level of 
overall state debt). A second option would have been to impose restrictions within existing 
legislation and to create a new monitoring and enforcement mechanism. A third option 
would have been to rely on an informal agreement with the major ﬁ nancial institutions 
involved with local governments, essentially asking them to enforce debt limits and to 
restrain overeager borrowing by their clients. A fourth, not necessarily freestanding, option 
would have been to rely on market discipline and transparency to screen out risky clients 
and to sanction bad decisions by borrowers and lenders.
A coherent policy would have to address debt adjustment procedures, the method 
of allocating normative grants for operational purposes, the hidden burden sectoral laws 
placed on service delivery units and ﬁ nancial and cash management tools to optimize the 
system. In the end, maintaining essential public services, protecting debtors, creditors, and 
the state budget, while making it entirely clear what would happen in the case of municipal 
default, formed the main justiﬁ cation for creating a debt adjustment law. Instead of tight 
allocation regulations known in Europe, the Hungarian government decided that both 
lenders and borrowers should be held responsible for their decisions, while the central 
government put in place mechanisms for ultimately protecting mandatory services.
The Act on Municipal Bankruptcy
Th e Act on Municipal Bankruptcy (Law on Municipal Debt Adjustment, Law XXV of 
1996) was approved by the Hungarian Parliament on March 26, 1996, by an 84 percent to 
16 percent margin, and went into eﬀ ect in June. Contrary to expectations among experts 
and in the press during the period of ﬁ scal restrictions, in four years only a handful 11 of 
municipalities ﬁ led for bankruptcy protection and creditors did not initiate any proceedings. 
Strong evidence indicates that the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy preempted additional 
ﬁ lings, because both creditors and debtors were encouraged to seek redress outside the 
court system and to take other steps to ensure solvency and operational eﬃ  ciency. Within 
the overall legal framework and capital market, municipalities stopped borrowing in excess 
of their capacity to service debt (Kopányi and others 2000). Other ﬁ scal restrictions (debt 
service limits, changes in normative grants, and shared revenues) and developments in the 
capital markets also turned the municipal sector into net lenders to the ﬁ nancial sector 
between 1996 and 2000.
Since 1996 overall annual municipal borrowing of all types ranged between Ft 50 
and Ft 70 billion, reﬂ ecting a drastic decline in real terms. Some critics have cited the 
virtual cessation of long-term municipal borrowing (from 1996 to 2000) as a negative 
consequence of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy. Th e state’s intention, however, was to 
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avoid any contingent liabilities on behalf of local governments, and to ensure continuity of 
vital public services without additional strain on the national budget. Instead of revamping 
task allocation because of political obstacles, Hungary’s approach has been to regulate when 
possible and to allow market actors to assume risk.
By early 2000 only nine municipalities had ﬁ led for municipal bankruptcy and about 
60 bankruptcy threats resulted in out-of-court agreements. All the municipalities except 
Nágocs, which ﬁ led for bankruptcy for a second time in August 2000, recovered. Another 
municipality (Gilvánfa) suﬀ ering from protracted operating deﬁ cits ﬁ led for bankruptcy 
in September 2000 for reasons entirely unrelated to debt, borrowing, or capital projects. 
Th erefore, this ﬁ rst analysis of the four-year experiences would be instrumental for Hungary 
in the process of subnational modernization and in creating a competitive municipal credit 
market. Summarizing Hungary’s experiences would also be invaluable for the neighboring 
transition economies in modernizing their intergovernmental systems.
Objectives and Roles of a Bankruptcy Act
In the course of the policy debate surrounding the creation of the Act on Municipal 
Bankruptcy, policymakers in the Finance and Interior Ministries and experts appointed to 
perfect the proposal (including practicing commercial bankruptcy trustees and judges, and 
volunteer foreign experts in municipal ﬁ nance) concluded that, if the state is not willing to 
control the risks of municipal borrowing administratively or legislatively (box 30.3), then 
an unambiguous law would need to serve the basic protection purposes.
Box 30.3 Risks Associated with Municipal Defaults and Financial Stress
Borrower local government:
  Inability to make timely payment; penalties and sanctions imposed
  Strain on operational budget
  No returns paid on halted or partially ﬁ nished investment projects
  Assets and collateral lost
  Disruption of essential public services
  Risk of losing next election
  Sanctions from national government (eligibility for other grants, criminal prosecution, and so forth)
  Repayment of other debts endangered
  Blacklisting by ﬁ nancial institutions
  Ultimate dissolution of local government; forced merger and state supervision
National government:
 Guarantees called, stress on national budget
  International obligations on gross state debt (Maastricht, International Monetary Fund, and so forth)
 Bad precedents set in case of repeated bailouts
 Lose value of grants and investments already made if projects halted midstream
 Service provision obligation reverting to national level (safe drinking water)
  “Bad publicity” for entire local government system
  Need for policy reform and incipient debate
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Lender, vendor, bondholder:
  Balance sheet losses (value of loans made or bonds held;  accounts receivable written oﬀ )
  Provisioning and regulatory problems
  Cost of managing bad assets
  Negative publicity for banks “pressuring” municipalities
  Risk of losing entire asset or loan in a resolution agreement or liquidation procedure
  Lost future business with municipal sector
  Cost of maneuvering to shift cost to taxpayer (bank bailouts; selling oﬀ  loans)
Th e following key functions of bankruptcy legislation have been identiﬁ ed: (a) prevent 
and preempt municipal defaults with respect to any lender, bondholder, or vendor; (b) 
provide clear administrative and legal procedure for aﬀ ected creditors to follow; (c) provide 
reorganization and resolution procedures; (d) make certain that the national government 
will not guarantee local borrowings, because sovereign guarantees need an act of Parliament 
and speciﬁ c authorization in the annual budget; (e) maintain public services; and (f ) allow 
for expansion of borrowing as local taxes and revenues increase. Municipal debt adjustment, 
combined with preemptive reorganization, budget cutbacks, and some emergency funding 
from the state, were seen as methods of discouraging irresponsible borrowing.
Petition and Commencement of Bankruptcy
If a municipality does not pay an acknowledged obligation to a creditor, vendor, or another 
party (either an invoice or a court order to pay) within 60 days of the due date, the mayor 
is obligated to notify the city council and to petition the bankruptcy court within eight 
days. Th e mayor faces strict ﬁ nancial sanctions as a private person if a bankruptcy process 
is not initiated due to delays on his or her part. A creditor may also petition the court if a 
municipality is in arrears more than 60 days.
Th e court has 15 days to examine the petition and to ask for more information and 
corrections. Th e mayor has eight days to respond to the court’s requests. Th e court, at its 
option, may reject a bankruptcy petition if it determines that the obligation can easily be 
met with existing assets and cash ﬂ ow. Th us, “false” bankruptcies can be prevented, at least 
according to the intent of the law.
If the court concludes that the municipality is truly insolvent, it declares the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy process and appoints a trustee. A host of obligations is then 
imposed on the mayor and the city council, and a separate set of actions is required of the 
creditors. Th e commencement of bankruptcy triggers a moratorium: no creditors may ﬁ le 
suit, and all claims are to be reported to the bankruptcy trustee.
Phases of the Court-led Bankruptcy Procedure
In a court-led resolution we ﬁ rst summarize the key steps after declaration of a bankruptcy, 
then show what happens if the creditors and the debtor can not come to an agreement on 
debt resolution.  
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Declaration of Bankruptcy
Th e declaration of bankruptcy by the court means that a legal notice is published in 
the Enterprise Gazette and public notices are placed in several newspapers. Th e court 
simultaneously appoints a trustee, and the municipality has eight days from inception 
to form a crisis committee. Th e municipality then has 30 days to prepare a bare bones 
emergency budget that ﬁ nances only mandatory tasks (see box 30.4). Th ese mandatory 
services do not necessarily have to be performed directly by the municipality, but may be 
outsourced to neighboring towns, private ﬁ rms, nongovernmental organizations, the county, 
or a regional association of municipalities. Th e services simply must be made accessible to 
the citizens of the municipality in bankruptcy.
Box 30.4 Mandatory Services during Bankruptcy
Th e Annex to the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy, on commencement of bankruptcy, bans optional, non-
mandatory services voluntarily assumed by a municipality, and mandates that a local government only 
performs the following tasks: 
1. Maintaining cemeteries
2. Providing for chimney sweeping
3. Providing and maintaining septic dumping stations
4. Street cleaning, solid waste removal
5. Protection of natural environment, habitats
6. Provision of drinking water, sewage collection and disposal, ﬂ ood and groundwater control
7. Local road maintenance, snow removal
8. Public lighting
9. Removal of animal carcasses, animal control, and removal of diseased animals
10. Protection of fauna and ﬂ ora
11. Rodent control
12. Fire protection and rescue
13. Provision of preschools, elementary schools, and educational facilities for national and ethnic 
 minorities
14. Facilities for handicapped children
15. Dormitories for nonresident students, secondary and vocational education, adult education, basic 
 artistic training, speech therapy, and so forth
16. Special educational services for hospitalized children, and handicapped children who cannot be 
 schooled together with other students, and so forth
17. Services to evaluate the needs for special education
18. Child and family welfare
19. Basic health care (medical clinic, dental, nursing)
20. Outpatient care
21. Social services, day homes, and so forth
22. Rehabilitation
23. Access to special rehabilitation services
24. Unemployment compensation, social assistance, public aids, etc.
25. Certain national defense and mobilization tasks
26. Civil defense
27. Operating the mayor’s oﬃ  ce and the city council (except providing honoraria to city council 
 members)
28. Social beneﬁ t for long-term unemployed
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Th e municipality stops payments on all debts and ﬁ nances only the mandatory 
functions. Th e trustee examines the legality and legitimacy of all decisions leading to 
the ﬁ nancial crisis and makes recommendations to the court for criminal and civil 
prosecution, if necessary. Th e trustee must endorse all invoices prior to payments made by 
the municipality during this period. Th e trustee gathers contracts, liens, mortgages, and so 
forth, and examines them for legality.
If the municipality does not pass an emergency budget, a reorganization plan, and a 
resolution plan within 60 days of the bankruptcy commencement, the trustee recommends 
to the court that the process skip directly to asset liquidation (box 30.5). In this case 
creditors are given an opportunity to suggest asset liquidation favorable to them. In most 
cases bankruptcy commencement also means that, simultaneously, resolution negotiations 
begin between a committee of creditors and the municipality, led by the mayor and 
supported by the trustee.
Box 30.5 Options and Responsibilities for Creditors
Creditors have 60 days to ﬁ le claims. If they miss the deadline, they may press these claims only after a 
two-year moratorium on lawsuits that goes into eﬀ ect as the bankruptcy process is closed. Claims that are 
reduced or excluded from a resolution agreement that all parties sign, and the court approves, may not 
be sued for even after the end of the two-year moratorium. If a debtor does not live up to the terms of a 
resolution agreement, then the creditor may sue the debtor after the moratorium expires, but only for those 
claims that were a part of the mutually agreed upon resolution agreement. Of course, if the creditors and 
debtor do not come to an agreement, and the court enforces liquidation, then unpaid or partially unpaid 
claims may not be sued for in the future (paragraph 11, Act on Municipal Bankruptcy)
Th e resolution agreement must be reached 210 days after bankruptcy commencement 
or else the trustee will prepare an asset and debt adjustment plan that may not be favorable 
to either the debtor or the creditor. In practice, the municipal crisis committee and the 
debtors have nearly 210 days to form an agreement, given that discussions and crisis 
management take place simultaneously. In theory, the negotiation process can be wound up 
in less than a month in a cooperative scenario. In other words, both parties are encouraged 
to come to an agreement as soon as possible, because a court-ordered liquidation of assets 
and debts entails risk, and the municipality is taken over by the trustee who can veto the 
mayor and the city council.
If No Agreement Is Reached
In an uncooperative scenario in which the debtor and the creditors cannot come to an 
agreement, allowances are made for public auctions of assets and for numerous appeals, 
public notices, and so forth. In the most diﬃ  cult situations, the court can request the 
Parliament to dissolve the local government and call for new elections. At this time, 
criminal and civil prosecution can also take place. Fortunately, most cases since 1996 have 
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ended up with a court-approved resolution agreement, and forced asset liquidation has 
not taken place. Th e entire process, including appeals and, if needed, public auctions of 
municipal assets, is set to take place within 270–300 days of commencement, depending on 
whether the municipality, the court, and the trustee use their full allotment of processing 
time.
Th e framers of the law were aware of the negative eﬀ ects of delays and stalling by legal 
representatives of all parties, and built in sanctions and incentives at each stage: ﬁ rst, to 
encourage quick resolution agreements; second, to support tax increases, rationalizations, 
and the elimination of luxury spending while guaranteeing the public health and welfare 
functions required by law; and third, to allow for criminal and civil prosecution of corrupt, 
fraudulent, and reckless decisions to borrow for non-mandatory purposes that endanger 
public services.
Court Restructuring and Successful Preventive Cases
In this section we summarize experiences of actual court cases, and then we address the 
issue why so few formal bankruptcy cases occurred in the 1990-2000 period. Among the 
underlying factors we discuss the very positive preventive eﬀ ect of the bankruptcy code, 
the preemptive actions at the local level, and some regulatory shortcomings that soften the 
bankruptcy regulation.
Actual Court Cases
We break our analysis of the workings of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy into two 
phases. First, we analyze the actual bankruptcy ﬁ lings and their resolutions to demonstrate 
causality and experiences in resolution negotiations and crisis management (table 30.1). 
Second, we focus on the preemptive eﬀ ects and out-of-court resolutions in practice from a 
few detected ﬁ nancial crises.
In the nine cases of municipal debt adjustment declared and processed from July 1996 
to the end of 1998, the law met its objectives (see boxes 30.6 and 30.7). Th e bankruptcy 
trustees were able to supervise emergency budgets and to reorganize municipal services, 
and seven of the cases resulted in resolution agreements that were approved by the court 
and published in the Enterprise Gazette in 1997 and 1998. In two cases the courts had to 
liquidate assets and liabilities on the recommendation of the bankruptcy trustee and the 
creditors.
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Table 30.1 Petitions for Municipal Bankruptcy in Hungary, 1996–2000
Defaulted 
Municipalities
Population Diﬃ  culty 
began
Debt 
(Ft million)
Petition ﬁ led Process end Result
Bakonszeg 1,330 1995 154 August  1996 June  1998 Liquidation
Bátorliget 777 1995 65 August  1996 March  1997 Resolution 
agreement
Nágocs 820 1995 123 September  1996 May  1997 Resolution 
agreement
Páty 4,605 1995 400 August  1996 October  1997 
January  1999
Liquidation
Csány 2,312 1994 46 August  1996 April  1997 Resolution 
agreement
Egerszólát 1,120 1996 24 August  1996 April  1997 Resolution 
agreement
Kács 684 1996 32 December  1996 July  1997 Resolution 
agreement
Domaháza 1,061 n.a. 22 September  1997 June  1998 Resolution 
agreement
Somogyudvarhely 1,218 1997 31 January  1998 October  1998 Resolution 
agreement
Nágocs 2 820 1995 n.a. August 2000 April 2002 Residual claims 
from 1996
Gilvánfaa n.a. n.a. n.a. September 2000 Ongoing 100% 
unemployment, 
persistent deﬁ cit
Note:  a. Gilvánfa has no debts, because its municipal government has been essentially inoperable since 1998 
 and has received many bailouts as a village with a 100 percent Roma population with highly 
 sensitive political overtones. It is by no means typical, and its debt adjustment ﬁ ling is because of 
 payments long overdue to vendors.
Note:  Although precise numbers are not available, budgets for these communities ranged from Ft 30 million 
at the low end to about Ft 80 million at the high end in 1995 and 1996.
Source: Jókay, Szepesi, and Szmetana 2000.
Th ese nine cases demonstrate that the central government avoids debt adjustment 
process at all costs unless the local government has lost its ability to deliver the most 
fundamental services, for example, when schools and health clinics lost their access to 
public utilities and key staﬀ  had to go without pay. A local government in bankruptcy does 
not have access to construction or development grants or equivalent subsidies. Th erefore, 
maintaining potential access to these funds is another incentive to take operational 
cutbacks; avoiding the bankruptcy is only a secondary beneﬁ t.
Th e Act on Municipal Bankruptcy caused no domino eﬀ ects. In the ﬁ rst quarter of 
1996 before the act was passed, and immediately thereafter, the popular and professional 
press made claims that 50–100 municipalities would immediately declare bankruptcy. 
Th ese claims were not substantiated, and the Finance and Interior ministries had no 
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information as to how these numbers were derived. On the other hand, the deﬁ cit grant 
program eventually handled 700–1,000 applications (out of 3,200 municipalities) annually, 
and one can safely assert that the deﬁ cit grant is an active tool in bankruptcy prevention.
Box 30.6 Cases Resulting in Liquidation of Assets and Claims
Bakonszeg (population 1,330). Located in an impoverished area of Hungary, Bakonszeg engaged in a 
variety of proﬁ t-seeking business activities in the period from 1990 to 1995. Th ese activities included 
establishing a spa company, guaranteeing the debts of several other commercial companies, and borrowing 
signiﬁ cant amounts to ﬁ nance the construction of a resort village. In 1995 the State Audit Oﬃ  ce uncovered 
evidence of fraud and illegal activity, including the falsiﬁ cation of signatures on municipal guarantees. Th e 
bankruptcy commenced soon after the law came into force. At that time, creditor claims amounted to Ft 
154 million, and only Ft 2 million in collateral was available. Th is shortfall meant that 1.2 percent of the 
debt was covered. Th e municipality and the commercial companies it controlled succeeded in borrowing 
funds from at least four diﬀ erent ﬁ nancial institutions within a ﬁ ve-year period. Th e village petitioned for 
bankruptcy in August 1996. Th e bankruptcy trustee, the creditors’ committee, and the municipality could 
not come to an agreement, so the court began to process the forced liquidation of debts and assets on 
December 22, 1996, which ended in 1998 on payment of the trustee.
Páty (population 4,605). Th is village, located in a fast growing semi-rural area near Budapest, engaged 
in intensive infrastructure projects starting in 1991 that included gas supply and a sewer system in 1994. 
By 1995 the village faced ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties and its debt neared Ft 600 million. Th e 1995 budget was in 
crisis. Th e village applied for deﬁ cit grants and could not perform the most elementary functions because 
the lender bank intercepted the revenues and paid itself ﬁ rst, leaving few funds for basic tasks. Th e mayor 
and the administrative notary were forced to resign because of this and other business activities, and an 
entirely new government was elected in January 1996. Th is time, the village was for ﬁ ve months overdue 
in making utility and other payments as the bank continued to remove funds from the village’s account. 
Th e County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ces ﬁ nally stepped in and intercepted all funds ﬂ owing 
to the village from the central government, and this measure stopped the bank from depleting the village’s 
accounts to the detriment of public services. Of the Ft 600 million in estimated debts, Ft 200 million were 
owed to the bank, Ft 26 million to the tax oﬃ  ce, and Ft 14 million to the Interior Ministry.
Bankruptcy was petitioned in August 1996, with the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee. On further 
investigation, of the estimated Ft 600 million in debt, the trustee determined that only Ft 400 million were 
justiﬁ ed and legitimate and owed to 53 creditors. Th e village was allowed to ﬁ nance its basic functions, and 
no utilities were disconnected. Th e village became solvent under the tight supervision of the trustee and 
was able to ﬁ nance basic activities. Th e resolution agreement was approved by the court in April 1997, and 
this step started a nearly two-year asset liquidation phase. Th e local government held three auctions to raise 
funds, at which the creditors had priority rights to bid. At ﬁ rst glance, it seemed that all creditors could be 
paid if the sewage treatment and collection system were sold for about Ft 300 million, but because assets 
built in part with state funds could not be sold, less than half of the claims could be satisﬁ ed. All creditors 
were paid in cash or in securities and receivables, and the asset liquidation phase ended in January 1999. 
Despite signiﬁ cant claims with doubtful sources of repayment, neither vendors 
nor banks petitioned for bankruptcy. Th ese creditors probably assumed that the local 
governments had few negotiable assets available and that operational cutbacks could not 
produce a cash ﬂ ow suﬃ  cient for fully satisfying claims.
Th e small size of villages that petitioned for debt adjustment suggests that large 
infrastructure projects, such as gas supply and piped sewage collection, were not just 
technically but ﬁ nancially unrealistic. Mayors seek “political rent” by borrowing to build 
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such projects that neither user charges, local taxes, nor capital income on other assets can 
ﬁ nance.
Box 30.7 Cases Concluded with Resolution Agreements 
Bátorliget (population 777). Th is small village had operational and payment problems throughout 1995 
and petitioned for bankruptcy in August 1996, because it could not make payments on debts of at least 
Ft 65 million, Ft 41 million of which were owed to a construction company building public utilities. Th e 
balance was owed to a bank for ﬁ nancing school construction and to the Interior Ministry, which had 
provided a refundable emergency grant in 1995. A resolution agreement was approved by the court in 
March 1997, in which the vendor was paid in full, and the bank and Interior Ministry’s payments were 
rescheduled for 2000. Th e village has been operating under a deﬁ cit consistently, and has requested deﬁ cit 
grants ever since. 
Nágocs (population 820). Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce investigated this village in May 1995 and ruled that 
the village council had engaged in fraudulent activity, had violated accounting and ﬁ nancial standards, and 
had engaged in borrowing to ﬁ nance non-mandatory, proﬁ t-seeking activities that caused the village to 
default on Ft 123 million in debt. Th e central government provided deﬁ cit grants to the village in 1995 and 
1996 in the amount of over Ft 25 million. As the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy went into eﬀ ect in June 
1996, the village ﬁ led its petition. Twenty-three creditors submitted claims for Ft 78 million in principal and 
Ft 45 million in interest. Th e resolution process resulted in Ft 63 million of principal claims being recog-
nized, and the bankruptcy trustee submitted the agreement to the court for approval in April 1997. Assets 
that could serve to pay oﬀ  the debt amounted to only Ft 50 million at book value, most of them industrial 
land belonging to a defunct shoe factory that could only be sold for Ft 20 million. Th ese funds were distri-
buted proportionately among the creditors. Other assets to cover the debt amounted to only Ft 13 million. 
Th e bankruptcy process was declared closed by the court in May 1997, less than a year after ﬁ ling. 
Csány (population 2,312). Th e village built a natural gas distribution system in 1994. Th is project led 
to Ft 46 million in debt that could not be serviced in 1996. Bankruptcy was petitioned in August 1996, and 
the resolution agreement was ﬁ nalized in February 1997. At that time, the salvage value of the completed 
gas supply system was nearly Ft 50 million. Th e system was sold and the creditors satisﬁ ed. In April 1997 
the case was closed. Th e village lost Ft 27 million from its balance sheet because of the low price for the 
gas system. (Why a village of this size needs piped gas is another matter.) In this case, nearly all of the debt 
was owed to one bank, thus making negotiations simple.
Egerszólát (population 1,120). Th e village’s gas supply project led directly to default in 1996 on Ft 
24 million in debt ultimately accepted by the bankruptcy trustee. Th e village had Ft 1.7 million in cash 
and negotiable assets of about Ft 23 million. Th e resolution agreement called for selling the gas network, 
worth Ft 45 million, at a 75 percent discount for Ft 11 million. Th e local government paid oﬀ  the debt, 
but suﬀ ered a loss of Ft 21 million on its balance sheet. Th e case was closed and approved by the court in 
April 1997.
Kács (population 684). Th is tiny mountain village, with abundant biomass available and located 15 
kilometers from the nearest gas main, decided to build a gas supply network, defaulted on its bank loan, 
and missed other payments to vendors and suppliers. Th e resolution negotiations recognized claims of Ft 
32 million. Th e bank and the Interior Ministry were to be refunded with annual budget allocations by the 
end of 1999. Th e other creditors were to be repaid from proceeds from selling the gas system. Th e court 
closed the case in July 1997, about seven months after the village petitioned for bankruptcy.
Domaháza (population 1,061). In September 1997, Ft 16 million in unpaid claims came due, and the 
mayor petitioned for bankruptcy. By December 1997 legitimate claims against the village amounted to Ft 
22 million. Th e court approved the resolution agreement in 1998.
Somogyudvarhely (population 1,218). Th e village borrowed Ft 20 million from a bank in 1994 to 
build a gas supply system. Th e Ft 20 million were borrowed despite diﬃ  culty in servicing an existing Ft 
11 million debt. After cost-cutting measures and tight budgets, the mayor petitioned for bankruptcy in 
January 1998. Th e court approved the resolution agreement and the case wound up in October 1998.
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Why So Few Formal Debt Adjustment Cases 1996–2000?
Th e recent experiences suggest that, as a result of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy, eﬀ ective 
preventive measures are being put in place even in the smallest communities to avoid the 
risk of asset liquidation. Also, since 1996, ﬁ nancial institutions are a lot more prudent in 
lending to municipal gas and wastewater projects. Furthermore, given the new provisions 
of the deﬁ cit grant system, local governments must cut back non-mandatory and optional 
activities and rationalize their operations in order to qualify. Th e deﬁ cit grant system 
intends to ensure ﬁ nancing basic services to which the population is entitled (paragraph 
87, 1990 Act on Local Government). Experts close to the process, both within and outside 
the public administration, are convinced that the deﬁ cit grant system and its rationalization 
have prevented many bankruptcy situations from taking place. Th e annual 700–1,000 
applications for a deﬁ cit grant, however, suggest that service delivery and ﬁ nancing reforms 
are urgently needed for the smaller settlements (Kopányi and others 2000). 
Deﬁ cit Grant: A Hard Alternative
Deﬁ cit grants are given to 500–800 small villages annually, signaling that the smallest 
villages cannot provide their mandatory services given inadequate scale economies under 
the current transfer payment system that relies on per capita normative grants. Th ose 
who apply for emergency grants are discouraged from making new investments, because 
borrowing or producing matching payments for drawing down investment grants would 
strain operations, and emergency grants are not intended to support capital investment.
Over the six-year period 1993–1998, more than one-third of Hungary’s municipalities 
have received emergency grants, most of them repeatedly (table 30.2). A particularly 
alarming tendency is that one-quarter of cities and two-thirds of counties received 
emergency assistance in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Th e municipality requesting such emergency 
payments must demonstrate that it has rationalized its institutions and maximized local 
taxes, and that its portfolio of real and ﬁ nancial assets is managed to generate income for 
ﬁ nancing core services.
Table 30.2 Deﬁ cit Grant Program, Grants, 1993–1998 (Ft million)
Year Number of 
counties
Amount Number of 
cities
Amount Large 
villages
Amount Small 
villagesa
Amount
1993 none none 12 405 5 26 — 469
1994 8 560 30 911 21 143 — 1,478
1995 16 1,600 48 1,809 46 376 — 2,513
1996 11 880 34 1,200 35 238 — 2,100
1997 11 540 53 2,200 46 406 — 2,900
1998 14 1,187 59 2,520 45 494 — 3,500
Notes: a. Approximately 800 villages per year receive grants. A total of 16 diﬀ erent counties, 87 cities, and 
 1,131 villages have received these grants 1993–1998. 
Source: Interior Ministry data.
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Applicants are screened at the County Treasury and Information Service oﬃ  ces, which 
make recommendations on reorganization and local taxes. Smaller villages are required to 
form notary districts and to join neighboring villages in associations for the delivery of 
services. Once these cost-cutting measures have been exhausted, the village is eligible for 
a deﬁ cit grant. Payment on debt and expenses related to capital investment that provides a 
mandatory service is a legitimate expense under the deﬁ cit grant program.
Deﬁ cit Grants and Bankruptcy
Identifying the causal relationship between making adjustments to qualify for the deﬁ cit 
grants and the small number of bankruptcy cases is an uncertain proposition. Th e existence 
of the deﬁ cit grant program and the necessary steps to qualify has positively reinforced 
the rules of bankruptcy legislation. It has reduced the number of potential bankruptcy 
candidates by preempting bad investment projects and encouraging smaller municipalities 
to concentrate on mandatory operations and cost-sharing options. Beyond these, the 
persistent inability of smaller villages to ﬁ nance purely mandatory services has not led 
to defaults on debt payments. Th e deﬁ cit grant program speciﬁ cally addresses operational 
deﬁ cits, and the restrictions in place starting with the 2000 budget require radical cutbacks 
in spending and reorganization of service delivery (box 30.8).
Th e Act on Municipal Bankruptcy was not designed to address persistent deﬁ cits 
caused by inadequate scale economies and other ineﬃ  ciencies. Conversely, the deﬁ cit 
grant program was not designed to head oﬀ  debt service problems. Th e increase in the 
number of municipalities applying for an ever-larger pool of deﬁ cit grants and the dearth 
of bankruptcy ﬁ lings has a spurious relationship. Th e number of bankruptcy ﬁ lings is 
negligible since January 1, 1999 (see table 30.1), just as the deﬁ cit grant program imposed 
stricter qualiﬁ cation criteria. If deﬁ cit grants “cause” fewer debt adjustment ﬁ lings, then 
stricter standards and fewer awards would increase the number of bankruptcy ﬁ lings. 
Th is increase has not occurred. Th e key role of the deﬁ cit grant is simply to put oﬀ  the 
decision to reallocate functions and tasks in the municipal sector, a decision that is not 
plausible politically without a solid two-third government majority. (Th e Socialist–Liberal 
coalition between 1994 and 1998 had a 72 percent majority and decided not to alter task 
allocation.)
Box 30.8 Deﬁ cit Grants—Soft Money for Hard Policy Choices?
Supplementary funds are available for local governments that, after fulﬁ lling strict conditions, are still not 
able to ﬁ nance their mandatory operations or need assistance in ﬁ nancing a court-approved resolution 
agreement (resolution loan interest subsidy). Th e annual Budget Act, in this case annex 6 of the 2000 state 
budget (Law CXXV of 1999), contains the conditions for awarding deﬁ cit grants and loan subsidies for 
carrying out court-approved resolution agreements. Th ese conditions include the following: 
  A village with fewer than 500 inhabitants is disqualiﬁ ed if it has not joined a notary district (that is, 
still has its own administrative notary), unless it has signed an agreement to join a notary district by 
January 1, 2001.
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  A village is disqualiﬁ ed if it does not ﬁ nance any other institution besides a village hall, unless it is a 
member of a service delivery association.
  A village with fewer than 1,100 residents may not have usage rates below 50 percent in its health, 
social welfare, and educational institutions. For villages with over 1,100 residents, the usage rate 
must be at least 70 percent (stricter than the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy). Exceptions are those 
villages with fewer than 500 residents where only one such institution of each type exists or where the 
facilities are operated jointly with other villages in a service delivery association.
  An applicant is disqualiﬁ ed if it has not initiated joining a service delivery association if its own usage 
rates fall below the standards.
  An applicant is disqualiﬁ ed if it has time deposits exceeding three months in term, including its 
institutions, that exceed its authorized reserves set aside for capital projects, then it is disqualiﬁ ed.
  An applicant is disqualiﬁ ed if it has not imposed a local tax and is not planning to do so, the annual 
Budget Act (annex 4) contains a taxing power calculation formula for each municipality. Th is local 
tax calculation applies only to the local option business turnover tax, but it is used to determine the 
estimated revenue that could be raised locally. Th is amount is deducted from the potential amount of 
the deﬁ cit grant. (Th e principle of estimating taxing power is to reduce central grants or to support a 
potential redistribution of local taxes is under court challenge and is expected to reach the Supreme 
Court.)
  An applicant is disqualiﬁ ed, if its planned capital expenses exceed its sources of capital income, 
including grants, cash on hand, loans. 
  Th e County Treasury and Information Service Oﬃ  ce calculates an adjusted budgetary gap that is not 
covered by the various current normatives for a village, and is corrected by a variety of cost factors, 
cash on hand, and administrative tests listed above. Th e County Treasury and Information Service 
Oﬃ  ce also makes suggestions for budget cuts and other restrictions before approving and submitting 
the deﬁ cit grant application to the Interior Ministry. Deﬁ cit grants may not be used to pay principal 
or interest on short-term loans. Th e municipality must document all the claims it makes pertaining to 
policy decisions, such as joining association and so forth after receiving the funds. 
Th e Interior Ministry also grants a refundable interest subsidy for commercial loans taken by local 
governments to ﬁ nance the implementation of a court-approved resolution plan. Th ese loans are essentially 
short-term liquidity loans to ﬁ nance settlements as assets are liquidated and other measures implemented 
to satisfy creditors. Th e Interior Ministry also provides grants capped at Ft 2.5 million to pay the 
bankruptcy trustees once the court has approved and published the conclusion of the bankruptcy process.
Preventive Eﬀ ects of the Bankruptcy Law
One of the most important consequences of bankruptcy legislation worldwide is that it 
generates strong motivation at both sides of the market to avoid, prevent and preempt 
bankruptcy petition with internal measures as well as by out-of-court resolution agree-
ments. Th ough diﬃ  cult to measure due to the conﬁ dential nature of these kinds of 
agreements, anecdotal evidences suggest that dozens of municipalities have successfully 
avoided bankruptcy with negotiated resolutions.
Capacity and Compliance
Given the large number of smaller villages that annually request deﬁ cit grants and the 
low number of bankruptcy procedures, other evidence for the successful preemptive nature 
of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy can be found in a rarely cited passage. Paragraph 
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18 of the act states that an emergency budget and reorganization plan must analyze 
capacity usage ﬁ gures for institutions that deliver health, social, and educational services. 
Speciﬁ cally, an emergency budget cannot ﬁ nance institutions that are operating at less than 
half of their capacity unless that institution is the only one of its kind in a village. In other 
words, villages with two barely used day-care centers must consolidate them, but if the 
village only has one, it may keep the facility in the emergency budget. Another indicator is 
whether the facilities’ per capita average cost exceeds the national standards for villages of 
that type by 30 percent or more.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that municipalities-in-crisis prevention measures are 
applying these two standards of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy. In other words, political 
and professional leaders cite this standard when preparing a deﬁ cit grant application or taking 
other steps to prevent default and continue ﬁ nancing mandatory tasks. Even if a municipality 
in ﬁ nancial crisis is not considering a deﬁ cit grant application, emergency budget capacity 
standards could be used to justify politically controversial preventive cutbacks in local 
budgets.
Another explanation for the low number of bankruptcy ﬁ lings may come from a lack 
of compliance (box 30.9). Because creditors hesitate to petition the court in the hope that 
they may achieve some type of preemptive settlement, debtors may ignore the triggering 
conditions in the law. Unless the municipality is randomly selected for inspection by the SAO 
or another authority, or is reported by a watchdog organization, these failures to invoke the 
debt adjustment process will go undetected and unpunished.
Box 30.9 Lack of Filings—Lack of Compliance?
Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce in its annual random sectoral compliance (1,000) and comprehensive ﬁ nancial 
audits (30–50) of municipalities has indicated that about 10 percent of comprehensive audits, or three to 
ﬁ ve  municipalities per year, should have petitioned for bankruptcy, but have not. Several of the early ﬁ lings 
in 1996 were instigated by State Audit Oﬃ  ce inspections in 1995, though the more recent inspections have 
not forced any new ﬁ lings, because preventive and compensatory measures are implemented immediately. 
Th ese ﬁ gures should not be projected on the entire population of municipalities, but are indicative of the 
compliance problem.
Detecting Near-defaults
Th e preventive capability of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy cannot be ascertained from 
any register of municipalities in distress (box 30.10). If a municipality does not apply for a 
deﬁ cit grant and the press is quiet about its ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties, then no source of reliable 
information is available on which to estimate the volume and nature of municipalities in 
near-distress situations. In general, all municipalities have a diﬃ  cult time balancing their 
operational budgets and maintaining a certain standard of services while keeping the 
number and extent of institutions unchanged.
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Box 30.10 Th e Sample for Detecting Municipalities in Distress
We relied on our own experience as ﬁ nancial advisors to municipal development projects and to cities in 
distress. Th e sample chosen includes large villages and small towns, ranging in population from 4,000 to 
27,000. Th is category is one notch above the villages described in the section on deﬁ cit grants, and their 
budgets and service delivery mechanisms are perhaps slightly less complicated than the larger cities that 
operate extensive and duplicative institutions. In those cases more sophisticated methods such as internal 
controls and cash pools (local treasuries) could be implemented to ensure both liquidity and the ability to 
service debt and operations.
Interviews were conducted with the professional and political leadership of the following 
municipalities (populations are in parentheses): Békésszentandrás (3,984), Nagykőrös (26,565), Szécsény 
(6,894), Szerencs (10,208), Tápiószentmárton (5,094), and Tokaj (4,500). Despite an empirical deﬁ nition 
of “nearly in default,” these large villages and small cities had all amassed debt and had incipient payment 
problems, but all of them managed to avoid the bankruptcy process by reaching preemptive agreements 
with their creditors.
Th e nonexistence of a centrally located and publicly accessible ﬁ le of municipal budgets, 
annual ﬁ nancial statements, and other forms of disclosure not only hinders the capital market 
but also makes guessing the number of near-bankruptcies rather diﬃ  cult. Th e law gives a clear 
deﬁ nition of when a municipality must petition for bankruptcy and under what circumstances 
a creditor may ﬁ le such a petition. Th e law does not deﬁ ne any pre-adjustment disclosure or 
registry requirement.
Evidence for bankruptcy prevention, however convincing, is circumstantial and haphazard 
at the macro-level, and individual cases of municipalities negotiating with creditors and 
passing diﬃ  cult budgets with real cutbacks seem to imply that creditors and municipalities 
want to avoid the bankruptcy process (including choosing noncompliance as an option). Th e 
level of municipal debt can only be assembled after the fact from projected ﬁ gures in budget 
resolutions and from annual reports that are ﬁ led six months after the close of the calendar 
year. Both sources of information are used unwisely for making projections in real time about 
incipient debt service diﬃ  culties. 
Municipal debt to ﬁ nance development projects cannot be an indicator of future ﬁ nancial 
stress unless the particulars of the project, the balance sheet of the municipality, and its 
predicted or expected revenue stream are well known.
Typical Financial Diﬃ  culties
All the analyzed localities gave quite similar answers to the question that focused on when 
and how the ﬁ nancial and economic diﬃ  culties began with long lasting liquidity tension.
Békésszentandrás borrowed to ﬁ nance its own share of a development project that did 
not produce revenues directly, and the town’s institutional structure remained extensive and 
overstaﬀ ed. Because of a wage increase granted centrally for political reasons, the town nearly 
defaulted on its loans in the second half of 1996.
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Tokaj faced similar problems in 1995, when its large network of institutions employed 
nearly 10 percent of the total population. Tokaj was running a large, close to 10 percent, 
operational deﬁ cit caused by overstaﬃ  ng and the ﬁ xed cost of the municipal buildings. Hence, 
local services became jeopardized and the city’s liabilities rose dangerously.
Szerencs made environmental and infrastructure investments in 1995 using state grants 
that it had to match with own-source revenues; hence, it borrowed. Th e loan payments simply 
exceeded the city’s capacity to generate free revenue. Th e city complained that normative 
operating grants declined in real terms, forcing them to use funds otherwise available for debt 
service to subsidize operating expenses.
Szécsény began an extensive development program in 1990, ﬁ nanced in part by bank 
loans and a variety of state grants. Th e development program included the construction of a 
telephone system, wastewater treatment, and gas network. Th e total cost of these investments 
was underestimated, and the city had to borrow additional funds to complete the projects. 
Higher interest payments placed stress on the budget that tried also to ﬁ nance an oversized 
and overstaﬀ ed government inappropriate for a city of that size.
Nagykőrös decided to go forward with a city hospital reconstruction project in 1993, 
despite being awarded a targeted grant that had a much higher own-source requirement than 
the addressed grants used to ﬁ nance these types of projects. Because of ambitious borrowing, 
the city’s interest payments caused a ﬁ nancial crisis by 1995.
Tápiószentmárton also borrowed excessively in 1994 to ﬁ nance infrastructure projects, 
and debt service was not in line with its operating budget or with its ability to generate capital 
income.
Preemptive Methods in Practice
We also analyzed the methods and interventions that were carried out by distressed local 
governments so that court restructuring could be avoided. Th e following last-minute 
measures addressed overdue debt service payments and other liabilities.
Budget Cuts and Municipal Treasuries
Tokaj municipality worked out a multistep reorganization plan in 1995. First, an 
independent consulting ﬁ rm conducted an internal audit on city institutions and 
management policies. Th e city experienced organizational proliferation but lacked the 
political will to close down and merge some of them. Traditional personal relationships 
impeded eﬀ ective measures, especially when it came to cancellation of certain positions 
and jobs. With 580 public employees in a city with 5,000 inhabitants, about half the 
population had an immediate family member whose salary came from the city budget. 
Besides making decisions and actions to sharply reduce the labor force and the number of 
institutions to a satisfactory level, the municipality merged organizations and institutions 
with similar ﬁ elds of operation (see chapter 22). An eﬀ ective management information 
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system was established, introducing zero-based budgeting and working out a new ﬁ nancing 
policy with a municipal treasury that made it possible to deliver up-to-date information to 
decision-makers at diﬀ erent levels.
Negotiations with Creditors
In Békésszentandrás, the most important action was an agreement with the creditor bank 
to reschedule debt repayments. Th e municipality asked for restructuring of its debt and sold 
some of its securities portfolio and real estate.
Szécsény also had an internal organizational audit, and the outcome resulted in harsh 
saving actions at all levels. Th e previously independent budgetary agencies were merged 
with a common ﬁ nancial administration, a municipal treasury. Th e municipality also 
rescheduled its liabilities and chose a new lead bank in 1997 (rather rare in the municipal 
sector at that time). Th e network of institutions was rationalized through closings and 
mergers, and some service institutions were handed over to the county government (see 
chapters 5 and 14). 
Szerencs also urged restructuring of its debt and conducted an internal audit. Th is 
municipality, however, was recipient of deﬁ cit grants in 1995. Th e lobbying landslide that 
followed the bailout of Szerencs and other municipalities accelerated the formulation of 
the bankruptcy act. Th e four other municipalities covered by the one-time deﬁ cit grant 
underwent debt adjustment as the law came into force in June 1996.
Tápiószentmárton, like all other distressed local governments, adopted saving actions 
in the village budget and the institutions. Th e measures included labor force and municipal 
service reductions. As a consequence, mandatory tasks are executed with fewer ﬁ nancial 
sources than before. Th e village’s ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties continued throughout 1999, but the 
mayor managed to avoid having to ﬁ le for bankruptcy.
Key Factors in Avoiding Bankruptcy Petition
After 1996 municipalities routinely introduced a number of procedures to avoid bankruptcy 
petition. Th eir learning curve is steep and profound:
 Debt restructuring and rescheduling of liabilities with all lenders and vendors
 Conscious rationalization and restructuring of budgetary institutions aimed at 
eliminating parallel functions by closings, mergers, or handing them over to the county 
government
 Establishment of a local treasury to reduce the need for cash and short-term borrowing, 
and to capture interest income across the administration and budgetary institutions of 
the local government
 Labor force reduction at all levels based on thorough internal performance audits
 Decrease of voluntary municipal services
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 Eﬀ orts to increase local taxes and to set realistic fees for local services
 Applications for deﬁ cit grants that essentially force examination of capacity usage, per 
capita service costs, and options to join associations and notary districts
 Enhanced internal control and debt monitoring.
 
Debt accumulation and debt service problems ﬂ ow, nearly without exception, 
from ﬁ nancing the own-source portion of local infrastructure projects. When debt 
service payments to lenders began to threaten other vendors and mandatory operations, 
municipalities petitioned for bankruptcy. Much of the debt owed to vendors is invisible in 
the form of registered overdue liabilities and vendor loans that are packaged in a series of 
progress invoices spread over three-year ﬁ nancing grants. Th us, the extent of potential debt 
owed to vendors that may be in default is objectively diﬃ  cult to measure.
Vendors and implicit lenders to date have not petitioned against municipalities out of 
fear that their claims would enjoy a lower priority than taxes, wages, and other obligations. 
A potential for more bankruptcy ﬁ lings still exists if all vendors decided to press valid 
claims and stopped overlooking overdue receivables.
Local governments reported that the County Treasury and Information Service 
Oﬃ  ces and private consulting ﬁ rms were the most helpful in both preventing bankruptcy 
and providing technical assistance for debt restructuring. Most banks and creditors were 
willing to cooperate in out-of-court restructuring, and none of them has ﬁ led a petition 
against a municipality.
All the analyzed local governments replied that after these interventions their liquidity 
was gradually improving and the operating deﬁ cit decreasing, because their institutions 
were operating with higher eﬃ  ciency. It became obvious that many of the examined 
localities have no real chance to engage in new development projects or investments 
because their ﬁ nancial skills are still very weak and vulnerable although they have no day-
to-day liquidity problems.
Regulatory Shortcomings Softening the Bankruptcy Law
Th e 2000 state budget contains strict provisions for funding deﬁ cit grants as well as for 
interest subsidies available for supporting debt conciliation loans. Th is amendment to the 
state budget also contains line items for paying bankruptcy trustees on declaration of the 
closing of bankruptcy cases. Th e deﬁ cit grant program for 2000 amounted to Ft 9.6 billion 
(about US$ 35 million) including payments for the bankruptcy trustees and the interest 
subsidies. For the 2001 and 2002 budgets, these amounts rose to Ft 10.5 billion and Ft 11.4 
billion respectively. 
A third category for assisting municipalities in ﬁ scal distress could result in further 
softening the discipline of lenders and local governments. Th e 2000 budget set aside a 
discretionary fund of Ft 1.2 billion (over US$ 4 million) to be used at the discretion of the 
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Interior Minister to provide grants (or interest-free loans) for municipalities that do not 
qualify for assistance under bankruptcy or deﬁ cit grant. Th ese funds are for unspeciﬁ ed 
“temporary liquidity problems” and the Interior Minister is only required to report on 
its usage in January 2001. Certainly, these discretionary liquidity grants, which should be 
monitored, pose a risk of loosening the positive restrictive regulatory environment in eﬀ ect 
in Hungary since March 1995.
Conclusions
Th e municipal bankruptcy framework has performed eﬀ ectively in Hungary’s rather 
market-oriented legislative and institutional environment. Many situations have neither 
room nor need for such bankruptcy legislation. For instance, when constitutional structure 
does not allow subnational units to borrow for capital projects, the state controls municipal 
borrowing or borrows for municipalities. In other cases the state automatically guarantees 
municipal borrowings or acts as a lender to municipalities. In the central and eastern 
European countries, one can ﬁ nd all kinds of the above-mentioned methods often used 
jointly, inconsistently, and with severe shortcomings. Th e positive Hungarian experiences 
might be applicable in a number of other central and eastern European countries.
Local Management Capacity and Systemic Faults
Th e municipal bankruptcy law has been criticized for essentially eliminating municipal 
capital borrowing, though in our view this trend is a result of many factors related to 
infrastructure grants, ﬁ scal restrictions, and many local capacity questions. Th e law also 
seems to favor the debtor, giving it the option to reschedule debt indeﬁ nitely because 
creditors are hesitant to ﬁ le petitions because of the uncertain outcome of resolution 
negotiations or forced liquidation. By contrast, the entire local government system works 
from a holistic perspective, albeit not fully eﬀ ectively, and it may be expensive.
Th e Act on Municipal Bankruptcy has been eﬀ ective because it is not used as a sole 
last step in a theoretical series of unintentionally related preventive measures, but rather 
lenders and borrowers have been forced into more responsible behavior. Capacity questions, 
task allocation, the sharing of revenues, the dearth of the intermediate level of service 
delivery, and so forth are related questions that the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy cannot 
address. It can only repair situations that went out of control.
Project management skills are clearly lacking at the local level, which faces diﬃ  cult 
technical and ﬁ nancial tasks, such as coordinating state grants, private funds, service 
enterprise funds, and the down payments of citizens. Th e SAO pointed out that rarely 
do local assemblies fully consider the implications of debt service obligations nor do they 
request feasibility studies or conduct similar calculations. Furthermore, projects funded by 
grants and debt are often oversized and will operate at a suboptimal level (SAO 1998b). 
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Perhaps these types of skills could be improved by the upcoming local governments 
or conducted by professional organizations serving for regional service associations of 
municipalities.
Reaction of Lending Institutions
Th e Hungarian Savings Bank holds a near monopoly of the municipal market, controlling 
90 percent of accounts but only 70 percent by volume. Several major cities have switched 
accounts to competitor banks. Th e Hungarian Savings Bank is reported to have begun to 
ask loan applicants to sign a declaration that they consider themselves exempt from the 
borrowing limit paragraph of the local government law, thus enabling the bank to lend 
in excess of the limit. Th is administrative barrier to excess lending does not seem to work 
in practice because no one ensures the legality and validity of these declarations and the 
accounting system cannot give a real-time and accurate calculation of compliance.
Th e lead bank that handles a municipality’s current account is familiar with its ﬁ nancial 
status, spending patterns, and risk proﬁ le. Th e existence of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy 
and the borrowing limit thus limit the most egregious examples of inappropriate lending, 
and the lack of true creditworthiness is fully apparent to the lending institutions. Vendors 
and competing ﬁ nancial institutions, such as bond underwriters, do not have access to 
information of this quality. Other lenders have indicated that, given their conservative 
collateral policy, the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy is not an eﬀ ective factor in making 
lending decisions. A risk factor, however, is the legislative redeﬁ nition of what funds are 
available for debt service. For example, rumors of centralizing the business tax altered 
the funds available for debt service in a ﬁ ve-year ﬁ xed interest bond issue organized by a 
universal bank on behalf of a ﬁ rst-tier city from one year to the next.
Financial institutions have a legitimate fear that the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy 
does not necessarily protect their interests in a resolution negotiation or forced liquidation 
because negotiable assets available to settle debts are usually not suﬃ  cient, and projects 
funded do not generate suﬃ  cient revenues. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon legal systems, loan 
covenants in Hungary do not contain provisions for mandatory rate or tax increases to fund 
debt service, nor do resolution agreements mandate tax and rate increases. In other words, 
a legitimate criticism of the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy is that it fails to protect fully the 
rights of creditors, especially those who rely on revenue-generating projects and not liens 
on property as security. As a result, banks have begun to require 200–300 percent collateral, 
which ties up assets as security and hinders development.
Another valid criticism of the system is that the mayor, city council members, and 
senior executive staﬀ  cannot be held personally liable for bad decisions that damage the 
interests of the municipality and the lender.
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Reaction of Municipalities
Th e Act on Municipal Bankruptcy does not prevent local governments from borrowing for 
infrastructure projects; rather this borrowing is curtailed by the dearth of freely available 
cash generated either by a project or other local revenues, such as tax collections and capital 
income. According to Ministry of Finance data, the local government sector reached only 
19–30 percent of its legal borrowing limit during the years 1996–2000.
Th ose who are not creditworthy even in the creative sense (self-exemption from 
various debt service limitations) do not receive bank loans, and the strict prerequisites of the 
deﬁ cit grants are forcing staﬃ  ng and other cutbacks in smaller communities with persistent 
operating deﬁ cits. Th e various steps taken to avoid bankruptcy petition evidence the most 
vivid reaction of municipalities to the Act on Municipal Bankruptcy. According to the 
SAO, the act and the restriction on debt service convinced local governments to be more 
prudent in their borrowing, and preventive measures included tax increases and service 
cutbacks at the city level. Such measures have little eﬀ ect or are diﬃ  cult at the village level 
(SAO 1998b).
Overall, excessive indebtedness was caused in part by political pressure from the 
population and inexperience on the part of elected oﬃ  cials.
Projects in Hungary are not of a suﬃ  cient scale to generate enough revenues to support 
stand-alone ﬁ nancing, while localities cannot capture the economic beneﬁ ts of better 
infrastructure through value-related property taxes to support a general obligation-type 
debt structure and the covenants usually used to mitigate risk. Operating budgets are under 
stress and do not generate surpluses suﬃ  cient for large-scale borrowing.
Sewage collection and treatment projects, for example, are of such magnitude in terms 
of capital cost that user fees cannot support debt, amortization, and operational expenses 
given the long economic life of the assets and the short maturity of the usual loans. (Because 
the asset is constructed partially from state funds, it cannot be oﬀ ered as collateral because 
it cannot be sold oﬀ  in a liquidation scenario or privatized for 10 years).
Policy Issues for Further Research
Th e bookkeeping and accounting, reporting, and disclosure requirements for local 
governments are due for reform. Local governments are acting essentially as holding 
companies, budgetary agencies, authorities, and the ultimate arbiters of local democracy 
and self-rule. Under these circumstances, accounting and budgetary practices do not 
capture the complexities of their balance sheets, the need for separate capital budgeting, 
and the realities of delivering mandatory services (see chapter 19). 
Financial and securities services should not be exempted from public procurement 
rules. In the municipal sector, given the scale of environmental infrastructure, ﬁ nancial 
intermediaries are responsible for funding.
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A register of municipal debt, maintained on a real-time basis, as well as other credit 
bureau type information currently monopolized by account holding banks, should be made 
available to vendors and creditors. At least one rating agency is active in rating municipal 
issues, having just rated a ﬁ ve-year ﬁ xed interest rate bond issued by Budapest District IV 
in June 2000.
Th e economic and operational characteristics of the 1,300 or so local governments that 
have applied for deﬁ cit grants between 1993 and 1999 (including many repeat applicants) 
should be analyzed in an attempt to model, perhaps predict, the parameters of the typical 
future applicant.
Collection, evaluation, and dissemination of the experiences of bankruptcy trustees and 
judges would be instrumental in clarifying the eﬀ ects of Act on Municipal Bankruptcy.
Options should be considered for introducing the personal liability of professional 
staﬀ , elected oﬃ  cials, and others involved in grossly negligent decisions to borrow.
Examination of the few long-term borrowings (both bank loans and bonds) would 
reveal how debt is secured and repayment assured, how funds are used, and what risks 
market players cover. Such an examination would reveal how existing restrictive regulations 
are used in practice, and perhaps suggest reforms to the existing legal and regulatory 
framework to attract more private capital into the municipal sector.
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